Shafaq News- Baghdad

The maritime war between the United States and Iran flared back into open fire this week, with American forces sinking Iranian oil tankers, Tehran firing missiles at a base in Jordan that hosts US troops, and Brent crude climbing past $100 a barrel for the first time since July. Iraq is not a combatant in that war. It may be its most exposed bystander, and the escalation has arrived almost three weeks before a deadline that could decide whether it stays out.

By September 30, Iraq's new government is expected to reach a critical stage in its effort to bring weapons held by Iran-aligned factions under state control, as the US-led coalition's military mission draws to an end. The two clocks are now running against each other. A regional war that gives those factions both a cause and cover to keep their weapons is accelerating at precisely the moment Baghdad has promised Washington it will take those weapons away.

Ashraf Akka, a specialist in international relations based in Ramallah, told Shafaq News that Iraq is the most fragile state in the region under the current trajectory. “Iraq cannot easily hold the middle ground between Washington and Tehran, and its territory could become an additional theater if either its factions strike American interests or the United States and Israel retaliate inside Iraq,” he told Shafaq News.

The mechanics of that risk are already established. Since the war opened on February 28, Iran-aligned Iraqi factions grouped under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella of hardline Shia paramilitaries, several of them also folded into the state-funded Popular Mobilization Forces, have struck US facilities in Iraq and the Gulf hundreds of times, by the reckoning of Iraqi and US officials. American and Israeli airstrikes have answered by killing dozens of fighters and, in at least one case reported by Baghdad, an Iraqi army commander. The Kurdistan Region has absorbed a share of the damage, with Erbil hit repeatedly and strikes reaching hotels, telecommunications sites, and residential districts.

This week sharpened every one of those pressures. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it destroyed three Iranian tankers on September 5 and five more on September 8, each time describing the strikes as retaliation for Iranian attempts to hit US warships.

Iran answered on September 9 with missiles aimed at the Al-Azraq base in Jordan; the Jordanian military said it intercepted 18 of 20 incoming missiles, with the rest falling in open ground and no casualties. Iran's claim to have damaged two US destroyers was denied by CENTCOM. On the same day, the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency voted 23 to 3 to refer Iran to the Security Council over its nuclear obligations, the first such move in two decades.

For Iraq, the most direct signal came at sea. A cargo ship was struck by a projectile roughly 52 kilometers southeast of al-Faw, at the mouth of the corridor through which almost all of Iraq's crude reaches the world. Iraq exports the bulk of its oil through the northern Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Traffic through the strait has thinned to around ten commodity vessels a day over the past ten days, its lowest in months, and Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, has announced a restricted maritime zone in which ships entering without permission may face Iranian penalties. A prolonged squeeze on those lanes reaches Iraqi state finances directly, since federal revenue and the stability of export routes both hinge on the security of the Gulf.

Baghdad's room to maneuver is narrow in both directions. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, whose government rests on the Shia political forces closest to Tehran, has warned that factions refusing to disarm will face terrorism charges and reaffirmed that foreign forces will leave by October 1. Washington has pressed him hard: after a drone struck a US diplomatic facility in Baghdad, the State Department summoned Iraq's ambassador and publicly faulted Baghdad for failing to prevent the attacks. Tehran has pushed the other way.

Read more: US pressure cannot halt Iraq-Iran trade, expert says

Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran's Quds Force, the arm of the Revolutionary Guard that manages relations with allied groups abroad, visited Baghdad seeking an arrangement that would let the factions retain, or merely freeze, their weapons rather than surrender them. The Badr Organization, among the oldest of those groups, has warned that forced disarmament could open the door to internal strife.

The deeper problem for Iraq is that the war it is exposed to shows no sign of ending quickly. Saleh al-Qazwini, a political analyst who follows Iranian and regional affairs, told Shafaq News that Western forecasts of Iranian collapse misread the picture: inflation and a falling currency are real, but the state's security and political institutions remain intact, and decisions taken at the top by the Supreme National Security Council or the Supreme Leader still hold.

Mahdi Azizi, an expert on Iranian affairs, made a complementary point, arguing that “economic pain has not pushed Tehran toward surrender” and that time may work against Washington as the cost of a long war mounts. “If both readings are correct, the exchange grinds on.”

Akka expects intermittent fighting of low to medium intensity, limited air strikes, attacks on ships and energy infrastructure, cyber and intelligence operations, and the activation of allied groups across the region, a scenario he judges more dangerous than a short, sharp conflict precisely because it leaves no clear line between war and peace. For Iraq, months of that ambiguity mean months in which a single faction's strike on a US target could invite a response on Iraqi soil, and in which the disarmament deadline functions less as a resolution than as a test Baghdad can neither afford to fail nor fully pass.

Al-Zaidi's task is to take the factions' weapons without triggering the internal conflict they have threatened, and to do it while a live regional war hands those same factions their strongest argument in years for keeping them.

Read more: Tension meets dialogue as Iraq approaches September 30

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq's most powerful armed factions say they will give uptheir weapons only after the country secures full sovereignty, a condition theydo not expect to be met by the end of September. Prime Minister Ali Falihal-Zaidi has linked efforts to bring faction weapons under state control to theSeptember 30 end of the US-led Coalition's mission, arguing that the departureof foreign forces would remove one of the factions' principal justificationsfor remaining armed. Some Iran-aligned groups reject that sequence.

The clearest statement of their terms came from KataibSayyid al-Shuhada, an Iran-aligned faction inside the state-funded PopularMobilization Forces (PMF) and a group the United States designated a terroristorganization in 2023. Its spokesman, Kadhim al-Fartousi, told Shafaq News thefaction would not disarm while foreign forces and outside threats to Iraqisovereignty remained, and that its arsenal exists to defend the country ratherthan to serve any single government. The factions, he said, treat weapons andsovereignty as one bargain.

Washington’s pressure on the question is concrete. TheHouse-passed version of the US National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 2027 (H.R. 8800), which as of September 11, 2026 has not yet been enactedinto law, would limit the obligation of certain US security-assistance fundsfor the Iraqi security forces to no more than 25 percent until the Secretary ofDefense certifies that Baghdad has taken credible steps to “reduce theoperational capacity of Iran‑aligned militia groups not integrated into theIraqi security forces” through a publicly verifiable disarmament,demobilization and reintegration process; strengthen the authority andoperational control of the Prime Minister of Iraq as Commander‑in‑Chief overthe Iraqi security forces; and investigate and hold accountable members of“Iran‑aligned militias or the Iraqi security forces” who operate outside theformal chain of command and engage in attacks on US or Iraqi personnel orotherwise act in an illegal or destabilizing manner.

Alina Romanowski, the former US ambassador to Iraq, told anAtlantic Council panel in Washington that sanctions would remain Washington'smain instrument and would tighten until the United States reaches a broadersettlement with Iran.

For Baghdad, she said, the working relationship betweenal-Zaidi and President Donald Trump is the most effective way to soften thatpressure and turn it toward economic cooperation. The two met in Washingtonover the summer.

Al-Zaidi has little margin to absorb any of it. Anindependent banker with no prior senior office, he took power in May as acompromise candidate of the Coordination Framework —the alliance of Shiapolitical forces that includes the parties tied to the factions he is now askedto confront— after months of deadlock following the 2025 election. At 41, he isthe youngest prime minister in Iraq's history.

Fahd al-Jabouri, a leader of the National Wisdom Movement, aShia party within the Coordination Framework, said disarmament is settled inprinciple and needs only time. He described a document, expected to be signedin the coming weeks, that would set out a mechanism for the handover, andcalled it a near-agreement among the government, the factions, and theFramework.

September 30, in his account, opens the process rather thanends it, with the handover running toward the close of the year.

There are talks to point to. A three-member committee formedby the Framework —the former prime ministers Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and Nourial-Maliki, with Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri— has met the factions inrecent weeks over the guarantees they want, among them the coalition'sdeparture and national control of Iraq's air defenses.

Issam al-Faili, a professor of political science atal-Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad, reads the legislative track lesshopefully. "The long-delayed PMF Service And Retirement Law, which wouldfix the force's ranks, pay, and command structure in law, is being used to foldthe factions into the PMF rather than to dissolve them," a path that wouldkeep their weight inside the state. Some groups are making any reorganizationconditional on the law's passage, he added, and the bill remains stuck.

Read more: Iraq's PMF Service and Retirement Law: Is political exploitation inevitable?

That reading fits a proposal reported in August, under whichweapons handed over by the factions would be stored at PMF sites rather thanpassed to the defense or interior ministries or the counter-terrorism service.The PMF still contains the Iran-aligned factions themselves, so the arrangementwould put the weapons under a state command in name while leaving them insidethe same network. Shiite political figures have described the shift as a movefrom disarmament toward what they term weapons management.

Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi analyst and fellow at CenturyInternational, part of The Century Foundation, made a similar case at theAtlantic Council. The emerging timeline, he said, ends the coalition's missionbut not the factions' armament; the groups see no reason to disarm while USsanctions still target their commanders, and no political guarantees are on thetable.

He described the government's approach as pressure pairedwith incentive: sanctions and the threat of force on one side, the promise offoreign investment, particularly in energy, on the other. That investment, hesaid, is meant to revive an economy he estimates has lost billions of dollarsto disrupted oil exports, leaving the state struggling to cover salaries andpensions.

Jiyad put al-Zaidi's real problem at home. Relations withWashington are the warmest in years, he said, carried by the rapport with Trumpand by back-channel diplomacy. But the prime minister holds no bloc or party ofhis own to shield him from the established leaders who have run Iraqi politicsfor two decades. Should the effort fail, Jiyad suggested, al-Zaidi could weighresignation rather than let wider sanctions fall on the state —a possibility heraised, not a stated intention.

A thinner US presence brings its own risk, Romanowski added:it narrows Washington's options for a quick military response if the factionsescalate, including against the Kurdistan Region, which has taken repeateddrone and missile fire.

Haitham Numaan, a professor of political science at theUniversity of Exeter, is more doubtful still. Al-Zaidi's outsider standinggives him some room, he said, but a prime minister produced by the existingorder cannot break with it, and the factions are bound too tightly to powerfulblocs for him to take them on directly.

What has happened so far, in his view, is a set of politicalmaneuvers meant to convince Washington that change is coming. He warned thatIraq could be pulled into a wider US-Iran confrontation, whatever Baghdadintends.

Read more: Iraq's disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions

That danger stopped being hypothetical while the talks werestill underway. Saudi Arabia said several drones launched from Iraq struck itsEast–West pipeline in the Riyadh and Medina regions, causing casualties andproperty damage and forcing a precautionary shutdown of a line that carriescrude toward the Red Sea coast. Riyadh said it reserved the right to protectits sovereignty, security, and installations.

No faction claimed the attack, a silence that stands outfrom the openness with which the same groups had set out their terms weeksearlier.

Al-Zaidi's response tracked the demand Washington has beenpressing. After authorities concluded the drones had flown from a site insideMaysan, he ordered an investigation into the province's operations command andremoved its commander, while security forces opened a large-scale search forthose responsible, a campaign the Counter-Terrorism Service could join.

The move asserted his authority as Commander-in-Chief, thesame authority the US defense bill would have him strengthen, and it exposedthe limit of the arrangement his government has been negotiating: weapons keptinside the state yet still inside the factions' network had, by Riyadh'saccount, just been fired across a border at a neighbor whose investment Baghdadis counting on to rescue its economy.

September 30 will close the coalition's military mission,the final phase of a drawdown that began when US forces left federal Iraq in2025. The factions' weapons will still be in the country the next day. Underthe arrangements now discussed, they would pass into state-run PMF storagerather than be surrendered, a distinction the government and the factions haveyet to settle.

Read more: Tension meets dialogue as Iraq approaches September 30

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Yemen's Houthis said Thursdaythey had captured Mocha, a Red Sea port held for years by government-alignedforces, carrying the country's long civil war to the edge of Bab al-Mandeb —oneof the world's most heavily used shipping lanes. It is a major escalation fromthe relative calm that followed the UN-brokered truce in April 2022, and itarrives as Yemen's war is drawn into the wider standoff between Washington andTehran, with consequences that reach as far as Iraq.

The Houthis, formallyAnsarallah, control Yemen's capital and much of its north, and have turned acoastal advance into a strategic threat. Whoever holds the ground near Bab al-Mandeb, the strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, sits astridea passage that a large share of global maritime trade cannot avoid. That is whya single port town, in a war the world had largely stopped watching, nowregisters well beyond Yemen.

For most of four years, it hadgone quiet. The 2022 truce froze the front lines and held, in rough form, longafter its formal terms lapsed. That calm began eroding in July with a broadground offensive in Taiz, Hodeidah, Marib, Jawf, and Bayda, alongside Houthistrikes on southern Saudi Arabia at a scale the kingdom had not faced in years.The war is no longer confined to internal battle lines. The Red Sea, Babal-Mandeb, and Saudi territory have all become part of the equation.

The Houthis said they had alsoretaken the Hays–Khokha axis linking Taiz and Hodeidah, reversing gains Yemen’sinternationally recognized government had claimed days earlier. Fightingintensified across the western Taiz fronts. Col. Majid al-Nazili, a spokesmanfor government forces, said his side would use "all weapons" againstany Houthi movement inside what he called a designated "kill zone,"and warned civilians off the Taiz–Mocha road until further notice.

The Houthi military spokesman,Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree, countered that his forces had repelled a governmentformation in Taiz with locally made missiles.

Each side's map is its own;the one point of agreement is that the coast is contested and moving.

Myles Caggins, a retired USArmy colonel and former spokesman for the US-led coalition against ISIS, readthe Mocha claim as a gain of real and symbolic weight for the Houthis. Theposition lets them menace ships near Bab al-Mandeb, he told Shafaq News, and ithands the government a tactical and psychological defeat.

He expected the site's valueto invite Saudi and other airstrikes aimed at “dislodging them.” But he drew afirm line between seizing a port and controlling a strait: dominating trafficthrough Bab al-Mandeb would demand holding coastal footholds, islands, andpassages, and sustaining the ability to threaten shipping over time, a farharder task than taking Mocha.

Mocha's strategic importancealso raises the prospect of a wider regional response. Malik Francis, apolitical analyst and a member of the US Republican Party, argued that eventshave already outgrown another round of the Yemen war.

The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandebare no longer merely waterways, he told Shafaq News, they are now fixtures ofregional and international security. “Turning the strait into a pressure cardand targeting international navigation could pull new actors in.”

Saudi Arabia has every rightto defend itself, he added, but force alone offers no durable exit, andRiyadh's interest lies in a stable Yemen rather than a hostile neighbor. Henoted that the kingdom's security partnerships with Turkiye and Pakistan meanany major strike on its territory could widen the circle by shifting the warfrom a Houthi–Saudi contest into a web of alliances, and from one front intoseveral.

Those partnerships are alreadyin motion. Saudi, Pakistani, and Iranian sources told Reuters on Wednesday thatIslamabad had relayed a Saudi warning to Tehran to rein in Houthi attacksbefore the confrontation spreads. The step gains weight against reportedSaudi–Turkish–Pakistani security coordination, though Islamabad has said itsrole would be limited to defending Saudi soil and would not extend to combatinside Yemen.

The alarm reached the SecurityCouncil itself. Hans Grundberg, the United Nations special envoy for Yemen,warned an emergency session Thursday that the escalation could spill pastYemen's borders unless it is contained, and pressed the Houthis to halt theirattacks and return to talks. He said the group's strikes had killed civilians,among them children, and had driven roughly 11,400 families from their homesacross the country.

Iraq enters this picture froma different place than it has before. Saleh al-Shazar, a professor ofinternational relations, said the post-2003 vacuum in Iraq widened Iran'sregional reach while several Arab states kept their distance from Baghdad.

Iraq has drifted closer to theIranian axis politically, he said, yet it still pursues a policy ofself-distancing: staying out of regional fights and keeping its balance betweenthe larger powers. Its own history of war, from the fight against ISIS to earlierGulf conflicts, leaves both state and society reluctant to sign onto newmilitary blocs.

“Regional defense arrangementsdo not automatically fold Iraq in: parliament must ratify any treaty, and thepacts on the table remain defensive rather than binding commitments,” he said.

Yemen, though, carries its ownlogic. The ideological and military bond between the Houthis and Iran makes ita genuine player in any wide confrontation, al-Shazar said, above all throughits ability to disrupt shipping. And any eventual settlement with Iran couldinclude the Houthis alongside Hezbollah in Lebanon and armed factions in Iraq—meaning the current military track does not foreclose a return to politics ifthe major parties reach an understanding.

The implications also extendto Iraq. The escalation has also fueled concerns that pressure around Babal-Mandeb could become another front in the broader US-Iran confrontation,alongside tensions near the Strait of Hormuz.

September 30 has been linkedboth to the end of the Global Coalition's mission and to efforts to bringfaction weapons under state control, although Iraqi officials and politicalforces have since debated whether the weapons process must be completed by thatdate. A wider regional conflict would make that process more difficult as Iraqseeks to balance its ties with Iran, the United States, and Gulf states.

Read more: Iraq's disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions

The Houthi advance thereforeposes an indirect but significant risk to Iraq. Further escalation around Babal-Mandeb could widen the US-Iran confrontation, strengthen arguments by armedfactions for retaining their weapons, and make Baghdad's effort to stay outsidethe conflict increasingly difficult.

Written and edited by ShafaqNews staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq does not have a shortage of banks, payment cards, or reform plans. What its financial system lacks is the one thing that would make any of them work: public confidence that money deposited today can be withdrawn tomorrow. Until Iraqi banks earn that trust, cash will keep its advantage, and the figures show it is winning by a widening margin.

Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) data put currency circulating outside banks at 104.542 trillion dinars ($79.45 billion) at the end of April 2026, against just 8.354 trillion dinars ($6.35 billion) held inside them. By May, the imbalance had grown, with cash outside banks climbing to 106.812 trillion dinars ($81.18 billion) as bank holdings slipped to 6.748 trillion dinars ($5.13 billion). Money is not merely sitting in the system's margins; it is draining away from its center.

Mahmoud Dagher, a financial expert and former CBI director general, cautioned against reading all of it as hoarded savings. Of roughly 105 trillion dinars in issued currency, he told Shafaq News, about eight trillion sat in banks and 97 trillion circulated elsewhere, but around two-thirds of that finances everyday transactions, property purchases, salaries, and wages, with perhaps a quarter held as stored savings. His point sharpens rather than softens the problem: Iraqis are not simply saving in cash; they are running an entire economy through it, and they do so because they distrust the alternative. After all, payment habits are entrenched, and electronic options remain slow to take hold.

Read more: Exchange offices in Iraq: Cash economy outpaces banking sector

The cost of that arrangement falls on the wider economy. Mudhir Mohammed Saleh, financial adviser to the prime minister, warned that money outside formal channels starves banks of the resources they need to lend. Cash held by households and businesses outside the financial system, he told Shafaq News, reduces what is available for intermediation while reinforcing informal activity and raising the cost of transactions. “Drawing those funds in will take competitive returns, stronger protections, simpler procedures, and dependable access to deposits, and even then the work is not done.”

The goal, Saleh stressed, is to channel the money into investment, production, and employment.

The banks, however, are moving in the wrong direction. CBI figures show deposits falling for a third straight month, from 105.090 trillion dinars in March to 104.727 trillion in April and 104.296 trillion by the end of May. Cash credit declined over the same period, from 73.832 trillion to 73.173 trillion dinars. The retreat is not for want of institutions: the Eco Iraq Observatory counted 81 banks and representative offices in July: eight state-owned, 24 local commercial, 31 local Islamic, 16 foreign, and two foreign representative offices.

Najm Abdul Tarish, an economic expert and professor at the University of Dhi Qar, argued that cash itself is not the issue; its dominance over both transactions and savings is, because it sidelines financial institutions from the wider economy. He traced that dominance to the same cluster of causes: distrust, ingrained payment habits, the informal economy, and thin electronic uptake.

In March, an economic source told Shafaq News that major state lenders, including state-run Rafidain and Rasheed banks, faced acute liquidity shortages that forced some clients to come back later or accept only part of what they had requested. When retrieving a large sum can take days, holding banknotes feels more dependable than any account: theft, loss, and depreciation notwithstanding.

Progress on payments has not closed the gap. Iraq has made measurable gains in electronic transactions: the Eco Iraq Observatory put active bank cards at around 25 million in July, and earlier government figures showed financial inclusion rising from under 10 percent in 2019 to roughly 40 percent. Yet access does not equal deposits. Salary earners often withdraw their wages the moment they land, merchants accept cards while still preferring cash, and households open accounts they never use for long-term saving. More cards, in short, have not meant less cash.

Read more: Cash culture dominates Iraq, reform efforts stall

Iraq's dependence on oil compounds the strain. Petroleum supplies at least 80 percent of state revenue, which ties the banking system to the swings of government finance. When oil income falls, Baghdad relies more heavily on domestic banks.

In August, senior Finance Ministry officials and a source close to Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi told Shafaq News that the government was preparing to borrow more than three trillion dinars from local private banks to cover public-sector salaries after petroleum revenue dropped sharply. For depositors, a system with a narrow deposit base must absorb private-sector demand and bursts of state borrowing at once. That does not by itself delay withdrawals, but it deepens the structural pressure and underscores why stable deposits matter.

Baghdad is pursuing changes to governance, state-bank structure, and digital infrastructure: the Finance Ministry plans to merge Rafidain with Rasheed and the Cooperative Agricultural Bank with the Industrial Bank, and the government is weighing leadership changes at state lenders faulted for poor service and slow modernization. Cards, mergers, and new regulations can widen access. None of them can manufacture reliability.

Until Iraqis feel secure enough to trust banks with their money —confident that a deposit made today can be withdrawn in full tomorrow— cash will keep its advantage, and every reform will run up against the trust it has yet to earn.

Read more: Iraq turns to bank borrowing amid oil-revenue collapse

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Iraqis have filed more than 26,000 corruption reports with the IntegrityCommission, the country's main anti-corruption body, according to governmentspokesman Haidar al-Aboudi, in a surge the government links to the DawnCrackdown (Sawlat al-Fajr) national campaign launched on June 28.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi ordered the activation of a long-dormant lawproviding financial rewards for people who report corruption during an Aug. 29visit to the commission, calling the fight against corruption the country's “firstline of defense.”

Al-Aboudi said the value of recovered funds, assets, and property haspassed 1.359 trillion dinars (roughly $1.04B), much of it during the campaign.Al-Aboudi said the government was also pursuing institutional reforms,including greater automation of public services to reduce direct contactbetween citizens and officials and limit opportunities for bribery.

The campaign has not been limited to arrests. The government and theIntegrity Commission have also moved to strengthen prevention, audit statecontracts, and monitor projects and border crossings.

How The Reward And Protection System Works

Iraq's legal framework combines a financial incentive for informantswith measures meant to shield them, according to legal researcher Alial-Tamimi. He cited two laws: the Informant Rewards Law No. 33 of 2008 and theLaw on the Protection of Witnesses, Experts, Informants and Victims No. 58 of2017.

The 2008 law sets a reward for citizens whose information leads to therecovery of state funds or exposes theft, embezzlement, forgery, oradministrative corruption, al-Tamimi told Shafaq News. The reward is 5 percentof recovered money up to 100 million dinars and 3 percent of any amount above that,he explained, while reporting a forgery that leads to an arrest can bring up to500,000 dinars. Payment depends on the money being recovered and a final courtruling, with the informant's identity kept confidential.

The 2017 law provides security, judicial, and social protection,al-Tamimi said, including concealing an informant's identity, relocating themwhen necessary, and allowing testimony to be given in ways that preservesecrecy. It also established a witness-protection division within the InteriorMinistry to assess risks and carry out protective measures.

“Together, the two laws create a balance of reward and protection thatcan help investigators reach information that is hard to obtain by conventionalmeans.”

Vetting The Reports

The commission is empowered to sort and verify the reports it receives,said lawyer Ahmed al-Abadi. Article 13 of the Integrity Commission law lets thebody handle and filter reports, including setting aside any that contain nocrime or that inquiries show to be false, while an investigating judge canrequest and examine a report.

The commission evaluates each report and refers cases showing evidenceof possible wrongdoing to an investigating judge, al-Abadi said. The judge canthen hear witnesses, gather evidence and question suspects before referring acase to court if there is sufficient evidence of a crime.

The reward system provides an additional filter because payments aremade only when information produces legal results and leads to the recovery offunds, he said. Reports found to be malicious or rooted in personal disputescan be dismissed, while informants' identities are kept confidential to protectthem from retaliation.

The Risk Of Overload

Mohammed al-Rubaie, head of Al-Nahrain Foundation for SupportingTransparency and Integrity (NFTI), said the volume of reports reflects realpublic participation and support for the campaign but also exposes aninstitutional challenge. He noted that the 2008 rewards law had existed foryears without being activated before it was revived in the current campaign,which he said raises questions about how effectively oversight legislation isapplied.

“Receiving 26,000 reports requires an electronic and governance systemcapable not only of taking in information but of analyzing it, classifying it,and linking it to the backgrounds of those who submit it and the nature of theclaims,” al-Rubaie said, alongside an institutional structure able to handlethat volume of cases.

He warned of a further danger he called a "flooding" tactic,in which networks tied to corruption could file multiple false reports againsta single person as investigations close in, aiming to scatter judicial effortand prolong inquiries. In such cases, “the courts could face dozens or hundredsof reports against the same person, some containing real information and otherswithout basis, forcing parallel financial, administrative, and judicialinvestigations that take a long time.” That, al-Rubaie said, could overwhelmoversight bodies and weaken their ability to reach the most important cases.

Political analyst Ziad al-Arar said activating the rewards system couldstrengthen cooperation between citizens and oversight bodies, but warned that thesurge in reports would require effective screening.

He proposed specialized follow-up committees to distinguish crediblereports from those driven by political or personal motives. “Involving citizensin fighting corruption should not become a substitute for oversightinstitutions, but part of an integrated system in which the relevantauthorities handle verification, investigation and referral to the courts,” hesaid.

Read more: Iraq’s Dawn Crackdown spreads through state institutions: What the latest cases reveal

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

US financial pressure on Iraqi banks cannot stop trade between Iraq andIran, because most of that commerce moves outside the dollar and beyondWashington's reach, Japanese sanctions expert Kazuto Suzuki* told Shafaq News.

More than six months into the US-Iran war, which began with US andIsraeli strikes in late February, Washington has widened its sanctionscampaign. Suzuki argued that the measures have failed to give the United Statesenough leverage to force major concessions from Tehran, with Iraq illustratingthe limits of that pressure.

Suzuki's assessment contrasts with Washington's portrayal of its latestmeasures as an intensified effort to disrupt Iran's remaining financialnetworks.

On August 24, the US Treasury launched Operation Economic Outcast,designating nearly 60 entities, individuals and vessels based in Hong Kong,China, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and elsewhere forfacilitating Iranian sanctions evasion, and widening the sectors exposed tosecondary penalties.

Days later, it moved to cut the UAE branches of Egypt's Banque Misr offfrom the US dollar system, and on September 4 it sanctioned Turkiye's GoldenGlobal Bank and two subsidiaries, accusing them of moving Iranian oil revenuefrom China through Turkiye and converting it into cash and gold for the IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force.

Suzuki did not dispute the breadth of the campaign. His argument wasabout its marginal effect: after years of adapting to American restrictions,Iran has little left to lose from another round. "The United States hasmade a very big statement, but the economic impact is very small," he toldShafaq News.

Where Iraq Fits

Iraq is where that limit is most visible. Suzuki called it the"weakest link" in enforcement, citing a long border he compared tothose of Afghanistan and Pakistan, informal commercial networks, and theavailability of financial channels outside the dollar. Washington has pressedIraqi banks over illicit dollar transfers to Iran, but he said those controlscan only reach transactions that use the dollar in the first place.

Traders on both sides can settle in gold, cryptocurrency, localcurrencies, and informal transfers built on commercial ties that long predatethe dollar, he said, which means pressure on Iraqi banks constrains a channelBaghdad and Tehran can route around.

Suzuki framed this as a structural limit on enforcement rather than aclaim that all such trade is illicit and cautioned that nominal measuresagainst Iraqi institutions would not necessarily halt the underlying flow ofgoods or money.

Read more: After Washington’s warning: What’s next for Baghdad–Tehran economic ties?

The China Obstacle

Scaling the pressure up, in Suzuki's account, would require Washingtonto blacklist major Chinese banks and companies, and it will not. Although theTreasury has sanctioned smaller facilitators in China and Hong Kong, targetinglarge Chinese institutions would carry high costs for the American economy at amoment when Washington depends on Chinese rare-earth minerals, and would inviteretaliation from Beijing. That dependence, he argued, removes the onlyinstrument heavy enough to change Iran's calculations and leaves Tehran free tokeep trading with its largest customer.

Secondary sanctions on other partners carry the same defect. Suzukidescribed them as a "double-edged sword," saying penalties on Turkiyeor the Gulf states over their trade with Iran would cost Washington more instrained alliances than they would deliver in leverage. He noted that the UAEhas cooperated voluntarily, while Turkiye, which profits from its trade withIran, has not; the Banque Misr and Golden Global actions show partner-countryinstitutions are not exempt, but a broader campaign against Turkish commerce,he argued, would produce more diplomatic damage than gain.

Limits of Economic Pressure

Economic pressure alone will not collapse Iran's political system,Suzuki said. Sanctions have worsened living conditions and fed public anger,and the authorities have used force against protests, but unilateral USmeasures also let Tehran blame Washington for the country's hardship and rallyresistance to outside coercion.

He drew a contrast with the period before the 2015 nuclear deal. ManyIranians who backed Hassan Rouhani in 2013 wanted both sanctions relief and abreak from the nuclear policies of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, andthe sanctions then carried international legitimacy.

Today's restrictions are largelyunilateral US measures imposed after President Donald Trump withdrew from theJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018, which Suzuki said makes them easierfor Tehran to portray as unjustified. The 2024 election of President MasoudPezeshkian reflected a desire for relief, he added, but not acceptance ofTrump's claim that more pressure could yield a better agreement.

The Hormuz Question

On the prospect of Trump securing an accord more favorable than theJCPOA, Suzuki was blunt: "The answer is no." A deal requiresagreement between two parties, he said, and Iranians are not prepared toconcede to American pressure.

He pointed to the memorandum of understanding, known as the IslamabadMemorandum, signed at the Palace of Versailles on June 17, as evidence thatWashington ultimately had to negotiate. Under its terms, it extended aceasefire, provided for reopening the Strait of Hormuz to toll-free shippingand lifted a naval blockade, according to the White House; Suzuki read thoseprovisions as concessions to Tehran rather than proof that pressure works. Thatceasefire has since collapsed, and US and Iranian forces were still exchangingstrikes around the Strait this week.

The waterway is itself in dispute. Washington says it controls theStrait and that the June deal restored free navigation. Suzuki disagreed,distinguishing the ability to intercept ships leaving Iranian ports from theability to protect commercial vessels along the Omani side, which he said theUnited States has failed to do.

With attacks continuing and insurers reluctant to enter, he argued,control belongs to whoever can make the route unusable. "The Americans arenot in control; the Iranians are," he said.

A Regional Security Gap

That gap, in his view, points beyond the current war. With UScredibility strained by a fight it has not won, and China unwilling to act asanything more than a customer, Suzuki said the Gulf states are being pushedtoward building their own security arrangement, one that would have to includeIran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and others rather than rely on either greatpower.

China has the economic weight to invest across the region, he said, butno appetite to become its military guarantor; in his account, Beijing treatsthe war as an opportunity, buying Iranian oil at a discount and selling Tehransatellite imagery and other goods.

The Gulf states are not without leverage of their own, Suzuki argued. Asthe parties with most to lose from a closed Strait, they can press Washingtondirectly by tying an end to the war to lower oil prices and to Trump's standingbefore the midterm elections and can pump more crude while the waterway staysopen. Persuading both Washington and Tehran to keep it open, he said, is wheretheir influence is greatest.

The Remaining Option

Washington's approach, Suzuki argued, has run through a familiarsequence of sanctions, then military action, then negotiation, and the firsttwo rungs are now exhausted. "The economic sanctions do not work, and themilitary option does not work," he said. "Then the only option is tonegotiate."

*Kazuto Suzuki is a professor of science andtechnology policy at the University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Public Policyand served from 2013 to July 2015 on the United Nations Panel of Experts thatmonitored sanctions on Iran.

Shafaq News

The sound of raised voices has followed Amir Khaldoun for most of hislife. He was only five when his parents separated, too young to understand whatdivorce meant but old enough to sense that the world he knew had changed. Thearguments eventually stopped. The marriage ended. Yet the fear that settledinto his childhood never truly left.

“Since I was five years old, I have been afraid of loud voices,”Khaldoun told Shafaq News. “I've lived with the fear of losing people, and Istill feel that something has been missing since my parents separated.”

What remains are memories of a childhood marked by anxiety, a lack ofemotional reassurance, and the feeling that home had become unfamiliar almostovernight.

“I grew up afraid of everything and unsure of myself,” he recalled. “Evenpeople close to me used to call me ‘the one with the shining tear’ because Icried so often after my parents separated.”

“I never found anyone who could support me emotionally. I grew upbetween neglect and difficult circumstances, and I still carry the effects ofthat period today.”

Khaldoun's memories are deeply personal. They are also becomingincreasingly common.

Read more: Love under strain: Iraq’s young struggle to tie the knot

Every month, hundreds of Iraqi families leave personal status courtshaving legally ended a marriage. In June alone, courts across Iraq, excludingthe Kurdistan Region, recorded 6,250 divorces, an average of nearly 208 eachday, according to the Supreme Judicial Council.

For parents, each case closes a legal chapter. For many children, it canmark the beginning of a much longer one.

The consequences can emerge in the uncertainty of moving between twohomes, the loss of familiar routines, or a lingering fear that life may neverfeel stable again. Such experiences can shape children long after childhood,contributing to anxiety, depression, behavioral difficulties, and a diminishedsense of security.

A May 2026 report in The Lancet Psychiatry noted that some childrenwithdraw from friends, while others find it difficult to trust those aroundthem. Many simply learn to hide what they are feeling.

Yet the emotional impact often depends less on the divorce itself thanon what follows.

Despite the steady rise in divorce cases in Iraq, services specificallydesigned to help affected children remain limited. Schools and socialinstitutions often lack clear mechanisms to monitor their emotional well-beingbefore temporary distress becomes a lasting burden.

Tahira Dakhel, a professor of children's literature at Al-MustansiriyahUniversity, believes this reflects a broader misunderstanding of what childrenneed after divorce.

“Providing material support alone is not enough,” Dakhel said. “Childrenneed emotional security and a relationship with both parents.”

She called for specialized government institutions to providepsychological, educational, and social support through structured programs thatfollow children's recovery over time rather than responding only after problemsemerge.

“Maintaining a child's relationship with both parents is in the child'sbest interests,” she added, arguing that weakening that bond without necessitycan have emotional consequences well beyond childhood.

Schools are often among the first places where children's strugglesbecome visible. A child who suddenly becomes withdrawn, loses interest inschool, or reacts with unusual anger may be showing signs of emotional distresslinked to problems at home.

Read more: Iraq’s Controversial Personal Status Law: The future of girls at a crossroads

Mariam Al-Fartousi, head of the Alice Organization for Family and ChildAffairs, said schools have an important role in identifying children affectedby divorce, but that role remains limited in many parts of Iraq.

Educational counselors, she said, need stronger tools to recognizepsychological difficulties caused by family conflict and provide early support.“The absence of such programs leaves many children struggling without properguidance.”

The first formal encounter with the consequences of divorce often takesplace in personal status courts, where decisions are made about custody,financial support, and family arrangements. For children, those proceedings canturn a private family crisis into a public reality.

“The child is often the first victim during separation procedures,”Al-Fartousi said, noting that some children witness their parents' separationin court without psychological support to help them understand what is happening.

Social researchers also examine family circumstances, speak withparents, and assess which arrangements would best protect the child's interestsbefore submitting recommendations to judges.

Nebras Ali, a social researcher working in one of Iraq's personal statuscourts, said the process requires looking beyond the legal dispute.

“We take into consideration the child's age, psychological condition andpersonal preferences, as well as the ability of either the father or mother toprovide a stable environment,” Ali told Shafaq News.

“We also examine the family's financial, social and behavioralcircumstances before submitting a professional report to help the judge make adecision that serves the child's best interests.”

Social researchers become involved before a divorce is finalized and,where possible, try to determine whether reconciliation is possible. In somecases, couples decide to remain together.

“In exceptional cases, we may recommend placing a child in a social careinstitution if staying with either parent would expose them to seriouspsychological or social harm,” Ali said, adding that such recommendations aresubject to legal procedures and intended as a protective measure rather than aroutine solution.

For many children, however, the decisions made in court represent onlyone part of a much longer emotional journey. Doha Shaheen knows that journeywell.

Using a pseudonym to protect her identity, she remembers being sevenyears old when she last saw both parents living together.

“I was very young when I saw my parents together under the same roof forthe last time,” Doha told Shafaq News. “I did not understand the meaning ofdivorce then, but I understood that the home where I used to sleep safely wasno longer the same.”

The experience shaped the way she viewed relationships, leaving herafraid that any family she created could eventually face the same fate.

Read more: Soaring wedding costs push Iraqi youth away from marriage

“I grew up carrying the effects of that experience…I feared building afamily that would end in the same way, but I went through the same experiencemyself.”

Today, Doha has three children.

“They are living through the same wound that I experienced in mychildhood,” she said, describing the realization that the effects of herparents' separation had not disappeared with time.

“I did not know how to overcome my parents' separation, and I did notunderstand that life had to continue,” she recalled, describing her childhoodas a time dominated by loneliness rather than play and carefree memories.

Social researcher Manahil Al-Saleh said children respond to divorcedifferently depending on their age, personality, and the environment theirparents create after separation. Many, however, share a sense of lost stability.

Younger children may struggle to understand why their parents separatedand sometimes blame themselves, while adolescents may express distress throughbehavioral changes, social withdrawal, or difficulties in their relationships.

Major changes in daily life —such as moving to a new home, changingschools, or dividing time between two households— can deepen that sense ofinstability. Continued conflict or poor communication between parents can alsoleave children feeling caught between them.

“Over time, some children may lose confidence in themselves, struggle tobuild stable relationships and begin to see emotional connections as uncertainor temporary,” Al-Saleh said.

She stressed, however, that divorce itself does not determine a child'sfuture. Parents can reduce its emotional impact by explaining the separation inan age-appropriate way, reassuring children that they are not responsible,allowing them to express their feelings, and continuing to cooperate in theirupbringing.

For Amir Khaldoun, those opportunities came too late.

He remembers what followed his parents' separation: the fear of loudvoices, the feeling that something was missing, and a childhood spent trying tounderstand a loss he was too young to explain.

His parents' marriage ended years ago. Its impact did not.

Read more: Vanishing vows: Why Iraqi marriages now fail in months, not years

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

A rare eyeless fish still survivesin Al-Anbar's stable groundwater while mass die-offs spread across Iraq'srivers, marshes, and farms. The contrast frames the country's central failure:not that its fish are dying, but that Iraq often cannot say why.

The evidence points to no singlecause. Water scarcity and oxygen depletion are documented in some areas;pollution is suspected but unconfirmed in others; salinity, disease, anddestructive fishing add further pressure. In most cases, the testing needed toisolate one factor from another was never done, and the diagnostic gap, morethan any single toxin or drought, is what leaves each die-off unresolved.

The losses come amid a steepcontraction in the industry. Iraqi Fish Producers Association head Iyadal-Talibi told Shafaq News that annual production has fallen from more than900,000 metric tons in 2018 to an estimated 250,000–300,000 today. That collapse—roughly two-thirds of national output in under a decade— turns the issue froman environmental concern into a broader food-security problem.

The Green Iraq Observatory estimatedon August 8 that more than 1,000 metric tons of fish had been lost nationwideduring 2026.

Maysan: Scarcity Suspected, LabEvidence Lacking

Maysan offers the most consistentcase for linking deaths to falling water levels, though the evidence restslargely on official attribution rather than measurement.

Fish began dying in the Al-AmshanCanal in early August after water releases dropped sharply, according to theprovincial council's Agriculture and Water Committee. Environmental activistMortada al-Janubi attributed deaths in the Al-Ezz River and central marshes toreceding water and falling oxygen. Maysan lawmaker Duha al-Sadkhan told ShafaqNews that hundreds of tons were lost in Al-Mejar Al-Kabir district, with damageestimated at three billion to five billion Iraqi dinars ($2.28M – $3.80M).

The stronger evidence is historical.In August 2024, testing after extensive mortality in Al-Huwaizeh Marsh, on theIraq-Iran border, identified critically low water levels and oxygen depletionas the principal factors; environmental expert Ahmed Saleh put mortality therenear 95 percent. That episode was measured. The 2026 Al-Amshan deaths have beenattributed to the same mechanism, but Shafaq News found no publicly availabletesting confirming it. The distinction matters: a plausible explanation is notnecessarily a proven cause.

The World Bank warned in 2022 thatdams, water abstraction, and wetland drainage were cutting river flows andthreatening inland fisheries. For fish held at high density in cages or ponds,reduced flow compounds the danger: poor circulation drives oxygen stress anddisease.

Wasit: Pollution Is Credible ButUnproven

If Maysan points to scarcity, theApril die-off in Wasit remains genuinely unsettled, with attention fixed onwhether contaminated water moving from the Diyala into the Tigris caused thelosses.

The Green Iraq Observatoryattributed the episode to untreated sewage and industrial waste carrieddownstream after releases from Hamrin Dam rose, and it documented more than 20cases of poisoning and skin injury requiring hospital treatment. Al-Talibi blamedsewage entering the Tigris through the Diyala and estimated that about 95percent of Kut's floating cages were affected.

But no public laboratory datareviewed by Shafaq News reported the measurements that would separate pollutionfrom oxygen depletion, infection, or several causes acting together: dissolvedoxygen, ammonia, heavy metals. Iraq's 2018 mass mortality shows why that gapmatters: an international investigation concluded that Koi Herpesvirus was theprincipal cause, with poor water quality and overcrowding raisingsusceptibility rather than triggering the deaths. The obvious culprit was notthe killer.

Pollution remains a real threatregardless. A World Bank document in May 2026 estimated that more than 70percent of sewage in Iraq's urban areas enters rivers untreated. WaterResources Minister Muthanna al-Tamimi announced legal action in July against partiesaccused of polluting the Tigris and Diyala, citing joint inspections with theEnvironment Ministry. Months later, no public information identifies thedefendants or indicates whether the cases have advanced.

The South: Salt Changes The Habitat

The same loss of freshwater thatstarves fish of oxygen creates a second pressure farther south, where weakerriver flows let saltwater push deeper into the Shatt Al-Arab and connectedwetlands.

A 2025 study by researchers from theuniversities of Basrah and Babylon recorded a salinity of 29.9 practicalsalinity units in Al-Hammar Marsh, where every fish sampled at one stationduring the intrusion was a marine species. At Abu Al-Khaseeb, at 25 units,marine species made up 82.8 percent of recorded abundance. The findings do notname salinity as a cause of the recent die-offs, but they show how sharplydeclining flows can rewrite which fish a habitat can hold.

Read more: Hawizeh Marsh faces catastrophic fish die-off

Illegal Fishing Keeps Removing Stock

Destructive fishing also continuesto strip breeding populations already weakened by water loss.

Iraq's Law No. 48 of 1976 banspoisons, explosives, chemicals, and electrical devices, with penalties up toimprisonment and confiscation of boats and catches. Yet the Supreme JudicialCouncil found electrofishing, explosives, pesticides, and illegal nets still inuse in 2024 and urged consolidating provisions scattered across separate laws,a legislative fix that has not come.

The World Bank likewise flaggedelectrofishing and breeding-season fishing as persistent, poorly enforcedthreats. Agriculture Ministry spokesperson Qusay al-Hattab told Shafaq Newsthat teams document violations with GPS equipment, but no public nationwidefigures show how many were recorded in 2025 or 2026, or how many led toconvictions.

Read more: Death in the current: Pollution decimates Iraq’s river ecosystems

Millions Released, SurvivalUntracked

Against these combined pressures,the government's most visible response is restocking. The Agriculture Ministryreleased about 155 million fish in the 2026 season, al-Hattab said —up fromroughly 95 million the year before— including more than 11 million into AnahLake in Al-Anbar in April alone. The Animal Resources Directorate produced morethan 1.5 million native fish between 2023 and 2025, among them Binni, Qattan,and Shabout.

What happens next is unknown. Nopublished data reviewed by Shafaq News show how many released fish survive tomaturity or form breeding populations. The releases are countable andimmediate; the water they enter is often the same unmeasured water where fishhave been dying. Restocking may replace some of the losses without addressingthe conditions behind them, while no publicly available data show whether theprogram is producing sustainable fish populations.

That is the shape of the problem. InMaysan, insufficient water and oxygen depletion. In Wasit, pollution that isplausible but unconfirmed. In the south, salt is reshaping habitats. Behind allof them, disease that has turned catastrophic before and illegal fishing thatnever stopped. The investigation finds no single nationwide killer, and, moreoften, no test capable of naming the local one.

Until that changes, Iraq risksreplacing dead fish faster than it can explain why they died, treating thelosses without fully understanding their causes. In Al-Anbar's caves,meanwhile, the blind fish endures in something increasingly scarce elsewhere: stableconditions.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Shafaq News

A lawyer filed a formal complaint on Wednesday askingprosecutors in the Iraqi province of Wasit to summon Hadi al-Ameri, leader ofthe Badr Organization, over public remarks describing Iraq's 2019 Tishreenprotests as "sedition " that armed groups he called "the resistance"had confronted.

Families of protesters killed during the demonstrations areseparately pursuing court action, according to relatives who spoke to ShafaqNews.

Al-Ameri, who is also a prominent leader of the CoordinationFramework, a coalition of mainly Iran-aligned Shia parties that dominatesIraq's government, made the comments on Sunday at a ceremony marking the deathof Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a senior Shia cleric killed in a2003 bombing in Najaf. In a video that circulated widely, al-Ameri said the resistance"bravely stood against the Tishreen sedition and preserved the state and thepolitical system." 

Read more: Iraq’s protests after Tishreen: A system that learned how to contain the street

The Tishreen (October) protests were the largestanti-government movement in Iraq since 2003, beginning in Baghdad and southernprovinces on 1 October 2019 over corruption, unemployment and failing publicservices. Rights groups including Amnesty International said at least 541protesters were killed and more than 20,000 wounded,

Amnesty said successive governments had formed numerousinvestigative committees but had made no findings public. Despite at least2,700 criminal cases being filed over abuses during the protests and theiraftermath, few people have been brought to trial and “next to no justice hasbeen delivered,” the organization said, adding that many sentences had beenoverturned.

The Complaint

Lawyer Hazem Mazen al-Badri submitted his complaint to thehead of the Public Prosecution Office in Wasit, seeking to open a case andsummon al-Ameri. According to the filing, al-Badri asked prosecutors toauthenticate the original video and verify its date, location, and context, tohear al-Ameri's account of which groups he meant, and to compare his statementswith earlier investigations and the case records concerning protesters. 

Read more: Iraq's Coordination Framework is weakening, but no rival is ready to replace it

Families of the dead have voiced similar demands. Alial-Dahamat, brother of prominent civil activist Amjad al-Dahamat, who wasassassinated in the southern province of Maysan during the protests, toldShafaq News that victims' families were not surprised by the remarks butconsidered them significant because they came publicly from a senior politicaland security figure. He said families had appealed to the Supreme JudicialCouncil and the Public Prosecution to act, and that some had already filedlegal complaints against al-Ameri.

Bahaa al-Sarai, brother of activist Safaa al-Sarai, who wasalso killed during the protests, said on Tuesday that he intended to file suitover the remarks.

Ali al-Abadi, head of the Iraq Center for Human Rights,called on the Supreme Judicial Council and government bodies to open atransparent investigation, and urged the United Nations and the InternationalCriminal Court to take up the case, according to a statement he issuedWednesday.

The Badr response

The Badr Organization rejected interpretations of al-Ameri'sremarks as an admission of involvement in suppressing the protests.Abdul-Hussein al-Zalimi, a Badr official, told Shafaq News that al-Ameri hadnot meant the protest movement or its early demands for services and reform,which “drew support from the Shia religious authority and broad sections ofsociety.”

Read more: Explainer: Iraq’s Coordination Framework and Its Rise to Power

Al-Zalimi said al-Ameri was instead referring to those heaccused of later diverting the movement and introducing outside agendas, andthat Iraqi leaders had spoken at the time of “a foreign hand” behind some ofthe killings of protesters and security personnel.

The dispute revives a contested account from 2019, whenofficials spoke of an unidentified "third party" targeting bothprotesters and security forces, while rights groups and activists attributedkillings, abductions and assassinations to security forces and armed factions.No comprehensive, public judicial ruling has since assigned responsibility forthe full range of abuses committed during the protests.

The Tishreen movement forced the resignation of PrimeMinister Adil Abdul-Mahdi's government in November 2019 and led to earlyelections in October 2021. Al-Badri's complaint now rests with the Wasit publicprosecutor, who has not announced a decision on whether to summon al-Ameri. 

Shafaq News

By Ali HusseinFeyli

When this country’s water,land, and skies are in their worst condition, the plans and statistics placedon the desks of environmental policymakers are not enough to grasp the depth ofthe crisis. Official reports may measure falling water levels in the Tigris andEuphrates or concentrations of dust and fine particles over cities, but thelong-term risks are far greater than figures and indicators alone can capture.

What Iraq faces today is notmerely environmental degradation, but a decline in the historical awarenessthat shaped a culture of adapting to nature over thousands of years. Mesopotamiancivilization was built around the value of land and rivers as foundations oflife and stability, and as resources to be preserved rather than depleted,because society’s prosperity was always tied to its ability to manage itsresources and live within nature’s limits.

That balance began to breakdown when oil extracted from beneath the ground became the center of theeconomy, while the value of resources above it —water, agricultural land,orchards, and other natural assets— declined. Over decades, short-sighteddecisions subjected the environment to unregulated exploitation and turnedlarge areas of Iraq’s fertile landscape into sites of uncontrolledconstruction, without a long-term vision to protect what remained of the country’sresources.

Read more: Iraq’s water crisis: A structural rewrite of agricultural governance

Large areas of orchards thatonce served as natural lungs for cities and as shields against heat, dust, anddesertification were removed, while concrete development expanded at theexpense of green land, reducing cities’ ability to withstand the effects ofclimate change and rising temperatures.

This painful shift went beyondpoor management, leaving society with pollution, declining water resources, andshrinking vegetation while creating a cultural disconnect between youngergenerations and the natural environment that once formed part of Iraq’s memoryand identity. Today, younger generations are growing up less connected torivers, orchards, and clean air, and more accustomed to dust, pollution, andurban congestion.

Environmental decline is notsimply the result of temporary administrative failures, but a sign of a deeperproblem in how responsibility toward the country and future generations isunderstood. Addressing it requires more than superficial water agreements withneighboring countries or budgets for projects that lack planning, oversight,and effectiveness; it demands a change in how Iraq manages its land, water, andcities.

Read more: Salinity and drought ravage Iraq’s historic farmlands

Baghdad today offers a painfulexample of the consequences: polluted land, dust-laden air, and water undergrowing pressure show that the environmental crisis is no longer a marginalissue, but has become part of the crisis affecting quality of life itself.

When nature is depleted andthe country itself is turned into a commodity, the cost of repair becomes fargreater than the cost of protection, with some losses eventually reaching apoint where money alone, regardless of how much is spent in the future, can nolonger compensate for them.

This article was originallywritten in Arabic.

Shafaq News

Iraq’s Dawn Crackdown, or Sawlat al-Fajr, has moved beyond the dramaticraids that marked its opening weeks, evolving into a broader campaign reachingmunicipal offices, land registries, electricity institutions, banks, provincialadministrations and senior political figures.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi launched the nationwide anti-corruptiondrive on June 28. By August 9, Shafaq News had documented the detention of atleast 210 officials, lawmakers, public employees and business figures duringthe campaign’s first six weeks. The government has not issued a continuouslyupdated consolidated arrest count.

The operation did not end with the first waves of arrests. A Shafaq Newsreview between August 11 and August 31 identified more cases involvingcorruption, bribery, embezzlement, illicit enrichment, forgery, fraud, misuseof public funds or closely related investigations and convictions.

Dhi Qar Stands Out

Among cases tied to specific provinces, Dhi Qar appeared most frequentlyin Shafaq News' August 11–31 review, with most involving Nasiriyah and itsmunicipal administration.

The cases included arrests of municipality employees, allegationsinvolving public land, forged documents, suspected damage to public funds,bribery and manipulation of property transactions.

On August 17, a former head of Nasiriyah Municipality’s PropertyDivision was sentenced to six years in prison for taking bribes andmanipulating land transactions. Authorities said hundreds of documents —includingdeeds, receipts, sale agreements and official correspondence— had been seizedduring the investigation.

Two days later, a municipal employee facing several corruption warrantsevaded an attempt to arrest him. Authorities were examining allegedmanipulation involving tens of thousands of residential plots as well assuspected waste in investment and health contracts.

The pressure continued through the end of the month, when securityforces and Federal Integrity Commission personnel raided the NasiriyahMunicipality building and arrested a surveying expert over alleged misuse ofpublic funds.

By then, Shafaq News had documented more than 23 arrests in Dhi Qarsince the Dawn Crackdown began, in addition to the dismissal of severaldirectors-general.

The pattern made Dhi Qar —and Nasiriyah Municipality in particular— oneof the most prominent provincial centers of the campaign in Shafaq News'review.

Baghdad ranked second in the August 11–31 review, while other cases werereported in Al-Muthanna, Saladin, Babil, Najaf, Maysan, Al-Anbar, Basra,Nineveh, Al-Diwaniyah and Al-Sulaymaniyah.

Other cases were national in scope or did not belong cleanly to a singleprovince.

Read more: Iraq detains 35 officials in weekly corruption sweep

Municipalities, Land And Property Dominate

Municipal government, local administration, land and property accountedfor the largest cluster of cases reviewed by Shafaq News. Other cases involvedthe electricity, oil, health, security, culture, investment, transport andindustry sectors, as well as other public institutions.

Some cases involved finance, banking, pensions and currency offices aswell as senior political or public offices.

Land appears repeatedly as both a public asset vulnerable tomanipulation and a mechanism through which suspected illicit gains can beconcealed.

In Baghdad, authorities foiled an alleged attempt to seize state landusing forged ownership documents.

In Basra’s West Qurna area, investigators uncovered an alleged networkusing forged documents in land-compensation claims.

In Najaf, a bribery investigation involved a forged municipal barcodeconnected to the ownership of a land plot.

The largest single land-related operation reported during the periodcame in Al-Muthanna, where the National Security Service announced the arrestof 61 people over an alleged property-record forgery network.

Investigators said more than 90 transactions had been manipulated orforged, causing losses estimated at around two billion dinars, or about $1.5million. The suspects included government employees, lawyers and real-estateoffice owners.

The repeated appearance of municipalities and land offices suggests thatthe campaign is increasingly reaching the administrative level where citizens,investors and government employees interact directly with state property,permits, records and public contracts.

Electricity Emerges As Another Pressure Point

The electricity sector was the second major institutional cluster. Thecases ranged from arrests and bribery convictions to allegations of illicitenrichment and financial violations involving current or former officials.

One investigation led to the seizure of millions of dollars and goldfrom an electricity official. Other cases involved employees of electricitydirectorates, officials at generation and distribution companies, andconvictions over bribery or illicit gains.

By the second half of August, electricity had clearly become one of thecampaign’s most visible institutional fronts.

Read more: Corruption arrests in Iraq pass 210 under PM al-Zaidi

Banks, pensions and public money

A further part of the campaign centered on banking, pensions, currencyor other state financial systems.

The cases stretched from an employee of state-owned Rafidain Bankaccused of misuse of public funds to allegations involving pension paymentsissued in the name of deceased beneficiaries.

An Integrity Commission audit announced in August identified 16,384deceased beneficiaries whose pension payments had not been stopped, alongsidearound 40,000 biometric payment cards issued using outdated records.

In Najaf, investigators separately detained Rasheed Bank employees overpension payments allegedly embezzled for years in the name of a deceasedretiree.

Authorities also opened reviews into losses at state-owned banks, whilesecurity forces announced operations against counterfeit currency, fake dollarsales and digital-wallet fraud.

From Local Employees To Senior Figures

At the same time, enforcement has continued to reach higher levels ofpublic office.

The August cases included former lawmakers, a former governor, a formerdeputy minister and other senior officials.

Shafaq News also documented that a wider corruption review had reachedformer prime ministers and lawmakers, while the Central Bank later orderedasset restrictions involving political figures under investigation.

On August 30, a former MP and a former oil official were reportedsentenced in separate corruption cases involving illicit enrichment.

Saladin: From Public Fees To Hidden Property

Saladin provides another example of how investigations have widened fromindividual transactions to accumulated wealth.

Cases during the period included the conviction of a former governor,alleged embezzlement involving the Traffic Directorate and the arrest of 21people in an investigation into unauthorized parking areas and fee collection.

Then, on August 29, the Federal Integrity Commission disclosed recordsconnected to about 95 properties during an investigation involving a seniorReal Estate Registration official.

Investigators said properties had been registered in the names ofrelatives and intermediaries and were examining allegations of bribery, misuseof office, illicit enrichment and money laundering.

Authorities seized property records, contracts, cash, gold, computersand other materials during the investigation.

The case illustrates another shift in the campaign: from identifyingsuspect payments to tracing how alleged proceeds may have been converted intoreal estate, gold and other assets.

Asset Recovery Becomes A Second Front

The Dawn Crackdown has increasingly been presented not simply as anarrest campaign but as an effort to return stolen money to the state.

By August 9, an estimated 482.6 billion dinars (about $371.6 million)had been recovered in cash and assets, according to figures cited by the EcoIraq Observatory. The total included cash as well as roughly half a ton ofgold.

International specialists in tracing stolen and smuggled funds alsojoined Iraqi teams in Baghdad in August, with authorities seeking to track assetstransferred abroad and pursue suspects outside the country.

Separately, the Iraqi National Security Service said on August 27 thatit had recovered more than 93 billion dinars (around $70 million) for the statetreasury during the first half of 2026, while also reporting seizures ofdollars and Iraqi currency in its operations.

A Campaign Shifting From Raids To Prevention

During a visit to the Federal Integrity Commission, Prime Ministeral-Zaidi ordered the implementation of a reward system for corruptionwhistleblowers, tighter monitoring of border crossings and greater publicdisclosure of those implicated in graft.

He also called for monthly and quarterly progress reports and increasedscrutiny of high-value provincial and federal contracts.

The Integrity Commission said field teams had been established to auditcontracts throughout state institutions and that reviews had already beencompleted at eight ministries, with others continuing.

Officials also announced completion of Iraq’s National Integrity andAnti-Corruption Strategy through 2030.

That development marks an important evolution in the Dawn Crackdown.

The first phase was measured largely through who was arrested.

The next may increasingly be judged by which systems are changed, howmuch money is recovered, whether major cases reach final court judgments, andwhether the same forms of corruption return after the raids end.

Read more: Iraq detains top officials in anti-corruption sweep: What we know so far

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Khanaqin

The map around Khanaqin looks markedly different from what it did a generation ago. In northeastern Diyala, near the Iranian border and southeast of the Kurdistan Region, administrative boundaries have shifted, familiar areas have come under different jurisdictions, and disputes over land and population have made every change more consequential.

What began on the map has gradually reached further into the life of the city. Agricultural contracts remain unresolved, families arriving from elsewhere have changed the commercial landscape, Arabic has become more prominent on shop signs, and some parents are reconsidering whether Kurdish-language education offers their children the future they want.

All of this has unfolded alongside a political struggle of its own. Kurdish parties retain a substantial base in Khanaqin, but their votes remain divided, while residents often find themselves navigating between Baghdad's administrative authority and Erbil's longstanding political and social ties to the city.

A Shrinking Map

For people who remember Khanaqin's former reach, the change is visible in the territory itself. Qaratepe, Jabbarah, Jalawla and Saadiyah were once part of the district, according to Muhaymin al-Agha, a senior official in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The conversion of Qaratepe and Jalawla into separate districts removed them from Khanaqin's administration and reduced the territory under its control.

''The PUK has challenged some of those decisions through legal channels,'' Al-Agha said, arguing that objections were not adequately addressed before some of the changes moved through Diyala's provincial institutions.

The story, however, reaches back further than the events of Oct. 16, 2017. Those events came weeks after the Kurdistan Region held an independence referendum, which Baghdad rejected as unconstitutional. On Oct. 16, Iraqi forces, backed by Popular Mobilization forces (PMF), moved into several disputed areas, including Khanaqin, after Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew, shifting control of territory that had been held by Kurdish forces.

Serbest Barzo, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), traces an earlier turning point to 1992, when the subdistricts of Bamu and Maidan were separated from Khanaqin and attached to Kalar. Further changes came after Oct. 16, 2017, affecting Mandali, Jalawla, Qaratepe, Jabbarah and Saadiyah.

"Khanaqin was one of the largest districts in Iraq in terms of area and administration," Barzo recalled.

Its territory once extended east toward Iran, north toward Halabja and al-Sulaymaniyah. Today, the city is largely a district center with almost no subdistricts remaining under its direct administration.

Sarwan Mohammed, a Khanaqin resident, sees more than administrative reorganization behind that transformation. He links some of the later changes to competition among influential Sunni Arab political forces in Diyala, associating the administration of Qaratepe and Jabbarah with the influence of the Taqaddum (Progress) Party, led by Mohammad Al-Halbousi, and developments involving Jalawla and Saadiyah with the Sovereignty Alliance (Al-Siyada), led by Khamis Al-Khnajar.

Land and Identity

For Barzo, the consequences are particularly visible in the changes that have taken place since 2017. He describes them as "Arabization and demographic change," pointing to Arab families from other areas who moved into Khanaqin and bought shops, homes, and land.

He further connects those developments to Article 140 of Iraq's constitution, which provides a framework for resolving the status of disputed territories and addressing the consequences of earlier demographic policies. Nearly two decades after the deadline originally set for completing the process, Article 140 remains unimplemented.

The unresolved status of the disputed territories has also left land and agricultural contracts in limbo. Legislation and decisions introduced after 2003 were intended to address earlier policies and restore rights to their owners, Barzo argues, but significant parts of that process have not been fully implemented in Diyala, particularly in Khanaqin.

Some contracts granting the use of disputed agricultural land have continued to be renewed rather than being settled through a final determination of ownership. For Barzo, the issue is not the ethnicity of the person using the land, but the legal basis of the right itself.

The population side of the dispute is harder to separate from everyday life. Abu Marwan, a former educator, has noticed more people from outside Khanaqin in its markets, restaurants, and public spaces. Some settled after the October 2017 events, he told Shafaq News, while others arrive to work, trade, shop, or complete government transactions.

For Barzo, those movements matter partly because of where Khanaqin sits, describing the city as part of a strategically important belt linking the Iranian border with the Kurdistan Region and central Iraq, further calling it the "Gateway to the Zagros."

"The location gives the administrative changes a significance that extends beyond the city itself," he said, stressing that control of Khanaqin and surrounding areas can affect the geographic continuity of Kurdish-majority territories outside the Kurdistan Region's formal administration.

That broader contest, however, is not confined to maps, property records or constitutional provisions. It is increasingly visible in the way the city looks and functions.

Changing Khanaqin

Walk through Khanaqin's markets and another part of the transformation comes into view. Arabic has become increasingly common on commercial signs, according to residents and shopkeepers interviewed by Shafaq News.

For many shop owners, the reason is practical. A growing number of customers come from outside the city, and Arabic is the language most likely to reach them.

The same kind of calculation is beginning to influence education.

Abu Marwan has watched some families reconsider whether to send their children to Kurdish-language schools. For them, the decision is not simply about language or identity, but also about what happens after graduation.

Financial difficulties have limited employment opportunities within Kurdistan Region institutions, while salary delays and other pressures have affected the education system.

Garmian University has become part of that uncertainty. The university once had about 4,000 students, but concerns over national recognition of its degrees have made some families uneasy about the prospects facing graduates.

For students, Abu Marwan sees two difficult paths: limited employment opportunities inside the Kurdistan Region or potential obstacles when they seek to enter federal institutions.

Language, in that sense, has become tied to the wider economic and political choices facing families. The changes are subtle enough to appear ordinary —a different language on a shop sign, a family choosing one school over another, a customer arriving from another part of Diyala— but together they point to a city whose social and economic landscape is shifting.

Divided Strength

Those shifts are taking place while Kurdish political forces remain divided over how best to respond. Ahmed Mohammed, a political observer of Kurdish affairs in Khanaqin, describes the relationship between Kurdish political forces as having moved from "integration" to "erosion."

The PUK and KDP frequently enter elections separately, and their rivalry can continue after the votes have been counted. Among their supporters, Mohammed argues, defeating the other Kurdish party can sometimes become almost as important as winning a seat.

The numbers illustrate the dilemma. Mohammed estimates that the KDP has more than 10,000 votes in the area, while the PUK has more than 30,000. Together, those figures represent a substantial electoral bloc, but separate lists divide its political impact and make it harder to convert that strength into equivalent representation in the Iraqi parliament and Diyala Provincial Council.

Mohammed argues that Kurdish political competition risks weakening the city's ability to defend its interests at a time when Khanaqin already occupies an ambiguous position between Baghdad and Erbil authorities.

That ambiguity is familiar to residents. When people from Khanaqin turn to Baghdad, artist Abbas al-Zahawi says, they can encounter the view that the city is politically connected to the Kurdistan Region. When they turn to Erbil, they can receive the opposite response: Khanaqin falls administratively under the Iraqi government.

The result is a sense of being caught between two systems without a clear political home.

Between Two Capitals

For residents who remember the years after 2003, that feeling is especially pronounced because the relationship between Khanaqin and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was once much more visible.

The city received reconstruction projects and substantial support from the KRG during that period. Barzo estimates that roughly 14 years of projects helped Khanaqin recover from some of the destruction and deterioration in services inherited from the previous Baath regime.

Al-Zahawi remembers the city before 2017 as "a beautiful mosaic" of people, languages and customs. The events of Oct. 16 that year, he believes, marked a turning point.

"The KRG and Kurdish political forces cannot be exempted from responsibility," he said, calling what followed "political erosion."

He also estimates that the KRG's service presence in Khanaqin fell by as much as 90% after the events, arguing that Kurdish parties devoted too much attention to internal competition instead of using their political and financial resources to protect the city's position and address residents' needs.

Al-Agha, meanwhile, places responsibility elsewhere as well as within the Kurdish political camp. While holding Baghdad primarily responsible for the administrative changes, he believes Kurdish divisions have weakened the ability of the parties to respond effectively.

The result, therefore, is a problem that can no longer be reduced to a single dispute over boundaries. For Khanaqin, the uncertainty surrounding its borders and political status continues to shape everyday life. As Baghdad and Erbil maintain competing ties to the city, residents are left waiting for greater clarity over the institutions and decisions that govern them.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq is stepping up efforts to place weapons under statecontrol as talks with armed factions continue ahead of the September 30 end ofthe US-led Global Coalition’s military mission in the country.

The government announced on August 21 that September 30would mark the deadline for bringing weapons under state control. Two dayslater, however, National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji clarified that thedate referred to the end of the Coalition’s presence and that the process ofbringing weapons under state control would continue gradually afterward. On thesame day, military spokesman Sabah al-Numan confirmed that talks with armedfactions were ongoing and that the central committee overseeing the issue hadmade significant progress.

Agreement On Principle, Differences Over Timing

Hasan Fad'am, a senior member of the Al-Hikma Movement led byAmmar al-Hakim, told Shafaq News that placing weapons under state control hadmoved beyond a government program to become a political project supported bymajor political forces and endorsed by Iraq’s religious leadership.

Fad'am stressed that all sides, including armed factions,agree in principle that weapons should be controlled by the state. Differences,he explained, concern the timing and mechanisms of implementation rather thanthe principle itself.

He described the talks with the factions as having madesubstantial progress, adding that he was not aware of any faction openlyrejecting the principle of state control. The Al-Hikma figure expects negotiationsafter September 30 “to become more serious and clearly defined, particularlyover how the policy should be implemented.”

Read more: Al-Zaidi at 100 days: Iraq's toughest tests still ahead

From Disarmament to Weapons Management

Security expert Adnan al-Kinani maintained that thegovernment was clearly seeking to reinforce state authority and restrictweapons to legally authorized bodies, while some armed factions were seeking todelay the process because of concerns about possible regional developmentsaffecting Iraq.

In an interview with Shafaq News, al-Kinani emphasized thatthe central issue was not the existence of weapons but whether their useremained outside state authority.

He called for a process that avoids confrontation and allowsfaction members to join official formations, including the Popular MobilizationForces (PMF) or the regular armed forces.

“Factions could pursue political and national roles throughalternative channels while protecting their members from becoming targets,” heargued, warning that external pressure could push Iraq toward dangerousescalation.

On August 23, political sources told Shafaq News that someShiite political leaders were seeking to replace the term “disarmament” with“weapons management,” with the use of weapons placed under the authority of thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces. The proposal also links weaponstransfers to the withdrawal of foreign forces and the passage of legislationgoverning PMF service and retirement arrangements.

Read more: Iraq's disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions

A Coordination Framework (CF) source separately revealedthat weapons handed over by factions could be transferred to PMF storagefacilities rather than to the Defense or Interior ministries. The source alsopointed to political agreement on accelerating legislation governing PMFservice and retirement, including ranks, career progression and rights forfallen and wounded members.

State Institutions Prepare for The Next Phase

Iraqi state institutions have also begun preparing for amore formal enforcement phase.

On Wednesday, Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidandiscussed with US Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris judicial procedures againstindividuals and entities carrying weapons in violation of the constitution andlaw, as well as mechanisms for enforcing the rule of law after the Coalitionmission ends.

On the same day, Iraqi security forces described placingweapons under state control as a matter of national sovereignty and confirmedthat the Coalition withdrawal was progressing according to its timetable. TheDefense Ministry has also been working to strengthen air-defense systems aheadof the next security phase, while security agencies announced that they hadfoiled an attempt to manufacture drones inside Baghdad.

Factions Take Different Positions

Saraya al-Salam, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali haveindicated a willingness to adjust their relationship with state institutions,while consultations continue with other groups, including Kataib Hezbollah,Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, according to political andmedia sources cited by Shafaq News.

On August 21, a source told Shafaq News that Asaib Ahlal-Haq had handed over weapons, including drones, at one of its bases south ofBaghdad. The operation was overseen by a committee including representatives ofthe Interior and Defense ministries, the National Security Advisory and the PMFCommission.

Other factions, however, continue to defend what they callthe “resistance weapons,” tying their future to the complete withdrawal offoreign forces from Iraq and guarantees that the country can defend itselfagainst external attacks. Shafaq News has reported that Kataib Hezbollah,Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada remain among the groupsinsisting on retaining their military capabilities.

Regional Pressures Shape The Debate

The weapons issue is also connected to wider securitychanges across the Middle East since Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.

Ardeshir Pashang, a senior researcher at the Iranian Centerfor Strategic Studies and the Iranian Association for West Asia Studies, notedthat Iraq has spent years balancing relations with Iran and the United Stateswhile at times becoming a venue for competing interests between the two powers.

Read more: Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality or growing isolation?

He outlined a difficult balancing act for Baghdad:preventing armed factions from taking unilateral military decisions whileavoiding a process that could create a new source of instability amidcontinuing regional tensions.

“The end of the Coalition’s military mission could removeone of the main arguments used to justify keeping weapons outside the state’sdirect control,” Pashang observed, adding that strengthening state authority“could reduce the risk of Iraqi territory being used again in regionalconflicts.”

He maintained that aligning the PMF’s institutional statuswith a unified chain of command under state authority would strengthen Iraq’ssovereignty and stability. Meanwhile, negotiations continue over how factionweapons would be managed and over legislation governing the PMF.

Read more: Iraq under regional pressure as neighbors threaten to strike Iran-aligned factions

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Baghdad and several other Iraqi provinces are seeing wave after wave ofprotests, by some counts three to four a week, demanding appointment to publicjobs, permanent tenure for contract staff, and better professional rights. Yetthe protests keep coming without clear results, and a sharper problem comesinto focus: is demonstrating still an effective way to pressure the government,or has it lost some of the weight it once carried?

The past few months trace the pattern. On May 18, 2026, around 5,000older graduates filled central Baghdad to demand appointments. Protests byholders of higher degrees followed in late June, then in August, by rotatingresident doctors and medical-profession graduates, alongside furtherdemonstrations by older graduates and contract employees pressing for permanentplacement on the state payroll. Some of these gatherings ended in friction withriot forces and injuries among protesters from various groups —echoing thememory of the 2019 Tishreen protests, the mass anti-government movement overunemployment and corruption that was met with a lethal crackdown.

Haider Ali Kazim, a representative of the older graduates, told ShafaqNews that "the current government responded to our demands after threeprotests and met with representatives of the protesters, but it set no deadlinefor resolving the issue."

The protesters, he added, "will wait for a limited period, but nota long one. If no clear solutions emerge, they will return to demonstrating,and perhaps to sit-ins and other forms of protest."

Kazim noted that the latest demonstration was the fifth since theolder-graduates movement began, and the third under the government of PrimeMinister Ali Al-Zaidi. Protesters knew, he said, that the appointment issueunder previous governments had been tainted by corruption and the sale of jobgrades, but they hope the current government will be different, especiallygiven its talk of fighting corruption. He put the number of older graduates ataround 150,000, some now near retirement age and still searching for jobsecurity.

Read more: Iraq: 250K graduates annually amid 20% youth unemployment

Pressure, Or A Temporary Fix?

Political scientist Qasim al-Rubaie said repeated protests reflect “structuralfailure in the political system and in the performance of state institutions,”particularly in the equitable distribution of wealth and public-sectoropportunities.

Protest, al-Rubaie told Shafaq News, "has become the most effectivetool for demanding rights, especially since the political system passed throughthe Tishreen uprising and its aftermath in a state of threat and instability.That pushed state agencies to respond to protesters' demands, whether generalor sectional, until demonstrations gradually turned into a means of obtainingrights amid the absence of planning and fairness in distributingopportunity."

Why A Government Job Is Worth Protesting For

In Iraq, a public-sector appointment is not one option among many; it isthe main road to a stable income. According to government data, the statesupports around 4.2 million public employees, more than 3 million retirees, androughly 3 million people in the social protection network, leaving over 10million Iraqis dependent on monthly government transfers. That dependence helpsexplain why successive groups of graduates continue returning to the streetswhen promised jobs fail to materialize.

But the state they are pushing has little room to move. Oil suppliedabout 84% of Iraq's revenues in the first quarter of 2026, while publicsalaries and wages formed the single largest expense at 15.32 trillion dinars(nearly $11.8 billion) in that quarter alone. Across the year, Iraq spendsroughly $70 billion on salaries and pensions. With payroll already swallowingthe budget, financing tens of thousands of new appointments runs straight intothe treasury's limits, the structural bind al-Rubaie describes.

In the older-graduates file alone, only about 8,600 positions areavailable through the Federal Public Service Council, even though roughly43,000 graduates have already received official employment codes, withappointments tied to the approval of the 2026 federal budget. By late May, aBaghdad demonstration marked the 27th consecutive protest organized bygraduates and advanced-degree holders since 2023.

That leverage, al-Rubaie said, has since faded: "The securitysituation stabilized, the pressure protests can exert declined, and the state'sown capacity to meet demands, much of which centers on appointments or requiresfinancial allocations, fell as well. Together, that made the response toprotests limited, if not absent."

If planning built on fair distribution keeps failing, he expectscitizens to reach for more forceful tools: strikes and organized, legal workstoppages by employees and unions; organized economic boycotts of certain goodsor services where appropriate and lawful; and recourse to the courts to challengedecisions that break the law. He also points to parliamentary and mediapressure, turning demands into concrete oversight and legislative files, and tounions and professional and student associations as channels more durable thanspontaneous gatherings.

Used together, al-Rubaie said, these tools could help build a state ofinstitutions grounded in citizenship and national identity, through justice andequality before the law, and away from discrimination by party, ethnicity, oranything else. That last point is a reference to the post-2003 power-sharingsystem, known as muhasasa, under which state jobs and posts have long beenparceled out among political blocs.

Mustafa Saadoun, director of the Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights,said governments often treat protests either as political challenges or asdemands confined to particular groups, even when they reflect broader publicgrievances.

Failing to respond "creates dysfunction and widens the trust gapbetween the citizen and state institutions," Saadoun told Shafaq News,adding that demands usually go unmet because governments cannot deliver them,are stalling, or believe the demands do not serve the state's interest. Whenthe same demands, needs, and people keep returning to the street, he said, itreveals that the mechanisms for handling protest are sometimes momentary,designed to contain and quiet a protest rather than address the real demands orthe causes that drove people out in the first place.

Read more: Iraq’s protests after Tishreen: A system that learned how to contain the street

From Hope To Frustration

Social researcher Ahmed al-Dhahabi said protests that drag on leave amark on those who join them, particularly as the wait grows long.

Sustained protest, al-Dhahabi told Shafaq News, does not mean only onething: it can express the strength of a demand and an awareness of rights, butit can equally reveal accumulated frustration and the weakness of institutionalchannels in absorbing those demands. Many of the recent protests drew youngpeople demanding appointment, alongside others tied to delayed salaries andsimilar issues.

Protest, he explained, usually begins with a psychological charge suchas hope, directed anger, a sense of the power to change things, and the feelingthat the protester is no longer alone. The presence of others generates whatsocial psychology calls "collective efficacy": the belief that agroup, acting together, can bring about change, which can deepen anindividual's sense of empowerment, belonging, and social support.

The trouble begins, al-Dhahabi said, when the protest becomes open-endedwith no clear response. The protester can move, psychologically, from hope towaiting and then to frustration and anger, which may erode trust or lead towithdrawal. “The most dangerous thing about waiting is not its length butwaiting without a horizon. When people repeat an action and feel it produces noresponse, feelings of helplessness, disappointment, and lost faith ininstitutions can set in.”

By contrast, al-Dhahabi said, successful protests can lift levels ofempowerment, identity, and cohesion among participants, while repeated failuretends to bring stress, burnout, and a sense of lost power. A long protest canalso strengthen protesters' social identity: a person moves from saying "Ihave a problem" to "I have a cause," and individual sufferinghardens into collective awareness.

A Crisis That Sharpens The Deadlock

This wave is building against a fresh fiscal shock. Iraq missed Julysalary payments for many public employees after oil revenue collapsed, withexports falling from about 100 million barrels in February to 32.1 million inMay and June amid the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Officials are nowweighing payment every 45 days, with one told Shafaq News that "We willpay whenever we have cash." A government struggling to pay the workers italready has is in no position to appoint the tens of thousands demanding tojoin them.

Between the repetition of protest and the retreat of the government'sresponse, the equation looks more complicated than a simple question about thestreet's capacity to demonstrate. Demands that persist without solutions mayturn protest from a pressure tool aimed at a specific result into a continuouscondition, one that reflects a wider crisis of trust between the citizen andthe institutions of the state.

Read more: Classroom to street corner: Degree holders stranded in Iraq's job drought

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

By Ali Hussein Feyli

The Communications and Media Commission (CMC) wasestablished in 2004 under Order No. 65. Article 103 of Iraq’s 2005 Constitutionlater guaranteed its financial and administrative independence and placed itunder parliamentary oversight. The central objective was to establish aprofessional regulatory body capable of managing the telecommunications andmedia sectors away from direct government and political-party interference.

In reality, however, this independence has repeatedlycollided with Iraq’s system of political power-sharing and partisandistribution of public positions, placing the Commission’s institutionallegitimacy under continued strain and contributing to a state of paralysiswithin its Board of Trustees.

Read more: Media regulator imposed at least 18 bans in 2026

A brief look at the CMC’s record reveals a clearcontradiction in its performance, as the Commission has played an effectiveregulatory role in telecommunications and internet services by addressingtechnical obstacles, allocating frequencies, licensing companies, introducingnewer generations of mobile internet technology, and securing a steady sourceof revenue for the state treasury.

Yet in the field of media regulation and theprotection of access to information, the Commission faces a more fundamentalcrisis, as Iraq’s media space is witnessing a clear decline in the quality ofpublic discourse, with standards based on attracting the largest possibleaudience increasingly replacing substantive intellectual and cultural values.

The dominance of what is commonly described in Iraq as“immoral content” is not merely the result of audience preferences, but alsoreflects a digital business model built around “click-driven revenue.” Somemedia institutions, through irresponsible practices, have contributed tolong-term cultural and educational harm, deepening a crisis of credibility andaccountability.

Read more: Legal pursuits in Iraq over blasphemy and “immoral content”

The consequences are not limited to culture. In adiverse and sensitive society such as Iraq, the decline in public discourse cancreate greater space for hate speech and pose risks to social cohesion andnational security. One direct consequence is the diversion of public attentionaway from fundamental questions and citizens’ daily concerns —includingcorruption, unemployment, deteriorating public services, water shortages, andelectricity— and toward superficial issues of little public value.

When meaningful debate is restricted in the publicsphere, the CMC’s reliance on penalties and the closure of controversial pagesand programs can produce only a temporary effect. Such measures have largelyremained within a punitive and security-oriented framework, without addressingthe intellectual and economic roots of the problem.

The ambiguity surrounding the applicable legalstandards has also made the dividing line between protecting public standardsand restricting freedom of expression increasingly troubling and unclear. TheCommission’s decisions may suppress the most visible manifestations of theproblem, but they cannot eliminate its underlying causes, which continue toreappear in different forms.

Creating a healthier public sphere cannot be achievedthrough administrative orders alone: the future effectiveness of the CMCdepends on separating its technical responsibilities from political disputesand establishing clear standards that guarantee the protection of freedom ofexpression. Addressing the problem at its roots also requires strengtheningindependent professional institutions, including the Iraqi JournalistsSyndicate.

Media regulation must not become a pretext forrestricting criticism or silencing voices that scrutinize those in power anddemand accountability. At the same time, weakening the Commission or subjectingit to political bargaining does not serve freedom of expression, but it givesthose who benefit from weak oversight greater room to fill the public spherewith marginal disputes that divert citizens’ attention from corruption, publicservices, rights, and government accountability.

Read more: Iraq's press freedom falls amid record violations

This article was originally written in Arabic.

Shafaq News

US pressure on Iran is no longer a matter concerning Tehran alone. Assanctions enter a new phase and their scope widens to cover sectors,individuals, entities, and vessels linked to the Iranian economy, Iraq findsitself facing a test that directly affects three critical areas: energy, tradeand the financial sector.

In its latest punitive measures, Washington expanded the scope of itstargets to around 60 individuals, entities, and vessels, while the US TreasuryDepartment announced the launch of “Operation Economic Outcast,” warningcountries, companies and financial institutions that continue dealing withtargeted Iranian sectors that they could face secondary sanctions andrestrictions on access to the dollar-based financial system.

The new measures extend beyond oil and finance. They also cover digitalassets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping, alongside individuals,entities and vessels linked to Iranian oil, financial, military, nuclear andcyber networks.

For Iraq, the stakes are particularly high. Economic ties with Iran arenot marginal; they run from the movement of goods through border crossings togas and electricity, and ultimately to funds and banking settlements.

Official figures indicate that bilateral trade reached around $13 billion in 2025, with the possibility of rising to $25 billion annually onceagreements covering border markets, joint economic zones and shared industrialcities are completed.

hat leaves Baghdad with a difficult choice: how can it preserve itseconomic relationship with Tehran without turning that relationship into adirect point of friction with the renewed US sanctions regime?

Sanctions: Baghdad’s Narrow Room for Maneuver

Iraqi political science professor at Al-Mustansiriyah University, IssamAl-Faili, considers the US measures, in part, a “warning shot” aimed at shadowcompanies and networks involved in money laundering and the smuggling of oiland currencies. In his assessment, Iraq will need to ensure that its dealingswith Iran pass through official channels and the international banking system,particularly as the expanding sanctions raise the level of risk for entitiesdealing with targeted Iranian parties.

Al-Faili says Baghdad would be “forced to deal seriously” with thesanctions if Washington moved to further restrict dealings with Iran, warningthat continued transactions with sanctioned entities could expose Iraqi partiesto penalties. He described the measures as part of a broader US effort to cutoff sources of funding to Tehran.

For Iraq, however, the most pressing question is whether it can secureUS exemptions, particularly for gas and electricity. Baghdad therefore needs,according to Al-Faili, to move early and establish mechanisms to protect itseconomic interests.

Read more: Record Arbaeen crowds, thin returns: Iran's collapse drains Iraq's religious tourism

Gas and Electricity: Key Vulnerability

Iraq relies on Iranian gas to operate a significant part of itspower-generation system, while annual payments for gas range, according toIraqi estimates cited in previous reports, between $4 billion and $5 billion.Washington has granted Baghdad temporary exemptions in previous years to allowenergy imports from Iran, but those exemptions have gradually become one of thetools used to pressure Iraq to diversify its energy sources.

Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee member Mukhtar Al-Mousawi saysthe government faces a difficult balancing act: it is, in his words, “forced”to comply with US sanctions, yet the scale of financial and commercial interestswith Iran makes the issue more complicated.

Al-Mousawi tells Shafaq News that Iraqi funds are held in Iranian banks,making the impact direct. At the same time, he believes Baghdad could secure “possibleexemptions” if the Iraqi government approaches its US counterpart, particularlybecause Iraq is “in dire need of Iranian gas.”

Al-Mousawi considers Iraq likely to be among the countries most affectedif the sanctions widen, making exemptions and negotiations with Washington acentral part of managing the crisis.

Electricity-sector figures illustrate the scale of dependence. In March2025, Iraqi Parliament Deputy Chairman of the Electricity Committee WalidAl-Sahlani said Iraq needed 1,800 MCM of Iranian gas, and that losing thisquantity would result in a loss of 8,000 megawatts from the electricity system.

With the US exemption ending, Iraq turned to alternative sources,including Qatar and Oman, while the Oil Ministry proposed importing around 600million standard cubic feet of liquefied gas through floating platforms atIraqi ports, providing around 4,000 megawatts, alongside the continuation ofthe agreement with Turkmenistan to import gas. The Gulf electricityinterconnection project was also on the table, with a capacity of up to 500megawatts, alongside efforts to strengthen interconnection with Jordan andTurkiye.

In November 2025, official figures indicated that Iraq’s electricityneeds reached around 50,000 megawatts during the summer, compared withproduction of approximately 28,000 megawatts at the time.

These figures explain why Iranian gas remains central to Iraq’scalculations: the gap between demand and production remains wide, whilealternatives require infrastructure, investment and time before they can bridgethe shortfall.

Iraq's exposure extends beyond gas. Iranian electricity itself hasremained part of the issue. In March 2025, Iran confirmed that electricityexports to Iraq would continue under an existing contract, alongside talks overoutstanding payments and their settlement. By May of the same year, Iraq wasstill importing Iranian electricity and gas while exploring alternatives fromthe Gulf states, Jordan and Qatar, as well as ways to make use of domesticallyproduced associated gas.

Hormuz Adds Another Layer of Risk

These calculations are unfolding as shipping through the Strait ofHormuz faces severe disruption. Fewer than 20 commercial vessels passed throughthe strait over the weekend of August 22 and 23, compared with levels beforethe war that began on February 28, 2026.

On August 22, Iran granted several Iraqi oil tankers permission to passthrough Hormuz following diplomatic contacts from Baghdad. Iraq’s risks,therefore, are not confined to energy imported from Iran; its own oil exportsare also exposed to the security and political environment surrounding themaritime corridor through which a large share of the region’s exports passes.

Read more: The end of a waiver: Iraq's struggle for energy independence

Banking: Sanctions from the Border to the Financial System

The secondary sanctions imposed by Washington force companies and banksto choose: continue dealing with targeted Iranian entities or risk losingaccess to the US financial system. That is particularly sensitive for Iraq,after Washington tightened its oversight of dollar transfers in recent yearsand acted against Iraqi banks over suspicions related to money laundering andthe financing of networks linked to Iran.

According to Al-Faili, Iraq cannot bypass official and internationalbanking channels in the gas and electricity files. “If US threats turn intodirect measures against those dealing with Iran, failure to comply with thesanctions could expose Iraq to penalties.”

On August 7, the US Treasury Department announced measures againstcovert Iranian currency networks operating across several countries, saying thenetworks had helped Iran move hundreds of millions of dollars as part of whatWashington describes as Iran’s “shadow banking system.” In another developmenton the same day, the Treasury said foreign financial institutions facilitatingsignificant transactions on behalf of sanctioned Iranian entities could facerestrictions on their banking relationships with the United States.

Against this backdrop, sanctions do not have to bring Iraq-Iran trade toa halt for their effects to emerge. The impact could begin with banks andmoney-transfer companies before extending to the costs of trade, insurance andshipping, as financial risks rise.

In July 2026, Baghdad and Washington agreed on a mechanism to addressone of the thorniest issues: Iran's outstanding gas payments.

Iraq and the United States reached an agreement allowing Iranian gas dues to be settled through the supply of goods, including food and medicine,rather than cash transfers. According to official data, Iran is seeking around$11 billion in outstanding payments, while part of the funds is held at theTrade Bank of Iraq and cannot be transferred because of US sanctions. Iran’scentral bank governor revealed that around $7 billion was held in Iraq, inaddition to more than $3 billion owed to Iran’s Oil Ministry, bringing totalreceivables to between $10 billion and $11 billion.

Under bilateral agreements, payments for Iranian gas and electricityimports are deposited into accounts at the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) and theTrade Bank of Iraq, while the original contracts stipulated payment for gas ineuros and electricity in dollars. The US withdrawal from the nuclear agreementin 2018 and the reimposition of sanctions subsequently made it impossible tosettle these dues in foreign currencies, causing them to accumulate within Iraq’sbanking system.

Tehran: Sanctions Should Not Extend to Neighboring States

Iranian affairs writer and researcher Saleh Al-Qazwini says Iran “doesnot want any country in the region to be harmed because of its relations withIran or the sanctions,” stressing that Tehran is concerned about the interestsof neighboring states, foremost among them Iraq.

Al-Qazwini told Shafaq News that, from the Iranian perspective, USsanctions lack a legal basis and that pressure on regional states to join thesanctions forms part of the “economic aggression” against Iran.

Iraq’s calculations, however, extend beyond the political position onsanctions. Baghdad is tied to the global financial system and the dollar on oneside, while relying on Iran for a significant portion of its energy needs onthe other. Trade with its eastern neighbor, meanwhile, remains a major part ofIraq's domestic trade.

On August 20, Reuters reported that US President Donald Trump’s threatsto impose sanctions on Iran’s partners had raised concerns about globalsupplies, while shipping through the strait remained subdued. At the same time,Baghdad has begun exploring alternative routes for its oil exports, includingexpanding shipments through Turkiye’s Ceyhan port and other routes throughSyria and Jordan. Estimates indicate that constructing a new pipeline throughSyria could take years and require substantial costs.

Iran Seeks Alternatives, Iraq Seeks Space

In Tehran, the new sanctions are not viewed as separate from a broadercourse of economic and political pressure.

Iranian affairs expert Mahdi Azizi considers US sanctions nothing newfor Iran and views the latest measures within a framework of economic,psychological and media warfare, alongside moves and mediation efforts aimed atbringing the two sides back to the negotiating table.

In an interview with Shafaq News, Azizi acknowledges the possibility ofrepercussions and problems, but points to Iran’s reliance on a “barter economy”and the expansion of ties with neighboring countries, as well as China andRussia, while making use of its membership in and relations with institutionssuch as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, alongside efforts tostrengthen domestic production.

China announced that it would take the necessary measures to defend itsinterests after Washington warned countries that continued to deal with Iran.Beijing maintained that economic pressure does not resolve problems and thatChinese-Iranian cooperation takes place within international law.

The options Tehran is exploring, however, do not necessarily provide adirect answer to Baghdad’s needs. Iraq requires alternatives of its own,particularly in energy and the financial sector.

For this reason, Al-Faili believes that “Baghdad needs to develop aclear vision for dealing with the repercussions and should not wait forsanctions to turn into an actual crisis in electricity, trade, or the bankingsector.” He points out that Iraq has explored options in recent years to reduceits dependence on Iranian gas, including floating gas-import platforms andelectricity interconnections with other countries, but these projects stillface implementation, technical, and financial challenges. He also maintainsthat grid interconnection and diversification of gas sources could give Iraqgreater room to withstand any potential disruption, “but this requires swiftdecisions and investment, because alternatives cannot replace Iranian gasovernight.”

Religious Tourism May Prove More Resilient

Religious tourism represents a major economic channel in Iraq-Iranrelations. Around 80% of hospitality, transport, and accommodation activity inNajaf during pilgrimage seasons is tied to Iranian visitors, according to theNajaf Hotels Association.

During the 2026 Arbaeen pilgrimage, more than 22 million people tookpart, including more than 4 million foreign visitors from 172 countries.

Najaf also received around 5 million visitors for the anniversary of theProphet Muhammad’s death, while the pilgrimage marking the death anniversary ofImam Musa al-Kadhim in Baghdad drew around 15 million visitors during the sameyear.

These flows come as religious tourism contributes around 3.3% of Iraq’sgross domestic product. The impact of US sanctions on the number of visitorsitself is likely to be indirect, since the sanctions do not target religioustravel as such.

Financial restrictions and the decline in the value of the Iraniancurrency, which has lost more than half its value over a year, couldnevertheless constrain Iranian visitors’ spending, a trend that has alreadyaffected hotel and market revenues despite continued visitor numbers. Visitorflows may remain high while the economic return they generate declines iffinancial pressure on Iranians and difficulties with payments and transferspersist.

Read more: Iraq between two fires: Tehran and Washington eye Baghdad’ spost-election phase

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The last stars were still visible when Imad Al-Khafaji noticed somethingmoving across the sky.

It was just before dawn. The 41-year-old had set out with a group ofnomadic Bedouin friends on a hunting trip in the Iraqi desert. They had stoppedtheir vehicle on higher ground to watch the sunrise and were preparingbreakfast when the object appeared, drifting about 300 meters away.

Al-Khafaji asked his companions what they were looking at. Theyrecognized the balloons immediately. Similar ones had been used to move drugsacross the desert, often around dawn, when shipments could be collected withpeople waiting on the ground.

There was little time to think. The group decided to bring the balloonsdown. One of Al-Khafaji's companions retrieved a licensed firearm and aimed.Several shots struck the balloons carrying the load, and the craft began tolose altitude. It eventually came down at about 6:00 a.m. The men climbed intoa four-wheel-drive vehicle and followed it across the desert.

At the landing site, they found 126 bags containing about 126,000Captagon pills, Al-Khafaji recounted to Shafaq News. Each bag held 1,000 pills.“A security official told me the shipment was worth about 3.4 billion Iraqidinars [roughly $2.6 million].”

Then they realized they were not alone. The shipment had not simply beenleft in the desert. People were waiting for it.

Read more: From cell to center: Iraq tests a new answer to addiction

Al-Khafaji recounted that the group of would-be collectors was initiallyless than five kilometers from the landing site. Across open desert, that wasnot a great distance. At one point, he put the gap at about 1.5 kilometers.

The hunting trip had become a race: secure a multimillion-dollar drugshipment before the people who had come to collect it reached the site. “Ourdetermination, together with my nomadic Bedouin brothers and livestock owners,prevented them from forcing us to hand over the drugs. We delivered theshipment to the security authorities instead,” Al-Khafaji explained.

The episode also highlighted the unusual position of people who live andmove through Iraq’s desert. Nomadic communities know remote tracks, openstretches and isolated areas that can remain difficult for regular patrols tomonitor.

Al-Khafaji said the presence of the Bedouins and livestock owners helpedprotect the group until security forces arrived. “That is why we were notattacked or assaulted while carrying out the task,” he said.

Security forces eventually arrived. They opened the bags, counted thepackages, and identified the substances before completing the legal report andtransferring the shipment to the relevant authorities.

Skyfall to Handcuffs

As security forces have tightened controls along traditional traffickingroutes, drug networks have looked for ways to move narcotics beyond roads,checkpoints and conventional surveillance. The sky offers one such route, andthe balloon confiscated in the desert was part of a wider pattern.

Iraqi security forces have intercepted other balloons carrying narcoticsfrom Syria into Iraq. One intercepted in September 2025 contained 245,000Captagon pills, while another in November 2025 carried 22,000.

Brigadier General Akram Al-Rashid, director of Al-Anbar’s Anti-NarcoticsDirectorate, reported that security forces had intercepted every balloondetected so far.

The border has also seen attempts attributed to what Major General RahimYounis Rahim, commander of Iraq’s 5th Border Guard Division, described as “terroristorganizations.” Previous efforts involved balloons launched from Syrianterritory toward Iraq.

“Those attempts were completely thwarted through field monitoring andthermal cameras deployed along the border,” he recounted to Shafaq News.

But balloons are only one adaptation in a trade built aroundconcealment.

Traffickers have increasingly used ordinary objects to conceal drugs. InMarch 2024, security forces dismantled a network moving crystal methamphetamineinside hollowed walnut shells. The operation involved 11 traffickers acrossfour provinces.

Months later, methamphetamine was discovered baked into flatbread inBaghdad. Elsewhere, narcotics have been concealed in children’s toys and amonglivestock. In Babil, authorities found drugs hidden inside a shoe hanging froma motorcycle.

At the Baghuz crossing along the Euphrates, Captagon and hashish werefound floating downriver in sealed plastic containers. Some had been wrapped inreeds to blend with debris carried by the water.

Hussein Al-Tamimi, a spokesperson for Iraq’s General Directorate forNarcotics and Psychotropic Substances Affairs, characterized the traffickingnetworks’ methods as constantly changing alongside the authorities’ response.

“The methods may look increasingly unusual, but the logic behind them isconventional: find a route that is harder to watch,” he said, pointing to Iraq’sdeployment of radar systems and thermal drones with ranges of up to 80kilometers.

A Growing Drug Market

The ingenuity of individual shipments can obscure the size of the marketbehind them. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime recorded a 3,380%increase in Iraqi Captagon seizures between 2019 and 2025.

In 2026 alone, the Directorate has seized about 2.18 tonnes of narcoticsubstances, according to Iraqi authorities. Crystal methamphetamine, Captagon,and Lyrica pills were among the substances most frequently seized.

The response has extended from the desert to the courts. More than 350trafficking networks have been dismantled this year, while 59 defendants havebeen sentenced to death and another 254 to life imprisonment, according to theInterior Ministry.

Yet seizures and convictions reveal only part of the trade. Behind everyintercepted shipment is a market: people who buy drugs, people who use themand, in some cases, people who begin selling them themselves.

Dr. Doaa Al-Basri, a researcher specializing in drug-related issues, hasencountered that market from the other end. During visits to prisons, she hasmet users from a wide range of educational and social backgrounds, includingyoung people and women whose paths into drug use were often very different.

For some, it began with friends or the influence of their surroundings.In other cases, there was no obvious economic hardship or psychologicaldisorder to explain why drug use began.

One case remains particularly striking to Al-Basri.

A young man had tattooed the name of his drug supplier on his forearm.The same person had helped him commit thefts and played a central role indrawing him into a life that eventually led to prison. Yet the young man remaineddeeply attached to him.

For Al-Basri, the affection and attention he received from the supplierwere things he had not found within his own family. What began as arelationship built around drugs had also filled an emotional void.

The case pointed to vulnerabilities that can exist long before drug usebegins: gaps in family support, awareness and emotional care. It alsoillustrated why drug use cannot easily be tied to a particular social class orlevel of education.

Among the users Al-Basri has encountered were doctors, universityacademics, pharmacists and religious reciters. Some turned to drugs whileexperiencing psychological distress.

For others, seeking help can be difficult. Stigma and fear of socialjudgment can discourage people from seeking psychiatric care or treatment,Al-Basri noted. “By the time they seek help, if they do at all, occasional usemay already have developed into dependence.”

That has pushed authorities to place greater emphasis on reaching peoplebefore drug use reaches that point. The Directorate has expanded its awarenesscampaigns through videos, television appearances, printed materials, seminarsin schools and universities, community and neighborhood meetings, andspecialist workshops.

The Directorate is also seeking to bring social media influencers andcivil society organizations into those efforts. At public events, it has usedmobile museums to warn about the dangers of drugs, extending the campaignbeyond police stations and courtrooms and into the communities where preventionbegins.

The shift reflects a broader reality of the trade. Seizures can removeshipments from the streets, and arrests can dismantle trafficking networks, butneither addresses the demand that keeps the market moving. The fight againstdrugs therefore stretches well beyond the desert routes where shipments areintercepted: it reaches into families, schools, prisons and communities, wherepreventing the next user can matter as much as stopping the next shipment.

Read more: Iraq fights back against synthetic drug flood engulfing the Middle East

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The Iraqi Badia —the arid steppe that fringes the country's western andsouthern deserts— is one of the largest tracts of ground the state has to keepwatch over, and one of the emptiest. It runs unbroken across three provinces,from Rutba in the far west of Al-Anbar, through the desert of Najaf, down toNuqrat al-Salman in Al-Muthanna.

Paved roads are few, and the security posts that do exist sit far apart,separated by distances a patrol cannot close quickly. Holding it means coveringland measured not in neighborhoods but in tens of thousands of squarekilometers, with a thin line of troops, berms, trenches, and aircraft.

In Rutba, which spans roughly 90,000 square kilometers against theSyrian and Saudi borders, the district's qaimaqam, Imad al-Dulaimi, tellsShafaq News that the security picture has held steady for years, with raids andsweeps continuing and the frontier tightly monitored through the deployment ofBorder Guard forces and coordination among various security formations. Anyactivity detected, he adds, involves small groups of three or four peoplerather than organized movements.

Part of what makes that possible has less to do with troops than withpeople. Along the desert's edges, herders and residents move only through fixedpoints, where their names are logged and they are screened, and where, byal-Dulaimi's account, they double as “informal eyes” for the security agencies.It is a pattern that repeats east across the Badia: at Najaf's desert margins,nine crossings tie the sand to the city, and anyone entering to graze, farm, ortravel has a file opened recording where they live and how they were vetted. Interrain where a fixed post cannot see past the next rise, the movement of civiliansbecomes its own form of surveillance.

Read more: Iraq’s western desert from ISIS hideouts to new security challenges

In Najaf, the line secured by state forces is marked by a trench andberm stretching about 155 kilometers, with fixed posts along its length, weeklypatrols, and monthly inspection rounds, according to Hadi al-Khafaji, chief ofstaff of the Imam Ali Combat Division within the Popular Mobilization Forces(PMF). The desert basin behind it covers about 38,000 square kilometers, itseastern flank held by his forces and its western flank, along the Saudi border,by the Border Guard.

Farther south, in Al-Muthanna, the burden falls to the Badia OperationsCommand under Major General Imad al-Maliki, which —according to a securitysource, the anonymity routine for Iraqi military matters— fields three brigadesto secure the Nuqrat al-Salman and Basiya deserts along with the al-Shabakastretch belonging to Najaf, leaning on armed and reconnaissance aircraft towatch ground its units cannot permanently occupy.

Taken together, the official account is one of stability maintained bypresence: hold the line, screen the crossings, patrol what you can, fly overthe rest.

That is where the reassurance meets its limit. Speaking with ShafaqNews, Khaldoun Hazem, an independent security analyst, does not dispute thatthe pieces are in place; he questions whether presence, by itself, amounts tocontrol. “There is no such thing as absolute security,” he says, “and gaps areinevitable; smugglers and militants make a living finding them along bordersand in open desert.”

The command in al-Muthanna he calls a genuine and overdue addition,filling a gap between existing operations in al-Jazira, al-Anbar, and Karbala.But the gap was real because the ground had gone under-watched for longstretches, he says, and serious infiltrations had happened there, includingaccounts that the area had previously been used to launch drones towardneighboring countries. In his view, establishing a command alone would notaddress what the area needs most: sustained intelligence and continuoussurveillance rather than simply deploying more personnel to remote positions.

His prescription is drones over troops. Unmanned aircraft, he argues,track more ground, more precisely, and unsettle anyone trying to move throughit simply by being overhead, work that ground units strain to do acrossdistances this large and for periods this long. He wants squadrons attached toarmy aviation and put to more than military use: watching the borders, chasingsmugglers, guarding the oil lines that cross the emptiness. As for the groupmost associated with the desert, he places it elsewhere, “not primarily in thisstretch but in Wadi Hauran toward Tharthar,” a long desert valley whose ravineshave long given fighters cover, terrain he calls vulnerable andunder-resourced.

What Hazem is describing is a different way of holding the same ground,not a longer line or a bigger garrison, but eyes that stay up when the patrolsgo home, and intelligence that reaches a post before a threat does. Between the90,000 square kilometers of Rutba, the 38,000 of the Najaf basin, the155-kilometer berm, and a new command in the south, the Iraqi desert remainsone expanse under many hands. The forces on it can say, accurately, that theline has held. Whether holding the line is the same as holding the desert isthe part no one has settled.

Read more: ISIS regroups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon: a new strategy?

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraqi journalists arefacing growing difficulties in obtaining official information as severalministries and government institutions lack designated spokespersons and someofficials decline to comment, forcing reporters to rely on leaks andinformation circulating on social media.

A draft Right ofAccess to Information Law, approved by the Council of Ministers and referred toparliament, remains under discussion as lawmakers consider amendments to someof its provisions. The legislation aims to strengthen transparency and allow citizens,journalists, and researchers to request official data, but has not yet takeneffect.

Interviewed by ShafaqNews, Wissam al-Mulla, a member of the Alliance for the Defense of Freedom ofExpression in Iraq, described the absence of official spokespersons at manyministries as a major obstacle for journalists seeking information from governmentinstitutions and other organizations.

“Some officialspokespersons refuse to give statements and rely solely on written releases,”al-Mulla noted, pointing to “excessive bureaucracy within governmentinstitutions.”

Al-Mulla alsoidentified the lack of laws protecting journalists and guaranteeing transparentaccess to information as a major challenge. He argued that some provisions ofthe current draft could restrict journalists and potentially expose them toimprisonment.

“Parliament shouldconsult journalists and civil society organizations before passing thelegislation and amend provisions that could restrict access to information.” Healso urged ministries to appoint official spokespersons to improve transparencyand limit the spread of inaccurate or misleading information on social media.

Alaa Najah, anacademic at the University of Iraq’s College of Media, told Shafaq News thatprevious governments had faced disputes over the Right of Access to InformationLaw and that its passage would give journalists a stronger basis for obtainingofficial information.

Journalists underprevious governments faced “fierce attacks” from officials, ministers, and somelawmakers, including lawsuits and efforts to silence the media.

According to Najah,the absence of reliable information creates major difficulties for newsorganizations, particularly as social media and digital news outlets haveexpanded.

Read more: The New era of control: Can Iraq's free press survive its politically-tainted rulers?

Media professionalKhattab Adel said withholding information from journalists has pushed newsagencies and correspondents to rely on what is known as “circulatedinformation,” a term that has become increasingly common. In an interview withShafaq News, he linked the lack of professional communication betweenjournalists and ministry spokespersons to the “spread of rumors anddifficulties in field reporting.”

Investigativejournalist Hassan al-Shannoun described obtaining information from officialsources and securing documents needed for journalistic work as increasinglydifficult. “Even obtaining simple information has become a challenge and anobstacle for journalists,” he noted, adding that requests sometimes requirelengthy rounds of calls, official correspondence, and long periods of waitingwithout receiving a response.

Speaking to ShafaqNews, Al-Shannoun argued that the problem reflects an administrative culturethat continues to treat information as something that can be withheld ratherthan as a public right and a tool for transparency.

“Journalism cannotperform its watchdog role if obtaining information is difficult,” al-Shannounargued, adding that transparency cannot be achieved without clear and rapidchannels for accessing official information.

Read more: Rights groups challenge Iraqi bill curbing access to information

Written and edited byShafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi reached the 100-day markon Friday, August 21, facing a series of longstanding crises that successivegovernments have struggled to resolve, from weapons control and corruption tooil exports, water shortages and public finances.

The milestone offers an early test of whether thegovernment's stated priorities can translate into measurable results. Hiscabinet also remains incomplete. Nine of its 23 ministries, including defense,interior and planning, are still without permanent ministers and remain underacting ministers amid political disputes over candidates and power-sharingarrangements.

Despite the incomplete cabinet, the Council of Ministersapproved a 2026-2029 government program containing 139 priorities across 14sectors and 13 major legislative measures. The program is built around thestated goal of establishing a "stable state, productive economy andbalanced partnerships."

The scale of the agenda highlights the government'sambition, but it also underscores its central challenge: Iraq's most difficultproblems require decisions that carry high political, economic, and securitycosts.

Weapons and Sovereignty

The government's most politically sensitive challenge is itseffort to place all weapons under state authority. Al-Zaidi has set September30 as the deadline for completing the process of bringing all weapons understate control, coinciding with arrangements for the end of the GlobalCoalition's military mission. The Coordination Framework, which brings togetherIraq's main Shiite political forces, agreed in principle to place weapons understate control. The dispute centers on implementation, guarantees and timing.Proposals have included negotiations with Iran-aligned armed factions overarrangements for withdrawing heavy weapons and placing them in state-controlledstorage, in an effort to avoid an internal confrontation.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Khaled Walid, a member of theReconstruction and Development Coalition led by former Prime Minister MohammedShia Al-Sudani, said that weapons control, the withdrawal of foreign forces andprotection of Iraq's territorial integrity will be the “key measures by whichthe government is judged in the months ahead.”

Washington-based political analyst Ramadan Al-Badran saidAl-Zaidi inherited challenges accumulated over years while also confronting newpressures created by regional developments. 

Read more: Iraq's disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions

Al-Badran told Shafaq News that the prime minister is"trying to lay the right foundations" based on national, regional andinternational consensus. He also credited the government with tackling issuesthat previous administrations had not addressed with the same level ofseriousness, particularly corruption and weapons control.

But progress on these fronts remains difficult to measure.The government has established a policy direction, yet implementation willdepend on political consensus, institutional capacity and the willingness ofpowerful actors to accept greater state control.

Diplomacy as Crisis Management

Al-Zaidi has also intensified Iraq's regional andinternational diplomacy, travelling to the United States, Iran, and Turkiye,while pursuing broader outreach to Arab states to strengthen Baghdad's ties andshield Iraq from wider confrontation.

The Washington visit resulted in 48 agreements and memorandaof understanding with US and international companies and institutions, coveringenergy, investment, infrastructure, technology, healthcare and other sectors.

In Tehran, discussions focused on regional de-escalation andBaghdad's potential role as a channel for dialogue, alongside energy,agriculture and bilateral cooperation.

Read more: Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality or growing isolation?

Oil: The Immediate Economic Test

Oil exports remain the government's most pressing economicvulnerability. Disruptions to Iraq's traditional export routes, combined withtensions between Iran and the United States and instability around the Straitof Hormuz, have added pressure to public finances that remain heavily dependenton oil revenues.

Lawmaker Uday Al-Zamili told Shafaq News that the oil exportcrisis still lacks "effective solutions," arguing that the governmenthas so far relied largely on proposals and arrangements whose details have notbeen fully presented to parliament. 

Al-Zamili also sought details on how the Iraqi-Turkisharrangement would work to export around one million barrels per day throughTurkish ports, saying parliament needed greater clarity over Iraq's financial returnsand whether the arrangement could also advance other bilateral issues,including water and trade. 

Read more: Iraq-US investment deals depend on implementation, experts say

The issue is particularly sensitive because oil revenuesdirectly underpin salaries and public spending. On August 17, Al-Zaidi held anexpanded meeting with oil-sector officials and the oil and finance ministers,calling for urgent measures to address export routes and the crisis's effects.

The challenge goes beyond maintaining production. Iraq mustalso ensure that it has reliable routes to international markets and sufficientfinancial flexibility to withstand disruptions.

Iraqi oil shipments are already moving through theIraq-Syria border crossings, providing Baghdad with an overland alternative toits traditional export routes. In early May, Iraq launched its first crude oilshipment through the Rabia–Al-Yarubiyah crossing, sending an initial 70 tankertrucks toward regional markets. Subsequent shipments ranged from 15 to 40tankers a day.

Reform Beyond Oil

At the same time, the government is seeking to reduce thestate's dependence on oil by increasing non-oil revenues, reforming thebanking, tax and customs systems, and encouraging investment and private-sectoractivity.

Walid described Al-Zaidi's administration primarily as a"government managing a political, economic and security crisis,"pointing to the wider consequences of regional conflict and instability.

He said the government was looking for new ways to increasenon-oil revenues, diversify oil export routes, limit operating expenditure andreform state institutions while strengthening anti-corruption measures.

Al-Zaidi also sought during his July visits to Washington,Tehran and Ankara to keep diplomatic channels open and contain the impact ofregional tensions on Iraq. But Walid noted that the ultimate measure of thegovernment's performance will be its ability to turn plans and promises intotangible results. He identified corruption and weapons control as the twoissues likely to weigh most heavily on the government's performance through theend of the year.

Water Adds Another Pressure Point

Drought and declining water inflows have placed additionalpressure on Iraq's already vulnerable water resources. Yet Turhan Al-Mufti, theprime minister's adviser on water affairs, offers a more positive assessment,saying water conditions during the summer of 2026 are three to four timesbetter than those recorded the previous year.

Al-Mufti told Shafaq News that the government is relying onagreements with Turkiye, including a framework agreement on water and amemorandum on financing water-related projects. He explained that the twoarrangements are expected to enter into force in September and provide a basisfor more sustainable water supplies.

Read more: Iraq’s water crisis deepens: Reserves collapse, mismanagement continues

Corruption as an Early Test

The government placed corruption near the top of its agendafrom the outset. On June 28, it launched an anti-corruption campaign dubbed the“Dawn Crackdown”, and took legal and oversight measures against prominentpolitical and administrative figures, in a move supporters described asdifferent from the approach of previous governments.

The prime minister's financial adviser, Mudher MohammedSaleh, has argued that the government should not be judged simply by the numberof days it has been in office, but by the course it set from the beginning. 

Read more: Corruption arrests in Iraq pass 210 under PM al-Zaidi

Speaking to Shafaq News, Saleh said the government hadplaced anti-corruption efforts among its leading priorities and sought to movethe issue beyond political rhetoric toward institutional oversight,accountability and the recovery of public funds.

At 100 days, Al-Zaidi's government has set out an ambitiousagenda and taken on several politically sensitive issues, but its mostconsequential tests lie ahead. Completing the cabinet, bringing all weaponsunder state control, securing reliable oil-export routes, protecting publicfinances and turning anti-corruption measures into sustained institutionalaction will determine whether the government's first year delivers lastingchange.

The central question is: can Al-Zaidi build the politicalconsensus and institutional capacity needed to address them?

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq news

Nearly 20 months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad'sgovernment on December 8, 2024, relations between Iraq and Syria are movingfrom a period of anxiety and caution toward a new phase marked by greatercommunication and pragmatism.

The relationship has never followed the pattern ofnormal ties between neighboring states. Throughout its history, Iraq-Syriarelations have been shaped by complex political and security calculations, withtheir trajectory repeatedly changing according to the balance of power andcircumstances in both countries.

The rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa to the Syrian presidencyinitially became one of Baghdad's main sources of concern. Yet contacts betweenthe two countries soon began at the intelligence level, taking an increasinglycontainment-oriented approach. Gradually, Iraq's rhetoric shifted fromexpressing multiple security and political concerns toward cautious,incremental engagement.

The evolution can be seen in the changing language ofNouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law coalition. On February 19, 2025,al-Maliki held al-Sharaa responsible for killings and destruction that hadaffected Iraqis in previous years. Less than a year later, on February 4, 2026,he described al-Sharaa as a brother and said he was prepared to establishbilateral relations with Damascus if he won the elections. At the same time, hedirectly accused Bashar al-Assad of having "exported terrorism" toIraq throughout his years in power.

The shift does not mean that all differences havedisappeared. Rather, it reflects Baghdad's growing assessment that engagementwith Damascus is becoming necessary to address shared security, political andeconomic interests.

Over the past year and a half, several major issueshave begun to shape the relationship: security cooperation, the Kurdish issue, judicial coordination, and economic ties, particularly oil transportation. Thelatter has gained additional urgency amid the crisis created by the closure ofthe Strait of Hormuz during the ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran, the route formost of Iraq's seaborne crude exports.

A Relationship Still Marked by an Imbalance

Despite the expanding contacts, the road betweenBaghdad and Damascus is not yet free of obstacles. The imbalance in officialvisits remains particularly visible.

Iraqi officials have made a succession of visits toDamascus, including National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri,Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzaniand, most recently, Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidan.

Syrian official visits to Baghdad, by contrast, haveremained limited. They have largely consisted of two visits by Foreign MinisterAsaad al-Shaibani in 2025: one ahead of the Arab Summit hosted by Baghdad andanother during the summit itself.

Al-Sharaa has not yet visited Baghdad, for reasonsthat remain present on both the Iraqi and Syrian sides. One of the mostprominent has been the Iraqi political debate over whether to host the Syrianpresident.

Recent developments, however, suggest that this phasemay increasingly belong to the past. The succession of high-level visits, mostrecently Zidan's trip to Damascus, points to a relationship moving toward amore regular institutional framework.

Faiq Zidan's Visit: Important, But not Enough

The visit by Zidan carries particular significancebecause it expanded bilateral engagement into the judicial sphere.

Baghdad-based political analyst Sabah al-Akaili saidthe visit was important, but it should be followed by reciprocal visitsinvolving security, economic, and political officials. “Iraq and Syria need toconsolidate balanced relations at a time when the region is going through acritical phase.”

He pointed to the historical relationship between thetwo countries and their mutual interests as reasons for greater coordination.

ISIS detainees transferred to Iraqi prisons were amongthe main issues discussed during the meetings, alongside judicial and legalcooperation, the exchange of expertise, transitional justice, transparency,combating corruption, and other shared judicial cases.

Read more: From Syrian prisons to Iraqi provinces

The ISIS file naturally occupies a central position inthe judicial track. Iraq holds around 7,000 members of the organization, withat least 3,000 of them being Syrian nationals.

Al-Akili argued that coordination over trials,transfers, and legal procedures has become both a security and judicialnecessity. The issue also extends to the possibility that individuals wanted byIraqi courts may be present inside Syria.

Baghdad's Fears: A Historical Backdrop

Iraq's concerns have been deeply connected to itsroughly 600-kilometer border with Syria.

For many Iraqi officials, the collapse of al-Assad'sgovernment presented the possibility of a new security vacuum that could beexploited by ISIS cells and other armed groups to carry out attacks in bothcountries.

Al-Sharaa's background added another layer to thoseconcerns. His previous association with al-Qaeda in Iraq under the name of AbuMohammad Al-Joulani became a major point of anxiety among Iraqi political andsecurity circles. Baghdad was also concerned about the fate of Syrian prisonsand camps holding ISIS members and their families in northeastern Syria.

Another factor was the presence of Iraqi armedfactions and their networks inside Syria. The fall of al-Assad raised questionsabout what would happen to existing arrangements of influence and regionalsupply lines.

During the initial period, Baghdad therefore adopted ahighly cautious position. It did not rush toward full political recognition ofthe new reality in Damascus, instead monitoring the behavior of the new Syrianadministration while seeking answers about border security, terrorism, and thefuture of detainees.

On December 26, 2024, just 18 days after al-Assad'sfall, National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri arrived in Damascusat the head of a senior delegation to meet the new Syrian administration. Itwas the first major and direct Iraqi contact with the new authorities whileformal political relations between Baghdad and Damascus remained largelyfrozen.

The visit was more than a brief security contact. Itcarried messages concerning border control, preventing armed groups fromentering Iraq, the fate of ISIS members, and the prisons holding them. Theatmosphere was so tense at the time that al-Sharaa's reception of al-Shatrisparked widespread debate after the Syrian president was seen carrying hispersonal weapon.

On April 25, 2025, al-Shatri returned to Damascus atthe head of a broader Iraqi government delegation that included officials fromthe Border Forces, the Border Crossings Authority and the ministries of oil andtrade. The agenda was no longer limited to security. Both sides discussedcounterterrorism, trade and the possibility of re-exporting Iraqi oil throughSyrian ports on the Mediterranean.

The Iraqi tone gradually changed, while Syriancommunication with Baghdad also expanded.

On August 28, 2025, al-Shatri made a third visit toDamascus and met al-Sharaa. Their discussions covered border security,counterterrorism, and the situation of the Iraqi community in Syria.

Meanwhile, the issue of ISIS families in al-Hol campmoved toward a solution. Iraq received most of the families transferred fromthe camp and continued to place them in social reintegration programs.

During his visit to Baghdad on March 14, 2025,al-Shaibani met Iraqi officials and said the new Syrian administration wantedto strengthen relations with Iraq, cooperate to prevent foreign interference,and confront the challenges of reconstruction.

Expanding Contacts: Energy Diplomacy?

The clearest expansion of the relationship came onJune 29, 2026, when Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein visited Damascus in his firstofficial trip to Syria. He met al-Sharaa at the People's Palace, withdiscussions focusing on strengthening bilateral relations and coordinatingpositions on shared challenges.

A week later, Iraq and Syria held their first publiclyannounced border meeting between their border forces in the al-Qaim area. Themeeting addressed mechanisms for field coordination, information sharing, andcontrol of the border strip.

Energy cooperation had already begun developing on aparallel track. On March 31, 2026, the first shipments of Iraqi oil weretransported by tanker trucks through the al-Waleed border crossing towardBaniyas. On April 1, the first convoys carrying Iraqi fuel oil crossed throughal-Tanf toward Baniyas.

The discussion subsequently expanded to therehabilitation of the historic Kirkuk-Haditha-Baniyas pipeline, with US supportfor the project and Iraqi-Syrian talks on expanding its capacity.

The project has acquired additional importance asregional tensions threaten conventional export routes. Diversifying Iraq'saccess to Mediterranean markets could provide Baghdad with an alternative toroutes exposed to disruption around the Gulf.

Al-Akaili described the energy file as activated butstill "below the level of ambition." He argued that continuinginstability around the Strait of Hormuz makes cooperation with Syria on oilexports more urgent, while stressing that such cooperation requires clearagreements between the two countries.

Nechirvan Barzani's Role

The visits by Iraqi officials to Syria have beenaccompanied by another important channel: the engagement of Kurdistan Region ofIraq President Nechirvan Barzani, whose role has built on previous meetings andcontacts between Erbil and Damascus.

On April 17, 2026, he met al-Sharaa on the sidelinesof the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Their discussions covered relations among theKurdistan Region, Iraq, and Syria, particularly in the economic and tradefields. They also discussed regional developments, the situation of Kurds andother communities in Syria, and the agreement between Damascus and the SyrianDemocratic Forces (SDF).

Days earlier, on April 6, al-Sharaa had spoken bytelephone with Barzani, discussing regional developments, Iraqi-Syrianrelations, and the situation of Kurds and other communities in Syria. Al-Sharaaalso condemned attacks targeting the Kurdistan Region amid the US-Israeli warwith Iran.

On August 3, Barzani traveled to Damascus and metal-Sharaa, further reinforcing the emerging channel between Erbil and theSyrian capital.

Kurdish politician Abdul-Salam Barwari, speaking toShafaq News, said Barzani could play a role in easing tensions that accompaniedthe arrival of Syria's new authorities.

"Iraq and Syria are neighbors and must try tofind harmony, because each needs the other," Barwari said, noting that thecircumstances surrounding the arrival of the new authorities in Damascus hadcreated tensions inside Baghdad.

"Barzani is capable of helping ease thesetensions," he added, stressing that Barzani's movement between Erbil,Baghdad and Damascus could help open the way for more reciprocal visits.

Barwari also identified the Baniyas pipeline,counterterrorism, and Iraqi-Syrian coordination as among the issues connectedto this broader diplomatic track.

Barzani's engagement has also extended beyondrelations between Erbil and Damascus. As previous Shafaq News interviews withobservers have highlighted, northeastern Syria places three principal actors inthe same equation: Damascus, Syrian Kurdish forces and Baghdad, alongside theUnited States, Turkiye and other regional actors.

By hosting SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and maintainingcontacts over the future of the SDF, Erbil has sought to help prevent theprocess of integrating Syria's civilian and military institutions from turninginto another confrontation.

The position emerging from Barzani's diplomacy restson a clear formula: a unified and stable Syria, while safeguarding the rightsof Kurds and other communities, Barwari affirmed.

A New Phase

Syrian researcher Ahmad Kamel believes that thedevelopments cannot be separated from the political changes that have takenplace in both countries.

Syria, he observed, has entered a new era, while Iraqis also experiencing a significant political transition. Kamel noted that thecurrent Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, as well as theprevious government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, had sought to establish goodrelations with Syria. Iraq's new government was sworn in under al-Zaidi in May2026.

"The success of the new Iraqi government inplacing weapons under state control and ending the phenomenon of armed militiaswill put Iraq before a new phase.”

He indicated that Damascus is responding positively toBaghdad's outreach and seeking a relationship based on common interests and themanagement of shared risks.

"Damascus is returning the greeting with an equalor better one."

"Relations are becoming institutionalized, butremain asymmetric, cautious and incomplete," he added, linking thedevelopment to what he described as a new economic geography in the region.

Kamel contended that Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan andTurkiye could together form an alternative network to maritime corridors thatare increasingly exposed to risk.

Kamel pointed to increased truck traffic between Iraqand Syria and efforts to rehabilitate oil pipelines as evidence that “what wasmerely a political concept has begun turning into economic realities.”

Read more: Syria’s calm: An end to threat or a start of a complex security phase for Iraq?

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraqis are asking chatbots for homework help and running government errands through their phones –in a country where the power still cuts out most summer afternoons. Artificial intelligence has arrived well ahead of the infrastructure meant to carry it.

As Baghdad pushes its digital transformation forward, AI has become a test of whether Iraq can modernize its institutions fast enough to keep pace with a technology already reshaping the world. The country sits 107th in the Government AI Readiness Index 2025, and its problem is not access to the tools, but building the foundations to use them.

Readiness takes more than software. Countries reap AI's benefits only when reliable infrastructure meets clear regulation, capable institutions, and professionals who can fold the technology into daily operations without sacrificing security, accountability, or public trust. Iraq's score (40.91 out of 100) reflects weaknesses that run through its entire technological landscape. Government databases are fragmented, coordination between institutions is thin, and many public bodies still lack the digital plumbing that advanced AI requires.

Dr. Safad al-Shammari, head of the Baghdad Foundation for Digital Communication and a professor of digital media at the University of Baghdad, told Shafaq News that AI is already woven into daily life, "from smartphones and major institutions to warfare."

For al-Shammari, the pace of that change raises questions that reach beyond the technology. As machines take on work once considered uniquely human —writing, analysis, judgment— the debate over how people and technology coexist only intensifies. Yet he also sees real opportunity for countries trying to modernize. Smart systems, he noted, are already sharpening disease detection and treatment in healthcare, while AI-driven tools are tailoring lessons to individual students.

Read more: Brainpower and bytes: Iraq's race for AI supremacy

The Government AI Readiness Index grades countries on digital infrastructure, innovation capacity, human capital, and regulatory preparedness. Iraq lags on all four. Haider Najm al-Alaq, spokesman for Iraq's Communications and Media Commission, said successful adoption depends on modern technology, sound regulation, and professionals capable of managing systems that grow more complex by the year. “Getting there will demand investment in data centers, cloud computing, and telecom networks, along with expanded training and AI instruction built into the education system.”

Technology alone, though, will not decide the outcome.

Dr. Muslim Abbas, an academic and researcher in media and digital studies, argued that adoption hinges on how institutions work, not on the hardware they buy. Many Iraqi bodies still run on outdated administrative systems, he said, adopting AI through one-off initiatives rather than strategies designed to overhaul public administration. Platforms are multiplying, but without integrated databases and modern administrative structures, much of AI's promise stays out of reach.

That institutional weakness sits atop a shakier physical layer. For years, the government has widened digital governance through platforms like the Ur e-services system, which now delivers hundreds of services across ministries and state institutions. Paperwork, administrative procedures, and public transactions are steadily moving online as Iraq tries to close a long-standing gap in e-government.

The shift has coincided with a surge in connectivity. The Ministry of Communications counts 21.4 million internet subscribers, while mobile subscriptions have overtaken the country's population of 45 million, a measure of how completely Iraqis have come to depend on their phones.

But access has outpaced quality. Speeds remain uneven, especially outside the big cities. Figures from Ookla and DataReportal put Iraq's median fixed broadband between roughly 34 and 42 Mbps through 2025, with mobile speeds ranging from 36 to 56 Mbps. For ordinary users, that means slow downloads and dropped connections. For AI, it is a far steeper barrier.

Read more: Internet in Iraq: Snail-speed service, high costs, and digital divide

Advanced models run on enormous computing power and constant data processing. Training and operating them requires steady electricity, fast networks, industrial cooling, and data centers built to carry heavy workloads around the clock. Dr. Haider Shallal Metaab, an academic specializing in media studies, said weak infrastructure is among the main reasons Iraqi institutions have not gone further with AI.

"Limited data center capacity, cybersecurity vulnerabilities and gaps in communications networks continue to affect organizations' ability to manage large volumes of data and deploy advanced systems," he said.

Power is the chronic weak point, particularly in summer when demand spikes. Aging transmission lines and reliance on imported energy strain the grid further. "Even brief power interruptions can disrupt AI computations, affect data processing and increase operating costs, making reliable electricity as important to artificial intelligence as software itself," Metaab said. Without stable power and resilient networks, he argued, Iraq's AI efforts will stay boxed into a handful of institutional projects.

The foundation is not only physical. Iraq also has to grow the talent to run and advance these systems, and part of that work has started in its universities.

The University of Baghdad opened Iraq's first College of Artificial Intelligence for the 2025–2026 academic year, with programs in biomedical applications, AI systems engineering, big data, and data science. Interest has climbed fast; admission thresholds topped 96 percent in several departments.

Read more: Iraq’s higher education enters the AI era: Promise and obstacles

The appetite reflects a wider shift in a labor market tilting toward technology careers. Iraq has one of the region's youngest populations, nearly 60 percent of its roughly 45 million people are under 25, which keeps relentless pressure on the economy to generate skilled jobs for the graduates entering the workforce each year.

Producing graduates is only half the problem. Specialists, who spoke to Shafaq News, agree that broader adoption will also mean retraining the existing workforce, especially in government and in businesses expected to build the technology into their operations. Skills in data analysis, AI management, and cybersecurity will matter more as organizations move from experimenting with digital tools to depending on them.

For now, Iraq's economy still lacks a mature AI industry to absorb its graduates, and many of its most skilled professionals continue to leave for opportunities abroad. Startups in fintech, software, and digital services have grown, particularly in Baghdad and parts of the Kurdistan Region, where innovation hubs have gained ground in recent years. Even so, the ecosystem is small, only a few dozen startups are building AI products.

Adel al-Ghurairi, a professor of digital media at the University of Baghdad, told Shafaq News that AI, deployed well, could drive gains across industry, energy, and agriculture, supporting sustainable development and helping cut pollution. But he warned that automation cuts both ways: “heavier reliance on intelligent systems could erode traditional jobs and deepen digital unemployment, hitting hardest in the administrative and repetitive roles most exposed to it.

Read more: The new blackmail in Iraq: AI and the exploitation of women

Iraq's position comes into sharper focus alongside neighbors that have moved more aggressively to build AI ecosystems. Over the past decade, several Gulf states have treated the technology not as a standalone initiative but as a pillar of their economic and governance strategies, pouring money into infrastructure, regulation, and partnerships with global tech firms.

The United Arab Emirates has put AI at the heart of its economic diversification, backed by sovereign wealth, advanced infrastructure, and ties to companies like OpenAI and Nvidia; it ranked 13th globally in the 2025 index, the highest in the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia, 22nd, has invested heavily through its Vision 2030 agenda, while Qatar, 32nd, has leaned on research institutions, innovation hubs, and university partnerships.

The difference is not only money. These countries spent years assembling the infrastructure, institutions, and rules that AI adoption depends on. Iraq is still laying groundwork its neighbors finished long ago, work that will demand sustained investment, coherent policy, and long-term planning, along with stronger networks, more capable institutions, and a workforce able to put the technology to use.

"Artificial intelligence is advancing regardless of national readiness," OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman once observed. Iraq's task is to make sure the country advances with it, rather than watching from behind a grid that still can't stay on.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

For generations, Iraqis seeking answers about marriage, children or difficult decisions might have turned to women who read fortunes from coffee cups or used books and dictionaries as forms of divination.

Now, the ritual has moved online.

Across TikTok and other social media platforms, Iraqi women are turning traditional fortune-reading into live-streamed services, answering questions about relationships and major life decisions for fees ranging from 5,000 dinars (about $3.80) to 100,000 dinars (about $76).

For some practitioners, what began as curiosity has become a source of income. “I didn’t practice dictionary readings professionally, and I never thought of it as a way to make money,” Lama Mohsen, who has been offering readings on social media for around two years, told Shafaq News. “I started out of curiosity, reading for relatives and friends. But as more people began asking me, it gradually became regular work.”

The questions she receives are rarely trivial, Mohsen said. Most concern marriage, separation, reconciliation or moving to a new home. Some clients return for another reading when the first answer is not what they hoped to hear.

Old Practice, New Platform

The shift marks a striking change in how a longstanding popular practice reaches its audience. Where readings traditionally took place face to face, with lengthy conversations before an interpretation was offered, social media has reduced the process to a livestream: a viewer submits a question and receives an answer on screen.

Growing demand has also expanded the range of services. Alongside traditional forms of divination using dictionaries, some practitioners now offer tarot readings and astrology-related content.

Sultana Hamid, who has hosted readings on social media for several years, distinguishes tarot from astrology, saying tarot uses a deck of 78 symbol-rich cards selected during a reading, while astrology draws on birth information and the 12 zodiac signs.

For Yusr Malik, however, dictionary-based readings remain more appealing. “The dictionary is one of the popular tools deeply rooted in the minds of women and girls, and they trust it,” she told Shafaq News.

Malik said her TikTok livestreams have attracted a large following and provided her with a steady income.

Seeking Certainty in Uncertainty

The popularity of the services may be about more than predicting the future. Ruqaya Fouad, a regular viewer of TikTok fortune-reading streams, said she turns to them when struggling with difficult decisions.

“Sometimes the khira helps relieve our uncertainty,” she said. “Especially when we are uncertain and cannot make a decision, we turn to the dictionary to try to find some clarity.”

Whatever the method, Fouad said, the answers can have a psychological effect during difficult periods, providing a sense of clarity when circumstances feel uncertain.

Researcher Hassan Abdul Samad cautioned, however, against allowing such readings to determine consequential decisions.

Read more: The fortune-tellers: Spinsters' way of trapping young men into marriage

Some people rely entirely on the result of a khira rather than assessing their circumstances realistically, he told Shafaq News. While a reading may ease psychological pressure for someone struggling with a difficult choice, major decisions should ultimately be based on careful consideration and realistic judgment.

What was once a largely private encounter has acquired a new audience, business model and platform. The dictionary and tarot deck remain much the same; the fortune teller is now on the other side of a smartphone screen.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq is entering a period of heightened tension as September 30, 2026approaches, the deadline set by the State Administration Coalition, whichbrings together the country's leading Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish politicalforces, to bring all weapons under state control.

The deadline comes amid diverging positions among armed factions, withsome supporting the principle while others rejecting it. Tensions have alsointensified following increasingly sharp rhetoric from Kataib Hezbollah in itslatest statement against Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi.

Two competing positions drive the crisis. Baghdad maintains that controlover weapons is a sovereign state responsibility, while several armed factionsinsist that any discussion of their weapons must be tied to the withdrawal ofUS and Turkish forces, the dissolution of the Peshmerga, and an end to"foreign domination over Iraqi decision-making."

Several questions remain unanswered in Iraq: Could the crisis move frompolitical tension to armed confrontation? And what impact will external actors,from the United States to Iran, have on the dispute?

Former State of Law Coalition lawmaker Arif al-Hamami calls thesituation critical as regional and international pressure builds, calling forthe weapons issue to be addressed without "imposition or threats."

In an interview with Shafaq News, al-Hamami says "everyone supportsupholding the law and placing weapons under state control," but anysolution must weigh the range of security threats facing Iraq, among them theactivities of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups operating from Iraqi territory,the presence of Turkish forces, and wider regional developments.

He proposes folding the armed factions into the Popular MobilizationForces (PMF), the state-linked security body —a step that would, in practice,formalize much of their existing footprint, since most of the factions alreadyfield brigades within the PMF.

Al-Hamami also expresses confidence in the "ability of the leadersof the Coordination Framework to contain the crisis" and hopes the Shiitereligious establishment in Najaf, Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, will intervene"to end the dispute."

Read more: Jurf al-Sakhr and Iraq's push to disarm factions

The Religious Establishment's Position

Debate over a possible role for the religious establishment draws onprevious positions by al-Sistani regarding state control over weapons.

On April 11, 2024, during a meeting with the UN secretary-general'srepresentative in Najaf, al-Sistani stressed the need to prevent foreigninterference, uphold the authority of the law, and place weapons under statecontrol.

On June 26, 2025, his representative in Karbala, Abdul-Mahdial-Karbalaei, renewed the call for the state to hold a monopoly on arms,foreign interference to be prevented, and the law to be upheld amid themilitary escalation between Iran and Israel at the time.

More recently, in May 2026, reports emerged that Patriotic ShiiteMovement leader Muqtada al-Sadr and Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had askedal-Sistani to issue a new religious ruling titled "Placing Weapons UnderState Control." According to those reports, the move sought to providereligious cover for efforts to end the presence of weapons outside officialinstitutions.

No such ruling has been issued so far.

Read more: Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality orgrowing isolation?

Diverging Positions

The positions of the various parties remain complicated. The governmentmaintains that any armed activity outside the state framework after September30 will be dealt with according to the Anti-Terrorism Law, while Iraq's fourtop state authorities remain committed to disarming groups outside the state.

In contrast, Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyidal-Shuhada insist on retaining their military capabilities. Other factions,including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali, have taken steps to bring theirarmed activities under state authority.

The government has also begun taking practical steps, including forminga committee to address the situation in Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil province. Thepanel includes representatives from the ministries of Interior, Justice andAgriculture, as well as the PMF.

These moves have coincided with serious security incidents, most notablya drone attack on 17 August targeting the private office of Kurdistan Region ofIraq (KRI) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, along with the residence of theintelligence chief.

The KRI's Counter-Terrorism Service said the two explosive-laden droneswere launched from Iranian territory, though it offered no supporting evidence.Iran rejected the accusation: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called the attack"reckless" and warned Kurdish authorities against "false-flagploys" designed to sow discord between the two neighbors, affirming thatTehran's ties with the Kurdistan Region remain friendly. No Iraqi armed factionclaimed responsibility.

Read more: Days to disarm Iraq's factions: deadline or negotiable ceiling?

Escalation and Factional Demands

The latest escalation also came when Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, a securityofficial with Kataib Hezbollah, warned that "patience is running out"over the government's "provocative and irresponsible actions,"threatening a response based on the principle of "an eye for an eye, andthe aggressor is the wrongdoer."

The group has set three conditions for any talks with the governmentover the weapons issue: the complete withdrawal of US forces and guaranteesthat they will not return; an end to what it describes as American dominationof Iraq's political and economic decisions; and the withdrawal of Turkishforces from northern Iraq and dissolution of the Peshmerga.

The conditions sharply widen the gap between the factions and Baghdadand could complicate efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

Kataib Hezbollah issued the statement days after an unannounced visit toBaghdad by Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran's Quds Force, on August 10. Iraqisources told Shafaq News that the visit addressed the weapons issue and thatQaani urged the factions not to surrender their weapons for now, while avoidingconfrontation with the government and seeking a political settlement.

Meanwhile, some political forces have sought to keep the crisis withinthe political sphere to prevent it from developing into an armed confrontation.Signs of such a possibility emerged following the arrest of a PMF officer, whowas subsequently handed back to the PMF following rapid political intervention.

The Dialogue Track

Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, said the committeeformed by the Coordination Framework to address the issue of state control overweapons would begin its work soon in coordination with the government toestablish appropriate mechanisms for implementation.

His position is significant partly because of its timing. During ameeting with US Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad Joshua Harris, al-Maliki stressedthat the issue should be addressed through "dialogue andunderstanding," while emphasizing that the state and its constitutionalinstitutions must remain the ultimate authority over security and militaryaffairs.

Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Organization, called on all sides toexercise restraint and avoid inflammatory statements. He expressed confidencein the "good intentions" of the prime minister and faction leaderswhile warning against steps that could give external actors grounds tointerfere in Iraqi decision-making.

A US Perspective

In an interview with Shafaq News, Former US Department of Defenseofficial David Des Roches views the establishment of a deadline as "apositive step," but warns that resistance from factions “taking ordersfrom Iran” rather than Iraq could prove "potentially lethal."

The central question, he argues, is whether the Iraqi state is preparedto confront "the Iranian agents in its midst," or whether it willaccept a compromise that amounts to "a new validation of an unacceptablestatus quo."

In Des Roches' assessment, "Iraq is not a sovereign nation"and does not appear ready to confront the internal forces he believes arenecessary to establish full sovereignty. He argues that maintaining "athinly-veiled Iranian presence" may be politically acceptable, but wouldnot be sufficient to lift restrictions on bank transfers and other mechanismsIran uses to evade international and US restrictions, particularly as "theIranian economy continues to crater."

If armed factions refuse to disarm, Des Roches believes Iraq will either"continue to be a partially sovereign nation" or face "a periodof civil war against Iranian proxies," adding that "there really isno other way." He also expects the KRI to "continue to have its owndynamic, separate from the rest of Iraq."

Separating the Two Tracks

In August 2026, the State of Law Coalition reportedly proposedseparating the US withdrawal timetable from the process of disarming the factions,according to a Coordination Framework source who spoke to Shafaq News. Underthe proposal, a transitional period would provide time to build confidence andreassure parties opposed to disarmament.

These concerns coincide with the process of ending the GlobalCoalition's mission in Iraq, scheduled to be completed on September 30, 2026.Factions determined to retain their weapons have cited this deadline as acentral justification for maintaining their military capabilities.

That raises a fundamental issue: Would confrontation at that pointbecome inevitable if the factions refuse to surrender their weapons?

Confrontation or Integration?

Independent politician Aaed al-Hilali describes the approaching deadlineas making the issue "highly complicated," but does not believe armedconfrontation is inevitable.

Speaking to Shafaq News, al-Hilali argues that Iraq's securityinstitutions are more experienced and capable of managing crises. He alsobelieves political forces understand that any internal confrontation wouldrepresent a loss for everyone and could trigger economic and institutionalfallout.

"The real danger is not the weapons alone, but the crisis of trustbetween the state and the factions and linking the weapons issue to thequestion of the foreign presence," he explains, stressing that "apurely security-based approach could be a gateway to escalation, and armedconfrontation must be the last option, not the first."

Political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi shares this assessment, consideringthe risk of confrontation real but not inevitable. " Iraq has theinstitutional, legal, and security levers to contain escalation, provided thereis a unified government position and no rush to use force," he told ShafaqNews.

For al-Tamimi, the core of the crisis lies in the state's ability toturn disarmament into a phased process negotiated through law and politics,supported by broad backing. He also warns that rejection of the decision bysome factions, combined with rifts inside the government or the securityestablishment, could turn the dispute into open fighting, threatening thecountry's stability.

Security expert Safaa al-Aasam almost completely rules out aconfrontation between the government and the factions.

"There is no armed faction prepared to harm the country's securitybecause they are sons of Iraq," he told Shafaq News, arguing that thedispute is political rather than an indication of an impending armedconfrontation.

He regards placing weapons under state control as a "populardemand" and points to the religious establishment's position that thereshould be a single authority holding weapons.

In his assessment, the dispute is likely to be resolved throughpolitical agreements involving government positions, integration into stateinstitutions, or arrangements under which the weapons would be brought underthe authority of official security institutions.

Read more: Iraq's September deadline undercuts armed factions' case for weapons

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Jurf al-Sakhr, a largely depopulatedfarming district in northern Babil province, has returned to the center ofIraqi politics as Baghdad presses armed groups to place their weapons understate control before a September 30 deadline. More than a decade after it wasretaken from ISIS and renamed Jurf al-Nasr, the district’s residents are stilldisplaced, and parts of the district remain under the control of factionswithin the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the state-linked, mostly Shianetwork of armed groups formed to fight ISIS in 2014.

The dispute now runs on two tracksat once. One is humanitarian: thousands of families who fled a decade ago havenever been allowed home. The other is strategic: the same closed zone has beennamed in successive official reports as a base for armed factions and a targetof foreign airstrikes.

A Strategic Pocket South Of Baghdad

Jurf al-Sakhr sits roughly 60kilometers southwest of Baghdad and about 13 kilometers north of the town ofal-Musayyib. Its orchards, irrigation drains, and waterlogged flats are hard topolice, and it straddles routes linking the capital to central and southernIraq, including the Shia holy cities of Karbala and Najaf, and to Al-Anbarprovince in the west.

That geography made the area asecurity problem long before ISIS. After the 2003 US-led invasion, the districtfell inside what Iraqi forces called the Triangle of Death, the farming beltdirectly south of Baghdad, taking in Mahmoudiyah, Latifiyah, and Yusufiyah andreaching Iskandariya and Jurf al-Sakhr, where al-Qaeda and other armed groupsexploited the terrain during the sectarian war. The same name is now also usedfor a separate northern zone across Diyala, Kirkuk, and Saladin provinces.

When ISIS swept through in 2014,Jurf al-Sakhr became one of its footholds in northern Babil, and displacementbegan even before the fight to retake it; the Iraqi Red Crescent Societyreported in May 2014 that roughly 900 families had already fled areas tied tothe district.

From Battlefield To Sealed Zone

The turning point came that autumn.An operation known as the Ashura offensive began on October 23, 2014, drawingIraqi forces and PMF factions, and the district was retaken within days. Iraqiauthorities argued at the time that leaving ISIS in place there would havethreatened the approaches to Karbala, Najaf, and Babil.

Recapture did not reopen it. Theforces and factions that fought there stayed, and Jurf al-Sakhr hardened into aclosed military zone where the armed factions maintained a dominant securitypresence. Several groups controlled it in the early years, among them KataibHezbollah, one of the most powerful Iran-aligned factions inside the PMF.

Hassan Fad'am, a former member ofparliament for Babil and a leader in the al-Hikma movement of Ammar al-Hakim, aShia political bloc that maintains no armed factions, says more than 70 percentof residents left during ISIS rule rather than after liberation, and thattroops who entered afterward found the district "fully mined andbooby-trapped." Clearing it, he argues, would require extensive technicalwork and government resources, and the case should not become a sectarian orpolitical weapon. Residents and opponents of the factions counter that aclosure now approaching twelve years exceeded any demining rationale and becamea permanent military and political fact.

Read more: Days to disarm Iraq's factions: deadline or negotiable ceiling?

Twelve Years Of Displacement

Government figures over the past twoyears show the displacement crisis remains, though the numbers shift with eachregistration cycle. Iraq's Ministry of Migration and Displacement said in May2024 that about 6,000 displaced families from Jurf al-Sakhr had yet to return.

For those still out, the lossextends beyond housing. Political researcher Abdul Qader al-Nayel says someresidents have spent close to a decade in displacement camps, pointing to theBzeibez camp in Al-Anbar province, which he estimates now holds between 1,360and 1,400 families. Most were farmers, he notes, and many now depend on aidafter losing their land and orchards, with years of displacement taking agrowing toll on families and children's access to basic services.

Read more: What happens to Iraq's armed factions after September 30?

A Wider Map Of Areas Outside StateControl

Security sources describe Jurfal-Sakhr as one of several areas where the state's authority remains limited.One source told Shafaq News that close to 20 armed groups and factions holdterritory where the army and police are kept out, and security cordons areimposed by the factions themselves. Another source pointed to weapons workshopsand depots inside several of them, said to hold drones and Iranian medium- andlong-range missiles, along with unofficial prisons and detention sites.

In Iraqi commentary, these placesare often called the depopulated, or "dark," cities. Their combinedpre-displacement population, according to figures provided by the securitysource, is put at around 1.25 million people, almost all Sunni, now spreadacross 13 camps in Al-Anbar, the outskirts of Baghdad, Saladin, and Nineveh,and across Erbil, Al-Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok in the Kurdistan Region. Together,the zones cover more than 3,000 square kilometers. Besides Jurf al-Sakhr, theyinclude parts of al-Musayyib and the area east of Latifiyah in northern Babil;al-Awja, and the outskirts of Tikrit in Saladin; and stretches of Al-Anbar andNineveh that run to the Syrian border.

Senior Sunni politicians havedescribed Jurf al-Sakhr in blunt terms. Muhammad al-Halbousi, head of Taqadum,the largest Sunni party, called it a camp for the armed factions that “no oneis able to enter.”

Read more: Iraq's September deadline undercuts armed factions' case for weapons

A Site Linked To Weapons And Strikes

What sets Jurf al-Sakhr apart fromother cases of post-ISIS displacement is the military activity reported insideit. In 2018, Reuters reported, citing Iranian officials and Iraqi and Westernintelligence sources, that Iran had moved short-range ballistic missiles toIraq and named the district among sites said to be used for storage. Laterreports pointed to workshops said to be developing missiles and drones, claimsthat have deepened the secrecy around the area without independentconfirmation.

The district has also been struckrepeatedly. Sites inside it were hit in a US strike in January 2024, and againon July 30, 2024, when the PMF Commission said four of its members were killedin three strikes on one of its positions; Washington described that strike asdefensive, launched after it detected preparations for an attack on US forces.Two further rounds of airstrikes hit PMF sites in the district on February 28and March 31, 2026; reports attributed those to the United States and Israel,though neither formally claimed responsibility.

A Symbol In Iraq's SectarianPolitics

Over the years, the district hasbecome shorthand for Iraq's wider Sunni-Shia and state-versus-faction disputes.In 2017, the Babil provincial council voted to pursue political actors whodemanded the return of the displaced, while Sunni politicians kept pressing forit. In April 2023, the head of the Sunni-led Sovereignty Alliance (Al-Siyada),Khamis al-Khanjar, declared, "We will pray in Jurf soon," a referenceto the residents' return that drew a sharp rejection from faction leaders, whowarned against readmitting people they accuse of ISIS ties.

That accusation is what makes theissue so combustible, since almost any statement about Jurf al-Sakhr can beread along sectarian lines. Fad'am warns against turning it into a sectarian,political, or media issue, arguing that such framing has itself blockedreturns.

“Years in the camps have bred a deepsense of grievance and weakened residents' trust in the state, makingreconciliation harder the longer it lasts,” Al-Nayel adds.

Read more: Jurf Al-Sakhar: A decade on, Iraq's displaced still barred from return

The Government's Next Move

The latest return to prominence istied directly to Baghdad's push for a state monopoly on weapons. The governmentof Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, who took office in May 2026 backed by the StateAdministration Coalition, a grouping of Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish parties, andwith US support, has set September 30 as the deadline for armed groups to bringtheir weapons under state control, a date that also marks the scheduled end ofthe US-led coalition's mission in Iraq. Government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudihas said any weapons outside state institutions after that date will be treatedunder the law, including counter-terrorism law. Kataib Hezbollah is among thefactions that have tied the future of their weapons to the withdrawal offoreign forces.

Against that backdrop, a governmentcommittee grouping the interior, justice, and agriculture ministries with thePMF Commission has begun fieldwork in Jurf al-Sakhr, where Kataib Hezbollahcontrols security in parts of the area. The broader plan relies on restrictingaccess to sensitive sites rather than conducting direct raids, in an effort toavoid armed confrontation.

The competing readings persist.Babil provincial council member Mohammed al-Mansouri frames the question not asa choice between reopening the district and keeping it closed, but as a duty toreturn residents while safeguarding the province, noting that Babil haspreviously been attacked from areas near the district.

Security expert Sarmad al-Bayatiargues the issue has been left unresolved so long that it has taken “on thequality of a myth, thickened by years of political and media claims,” and saysany settlement must begin by bringing the federal government, the securityservices, the factions, and the residents to one table to fix the area's legaland security status before mapping a route home.

For now, any path toward resolvingJurf al-Sakhr runs through the committee's work and the Sept. 30 deadline,after which al-Aboudi says weapons held outside state control will be subjectto legal action.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.