Shafaq News- Baghdad

A power gap of nearly 40,000 megawatts is forcing Iraq tolean more heavily on private generators this summer, with demand exceeding60,000 MW and protests spreading over worsening cuts in several provinces.

The government has moved to support the private generatornetwork, now a daily lifeline for millions of Iraqis, after Prime Minister AliAl-Zaidi received a delegation representing generator owners in the presence ofthe electricity minister and directed authorities to ease procedures forsecuring fuel. The Oil Ministry has also approved supplying generators withsubsidized fuel for three months at around $0.15 per liter instead of $0.31, ina bid to stabilize ampere prices and reduce pressure on households alreadypaying for power outside the national grid.

Ahmad Mousa Al-Abadi, an electricity and energy specialistand former spokesperson for the Ministry of Electricity, told Shafaq News thatthe decision is an attempt to ease pressure on the grid and prevent generatorsubscription prices from rising, but its success depends on steady fuelsupplies and field monitoring.

The ministry had warned early that the current summer wouldbe among the hardest for the power system because of shortages in fuel and gasfeeding power stations, he added. Shortages in local and imported gas havedirectly reduced production, while alternatives such as liquefied gas platformsand electricity interconnection lines have slowed because of regionalconditions and financial pressure.

The deficit extends to transmission and distribution, wherelosses still reach about 60%, alongside “aging grid sections and rising loads”caused by urban expansion and new residential areas.

In Al-Anbar, the local government announced that theprovince receives only 600 to 650 MW, although its actual need ranges between2,700 and 3,000 MW, leaving residents with no more than six to eight hours ofpublic supply a day.

Basra, Iraq’s main oil province, has entered scheduled cutsfor the first time in years, with four hours of supply followed by two hours ofoutage after production fell to about 3,150 MW against demand exceeding 5,500MW this summer. According to operating data from the Southern Control Center,gas supplies feeding Basra’s power stations have dropped from about 28 millioncubic meters per day in summer 2025 to nearly 9 million now, alongside thesuspension of some import lines.

Protesters in Al-Diwaniyah’s Ghammas district also blockedthe Al-Diwaniyah-Najaf road to demand a higher electricity share, arguing thatcuts had exceeded five hours for every one hour of supply.

The Ministry of Electricity says power is distributedaccording to ratios approved by the Higher Committee for Coordination amongProvinces, with Baghdad receiving 27.07% of the energy allocated to provinces,followed by Dhi Qar at 9.02% and Nineveh at 8.47%. However, residents, whospoke to Shafaq News, countered that the capital’s larger electricity share hasnot been reflected in residential neighborhoods, where transformers remainoverloaded, outages last for hours, and generator subscriptions rise monthafter month.

The core problem lies in the lack of balance between Iraq’selectricity sectors, explained lawmaker Uday Al-Zamili, a member ofparliament’s Oil, Gas, and Natural Resources Committee. Distribution networkshave improved in recent years, but transmission still needs major expansionbecause high-voltage lines and substations were designed for older demandlevels and no longer match current consumption.

The expansion of gas-fired power stations without parallelinvestment in associated gas capture, he said, is one of Iraq’s “main strategicmistakes,” as it kept the country dependent on imported gas to run asignificant part of its power plants.

Read more: Iraq power 2026: war on Iran collapses the grid's last defenses ahead of peak summer

Shafaq News-Baghdad

For much of theworld, a new year carries connotations of celebration and renewal. In Iraq, theopening of the Islamic Hijri New Year, marked by the arrival of Muharram, thefirst month of the lunar calendar, unfolds in a different register entirely.

Markets shifttheir displays to black fabric and mourning banners. Kitchens begin preparingcommunal meals for the needy. Husseiniyas, the dedicated halls where ShiaMuslim communities hold religious and commemorative gatherings, open theirdoors and arrange their halls for weeks of mourning councils. Volunteers begincollecting donations. The country, in measured but visible ways, prepares forone of the most consequential religious seasons on earth.

A CountryShaped By Faith

Iraq'spopulation is approximately 95 to 98 percent Muslim. Of that majority, anestimated 64 to 69 percent are Shia Muslims, with Sunni Muslims comprising 29to 34 percent. The remainder includes Christians, Yazidis, Mandaeans, and othercommunities who have inhabited this land for centuries. Iraq is, in short, acountry where Islam, and specifically Shia Islam, shapes the religious lifecalendar, commerce, and public space.

Globally, ShiaMuslims number between 320 and 400 million, representing roughly 20 percent ofthe world's Muslim population. The majority are concentrated in four countries:Iran, Pakistan, India, and Iraq. Iraq holds a singular place among them becauseit is home to the event that defines the Shia calendar, Karbala.

What KarbalaMeans

In 680 CE,Hussein bin Ali, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third Imam(spiritual leader) recognized by Shia Muslims, was killed alongside his familyand companions at a site in central Iraq, then as now called Karbala, afterrefusing to pledge allegiance to the Umayyad Caliph Yazid ibn Muawiya. For ShiaMuslims across fourteen centuries, it represents the definitive act ofsacrifice in the face of injustice, a moral compass that continues to governreligious identity, political expression, and communal life.

Karbala, a citytwo hours south of Baghdad, is home today to the shrines of Imam Hussein andhis brother Al-Abbas, and to a living tradition of pilgrimage that has grownsteadily each year.

The Scale OfObservance

In 2024, theArbaeen pilgrimage —held forty days after Ashura to mark the end of themourning cycle— drew more than 22 million visitors to Karbala, according toIraq's Ministry of Interior, making it the largest annual religious gatheringon earth, surpassing even the Hajj, the annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca.Attendance figures have grown steadily: from 11.2 million in 2016 to 16.3million in 2021 to over 22 million in recent years.

Ashura itself—the tenth day of Muharram and the climax of the mourning period— drawsmillions to Karbala from across Iraq and from Iran, Lebanon, the Gulf states,Pakistan, and beyond. In 2024, over 3.4 million foreign pilgrims entered Iraqspecifically for the Arbaeen pilgrimage alone.

What MuharramLooks Like On The Ground

The seasonbegins to take shape before the first day of Muharram arrives. In Baghdad'shistoric commercial districts, Al-Shorja, Al-Kadhimiya, Al-Sadr City, andAl-Kifah, shop displays shift. Black clothing, mourning banners, flags, andceremonial fabric move to the front. Demand for black garments, particularlyfor women and children, rises sharply and, according to traders, exceedscommercial activity during the Eid holidays.

Food becomespart of the same mobilization. Mobile mourning caravans, known in Arabic asmawkib (singular: mawkib— a procession or organized group that provides food,water, and service to pilgrims and mourners), begin preparing communal mealsfunded by year-round donations. Free distribution of food, such as bread, tea,rice dishes, and prepared meals, is a defining feature of the season, rooted ina tradition of public service tied directly to the memory of Karbala.

In Al-Hilla, acity south of Baghdad with deep artisanal heritage, blacksmiths' workshopsreturn to activity before Muharram begins, producing drums, flags, andceremonial blades for Husseini processions. The month ties inherited crafttraditions as firmly to religious observance as it ties ritual to commerce.

Across Iraq,Husseiniyas prepare their halls, sound systems, and seating for nightlycouncils of mourning, where reciters —religious poets and chanters trained inthe oral tradition of commemorating Karbala— lead congregations in lamentationand reflection. These councils run for ten days through Ashura and, in manycommunities, for forty days until Arbaeen.

Who Observes —And How

Muharram is notexclusively a Shia affair. Sunni Muslims also observe Ashura, the tenth day ofMuharram, as a day of optional fasting that commemorates separate events inIslamic and biblical history, including, according to tradition, the day theProphet Muhammad himself fasted. Both Sunni and Shia Muslims regard Ashura as aday of deep importance and reflection, though they observe it through distincttheological and historical frameworks.

In Iraq, whereSunni and Shia communities have historically coexisted across the same citiesand regions, most Sunni Muslims also mourn Hussein's death, though lesspublicly and with less ceremonial elaboration than their Shia neighbors. IraqiChristians and members of other minority communities observe the season'ssocial norms, abstaining from celebratory events, respecting the sombercharacter of the period, as a matter of civic and neighborly custom.

What this meansin practice for visitors, diplomats, and foreign officials is straightforward:weddings, public celebrations, and festive social events are considered deeplyinappropriate during Muharram, particularly in the ten days leading to Ashura.Music in public spaces recedes. Storefronts reflect the season. The socialatmosphere is one of collective mourning and public service, not festivity.

Tourism AndStrategic Importance

Iraq hasinvested substantially in the infrastructure surrounding these religiousseasons. Thousands of doctors and nurses from Iraq and abroad serve pilgrimsduring the period. Security deployments, crowd management systems, missingpersons units, and multilingual guidance materials are coordinated acrossprovinces and border crossings.

For foreigngovernments, Muharram is a period during which diplomatic scheduling,commercial delegations, and public engagements in Iraq require awareness of thecalendar's significance. Events that conflict with the ten days of Muharram, orthat fail to acknowledge the season, risk misreading the social and politicalenvironment in which they are operating.

Karbala's PlaceIn The World

Whatdistinguishes Iraq from other countries with significant Shia populations isthat the event being commemorated happened here, on Iraqi soil, and the shrinesthat embody it remain here. Pilgrims do not travel to Iraq to observe Karbalafrom a distance. They travel to Karbala itself: to stand at the tomb of ImamHussein, to walk the same ground, to participate in a tradition that, for ShiaMuslims worldwide, constitutes one of the most direct acts of faith availableto them.

By the timeMuharram arrives each year, Iraq is doing what it has done for more thanthirteen centuries: hosting the world's largest act of collective mourning, onthe ground where that mourning began.

Read more: Discover Iraq: Karbala, where memory breathes and future beckons

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Political actors in Baghdad and across the region areracing to assess the potential implications of the recently announced US-Iranunderstanding, but the outlook in Baghdad remains mixed, balancing hopes ofbenefiting from a possible easing of tensions against caution over whether theagreement will endure or face challenges at the first regional test.

The uncertainty is compounded by Iraq’s own complexpolitical, security, and economic landscape. The country remains deeplyaffected by shifts in relations between Washington and Tehran, as overlapping regional and international interests shape its stability,power dynamics, energy sector, and trade routes.

Read more: Iran and Israel exchange of missiles: What was achieved in the latest confrontation?

According to preliminary announcements, the US-Iranagreement, brokered by Pakistan, includes a halt to military operations acrossthe region, including in Lebanon, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz tointernational shipping, the lifting of Iran’s maritime blockade, and the launchof nuclear negotiations within 60 days.

Although implementation details remain incomplete, theannouncement has already begun shaping market expectations and regionalcalculations, signaling that its impact is likely to extend beyond Washingtonand Tehran to countries such as Iraq.

Imad Al-Musafir, a political analyst close to Iraq’sCoordination Framework, a coalition of mainly Shiite political parties, saidany escalation or stability in the region directly affects Iraq because of itsextensive political and economic ties with neighboring countries.

“The Iraqi political decision-maker needs a clear visionregarding developments in the region,”Al-Musafir told Shafaq News, adding that Iraq must employ it in a waythat serves its interests without compromising national principles andconstants.

In an interview with Shafaq News, Ihsan Al-Shammari,professor of strategic and international studies at the University of Baghdadand head of the Political Thinking Center, noted that Iraq could be among thecountries that benefit most from an end to hostilities between Washington andTehran.

Al-Shammari emphasized that Iraq had suffered significantlyfrom the military confrontation and its political, diplomatic, and economicconsequences. The agreement, he argued, represents an opportunity for PrimeMinister Ali Al-Zaidi’s government to reorganize priorities, particularly onthe political level, through a roadmap for state reform, institutionaldevelopment, and a national project.

Economically, Al-Shammari noted that previous tensions,particularly those involving the Strait of Hormuz, affected Iraq’s oilrevenues. However, he observed that Iraq should take broader advantage of thecurrent easing of tensions by diversifying export routes through Saudi Arabia,Jordan, Syria, and Turkiye.

“Such measures could enable Iraq to export an additional1.4 million to 1.5 million barrels of oil per day. The issue is not only aboutincreasing revenues but also restructuring the economy in response to thelessons of the recent conflict.”

Read more: Iraq to place armed factions' weapons under state control: What we know so far

On the security front, Al-Shammari said the agreement couldstrengthen efforts to place all weapons under state control. “There is nojustification for the existence of weapons outside the state framework,” heindicated, suggesting that the government may be encouraged to address theissue of armed factions within broader understandings involving Tehran.

Al-Shammari also explained that Iraq should move “beyondtraditional approaches” if it wants to maximize the benefits of the agreementand rebuild relations with both the United States and Gulf countries.

Despite the positive atmosphere surrounding theannouncement, Haitham Numaan, a professor of political science at theUniversity of Exeter in the United Kingdom, urged caution in assessing itsimplications. He told Shafaq News that it remains unclear how durable theagreement will be or whether it can be transformed into a lasting reality,adding that “the agreement remains fragile and lacks clarity.”

Al-Heeti pointed out that it is too early to draw firmconclusions about its impact on Iraq, whether positive or negative, clarifyingthat the next phase will be shaped not only by US-Iran relations, “but also bythe American role inside Iraq and the response of Iraqi political forces tothese changes amid ongoing economic pressures.”

The US agenda overseen by the US Presidential Envoy toSyria and Iraq, Tom Barrack, could prove more influential than the broaderUS-Iran relationship, with future developments depending largely onWashington’s policies and Barrack’s plans.

Political writer and analyst Ali Al-Baydar assessed thatthe agreement could provide Iraq with an opportunity that may evolve into alasting advantage if managed effectively, and Baghdad could be among theregional countries most positively affected by the agreement because of itsgeopolitical position and its relations with all parties involved.

Read more: Trump's new Iraq-Syria envoy faces an Iran test Syria never posed

He estimated that developments since October 7, 2023, hadsubjected Iraq to simultaneous pressure from both the United States and Iran,creating political uncertainty and competing loyalties. “Any reduction intensions could help ease domestic polarization and political divisions.”

Economically, the political analyst expected greaterstability to improve the investment climate and strengthen confidence in Iraq’seconomy. From a security perspective, he predicted that the agreement couldreduce reciprocal attacks and limit the use of Iraqi territory as an arena forregional confrontation, “allowing security forces to focus more on prioritiessuch as counterterrorism.”

Shafaq News (Updated at 12:41)

Lebanon did not negotiate the agreement that nowgoverns its fate. On June 14, the United States and Iran announced separatestatements —Trump posting on Truth Social, Iran's Supreme National SecurityCouncil issuing a formal communiqué— each claiming to have reached a memorandumof understanding ending the war.

The two texts shared three facts and little else. Oneof those facts mattered enormously to Beirut: Tehran's statement named Lebanonexplicitly as a front where hostilities would end immediately and permanently.Washington said the deal “will bring Peace and Security to the whole Region,”without mentioning Lebanon by name.

Beirut was not consulted, and its government did notwelcome the announcement so far. That silence, in the political grammar ofLebanese statecraft, was a precise and deliberate response to being writteninto a deal authored entirely over its head.

The Lebanon clause may prove among the agreement'smost consequential and difficult-to-enforce provisions. It names a front thatneither Washington nor Tehran can control on the ground, binds a party, Israel,that is not a signatory and has publicly rejected the clause's authority, andoffers a Lebanese state protection it lacks the domestic capacity to guarantee.The disconnect between what the clause promises and can deliver is thedocument's defining structural weakness, and Lebanon is where that weaknesswill be felt first.

A Party to the Outcome, Not the Negotiation

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Parliament Speaker NabihBerri on Monday welcomed the US-Iran memorandum of understanding. Aoun said he valued the agreement'sacknowledgment of Lebanon's particular circumstances, and called on all partiesto translate the understanding into practical steps that would end the cycle ofviolence and open a path toward recovery and reconstruction. Aoun also thankedthe states and parties, without naming them, that worked to ensure Lebanon was included in thede-escalation efforts, citing the scale of suffering Lebanese communities hadendured in recent months.

Berri, for his part, said thememorandum preserves Lebanon's full sovereignty without compromising thecountry's independence or freedom of national decision-making.

Aoun had stated earlier that the problem was plain before the MoU was announced. In exchanges with a UN Security Councildelegation, he told visiting officials that Iran was "using Lebanon as abargaining chip in their negotiations with the US. It is unacceptable."The accusation described something precise: Lebanon has functioned throughoutthis conflict as a theater of Iranian deterrence and Israeli military pressure,with Beirut possessing neither the capacity to control its own territory northe diplomatic leverage to shape the frameworks purporting to govern it.

Nothing in the June 14 text changes that. But thetext's silences raise questions more consequential than its stated provisions.There is no clause explicitly prohibiting Israeli forces from issuingevacuation orders to southern Lebanese villages under the cover of a ceasefire,a tactic that would render the agreement's protection theoretical for thecommunities it nominally covers.

The language barring Israel from consolidating themilitary positions it currently holds in southern Lebanese territory was alsoabsent, meaning a ceasefire could freeze an occupation in place rather thanreverse it. And no monitoring mechanism, credible reference body empowered toinvestigate violations, or agreed standard for the definition of a breach werealso announced, which means the party most likely to invoke pretexts forrenewed hostilities faces no institutional obstacle in doing so.

These hypothetical concerns imported from outside thetext follow directly from what the document does not say.

Israel's Position: Outside The Framework, InsideLebanon

No party has been more direct about the MoU's Lebanonclause than Israel, and its directness has taken military as well as diplomaticform. On the evening of June 14, hours before the memorandum was announced,Israeli strikes killed at least three people in Beirut's southern suburbs.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz issued ajoint statement the same day: "Israel will not tolerate firing at itsterritory."

Netanyahu informed President Trump that Israel doesnot consider itself bound by the Lebanon provisions of the emerging agreement.According to Israeli officials cited by Yedioth Ahronoth, he communicated thatIsraeli forces will not withdraw from Lebanese territory, will maintain currentpositions, and will continue operations against Hezbollah infrastructure—responding to any attack regardless of any framework's provisions.

The Israeli Security Cabinet also convened andexpressed broad support for that posture, but divided on the degree of forceand the diplomatic cost of rupturing ties with Washington.

Operations on the ground continued the following day.Lebanon's National News Agency reported Israeli artillery shelling on Mansouri,Kfar Tibnit, and Nabatiyeh al-Fawqa. The army detonated a remote-controlledarmored vehicle on the Haris-Tibnin road. A drone struck a vehicle in KfarTibnit with reported casualties. Explosions were reported in Khiam. The MoU'sink had not dried before its primary prohibition was being tested militarily.

Read more:Israel's war fell on Christians and Shiites in Southern Lebanon

Israel's underlying logic is consistent with itsstated position throughout the conflict. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotricharticulated it within the cabinet: Lebanon falls within Israel's directsecurity sphere; Iran is the domain of US-led diplomacy. The distinction, inIsraeli strategic terms, means the MoU's Lebanon clause addresses a categoryIsrael simply does not accept as applicable to its ongoing operations. Absentany text explicitly prohibiting Israeli freedom of military and securitymovement inside Lebanese territory —language the MoU does not contain— thatlogic carries no legal counterweight within the agreement itself.

Hezbollah's Veto, And The State's Paralysis

The clause also collides with a domestic reality thatBeirut cannot resolve by political will alone. Hezbollah's leader Naim Kassemrejected the June 4 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire framework, characterizing anydemand for the group's fighters to withdraw from southern Lebanon as"surrender and defeat." That rejection preceded the MoU and wasunaddressed by it.

Lebanon has maintained a separate, US-mediatednegotiating track with Israel, but Hezbollah has consistently insisted onlinking both tracks, conditioning any movement on the Lebanese-Israeli front tothe broader US-Iran framework. The MoU now provides that framework. WhetherHezbollah treats it as sufficient political cover to de-escalate, or as adiplomatic instrument that constrains Israeli action while preserving its ownposture intact, will determine whether the Lebanon clause has any operational meaningon the ground. The Lebanese state has no power to compel an answer in eitherdirection.

That powerlessness extends further. There is noguarantee, inside or outside the MoU, that Beirut will deploy the LebaneseArmed Forces to the south independently of any arrangement with Israel. ALebanese government that was excluded from the negotiations producing thisceasefire has limited political incentive, and arguably limited legaljustification, to implement its provisions unilaterally.

If Beirut concludes that it is not a party to theagreement, it may equally conclude that the agreement creates no obligation onits part to act. The possibility that the Lebanese government withholds adeployment order, from institutional caution, factional pressure, or the logicthat a non-party bears no implementation burden, is precisely the kind ofpre-emptive failure the MoU's drafters appear not to have considered.

There is also the subtler risk that Lebanese politicalauthority, as it has at various points historically, accommodates Israeliframing on Hezbollah rather than resisting it, not through explicitcollaboration but through the language of its public positions and thesequencing of its decisions. The MoU contains no text that functions as astructural obstacle to that drift. Whether those responsible for theagreement's implementation are attending to these possibilities is a questionthe document itself does not answer.

Read more:Lebanon's fragmented power blocks peace with Israel

Diplomatic Recognition Without Enforcement

The Lebanon provision establishes, within a US-Iranbilateral framework, that Lebanon is a covered front, a position Beirut caninvoke in Security Council deliberations, in its dealings with Washington, andin any future negotiations over a permanent agreement. For a government thathas spent months being acted upon rather than consulted, that is a marginal butreal diplomatic foothold.

What the clause cannot deliver is enforcement. It doesnot bind Israel. It does not address Hezbollah's weapons or territorialpresence. It creates no monitoring body, no timeline for Israeli withdrawal,and no consequence for violations. A ceasefire without a verification frameworkis, in the experience of previous Lebanese agreements —the 1989 Taif, the 2006UN Security Council Resolution 1701— a political statement rather than asecurity guarantee. Resolution 1701 prohibited offensive operations in southernLebanon and mandated Israeli withdrawal; nearly two decades later, neitherprovision had been fully implemented when this war began.

The broader unresolved problem of the June 14agreement compounds Lebanon's exposure. Iran's nuclear file, the Hormuzmine-clearance timeline, and the sequencing of a permanent deal each representpotential points of collapse —any one of which could reopen the militarydimension of the conflict and render the Lebanon clause irrelevant before it isever tested. Iran has stated explicitly that permanent negotiations areconditional on prior US compliance with the MoU. Washington has made noequivalent acknowledgment. If that divergence produces a breakdown before theJune 19 signing, or within the 60-day window the agreement reportedlyestablishes for final negotiations, Lebanon will find itself once again insidea conflict it did not choose, operating under a framework it did not negotiate,with no mechanism to absorb the consequences.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

After years of drought described as the worst in more than nine decades,the Euphrates River is bringing Iraq something it has not seen in a long time:an abundance of water.

With around 70% of Iraq’s surface water originating outside its borders,according to the Ministry of Water Resources, the country once again findsitself at the mercy of shifts beyond its control —this time not because ofscarcity alone, but because of a sudden influx moving downstream.

Reversing the Drain

“Iraq possesses irrigation systems capable of absorbing any volume ofwater arriving through the Euphrates without causing floods.”

This assessment from Turhan al-Mufti, adviser to the Iraqi primeminister on water affairs, reflects cautious confidence in Baghdad as theincoming wave approaches. He pointed to an extensive storage network thatincludes Lake Haditha, which still has considerable unused capacity, alongsideHabbaniyah and Razzaza, with additional diversion possible toward ThartharDepression and the southern marshes.

Calling it “a wet year, not a flood year,” al-Mufti portrayed Iraq’sability to cope in simple terms; “any quantity of water, regardless of howlarge.” The additional volumes, he added, could help revive marsh ecosystemsthat have endured years of decline.

The optimism follows a prolonged period of strain. During recent droughtyears, inflows from the Euphrates dropped by more than 50%, according to the Ministryof Water Resources, forcing major adjustments in farming practices and resourceplanning across the country.

Still, al-Mufti cautioned that climate change leaves little room forcomplacency and requires “a measured use” of available supplies.

River levels are only part of the challenge. Iraq’s population hassurpassed 46 million, according to 2024 World Bank data, placing ever-greaterdemands on already strained supplies. International estimates suggest thecountry may require more than $233 billion by 2040 to restore water andenvironmental infrastructure, while nearly 30% of agricultural land hasdisappeared over the past three decades.

In some provinces, agricultural activity has fallen by as much as 50%during severe dry spells, according to the Ministry of Agriculture —a reminderof how quickly changes in river flow can ripple through the wider economy.

As Iraq prepares to capture the incoming water, communities fartherupstream have already experienced its destructive side.

Euphrates flood wave approaches Iraq: Water lifeline or emerging threat?

Breaking Point Across

“The water flooded bridges and major facilities, forcing authorities tocarry out urgent evacuations using local warning systems.”

That was the reality in eastern Syria, where Ali al-Hamad of theMinistry of Local Administration and Environment described emergency operationsstretching across more than 200 kilometers of the Euphrates. Response teams, herecalled, faced “unprecedented challenges.”

Floodwaters swept through Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor before reaching Iraq,inundating farmland and disrupting daily life. Pumping stations stoppedoperating, while residents in several low-lying areas were forced from theirhomes.

Sixty water stations went out of service in the Shamiyah and Jaziraregions. Key crossings, including al-Mayadeen and al-Asharah bridges, sustained damage, and ferry traffic along the river came to a halt.

Syria’s Deputy Energy Minister Osama Abu Zeid linked the rise in waterlevels to a combination of snowmelt in the Turkish upstream basin and growingpressure on reservoirs that prompted the opening of dam spillways.

Warning that conditions “could lead to flash floods and dangerouserosion,” he urged residents to stay away from riverbanks, avoid swimming, andsuspend all activity near the water.

At the Euphrates Dam Institution, Haitham Bakour reported thatoperational teams remained on alert and maintained “operational readiness” toregulate releases and safeguard infrastructure.

Although the immediate danger phase was declared over, the damageremained evident. More than 5,000 dunams of farmland were flooded, affectingaround 2,400 families.

Counting the Drops

The same flow is now being monitored closely in Iraq, where specialistsare tracking both its volume and arrival time.

Water expert Tahseen al-Moussawi noted that releases from Syria “havenot exceeded 2,000 cubic meters per second,” attributing part of thedestruction in eastern Syria to “encroachments and fragile infrastructure leftbehind by years of war.”

The wave is expected to enter Iraq through al-Qaim before reachingHaditha Dam within four days. Described by al-Moussawi as “the first line ofdefense,” the facility can hold more than 10 billion cubic meters, whilecurrent reserves stand at roughly 2 billion.

Farther downstream lies an interconnected chain of storage facilitiesstretching across Habbaniyah, Razzaza, Tharthar, and the southern marshes—enough to accommodate billions of cubic meters. Yet despite that advantage,al-Moussawi argued that water administration continues to suffer from“significant waste and chronic poor planning.”

He estimated that Iraq requires around 20 billion cubic meters of water,while nearly 17 billion cubic meters are expected to arrive from Syria in thecoming days.

The developments upstream have also renewed scrutiny of Iraq’snegotiations with neighboring countries. Pointing to the rapid filling ofTurkish reservoirs, al-Moussawi argued that the situation “raises questionsabout the management of Iraq’s negotiating file,” urging renewed implementationof water-sharing arrangements.

Authorities are already focusing on storage. Bayez al-Zarari ofparliament’s Agriculture, Water and Marshlands Committee described the responseas being handled “in a scientific and carefully planned manner.”

Agricultural releases have been postponed until mid-June to maximizereserves, prioritizing retention over distribution. Monitoring efforts now relyheavily on satellite imagery and international tracking systems.

For al-Zarari, the influx represents a “narrow window, an opportunity tostrengthen water security if it is used properly.”

Read more: A century of promises: Iraq’s water diplomacy with Turkiye and Iran

The Great Reset

The Ministry of Water Resources has also sought to reassure the public.The country, it confirmed, “has the full technical capacity to absorb anyincrease in water releases,” while current indicators, it added, “do not callfor concern.”

The contrast with recent years is stark.

Iraq has just emerged from one of its harshest drought periods since1933. During that stretch, inflows fell to 27% of previous levels and reservesdropped to only 8% of total storage capacity, according to ministry figures.

Climate pressures have intensified that volatility. Average temperaturesin Iraq and northeastern Syria have risen by around 1–2°C since the mid-20thcentury, according to recent World Bank data, while rainfall has declined byroughly 18 millimeters per month in some areas.

Infrastructure damage from years of conflict has further reduced watersupply capacity by nearly 40%, forcing reliance on alternative and often lesssecure sources during periods of scarcity.

As releases from Syrian dams gradually subside, attention is turning toIraq’s ability to capture and distribute the incoming volumes across a networkstretching from Haditha to the southern marshes.

Specialists caution that the challenge lies not in the presence ofwater, but in its timing and distribution. Mismanagement, they warn, could turna regional surge into localized flooding rather than a national gain.

For now, the Euphrates is undergoing a rare reversal. After yearsdefined by drought, the river is carrying an unexpected surplus, leaving Iraqand Syria to adapt once again to conditions shaped by climate pressures anddecisions made upstream.

Read more: Iraq’s water crisis: A structural rewrite of agricultural governance

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Recent deadly traffic accidents on Iraqi highways have pushed road safety back to the forefront of public concern. Major roads continue to witness recurring human tragedies despite government efforts to modernize traffic enforcement and reduce accident rates.

Despite authorities expanding the use of speed cameras, radar systems, and smart monitoring technologies, the accidents continue to rise. The latest incident was the devastating bus fire on the international highway linking Basra and Dhi Qar, which killed 21 people and injured 19 others as religious pilgrims were returning from Karbala. The accident occurred less than 24 hours after another crash on the same route.

Alarming Numbers, Several Indicators

Official data show that Iraq records around 2,700 traffic-related deaths and more than 11,000 injuries annually. At the same time, the number of registered vehicles has surpassed seven million, a growth rate that increasingly exceeds the capacity of the country’s transport infrastructure.

According to Miqdad Miri, Director of Relations and Media at the Interior Ministry, the deployment of modern radar systems and surveillance cameras has helped reduce traffic accidents by 50% on several key routes, particularly the Baghdad–Karbala, Babil–Karbala, and Najaf–Karbala highways.

The General Traffic Directorate has also reported more than 45,000 traffic violations detected through electronic monitoring systems, with over 41,000 confirmed after review. Yet the recurrence of mass-casualty accidents suggests that the problem extends beyond enforcement alone. Experts argue that Iraq’s road safety crisis is rooted in a combination of human behavior, infrastructure shortcomings, and administrative weaknesses.

Human Error Remains the Dominant Factor

Former Iraqi Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki believes drivers remain the single most significant contributor to road accidents.

Speaking to Shafaq News, al-Maliki said motorists are responsible for more than three-quarters of traffic accidents, with excessive speed remaining the leading cause of fatal crashes, particularly on highways and intercity roads.

He pointed to a range of risky behaviors that continue to endanger road users, including failure to comply with traffic regulations, unsafe overtaking, disregard for right-of-way rules, and the widespread use of mobile phones while driving.

“Driver fatigue is another major concern, especially among bus and taxi operators who travel long distances between provinces,” he stressed, noting that the problem becomes more pronounced during religious pilgrimage seasons, when transport activity intensifies, and drivers often spend extended hours behind the wheel.

Recent Interior Ministry data recorded 157 cases of driving under the influence of alcohol during the first half of 2026, while campaigns targeting mobile phone use behind the wheel remain ongoing.

Roads Fall Short of Safety Standards

While human behavior plays a central role, al-Maliki cautioned against reducing the crisis solely to driver conduct.

He argued that Iraq’s infrastructure problems are equally significant, observing that many roads suffer from potholes, subsidence, and surface distortions caused by inadequate maintenance, conditions that can cause drivers to lose control of their vehicles without warning.

A lack of adequate lighting, road markings, and traffic signs on numerous highways further increases risks, particularly at night. “Poorly engineered diversions and road closures on some highways have become a constant source of unexpected hazards and accidents,” he said.

According to Transportation specialists who spoke to Shafaq News, Iraq’s road network has expanded considerably in recent years, but maintenance and modernization programs have not kept pace. The result is a widening gap between actual traffic demand and the technical readiness of the infrastructure designed to support it.

This imbalance becomes particularly visible during peak travel periods, when roads carry volumes of traffic beyond what they were originally designed to accommodate.

Safety Challenges

Al-Maliki also highlighted concerns over licensing procedures, arguing that lax standards in issuing driving licenses contribute to unsafe road conditions. He further pointed to the importation of vehicles that fail to meet essential safety requirements and to weak oversight of vehicle safety specifications.

These issues suggest that road safety cannot be improved simply by increasing fines or installing additional cameras. Rather, experts indicate that “Iraq requires a comprehensive review of its transportation and traffic management systems.”

Technology Delivers Limited Results

Despite the continuing fatalities, traffic authorities maintain that recent technological measures have produced measurable improvements.

Haider Shaker, head of the Media Division at the General Traffic Directorate, said accident rates have declined noticeably due to the use of modern technologies, stressing that accident trends ultimately depend on the extent to which citizens comply with traffic laws and regulations.

Authorities continue to expand the use of technological tools with the goal of reducing accidents to the lowest possible level. However, most advanced monitoring systems remain concentrated in Baghdad and provincial urban centers.

Large sections of Iraq’s external highways still lack continuous electronic surveillance, limiting the deterrent effect of enforcement measures on roads that frequently record the highest number of fatal crashes.

Read more: $1.2B traffic fix fails: Iraq seeks radical solution

This disparity helps explain why accident reductions in some monitored corridors have not translated into a broader nationwide decline in deadly incidents.

The Root Causes

For lawmakers, the scale of recent losses underscores the need for a deeper reassessment of Iraq’s traffic management policies. Ali Sheikh Khalis al-Barzanji, a member of the Parliamentary Committee on Transport, Communications, and Governance, told Shafaq News that “the first step toward solving the problem is accurately identifying its causes.”

Al-Barzanji said the committee is examining accidents from multiple angles, including road engineering standards, speeding, traffic organization, and the effectiveness of traffic signals and control systems.

“Reaching an accurate diagnosis of the problem will enable the legislative authority to exercise its oversight role”, he stressed, adding that it will also direct the government toward addressing “the real weaknesses behind the repeated accidents.”

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

On the western bank of the Tigris, where Saddam Hussein's former presidential palaces once projected the permanence of his rule, a different kind of permanence has settled. The ruins are quiet now, but they hold, in the soil beneath them and in the water that runs past them, the remains of some of the youngest soldiers Iraq ever lost, young men who walked out of a military base on a summer morning in 2014 and were dead before nightfall.

June 12 marks twelve years since the Camp Speicher massacre, the single deadliest act of terrorism in Iraq's modern history. On that day, ISIS descended on a military air base in Saladin province, about 170 kilometers north of Baghdad, and executed an estimated 1,700 predominantly Shia cadets in a killing operation that spanned multiple sites along the Tigris.

The victims were not combatants. They were Air Force recruits, most of them in their early twenties, in the middle of their training. Some were ordered to leave the base as ISIS closed in. Many were told they would be given safe passage, according to subsequent survivor testimony. They were not.

ISIS documented the killings as propaganda, releasing footage that showed groups of men being marched to riverbanks and ravines before being shot. Bodies were pushed into the Tigris. Others were buried in mass graves around the palace complex. The videos circulated globally and became, for many Iraqis, their first visceral encounter with what ISIS intended to do to their country.

In the days before June 12, the Iraqi military had effectively disintegrated across large parts of the north and west. Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, had fallen to ISIS on June 10 after government divisions abandoned their posts. The command structure for military installations in the region broke down almost immediately. Cadets at Camp Speicher received conflicting orders and, in many cases, no orders at all.

Security researcher Ahmed Omar, speaking to Shafaq News, described the massacre as the direct product of a total security failure. What occurred, he said, was not simply a mass killing but the consequence of institutional collapse on a scale that left thousands of unarmed young men without protection or direction at the moment they needed it most.

Camp Speicher, named after American pilot Scott Speicher whose plane was shot down during the 1991 Gulf War and whose remains were later recovered there, sat in Saladin province —the heartland of Iraq's Sunni Arab population and the birthplace of Saddam Hussein. The cadets who died were overwhelmingly from Iraq's Shia-majority provinces in the center and south; therefore, according to survivors who spoke to Shafaq News anonymously, the sectarian dimension of the killing was explicit: “ISIS chose its victims by religion, separating Shia recruits from Sunni ones before carrying out the executions.”

Um Diyaa, 65, sits every June in front of a photograph of her son, who was 24 years old when he was killed. In an account shared with Shafaq News, she described their last phone call, days before the massacre. "He said, ' Do not be afraid, I will come home soon." He did not come home. She later recognized him in one of the ISIS videos, among the men lined up at the river.

Abbas al-Mohammadawi lost two brothers at Speicher. He told Shafaq News that the grief of losing them was compounded by years of not knowing. "The real pain," he said, "was not just the news of their deaths. It was the years of waiting, before their remains were found and their identities confirmed."

After Iraqi forces retook Tikrit in 2015, forensic teams began excavating mass graves around the presidential palace complex. Dozens of burial sites were identified. DNA testing continued for years. By the tenth anniversary in June 2024, Iraqi authorities had recovered the remains of approximately 1,200 victims, according to statements by lawmaker Moeen al-Kadhimi, who heads the Tikrit Massacre Commemoration Committee. Al-Kadhimi called at that ceremony for the massacre site to be designated a federal sanctuary and for memorials to be constructed in every province.

The legal record of the massacre has accumulated slowly but with growing weight.

By August 2016, Iraqi courts had sentenced more than 50 individuals to death for their participation in the killings. Thirty-six of them were executed by hanging at Nasiriyah prison, with the Justice Minister present to oversee the proceedings. Iraqi judicial authorities have continued prosecuting additional suspects in the years since, though some cases remain open.

Read more: Amnesty Law does not cover inmates convicted in Speicher massacre

The most significant international legal assessment came in June 2024, when the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (UNITAD) handed a milestone report to Iraq's Supreme Judicial Council. The report, titled "Camp Speicher: A Pattern of Mass Killing and Genocidal Intent," concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe the killings were carried out with genocidal intent, in the context of a broader ISIS policy of genocide against Shia Muslims in Iraq. UNITAD also found grounds to believe the acts constituted crimes against humanity and war crimes under international law.

The findings were submitted alongside evidence packages collected by UNITAD's investigative unit.

For some families, the legal proceedings have not provided a measure of acknowledgment. Relatives of victims who have not yet had their remains recovered told Shafaq News that justice remains incomplete as long as the fate of missing individuals is unknown.

In Tikrit itself, where the killings took place, Hassan Ali, a resident, told Shafaq News that the execution sites have become symbols of grief that the city has not been able to set aside. "What happened was too large to be forgotten. Local residents joined the search operations after liberation and assisted forensic teams working to identify victims.”

Lawyer Adnan al-Jubouri, speaking in the context of the eleventh anniversary, told Shafaq News that Speicher must remain in the collective memory not as a sectarian wound but as a rejection of both sectarianism and political violence. "The Speicher crime is not just a local tragedy — it is a national one," he said.

Twelve years on, more than 800 victims remain unaccounted for, according to the International Organization for Migration, which has worked alongside Iraqi forensic authorities and the victims' families. The search continues.

Shafaq News

Long before the opening whistle of the FIFA World Cupsounded in distant stadiums, Baghdad had already begun its own celebration.Iraqi flags appeared on restaurant facades and café terraces, players’ imagesspread across screens and billboards, and businesses rushed to capitalize on arare moment as the national team returned to the tournament after a 40-yearabsence.

In a city where football often shapes the public mood, theWorld Cup has become more than a sporting event. It has evolved into a socialand commercial season, with fans searching for large screens andair-conditioned venues to escape the summer heat, while businesses compete toattract customers through football-themed promotions and viewing experiences.

Restaurants and cafes across Baghdad say they are preparingfor large crowds during Iraq’s matches. With soaring temperatures and limitedaccess to some broadcasts due to subscription costs, many supporters are optingto watch games in public venues rather than at home.

A Long-Awaited Return

For many Iraqis, the national team’s participation carriessignificance beyond football.

“It is a source of pride to see the Iraqi flag raised atthis international event and to have representation at the World Cup,” MustafaHassan, a player in a local amateur team, told Shafaq News.

Like many in his generation, Hassan views the tournament asan opportunity to reconnect with a sense of national pride that has been absentfor decades.

Iraq will compete in a challenging group alongside Norway,France, and Senegal in its first World Cup appearance since the 1986 tournamentin Mexico.

Hassan said he and his teammates have already arrangedgatherings with friends to watch the matches on giant screens and support thenational side. Yet he also noted another side of the World Cup atmosphere inBaghdad. “Most of these advertisements are purely promotional andcommercial and have little to do with the tournament itself,” he explained,adding that the businesses see it as a good opportunity for marketing andprofit because the competition attracts huge interest among Iraqis. 

Read more: Iraq prepare for historic World Cup return against Norway

Brands Join the World Cup Wave

The blend of national enthusiasm and commercial activity isvisible throughout the capital.

Soft drink companies have redesigned packaging with Iraqinational colors and football-themed imagery. Restaurants have introduced WorldCup-branded meal packaging and promotional slogans, while shops have decoratedstorefronts with football-themed displays. Even everyday consumer products,from canned goods to potato chips, have incorporated tournament-relatedbranding.

Twenty-year-old Rana, who does not usually follow football,said Iraq’s qualification has changed her attitude toward the competition. Thistime is different because the Iraqi team is participating, she told Shafaq News,adding, “I am excited to watch the matches with my family.” However, she believes many advertising campaigns surroundingthe national team's participation are driven primarily by commercial interests.“They do not provide real support to the team. They are mainly trying to markettheir products and make profits.”

Read more:Golden Boot or Golden Ball? World Cup 2026 stars chase history

Marketing Opportunity

Ali Al-Lami, a marketing expert, stated that some of thecampaigns fall under “ambush marketing,” where businesses seek to benefit froma major public event without necessarily being official sponsors.

“The World Cup, especially with Iraq’s return, has become apowerful attraction,” Al-Lami told Shafaq News, explaining that Companies,restaurants, and cafes “see it as an opportunity to advertise, attractcustomers, and increase revenue.” He also pointed to “opportunistic marketing,” in whichbusinesses capitalize on major local or international events for commercialgain. Many companies are less concerned with the tournament itself than withfilling seats and attracting customers, regardless of whether Iraq wins orloses. “Such campaigns reflect a broader reality of modern markets,” he said, indicating that brands constantly seek moments that unite people around a shared emotionand "attempt to transform that sentiment into consumer demand."

Divided Opinions

Baghdad residents remain divided over the growing commercialpresence surrounding the tournament.

Muaid Abdul Hussein, 33, said businesses exploiting majorevents is a global phenomenon rather than a uniquely Iraqi one. “Big eventsalways encourage companies to advertise through campaigns that spread acrossstreets, stores, and social media.” While acknowledging that such marketing often seeks tobenefit from public emotions, he said it is not entirely negative. “Theseadvertisements keep people connected to the event and remind them of itconstantly.”

Others take a different view. Abdul Qader Abdul Rahmanbelieves excessive advertising detracts from the spirit of the tournament.

“The World Cup is an event everyone knows and follows everyfour years,” he stressed, noting that the Iraqi public already knows where andhow to watch the matches, “so it does not need this volume of advertising.” He argued that some campaigns are intrusive and focus moreon promoting businesses than on celebrating the tournament or supporting thenational team. “For me, football is a beautiful game that should be enjoyedaway from attempts to turn every moment into a sales opportunity.”

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iran's Kurds have occupied a unique position in the MiddleEast's Kurdish landscape for decades. Unlike neighboring Iraq, where Kurdishself-rule evolved into a recognized autonomous Region, Iran's Kurdishpopulation remains part of a highly centralized state. Yet Kurdish identitycontinues to shape political debate inside the country, with Kurdishcommunities participating in elections, public institutions, and national lifewhile pressing for greater recognition, cultural rights, and a stronger voice inlocal governance.

Stretching across Iran's western frontier, Kurdishcommunities have preserved a distinct language, culture, and identity. Theirrelationship with Tehran, however, has rarely been static; it has shiftedthrough periods of cooperation and confrontation, political participation, andarmed resistance, often reflecting broader transformations within the IslamicRepublic itself.

Fourteen Percent Fractured

Although Iran does not conduct an official ethnic census,most international estimates place the country's Kurdish population between 12million and 15 million people —around 14% of the total population— making theKurds one of Iran's largest non-Persian communities.

What is often referred to as Iranian Kurdistan is not anofficial administrative unit but a broad geographic and cultural regionencompassing the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, and Ilam.Major cities, including Sanandaj, Mahabad, Saqqez, Bukan, and Piranshahr, havelong served as centers of Kurdish political, economic, and cultural life.

The region's mountainous landscape has played a definingrole in its development. Stretching across the Zagros Mountains and borderingboth Iraq and Turkiye, much of Iranian Kurdistan has historically remainedconnected to neighboring Kurdish regions through trade, migration, and socialties, while the rugged terrain helped preserve strong local identities.

At the same time, decades of internal migration haveexpanded the Kurdish presence far beyond the country's western provinces. LargeKurdish communities can now be found in Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan, and Mashhad,giving the community a growing presence in many of Iran's major urban centers.

Yet Iran's Kurds are far from a single, uniform group.Sorani, Kurmanji, Southern Kurdish, and Gorani are spoken across differentregions, reflecting significant linguistic diversity. Religious affiliationsare equally varied. While Sunni Muslims constitute the majority in many Kurdishareas, particularly in Kurdistan Province, large Shia Kurdish populations(known as Feylis) live in Kermanshah and Ilam. Smaller Yarsani (Ahl-e Haqq)communities, along with limited Christian populations, add further layers tothe region's social and cultural mosaic.

Integration without Autonomy

Few issues illustrate the Kurdish experience in Iran moreclearly than the gap between participation and recognition.

Kurds vote, run for office, and serve across the state'sinstitutions. Kurdish candidates regularly win seats in the Majles (Iranianparliament), while Kurdish citizens work throughout local administrations,universities, government agencies, and the private sector.

Yet political participation has not translated intocollective rights. Unlike Iran's recognized religious minorities, Kurds receiveno constitutionally guaranteed representation. Five of the parliament's 290seats are reserved for Armenians, Assyrians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, but nocomparable provisions exist for the country's ethnic communities. Kurdishlawmakers, therefore, reach parliament through electoral victories inKurdish-majority constituencies rather than through a quota system.

For many Kurdish activists, that distinction lies at theheart of the debate. Tehran frequently points to Kurdish participation inelections and public institutions as evidence of inclusion. Kurdish politiciansand activists argue that individual representation does not amount torecognition of Kurdish political identity or collective rights. The dispute hasresurfaced repeatedly in debates over language rights, political appointments,and unfulfilled promises to Kurdish voters. Former Kurdish lawmaker AbdullahSuhrabi voiced that frustration after filing a lawsuit against former PresidentHassan Rouhani over commitments he contended were "never honored,"remarking that Kurdish voters had backed him "for the sake of obtainingour rights."

The same divide appears at the administrative level. UnlikeIraq's Kurdistan Region, which has its own parliament, government, and securityforces, Iran's Kurdish-majority provinces remain fully integrated into thecountry's centralized structure. Successive governments have categoricallyrejected proposals that could open the door to territorial autonomy, arguingthat centralized governance and national unity are essential to preservingstability.

Mistrust Deeply Rooted

Many of the dynamics shaping Kurdish politics in today'sIran trace back to the turbulent years surrounding the fall of the Pahlavimonarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

Under the Shah, political activity in Kurdish regions facedtight restrictions, driving much of it underground. In that environment, two ofthe most influential Kurdish organizations in Iran —the Kurdistan DemocraticParty of Iran (KDPI) and Komala— consolidated their political identities andexpanded their networks.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution initially raised expectationsamong many Kurdish activists that the collapse of the monarchy would open spacefor greater political freedoms, cultural rights, and local authority. Thoseexpectations quickly collided with the priorities of the new leadership inTehran.

Disputes over governance, autonomy, and the structure of thestate soon escalated into armed confrontations across Kurdish provinces. Citiesincluding Sanandaj and Mahabad became centers of conflict as IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) units launched operations against Kurdishgroups, which mobilized armed supporters in response.

The fighting is estimated to have claimed between 10,000 and20,000 lives, according to data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).Although large-scale clashes gradually subsided during the 1980s, their legacyendured, reinforcing cycles of militarization and mistrust that continue toshape Kurdish-state relations decades later.

Read more: Iran’s protests between economic crisis and political contestation

Reimagining the Resistance

The organizations that have defined Kurdish politics in Iranfor decades now operate largely beyond the country's borders, primarily frombases in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. While they differ in ideology, strategy, andlong-term vision, most share a common objective: expanded rights,representation, and self-governance for Kurdish communities.

At the center of this landscape stands the KDPI. Founded inMahabad in 1945, it is widely regarded as the oldest and most influentialKurdish party in the country. Its platform calls for a federal and democraticIran in which Kurdish-majority areas hold broad authority over local affairswhile remaining within the state.

A broadly similar objective has long guided Komala, thoughits history has been marked by ideological debates, internal splits, andshifting factions. Rooted in leftist student and labor movements, it hasevolved but remains a major force in Iranian Kurdish politics, advocatingdemocratic reform, decentralization, and expanded political freedoms.

Neither KDPI nor Komala participates in Iran’s electoralsystem or holds seats in the Majles. Both are banned by Iranian authorities andhave operated for decades from Iraqi Kurdistan. Their influence rests less onformal representation and more on their historical role in Kurdishmobilization, along with sustained ties to communities inside Iran and acrossthe diaspora.

A different model is advanced by the Kurdistan Free LifeParty (PJAK), which emerged in the early 2000s. Drawing on the ideas ofAbdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),PJAK promotes democratic confederalism —a system centered on grassrootsgovernance, local councils, gender equality, and decentralized decision-making.It also maintains an armed presence in border areas, placing it among theKurdish groups most closely monitored by Iranian security institutions.

Beyond these larger actors, smaller organizations such asthe Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Khabat Organization of IranianKurdistan, and the Kurdistan Hardworking Group remain active in Kurdishpolitical life. None matches the influence of KDPI, Komala, or PJAK, buttogether they reflect the fragmentation that has long defined the politicallandscape.

Efforts to narrow those divisions have surfacedperiodically. In 2025, PAK, PJAK, Khabat, and the Kurdistan Hardworking Groupjoined KDPI in a new alliance aimed at improving coordination among Kurdishopposition groups in Iran.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Karim Parwizi, a senior KDPImember, described the initiative as part of a “historic responsibility” todefend Kurdish rights and advance “a democratic system that upholds justice andequality.”

Read more: 650 Strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan: How deniability became a weapon

Slogans and Shrapnel

If there is one external arena that has shaped contemporaryKurdish politics in Iran more than any other, it is Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

For decades, the Kurdistan Region has functioned as both arefuge and an operational base for Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. Thatreality remains a persistent source of tension with Tehran, which accusesseveral of those organizations of supporting unrest and engaging in activitiesit views as threats to national security.

The issue returned to the spotlight following the death ofMahsa Amini in September 2022. A 22-year-old Kurdish woman from Saqqez, MahsaAmini, died in the custody of Iran’s morality police in Tehran, triggeringnationwide demonstrations that became one of the most serious politicalchallenges faced by the Islamic Republic in recent years.

Kurdish cities quickly emerged among the most active protestcenters. Demonstrations repeatedly erupted in Saqqez, Sanandaj, Mahabad, andBukan, while the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” —rooted in the Kurdish phraseJin, Jiyan, Azadi— became the movement’s defining rallying cry.

As unrest spread, Iranian officials increasingly turnedtheir focus to Kurdish opposition groups, accusing them of amplifying proteststhrough messaging networks and cross-border influence.

Iranian lawmaker and former IRGC commander Mohammad EsmailKowsari stated that “Kurdish separatist groups, especially the PDKI, Komala,and PJAK, sought to take control over some areas in Iran’s Kordestan province,”adding that their presence contributed to the deployment of IRGC forces inwestern Iran.

The organizations named in those accusations rejected theclaims. Komala described Kowsari’s remarks as “unfounded” and “politicallydriven,” arguing they were intended to justify possible cross-border strikesagainst its positions.

The unrest sparked by Amini’s death marked only one layer ofa broader shift surrounding Iran’s Kurdish opposition movements. As tensionsbetween Iran, the United States, and Israel escalated in subsequent years,Kurdish groups increasingly appeared in discussions over possible regionalescalation scenarios.

Reports cited by international media outlets, includingReuters and Axios, suggested Kurdish factions had been included in contingencyplanning tied to Western and Israeli intelligence assessments in the event of apossible confrontation with Iran. The debate intensified further afterpolitical remarks, including comments attributed to US President Donald Trump,indicating openness to Kurdish participation in a potential strike on Iran.

For Kurdish opposition groups, the discussion reinforced alongstanding reality: political visibility does not automatically translateinto operational capacity.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Khalil Kanisanani, spokesperson forthe Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), noted that any meaningful involvement in amilitary campaign would depend heavily on external support. Such a role, heargued, would require “a real US military and logistical support, not merelypolitical backing or media statements.”

Kanisanani also pointed to a “major vulnerability” forIraq’s Kurdistan Region itself. “Kurdistan remains largely without effectiveair defense protection,” he noted.

While acknowledging the presence of limited US defensivecapabilities in Erbil, he added that no clear guarantees exist for broaderprotection should a large-scale regional war erupt.

Ultimately, Kurdish factions were not drawn into the jointUS-Israeli war on Iran that began on February 28. Even so, several groupspublicly signaled readiness to become involved if what they described as“favorable conditions and an enabling environment " emerged.

The conflict nevertheless carried direct consequences forKurdish opposition movements.

Following the outbreak of the war, Iranian forces carriedout repeated strikes inside Iraqi Kurdistan, targeting “oppositioninfrastructure.” According to Community Peacemaker Teams–Iraqi Kurdistan(CPT-IK), the Kurdistan Region recorded 809 drone and missile attacks betweenFebruary 28 and April 20, 2026. The strikes left 20 people dead and 123injured, with roughly 31% of the assaults targeted at facilities used byIranian Kurdish opposition groups.

The campaign continued even after the April 8 US-Iranceasefire.

Shafaq News reported at least 15 additional attacks onopposition-related sites following the truce. Komala recently indicated thattwo Iranian missiles struck one of its sites in Erbil, adding that Iranianforces have carried out more than 82 missile and drone strikes against itsheadquarters and military positions since regional tensions escalated.

Those developments underscore the complex position Kurdishgroups from Iran continue to occupy. Despite their demographic weight and longpolitical history, their movements have often struggled to translate influenceinto unified action. Differences in ideology, strategy, and priorities continueto shape the Kurdish political landscape, even as many groups pursue similardemands. How those movements navigate those divisions may prove as important totheir future as their relationship with Tehran itself.

Read more: Caught between war and neutrality: Kurdistan navigates escalating US-Iran confrontation

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The man in the ward does not look like someone undersentence. His day begins with exercise, then classes and vocational training,before he returns at night to a room with no bars on the door, in a buildingwhere no one is watching to make sure he does not leave.

Not long ago, someone in his position would have ended up inan overcrowded cell, sharing space with dealers and leaving with more contactsthan when he entered. A senior officer in Basra, separate from the officialscited later in this report, described the dynamic bluntly when he told ShafaqNews that prison turned users into dealers.

Iraq has begun shifting its approach to drug addiction bydirecting users into rehabilitation centers instead of prison, expanding asystem that has already handled about 8,000 cases nationwide. At the Al-RusafaRehabilitation Center in Baghdad, that shift is visible on the ground, even ifits outcome remains uncertain.

Law and Rollout

The change is rooted in Article 32 of Iraq's Drug andPsychotropic Substances Law No. 50 of 2017, which allows courts to replaceprison sentences with placement in rehabilitation centers. For years, theprovision existed largely on paper, as the country lacked the capacity toenforce it. That gap has narrowed. The Interior Ministry's General Directoratefor Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances has established 16 rehabilitationcenters across Iraq —three in Baghdad and the rest distributed across the provinces.

Brigadier General Ziyad Al-Qaisi, a senior official at thedirectorate, told Shafaq News the shift reflects lessons learned from years ofenforcement. Treating users and traffickers as a single category, he said,often produced repeat offenders and in some cases fed the same networksauthorities were trying to dismantle. “The alternative is to treat users aspatients, particularly those drawn into addiction through social pressure andunstable economic conditions.”

More than 6,800 people have completed treatment and returnedto their communities, while roughly 1,200 remain in care, according toAl-Qaisi.

At Al-Rusafa, treatment follows a structured model developedjointly by the ministries of Interior and Health, known internally as the"four-plus-one" program. Dr. Mohammed Abdul Karim, the center'sphysician, described a progression from detoxification through psychologicalsupport, physical rehabilitation, and vocational training. The fifth stagecontinues after discharge, with trades such as carpentry, tailoring, andmetalwork offered to address a gap that medical care alone cannot fill.

The man who lost his government job is in the final weeks ofthat program. He speaks about returning to work, rebuilding his routine, andavoiding the same circles that led him into addiction, aware that those circleshave not disappeared, but that what has changed is his distance from them.

After leaving the center, former residents remain in contactwith community police units under a framework described as "halfwayhouses," a model in which former residents remain under light supervisionwhile reintegrating into their communities, aimed at reducing relapse. Thesystem remains limited in reach but marks a clear break from earlierapproaches, where intervention ended at the prison gate.

Read more: Iraq fights back against synthetic drug flood engulfing the Middle East

Supply and Circumstance

A second resident, who arrived by court order six monthsearlier, described his path more simply: unemployment, environment, and thepull of friends. He speaks about recovery with caution and without definingwhat comes next.

Youth unemployment in Iraq is about 32 percent, according toWorld Bank data from 2025, limiting options for those leaving structuredprograms. In Basra, appellate court figures show that around 90 percent ofarrested drug offenders were unemployed at the time of their arrest.

Psychotherapist Ahmed Mohammed Shaker links the problem todeeper disruptions in Iraq's social fabric after 2003, weakened familystructures, and prolonged instability that left many without consistent supportsystems. Addiction, in his framing, emerges less as an isolated choice and moreas a condition shaped by environment.

Supply meanwhile remains active. The United Nations Officeon Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes Iraq as both a growing consumption marketand an emerging production point. Authorities seized more than 4.1 tons ofCaptagon —a synthetic amphetamine widely trafficked across the Middle East— in2023 alone, while investigations uncovered a production laboratory inAl-Muthanna province and suspected sites near several northern cities.

Trafficking routes run through three main corridors: thenorth through the Kurdistan Region, the west through Al-Anbar and the Syrianborder, and the south through Basra. Those routes are sustained, according tothe UNODC, by weak border control and, in some alleged cases, by armed groupswith commercial interests in the trade.

The Open Question

Rehabilitation centers address individuals who enter thesystem, but they do not dismantle supply networks or eliminate the economicpressures that make addiction more likely. Inas Karim, head of the civilsociety organization A Drug Free Iraq, has warned that stigma and fear of legalconsequences still prevent many families from seeking help, leaving asignificant share of cases outside formal treatment entirely. Data shows thenumber of Iraqis receiving treatment for drug use disorders more than doubled between2017 and 2021 —a figure that exposes rising demand as much as it reflectsexpanding capacity.

Iraq's rehabilitation system marks a clear shift, replacingincarceration with treatment and offering a path that did not previously exist.Centers function, and people return to their communities. What thosecommunities offer in return remains the open question.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Any sense of calm following the latest exchange of strikesbetween Iran and Israel quickly dissipated as tensions shifted to a new frontinvolving Tehran and Washington.

The United States launched airstrikes on several Iraniantargets after an American Apache helicopter was downed over the Strait ofHormuz, an incident Washington blamed on Iran. Tehran, in turn, pledged aresponse, casting doubt over the durability of the fragile de-escalation andraising questions about whether the confrontation will remain limited orjeopardize the negotiations currently taking place between the two sides underPakistani mediation.

A brief but intense round of direct military confrontationbetween Iran and Israel ended with a mutual halt to air and missile attacksless than 24 hours after the escalation began, returning the region to thefragile calm that has largely held since the April 8 agreement.

The rapid de-escalation followed a night of cross-borderstrikes that underscored both the risks of a wider regional war and theconstraints facing the main actors involved. While military operations stoppedalmost as quickly as they started, analysts interviewed by Shafaq News suggestthe confrontation reflected broader struggles over deterrence, regionalinfluence, and the future of ongoing US-Iran negotiations.

Escalation Followed by Swift Restraint

The latest exchange began after Iran’s Islamic RevolutionaryGuard Corps launched around 30 ballistic missiles and drones targeting areas innorthern and central Israel, including the Ramat David Airbase. Tehran describedthe operation as retaliation for an Israeli strike on Beirut’s southern suburbsthat killed two people and wounded 11 others.

Israel responded with airstrikes against 20 targets inTehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz, as well as the Bandar Mahshahr petrochemicalcomplex in southern Iran. The strikes also targeted strategic air defensesystems that Iranian authorities had deployed to rebuild capabilities damagedduring previous operations.

The confrontation ended after Iran’s Khatam al-AnbiyaCentral Headquarters announced the conclusion of military operations followingwhat it called a “painful response.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahusubsequently confirmed a temporary halt to Israeli strikes while warning thatany renewed Iranian attack would trigger a forceful response.

At the same time, Israel’s Defense Ministry emphasized thatmilitary operations in Lebanon would continue independently of anyunderstanding reached with Tehran, highlighting the compartmentalized nature ofregional conflicts.

Many observers view the latest escalation through the lensof negotiations that have been underway for two months between Washington andTehran in an effort to end the conflict that began on February 28.

According to Egyptian military strategist Samir Farag, thetalks had already made significant progress on two major disputes before thelatest exchange of fire.

The first concerns Iran’s nuclear program, particularly thefate of approximately 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. Faragtold Shafaq News that negotiators had moved close to an arrangement that wouldreduce enrichment levels within Iranian facilities to 3.67 percent, thethreshold generally associated with civilian uses such as electricitygeneration and water desalination.

The second major issue involves frozen Iranian assets.According to Farag, Tehran has insisted that the release of those funds remainsa top priority, reflecting mounting economic pressures at home.

Negotiators, he said, appeared to have reached a frameworkallowing the funds to be directed toward humanitarian needs, includingmedicine, essential goods, and social assistance, while ensuring they would notbe diverted to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or to Hezbollah.

Farag indicated that most aspects of the proposedarrangement had already received preliminary approval and that momentum wasbuilding toward a possible formal announcement as early as next Thursday,coinciding with the opening of the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Nevertheless, Farag believes both Washington and Tehranremain committed to a diplomatic solution, while Israel continues to displaygreater willingness to sustain military pressure.

New Deterrence Rules

From Tehran’s perspective, the confrontation served abroader strategic objective than simple retaliation.

Iranian affairs specialist Mahdi Azizi argued that theoperation was designed to establish new rules of engagement by signaling thatfuture attacks on Beirut’s southern suburbs would provoke a direct Iranianresponse.

Azizi told Shafaq News that Iran remains committed tosupporting its regional allies in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Palestine and seesthe protection of those partners as part of its wider deterrence strategy.

The US administration faces multiple constraints, includingpreparations for midterm elections, the approaching World Cup, and growingconcerns that Yemen could expand the confrontation by threatening shippingroutes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea, Azizi explained.

Netanyahu has political incentives to prolong confrontation,linking the prime minister’s calculations to efforts to remain in power andavoid legal challenges stemming from corruption cases that have repeatedlydelayed his trial.

Azizi attributed the rapid de-escalation to three mainfactors: US pressure on Israel to avoid a wider regional war, Washington’sefforts to limit the scope of military operations despite approving a limitedresponse, and Netanyahu’s decision to reject calls from hardline ministersBezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir to strike Iranian energy facilities,citing the potential international fallout of such a move.

Yemen’s Role: A Broader Regional Strategy

The latest crisis also marked the return of Yemen’s Houthimovement to direct military action since the April ceasefire.

Yahya Saree, the group’s military spokesman, announced acomplete ban on Israeli-linked maritime traffic in the Red Sea and revealedthat two missiles had been launched toward the Tel Aviv area. Israeli airdefenses intercepted one projectile, while the second landed in an open area.

For Yemeni politician Salah Al-Sayyadi, the latestdevelopments place the next move squarely in Washington’s hands.

In an interview with Shafaq News, he said the United Statesmust now decide whether to accept the current balance of deterrence andpreserve opportunities for diplomacy or pursue further escalation that couldundermine ongoing negotiations.

He stressed that Yemen remains in a state of ceasefire withWashington but warned that any direct US military intervention alongside Israelwould carry consequences.

More broadly, Al-Sayyadi indicated that the so-called “Axisof Resistance” has succeeded in reversing a long-standing strategic challenge.Rather than allowing the United States and Israel to isolate and confrontindividual fronts separately, he said, the alliance has increasingly fragmentedAmerican and Israeli priorities, forcing them to manage multiple arenassimultaneously.

Read more: Israel reshapes southern Lebanon: Displacementand settlement fears

Fragile Calm, Unresolved Questions

The speed with which the latest confrontation ended suggeststhat neither Iran nor Israel currently seeks a full-scale regional war. Yet theepisode also demonstrated how quickly localized incidents can escalate intodirect interstate conflict.

Behind the temporary calm lies a larger contest involvingnuclear diplomacy, regional deterrence, domestic political calculations, andthe role of allied non-state actors across the Middle East.

For now, the ceasefire has restored a measure of stability.Whether that stability endures depend on battlefield developments more than onthe outcome of negotiations between Washington and Tehran, and on thewillingness of regional actors to accept emerging rules of engagement thatremain far from settled.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The Peshmergaoccupied a unique place in the Kurdistan Region's political consciousness longbefore becoming part of Iraq’s federal framework after 2005. For the vastmajority of Kurds, the force represents far more than a military institution.Its name, commonly translated as “those who face death”, emerged from decadesof struggle between the Kurdish national movement and central governments inIraq and the wider region.

Today, thathistorical legacy stands at the center of a growing political dispute. As Iraqrevisits the issue of restricting weapons to state control, concerns havesurfaced over whether the Peshmerga should also fall within the scope of thosediscussions. The debate has exposed deeper disagreements over federalism,constitutional authority, and the balance of power between Baghdad and Erbil.

A Force Rootedin History

The origins ofthe modern Peshmerga trace back to the early twentieth century, before takingshape as a more organized force through successive Kurdish uprisings andpolitical movements that intensified during the 1950s and 1960s.

Following theKurdish uprising of 1991 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, thePeshmerga gradually evolved into the Kurdistan Region’s official securityinstitution. Their position gained further recognition with the adoption ofIraq’s Constitution in 2005, which established a broader frameworkacknowledging the Region and its governing institutions, including its securityapparatus.

For thisreason, Kurdish leaders maintain that the Peshmerga cannot be treated as amilitary force subject to political bargaining. In Kurdish collective memory,the force embodies experiences ranging from the Anfal genocide, chemicalattacks, displacement, and internal conflicts to the fight against ISIS, whenlarge sections of Iraq’s defense lines collapsed while the Kurdistan Regionremained largely under the protection of its own forces.

That symbolismfeatured prominently in recent remarks by the head of the Kurdistan DemocraticParty (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani. Widely regarded by many Kurds as acontinuation of the Peshmerga’s political and military legacy, Barzaniportrayed the force’s weapons as more than a conventional arsenal, underscoringtheir role as a symbol of sacrifice, dignity, and historical securityguarantees.

Read more: Kurdistan’s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences

How thePeshmerga Entered the Disarmament Discussion?

The backdrop tothe current controversy lies in renewed efforts to address the issue of weaponsoutside direct state control. The debate returned to the forefront as theUnited States and regional actors intensified pressure on Shiite armed factionsallied with Iran.

Initiallycentered on the future of groups operating beyond state institutions, thediscussion gradually expanded in some political circles to encompass theposition of the Peshmerga.

Politicalfigures in Iraq have circulated reports of a proposal attributed to TomBarrack, the US ambassador to Turkiye and presidential envoy for Iraq andSyria, suggesting that all armed formations, including certain Shiite factionsand the Peshmerga, should be brought under the umbrella of Iraq’s armed forcesand the authority of Baghdad. The proposal, however, has yet to emerge as anofficially declared US position.

Nevertheless,the concept gained traction in domestic political discussions. According toofficial statements and experts interviewed by Shafaq News, some Shiitefactions opposed to disarmament, or reluctant to place their militarycapabilities entirely under Baghdad’s control, have sought to include thePeshmerga in the same framework.

Their argumentcenters on a seemingly straightforward question: if all weapons are to beplaced under state authority, why should the Kurdistan Region’s forces beexempt?

Kurdishofficials, legal specialists, and security experts reject that comparison. Theyargue that it overlooks the distinction between a regional force whoselegitimacy derives from constitutional provisions within a federal system andarmed factions that emerged or expanded under exceptional political andsecurity circumstances after 2003 and during the campaign against ISIS. Many ofthose groups, they note, continue to face scrutiny regarding politicalloyalties, military chains of command, and links to regional conflictsextending beyond Iraq’s official decision-making structures.

Statementsissued by some factions have reinforced perceptions that efforts are underwayto shift the debate from the dilemma of armed groups to a broader comparisoninvolving both the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Peshmerga.

Nazem Al-Saidi,head of the executive council of the US-sanctioned Harakat Al-Nujaba, toldShafaq News that the Iraqi “resistance” does not impose red lines regardingdiscussions on surrendering weapons. He nonetheless tied any such process tothe withdrawal of foreign military bases from Iraq, an end to “financial andeconomic dependency, and distancing the country from political decisionsdictated by the US Embassy.”

Al-Saidifurther stated that factions which had relinquished their weapons may havechosen to move from the “resistance project” toward participation in thepolitical process, stressing that Harakat Al-Nujaba believes weapons should notbe surrendered “except to Imam Mahdi,”* given what he characterized as thedangers and challenges surrounding Iraq.

He alsoquestioned why pressure remains concentrated on factional and PMF weaponswhile, in his view, no equivalent attention is directed toward “the weapons ofextremist groups or the Peshmerga forces.”

Kurdistan’sConstitutional Position

For Kurdishofficials, this is precisely where the Peshmerga became part of a debate notinitiated by Erbil. They interpret references to the force as an attempt eitherto broaden the discussion or to portray American and governmental pressure asselective. In Erbil’s view, the comparison deliberately conflates twofundamentally different issues in law, politics, and history.

Security expertJabar Yawar, a former senior official in the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs anda prominent observer of security relations between Baghdad and Erbil, dismisseddiscussions about dissolving or disarming the Peshmerga as lacking any legal orpractical basis.

Speaking toShafaq News, Yawar stated that neither Iraqi nor international officials haveissued formal or informal calls for such measures, emphasizing that currentdiscussions focus on specific factions, including Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, KataibHezbollah Iraq, Harakat Al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, and Kataib ImamAli— not the Peshmerga.

Yawar pointedto Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution, which grants regions the right toestablish and organize internal security forces, including police, securityservices, and regional guards. On that basis, he argued that the Peshmergaconstitute the Kurdistan Region Guard, operating within a constitutionalframework rather than outside state authority.

Consequently,any attempt to alter the force’s status could not be accomplished throughpolitical agreements, external pressure, or arrangements between Baghdad andarmed factions. Such a move, according to this interpretation, would require acomplex constitutional and legislative process because the Peshmerga are notgoverned by an ordinary federal law that can be amended in the same manner aslegislation regulating other formations.

At thelegislative level, Iraqi lawmaker Sarwa Mohammed likewise asserted that anyeffort to dissolve the Peshmerga would violate the Constitution and contradictthe principles of Iraq’s federal system, which guarantees the Kurdistan Regionthe right to maintain its own security institutions.

She describedthe Peshmerga as a constitutional and professional force responsible forprotecting the Kurdistan Region’s borders, security, and stability, affirmingthat it should not be included in debates concerning weapons outside stateinstitutions.

“Confusing thePeshmerga with armed factions does not resolve the weapons issue,” Mohammedsaid, “It opens the door to a constitutional crisis between Baghdad and Erbil.”

At the sametime, she disclosed the existence of an initiative proposed by the State of LawCoalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki, aimed at addressing the status of certainarmed factions through integration into Iraq’s official military and securityinstitutions. Noting the ongoing discussions between the Iraqi government andseveral factions regarding mechanisms for surrendering weapons or incorporatingfighters into formal structures, she stressed concern that armed groupsoperating outside official institutions do not involve the Peshmerga.

Read more: Opinion: KDP, PUK, and the fracturing of Kurdish political partnership in Iraq

Washington’sPerspective

FromWashington, Kurdish affairs and US foreign policy researcher Delovan Barwarisaid the Peshmerga cannot be viewed as a temporary force or an armed groupestablished outside the state. Instead, he described it as a recognizedregional guard force fulfilling an acknowledged security role.

In remarks toShafaq News, Barwari characterized proposals advocating the dissolution of thePeshmerga as both unconstitutional and irrational because they conflict withthe constitutional framework through which Iraq recognized the Kurdistan Regionand its right to maintain regional security forces within a federal system.

He recalled theperiod following the fall of Saddam Hussein, when the Kurdistan Regionpreserved a degree of stability while much of Iraq experienced violence andinstitutional breakdown. Barwari also highlighted the Peshmerga’s role inconfronting extremist organizations ranging from Al-Qaeda to ISIS andcooperating with international coalition partners to safeguard Iraq and thebroader region.

Regarding theAmerican position, Barwari dismissed the notion that decision-makers inWashington are pursuing a serious effort to dismantle the Peshmerga.

“I do not seecredible evidence of a US effort in that direction,” he said, describing such proposalsas political messaging linked to internal Iraqi dynamics that tend to surfaceduring periods of tension between Baghdad and Erbil.

Similarassessments have come from American military figures who worked alongside thePeshmerga during the campaign against ISIS. Retired US Army Colonel MylesCaggins, former spokesman for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, went beyondrejecting calls to dissolve the force, portraying it as a valuable securitypartner whose capabilities should be strengthened rather than reduced.

Caggins, nowfounder & CEO of Words Warriors, a consulting and government relationsfirm, described the Peshmerga as “a long-standing security force fullyauthorized under the Iraqi Constitution.” He emphasized its role in maintaininginternal security in the Kurdistan Region and its record as a dependable USpartner during key military campaigns, from the period following SaddamHussein’s fall to the fight against ISIS.

He argued thatlocally established security forces recognized by the federal system reflectIraq’s geography, history, language, and social realities. Caggins also calledon the United States and allied countries to deepen cooperation with thePeshmerga and expand support in areas such as technology, training, andcounter-drone capabilities.

PoliticalBalancing or State Consolidation?

Lahib Higel,Senior Iraq Analyst at the International Crisis Group, rejected suggestionsthat Washington is actively pressing for the dissolution of the Peshmerga orits integration into federal forces. Instead, she viewed the discussion as adomestic political maneuver linked to Baghdad’s internal balance of power.

Speaking toShafaq News, Higel observed that the proposal may represent an attempt byfederal authorities to reassure Iran-aligned factions facing pressure overtheir weapons by presenting the issue as one affecting all forces operatingoutside Baghdad’s direct control.

She cautioned,however, that such an approach could have significant repercussions forrelations between Baghdad and Erbil while also intensifying divisions withinKurdish politics, particularly between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan, given existing disputes over Peshmerga reform andunification.

That internaldimension introduces another layer of sensitivity. Some researchers contendthat divisions within the Peshmerga’s military structure provide politicalopponents in Baghdad with additional opportunities to use the issue asleverage.

Yasser Kuoti, aMiddle East analyst and doctoral student in political science at BostonUniversity, pointed to signs of a broader US inclination toward strengtheningthe authority of the federal government. At the same time, he stated that thePeshmerga’s organizational structure remains partially influenced by thehistoric division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the PatrioticUnion of Kurdistan (PUK).

Although Erbiland its western partners have spent years pursuing reforms aimed at unifyingforces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, Kuoti noted that “the issuecontinues to supply some actors with arguments for bringing the force underfederal authority.”

He alsosuggested that calls for integration may stem from pressure exerted by Iraqipolitical groups seeking a parallel arrangement. In that context, factionsfacing demands to submit to state authority may insist that any effort toregulate weapons should apply equally to all armed forces.

RegionalDynamics and the Weapons

Iraqi strategicaffairs researcher Kazem Yawar noted that restricting weapons to state controlremains one of the key objectives included in the government’s program. Whilethe issue is not new, he said, recent regional developments and the ongoingconfrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran have pushed it backto the forefront of political and media discourse.

According toYawar, Washington has publicly advocated implementation of the principle thatweapons should remain under state authority, prompting extensive discussionacross official, media, and public spheres. The issue has also attractedattention from both the United States and Gulf states because of concerns overarmed faction activity and its potential impact on American and Gulf interests.

Yawar notedthat the Kurdistan Parliament enacted the Ministry of Peshmerga Law No. 19 of2007, and provided a clear legal framework for the Region Guard. He alsocontrasted the Peshmerga’s legal status with that of the PMF. The PMF emergedunder exceptional circumstances and was later regulated through legislationadopted in 2016, a law that can be revised through federal constitutionalmechanisms. The Peshmerga, by contrast, derive their status from constitutionalprovisions and regional authorities, making dissolution or full integrationimpossible without constitutional amendments or legislation issued by theKurdistan Parliament.

Kurdish Syrianpolitical analyst Shvan Ibrahim remarked that attempts to include the Peshmergain disarmament initiatives reflect a perception among some actors of Kurds as apermanent adversary or threat to the state.

Speaking toShafaq News, Ibrahim described comparisons between the Peshmerga and factionsthat he said “spread corruption, destruction, and devastation in Iraq andneighboring countries” as historically and politically unjust.

“The Peshmergadid not threaten neighboring states, did not attack Gulf countries, and did notharm civilians or politicians,” he said, adding that “Instead, they protectedKurdistan and millions of displaced people and refugees, including Iraqi andSyrian Arabs who fled ISIS, armed factions, and militias.”

He furtherindicated that the Peshmerga protected Iraqi political leaders during the earlystages of the Iraqi Governing Council, the provisional government of Iraq from13 July 2003 to 1 June 2004, and parliament, contributed to the defense ofMosul and other areas, and played a major role in the war against ISIS. Anyeffort to dissolve the force, he warned, “would trigger one of Iraq’s mostserious national crises by reviving a centralized model of governance thatconcentrates power in federal institutions and risks reproducing authoritarianpractices.”

Ibrahim alsoaddressed comparisons with Syria, where debates continue over the futureintegration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions. Inhis view, “the parallel is flawed.” The SDF emerged during a civil war and amidthe collapse of central authority, whereas the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is aconstitutionally recognized federal entity with elected institutions, locallegislation, and security forces whose existence is explicitly protected underIraqi law.

Read more: Iraq to place armed factions' weapons under state control: What we know so far

A Test ofIraq’s Post-2003 Order

The disputeover the Peshmerga’s place in Iraq’s weapons debate extends far beyond technicaldiscussions about security arrangements. It has become a political andconstitutional test of the state established after 2003.

Efforts toinclude the Kurdistan Region’s forces in disarmament discussions may appear, onthe surface, to be attempts to distribute pressure more evenly or createnegotiating balance. Yet such efforts collide with a fundamental distinctionbetween a regional force grounded in constitutional authority and historicalexperience, and armed formations whose relationship with the state remainscontested.

As Baghdadseeks to reinforce centralized security decision-making under both domestic andinternational pressure, Erbil regards any challenge to the Peshmerga as achallenge to the foundations of federal partnership itself.

In that sense,many observers believe that any approach failing to recognize this distinctionmay not advance the goal of regulating weapons. Instead, it could open the doorto a new constitutional confrontation between Baghdad and the KurdistanRegion—an outcome few actors appear willing to risk.

*In TwelverShiite doctrine, Imam Al-Mahdi is the hidden twelfth Imam who is believed toremain in occultation until his return at the end of times. His reappearance isexpected to usher in an era of justice and righteousness after a period ofturmoil and oppression.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq’s legal framework forregulating digital content was written for a different era. Decades-old penalprovisions and a media regulator conceived under post-invasion occupation lawnow constitute the primary tools available to a state confronting TikTokalgorithms, viral music videos, and an online population that isoverwhelmingly, irreversibly young.

A wave of fast-paced songs featuringsexually suggestive lyrics and nightclub imagery has spread rapidly acrossIraqi social media, drawing condemnation from parents, educators, and religiousvoices. The controversy focused on content, and that Iraq lacks the regulatoryframework to govern the platforms carrying that content, and every monthwithout legislative reform is a month the gap grows.

More than half of Iraq’s populationis under 25, according to the Ministry of Planning and United Nationsdemographic estimates. That demographic reality is the foundation of the story.A 2023 UNICEF survey found that 78 percent of children aged 10 to 14 access theinternet daily via smartphones, the majority without supervision or contentboundaries; 40 percent reported encountering harassment or inappropriatematerial. A 2024 study by Iraq’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs sharpenedthat picture further, testing smartphones and tablets purchased from Baghdadand Basra markets under typical family conditions —fresh out of the box,default settings intact. Most devices arrived with disabled filters,unrestricted browsers, and open app stores.

Platforms popular among Iraqichildren, such as TikTok and Snapchat, require multiple steps to enable safetyfeatures that most parents do not know exist. These are the predictableconsequences of a regulatory system that was never designed to address them.

Abdul Hussein Al-Ghazi, a Baghdadresident, told Shafaq News he had restricted his children’s smartphone accessentirely, “not as a precaution, but as a necessity.” Explicit content, he said,had entered schools and public spaces “through songs containing wordsunsuitable for their age and upbringing.” What Al-Ghazi describes as a parentaldecision is, in effect, a governance failure displaced onto households.

Educational supervisor Abdul AlimKhalid identified the institutional dimension of that failure. The classroom,he told Shafaq News, is increasingly in competition with the algorithm andlosing. The vulgarity pervasive in social media content directly affectschildren’s behavior, he argued, pointing to a contradiction no curriculumadjustment can resolve: “schools teach one set of values while the platformschildren inhabit for hours each day reinforce another.”

Social researcher Manhal Al-Salehsaid the consequences are moral and psychological at the same time, "Thiscontent does not just offend, it distorts. Adolescents are forming theirunderstanding of human relationships through what they watch, and thosedistortions do not disappear when the video ends."

She called for coordinated actionacross religious, educational, and media institutions, alongside stricterdigital monitoring and stronger enforcement of child protection law.

Al-Saleh's prescription isreasonable; however, the enforcement apparatus to deliver it does not yetexist.

Iraq’s Communications and MediaCommission (CMC) holds nominal regulatory authority over digital content.Established in 2004 under an executive order issued by Paul Bremer, thenadministrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority that governed Iraq afterthe US-led invasion, the CMC was designed for a broadcasting landscape oftelevision licenses and print publishers. It was not built for platforms whosemoderation decisions are made by engineers in California and whose algorithmsoperate entirely outside Iraqi jurisdiction. Since 2022, its board has comeunder the effective control of political blocs aligned with the CoordinationFramework, the dominant parliamentary coalition, meaning enforcement decisionsare also politically inflected.

Iraq’s Penal Code —Law No. 111 of1969— includes provisions criminalizing the publication of materials deemedcontrary to public morals, and the CMC has moved, at least on paper, to draft aregulation on digital platforms that would require social media companies toappoint a liaison officer, establish content take-down processes, and notifythe CMC before launching services in Iraq. On the ground, a source within theInterior Ministry told Shafaq News that authorities intervene only aftercomplaints are filed. Videos may lead to account monitoring, suspension, or thedetention of content creators. The Ministry acts in an enforcement capacity;responsibility for blocking content sits with the CMC. What is absent is aunified digital content law that defines harmful material with precision,establishes age-verification requirements with technical force, and createsmechanisms for holding platforms, rather than individual accounts, accountable.

The human cost of that absence isnot abstract. In April 2024, TikTok creator Ghufran Mahdi Sawadi, also known asUmm Fahad, 28, was shot dead by a motorcyclist outside her home in Baghdad’sZayouna district. She had previously been sentenced to six months in prison forposting videos a court deemed indecent. She was not the first Iraqi socialmedia personality to be killed; TikToker Noor Alsaffar had been fatally shot inthe city the year before. The pattern illustrates something that no regulatorybriefing captures cleanly: in Iraq, the space between legal prosecution andstreet-level violence against content creators is unregulated and, for some,deadly. Any discussion of digital governance that omits this context isincomplete.

Technical expert Ammar Al-Luhaibiidentified the operational limits of what currently exists. Platforms nominallyrequire parental consent for users under 16, he told Shafaq News. In practice,verification mechanisms are trivially bypassed. "Authorities can act onindividual accounts, but the problem is structural. You cannot treat a systemicfailure one account at a time.”

TikTok’s reach in Iraq now surpassesthat of every other platform; the app added 2.35 million users in 2024 alone,bringing total social media penetration in the country to 73.8 percent of thepopulation, according to the Digital Media Center. A regulatory frameworkoperating outside the jurisdiction of the platform, most rapidly expanding itsfootprint among Iraqi youth, is, by definition, insufficient.

Iraq is not the only country in theregion confronting this challenge, but it is conspicuously behind its neighborsin legislative response. Egypt’s parliament is actively drafting legislation torestrict children’s social media access, following a direct call from PresidentAbdel-Fattah al-Sissi. Morocco is debating similar measures. The UAE hasenacted a Child Digital Safety Law with enforceable age-based restrictions.These approaches carry their own risks —UNICEF warned in December 2025 thatoutright bans may backfire, pushing children toward less regulated platforms —but they represent legislative engagement with the problem. Iraq has not yetreached that threshold.

Read more: Children in chains: How Iraq’s digital safety fails the ‘Online Generation’

Periodic campaigns have recurred foryears in Iraq, generating the same cycle: viral content, public backlash,selective enforcement, renewed debate, and no structural change. Critics haveconsistently warned that without clear legal definitions and transparentstandards, crackdowns risk inconsistency and selective targeting rather thangenuine child protection. Conservative groups, meanwhile, continue pressing forstronger action and framing the issue as one of moral preservation. Betweenthose positions, the actual policy work —legislative modernization, technicalcapacity-building, sustained platform engagement— tends not to happen.

The digital economy complicates thepicture further, as Iraq’s growing influencer culture and the nightlifeentertainment content at the center of this controversy are not marginalphenomena. They represent, according to observers, an economic activity, audiencemarkets, and for women who dominate that space, professional livelihoodspursued at considerable personal risk. Purely prohibitionist approaches cannotaccount for that reality, and Iraqi regulators have so far declined to engagewith it directly.

Iraq’s demographic trajectoryensures this problem does not resolve itself. The problem facing lawmakers nowis whether to pursue structural reform —clarified regulatory authority, legallyprecise definitions of harmful content, investment in technical enforcementcapacity, and direct engagement with global platforms— or to continue managingeach cycle of outrage as it arrives.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Shafaq News

More than a year and a half afterthe Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary elections, the formation of the tenthcabinet remains stalled amid ongoing political disputes between the two mainparties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK).

As rounds of dialogue andnegotiations continue, questions are mounting over the real reasons behind thedelay in forming the government, and whether the crisis is rooted in theelection results themselves or in how those results are being translated into apolitical partnership capable of managing the next phase.

Parliamentary Seat Map

The Kurdistan Parliament elections,held on October 20, 2024, produced a new political landscape that reshaped thebalance of power inside parliament. However, no party secured a comfortablemajority that would allow it to form a government on its own, making consensusamong the major political forces a prerequisite for establishing the newcabinet.

According to the official results,the KDP won 39 seats, while the PUK came second with 23 seats. The NewGeneration Movement (Al-Jeel Al-Jadeed) made significant gains, securing 15seats. The Kurdistan Islamic Union won seven seats, the National Positioncoalition obtained four seats, and the Kurdistan Justice Group secured threeseats. The remaining were distributed among other political parties and quotarepresentatives of minority communities.

The results clearly showed that theKDP maintained its position as the largest political force in the Region butfailed to secure an outright majority that would enable it to form a governmentindependently. The PUK remained the second-largest force capable of influencingthe government formation process.

At the same time, the rise of theNew Generation Movement added further complexity to the political landscapeafter it became the third-largest bloc in parliament, creating new politicalequations that had not existed in previous legislative terms.

Read more: Kurdistan Region’s political deadlock: Impact and perils

Electoral Entitlement or PoliticalPartnership?

Saadi Ahmed Pira, a member of thePUK Political Bureau, said the crisis surrounding the formation of theKurdistan Region’s government is linked less to the election results themselvesthan to how those results are being handled and translated into genuinepolitical partnership within the executive authority.

“The PUK believes that electoralentitlement should be the foundation upon which the government formationprocess and the distribution of responsibilities and positions are built,” Piratold Shafaq News.

He argued that the KDP does notadequately adhere to this principle and instead seeks to form the governmentaccording to its own vision before allocating positions to other parties,without involving them effectively in drafting the government’s program,determining its structure, or defining how powers should be distributed.

“The real problem is not the numberof seats won by political parties, but the absence of full recognition of theprinciple of partnership based on electoral entitlement.”

He called on the KDP to apply withinthe Kurdistan Region the same standards of balance, consensus, and partnershipthat it demands from the federal government in Baghdad, ensuring that the newcabinet reflects the election results and the political will of voters.

Regarding calls for newparliamentary elections, Pira stressed that such a step would not solve thecurrent crisis because a new vote would not produce a fundamentally differentpolitical reality and would impose high financial costs.

He said the PUK does not fear newelections and believes it is politically and organizationally stronger todaythan it was before the last vote, arguing that resorting to elections would notaddress the root problem, which lies in disagreements over the governmentformation mechanism and respect for parties’ electoral mandates.

Pira noted that the PUK continues tocall for dialogue and negotiations aimed at forming a government based ongenuine partnership, political balance, and electoral entitlement, ensuring theparticipation of all forces represented in the Kurdistan Parliament in managingthe next phase.

He also described current regionaland international involvement in Kurdish affairs as positive, saying it“contributes to encouraging dialogue and bringing political parties closertogether.”

PUK President Bafel Talabani hasstated that a government similar to the current one cannot be formed,reiterating that his party seeks a cabinet based on partnership and balance,“one that understands the demands of the Kurdish public and works to improverelations between Erbil and Baghdad.”

Meanwhile, Kurdistan Region DeputyPrime Minister Qubad Talabani, a PUK leader, has likewise stressed thereadiness of political forces to reach a genuine agreement on forming the newregional government.

Crisis Predates the Elections

The KDP rejects accusations that itis responsible for the stalled negotiations and insists that the current crisisis linked to political positions that predate the elections, as well as newalliances formed afterward inside parliament.

Kamran Gharib, a KDP official,affirmed that the party had invited the PUK to enter negotiations over theformation of the tenth cabinet before Iraq’s parliamentary elections, “but thePUK did not respond to the invitation.”

Speaking to Shafaq News, Gharib saidthe election results and the KDP’s clear gain, not only within the KurdistanRegion but also compared with other Iraqi political forces, prompted the PUK tosearch for alternative political options and alliances, noticing that this wasreflected in the PUK’s move toward coordination with the New GenerationMovement and the formation of a joint bloc inside the Kurdistan Parliament.

“A large portion of New Generation’svotes came from al-Sulaymaniyah, Garmian, Halabja, and areas within the PUK’ssphere of influence.”

He argued that those votes primarilyrepresented “dissatisfaction with PUK policies” and that many voters whosupported New Generation had previously been part of the PUK’s support basebefore shifting to an opposition political project.

Addressing demands for thedistribution of positions according to a “50-50” formula, Gharib stressed thatthe arrangement belonged to a previous political phase and “has been overtakenby current political and electoral developments.”

He insisted that the present stagerequires respect for each party’s electoral entitlement based on itsrepresentation in parliament rather than adherence to traditional formulas thatprevailed in earlier periods.

“The KDP, when it calls forpartnership, balance, and consensus at the federal level, does not do so forthe benefit of the party itself but rather in defense of the rights of theKurdish component within the Iraqi state,” Gharib said in response to Pira’sremarks regarding partnership.

He also recalled the periodfollowing the rise of the Gorran Movement in Al-Sulaymaniyah, Garmian, andHalabja, when the PUK’s electoral results declined to a level that, accordingto electoral entitlement standards, did not qualify it to hold the position ofKurdistan Region Prime Minister.

Back to history, Gharib said, theKDP decided, at the request of the late President Jalal Talabani, to grant theposition to the PUK, leading to the appointment of Barham Salih as PrimeMinister of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Gharib highlighted that the “newPUK” is currently advancing demands and issues that the KDP believes are notbased on clear legal or democratic foundations, adding that any successfulpolitical process must be based on dialogue, understanding, and respect forelectoral entitlement, “not on imposing conditions or dictates by any party.”

Regarding the possibility of newparliamentary elections, Gharib said “all options remain on the table” toreactivate the legislative institution and form a new government, “except forany options that lead to escalation or confrontation.”

Like Pira, Gharib pointed to theexternal dimension, saying neighboring countries view the stability of theKurdistan Region as a shared interest and seek a strong government capable ofmanaging political, security, and economic affairs efficiently.

Roots of the Crisis

Between the competing narratives ofthe two parties, observers interviewed by Shafaq News believe the crisisextends beyond current disputes over positions and ministerial portfolios andis linked to a long history of political rivalry and differing visionsregarding the governance and future of the Kurdistan Region.

Political analyst Abu Bakr Karawanitold Shafaq News that the failure of the KDP and PUK to reach an agreementstems from four main factors that intersect and directly affect the governmentformation process.

The first factor is the historicallegacy of political disputes and conflicts between the two parties, dating backdecades to the 1960s. The second involves current political disagreements andunresolved issues that remain points of contention. The third relates todiffering views on local, regional, and international issues, as well ascontrasting perspectives on the future of the Kurdistan Region and itsadministration. The fourth factor concerns conflicting political interests tiedto the distribution of positions and powers within the next government.

Karwani said the absence of aunified institutional framework across the Region, combined with theadministrative and political divisions based on party influence in certainareas, “has deepened internal disagreements,” adding that this reality hascreated an environment that allows external actors to intervene and exploitthese divisions to advance political, national, factional, or sectarianinterests.

The political forces in theKurdistan Region, particularly the KDP and PUK, must recognize the scale of therisks that could result from the continuation of political division anddisagreement, he stressed, identifying the absence of an effective constitutionfor the Kurdistan Region as one of the key factors shaping the current reality.“There is no constitutional framework that clearly defines government formationprocedures or designates the authority responsible for assigning that task.”

He said these factors make anunderstanding between the KDP and PUK essential for successfully forming agovernment and ensuring its stability. “The most realistic option at thecurrent stage is the formation of a consensus government that includes the twomain forces and is based on political partnership and national consensus,Karwani said, concluded that the nature of the political system in theKurdistan Region, together with weak institutional structures compared with thelevel of party influence, necessitates consensus-based solutions rather than apolitical majority approach.

“This makes a partnership governmentthe best option for ensuring political and administrative stability and movingconditions toward greater stability and development.”

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Shafaq News

Tucked into Iraq's far north-western corner, Duhok is a province defined by contradiction. Bordered by Turkiye and Syria, and nested within the Kurdistan Region, it has long absorbed the movements of armies, empires, and refugees. Today it absorbs something else: the weight of displacement without resolution, development without stability, and beauty without peace.

Woven Identities

Duhok spans 6,553 square kilometers of jagged mountains, fertile valleys, and two vital rivers, the Great Zab and the Khabur. The province is divided into five districts: Duhok, Zakho, Al-Amediya (Amedi), Akre, and Sheikhan, each with its own historical character.

Its population, estimated at over 1.5 million, is predominantly Kurdish, with Kurmanji as the primary spoken dialect. But Duhok is also home to Yazidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and Arabs, communities that have coexisted for generations in an arrangement that is diverse by history and fragile by circumstance.

Read more: Duhok begins restoration of six key archaeological sites

Scars of Displacement

Few provinces in Iraq carry as heavy a humanitarian burden. Assyrians and Chaldeans fled Mosul and Baghdad following the 2003 US invasion. Over 100,000 Syrian refugees arrived after 2011. Then came the 2014 Yazidi exodus due to ISIS violence, an event that reshaped Duhok more dramatically than any other in recent memory.

Today, the province hosts over 380,000 displaced people, many in camps such as Domiz, Sharya, Khanke, and Bajid Kandala, shelters that were meant to be temporary and have become, for many, permanent. A 2023 UNHCR survey found that 60% of camp residents have no plans to return, citing destroyed homes, uncleared landmines, and ongoing insecurity.

"There is no home to return to in Sinjar," said Rojen Haji, a 21-year-old student who fled the region. "It was burned down. Our land is mined. Our people are divided. We have nowhere left to go."

The crisis is compounded by Turkiye's military campaign against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Duhok's border areas. Between 2018 and 2025, Turkish intensive operations have escalated across the Metina, Avashin, and Gara regions. Human rights organizations report that 145 villages have been evacuated since 2015 due to airstrikes and sustained military pressure.

"Duhok is a living archive of genocide, survival, and reconstitution," said Dr. Khalid Khorsheed, a historian at the University of Duhok. "Each community here has been displaced at least once, but they endure."

Spirit Endures

Displacement has not erased Duhok's cultural life. Yazidis continue to make pilgrimages to the Lalish temple in Sheikhan, the holiest site in Yazidism. In the highlands of Amedi and Akre, Christian communities maintain ancient Aramaic liturgies in churches that predate Islam.

The University of Duhok, with over 18,000 students, has emerged as a research hub for Yazidi history, environmental science, and agriculture. Yet youth unemployment stands at 27.4%, and many graduates remain uncertain about their prospects in the region.

Thirsty Economy

Duhok's economy rests on agriculture, trade, and public sector employment, all three under pressure. The Ibrahim Khalil border crossing remains a major asset, generating an estimated $12 billion in trade annually, but widespread informal commerce has fueled corruption and eroded institutional trust.

Agriculture, once the backbone of communities in Amedi and Akre —known for their apple and grape orchards— is struggling. Upstream damming by Turkiye, combined with climate change and irregular rainfall, has reduced river flows and left farming communities adapting under difficult conditions.

Tourism had offered a measure of relief. In 2023, over 850,000 visitors came to Duhok, drawn by the ancient citadel of Amedi, the Bekhal waterfall, and the mountain scenery around Akre, a 12% increase on the previous year.

But that momentum has since reversed sharply. Ihsan Issa, head of the Restaurants and Hotels Association, told Shafaq News that the sector has been in a "severe crisis" for the past two years, with most hotels and motels forced to close. He estimated that the suspension of tourism has cost Duhok's market nearly four billion Iraqi dinars (roughly $2.58 million) every month. The situation deteriorated further in 2026 following the outbreak of war between Iran and the United States, which led to the closure of approximately 95% of hotels in the province.

"Duhok has a wealth of natural beauty and cultural significance, but we risk losing it to uncontrolled development," said Tara Hasan, founder of the Amedi Heritage Foundation. "Tourism must serve to preserve, not plunder."

Thirsty Lands

The environment is under parallel stress. Data from Global Forest Watch shows that Duhok lost 15% of its tree cover between 2000 and 2022, driven by deforestation, military activity, and infrastructure expansion. Turkish dam construction on the Tigris and Zab rivers has worsened water scarcity, threatening both agriculture and natural resources.

Local responses are underway. The University of Duhok's Renewable Energy Research Centre is piloting solar-powered irrigation to address water shortages. In 2024, a $7.2 million ecotourism initiative, backed by European partners, was launched to promote sustainable development and conservation.

Duhok stands at a crossroads not of its own choosing. Its past is marked by forced movement and survival. Its present is defined by camps that outlasted their purpose, border conflicts that emptied its villages, and an economy caught between opportunity and collapse. What it retains, its diversity, its cultural memory, its stubbornness, may yet be enough to shape a different future

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The American approach to Iraq's Iran-alignedarmed factions has undergone a quiet but consequential transformation. Theappointment of Tom Barrack as special envoy for Iraq and Syria, replacing MarkSavaya, signals a shift not in objectives but in the method of pursuing them.The US still wants Iran's military footprint in Iraq reduced, but it is nowtrying to achieve that through structural pressure rather than visibleinterference.

Read more: Trump's new Iraq-Syria envoy faces an Iran test Syria never posed

The distinction matters because Savaya wasperceived across Baghdad's political class as a figure who reached too deeplyinto Iraqi internal arrangements. Barrack, according to analysts interviewed byShafaq news, represents a different profile: a businessman with direct ties toPresident Donald Trump, a preference for strong central states overconsociational power-sharing, and a mandate that deliberately bundles Iraq withSyria under a single envoy.

Dilshad Othman, a researcher in internationalrelations at the University of Tennessee, told Shafaq News that the UnitedStates no longer treats Iraq as a file with its own internal logic; it treatsit as a node in a broader regional security order aimed at reconfiguring thebalance of power and curtailing Iranian influence.

The apparatus Barrack inherits is alreadysubstantially built. Since early 2025, the Trump administration has operated onmultiple simultaneous tracks: diplomatic pressure on Baghdad to restrictweapons to state authority; congressional conditions tying security cooperationfunding to verifiable reductions in Iran-aligned factions' capacity; sanctionson banks and businessmen, direct warnings that Washington would not recognize agovernment that handed ministries to armed factions linked to Tehran; and,beneath all of this, a military option kept deliberately visible.

Read more: Is Iraq closer to restricting weapons to the state?

TheCoordination Framework Moves

The Shiite Coordination Framework'sauthorization of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to take all necessary measures torestrict weapons to state control was presented by the alliance as a sovereignnational position. Malik Francis, a Republican politician and political analyst,told Shafaq News that Washington views these steps positively, stating that"Iraq's long-term stability requires the state to be the sole entityauthorized to carry and use weapons within legal frameworks." The welcomewas not merely rhetorical: Francis situated US support within a broader effortto strengthen Iraqi state institutions and the rule of law, and added thatconsolidating the state's monopoly on force would improve the investmentclimate and enhance foreign business confidence in the Iraqi market, aneconomic framing that signals Washington is offering something beyonddiplomatic approval.

The US Chargé d'Affaires Joshua Harris'swelcome of the CF's authorization, described as a "qualitative shift"toward Iraqi sovereignty, arrived within a diplomatic framework designed tomake that shift the only viable path. Patrick Clawson, the Morningstar seniorfellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, assessed the CF'sauthorization as consolidating an existing reality rather than representing asudden rupture. The political groundwork, he argued, had been laid over manymonths.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq's announcement —forming acentral committee to inventory weapons, personnel, and equipment and transferthem to state authority— was the first concrete institutional step any majorIran-aligned faction had taken. AAH operates Brigades 41, 42, and 43 within thePopular Mobilization Forces and maintains a parliamentary wing through theSadiqoon bloc. Kataib Imam Ali (Brigade 40 of the PMF), which also holds fiveparliamentary seats through its Khadamat bloc, followed with a paralleldecision. That two factions moved in close succession, each with namedinstitutional mandates, signals something beyond individual calculation.

The process has since moved from politicalauthorization to physical implementation. Major General Saad Maan, head of theSecurity Media Cell, announced the first practical steps in the merger process:the handover of Saraya al-Salam headquarters and weapons in Samarra, followingMuqtada al-Sadr's decision to place the force under state authority. Al-Sadr'smove —primarily a domestic political maneuver by a figure who has longmaintained distance from Iran's direct orbit— added momentum and removed oneargument for hesitation from CF-aligned factions.

Read more: Iraq after the regional ceasefire: US bases and unresolved political questions

Petraeusin Baghdad

The visit by retired General David Petraeusto Baghdad in mid-May 2026, formally as a private citizen providing independentadvisory services to the White House, added a further dimension to the USpressure arrangement. After five days of meetings with senior Iraqi officials,Petraeus wrote that his interlocutors "recognized the importance ofensuring that the Iraqi Security Services have a monopoly on the use of forcein Iraq." The visit was not publicly acknowledged as official; itssignificance lay precisely in the fact that a channel allowed frank exchangewithout the formality of a diplomatic confrontation.

What Petraeus found reflected a factionallandscape in transition. Several groups, including Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada,Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, had signaled varying degrees of readiness to supportweapons restriction. The direction of travel among the pragmatic wing of theresistance ecosystem was, for the first time in years, discernibly towardaccommodation. The choice to route that assessment through a retired generaloperating outside official channels was not incidental; it reflects adeliberate American preference for pressure that is felt without being formallyapplied, credible precisely because it carries no diplomatic obligation tofollow through.

Read more: Najaf’s religious authority: A centuries-old voice for stability in Iraq

TheHoldouts

That direction of travel does not extend toall factions, as Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Ashab al-Kahf haverejected disarmament without preconditions, specifically, the completewithdrawal of US and Turkish forces from Iraqi territory.

Kataib Hezbollah remains one of the mostoperationally capable factions within the PMF; its Secretary-General AbuHussein al-Hamidawi survived a US strike in Baghdad's Karrada district in March2026 that killed three associates. The faction has publicly stated readiness torespond to the United States across all fronts if PMF leaders are targeted.

The divergence within what was presented as aunified resistance framework now exposes a structural fracture: CF-alignedfactions that contested the November 2025 elections and are seeking roles inthe next government have different incentive structures from Islamic Resistancein Iraq groups that define their weapons as existential and their strategicalignment with Tehran as non-negotiable. The former calculate thataccommodation buys political survival and economic legitimacy; the lattercalculate that disarmament eliminates their deterrence and exposes theirleadership to legal or physical targeting. Both calculations are rationalwithin their own framework.

Read more: Iraq’s armed factions and the disarmament debate: Why unity masks deep divisions

TheTransaction Behind the Pressure

Sources within the CF told Shafaq News of aninternal split over an American proposal that sharpens the transactionalcharacter of the disarmament process: the US would facilitate service andinvestment projects inside Iraq, implemented by American companies, in exchangefor progress on weapons restriction and factional handovers. The proposal hasdivided CF member parties, with some viewing it as a legitimate economicincentive and others resistant to what they read as a conditioned bargain.

The pattern fits a broader American operatingmode. In May 2025, Trump announced a ceasefire with the Houthis in Yemen, mediatedby Oman, under which the US halted its bombing campaign in exchange for thegroup ceasing attacks on American ships. The deal bypassed Israel and left theHouthis free to continue strikes on Israeli targets, exposing the transactionalrather than principled character of the arrangement. Trump's subsequent publicclaim of engagement with Hezbollah in Lebanon this June, occurring in the samewindow as Washington's welcome of the CF stance, follows the same logic:bilateral deals on narrow US interests, coercive pressure maintained on thebroader Iranian influence design.

Ali al-Baydar, a Baghdad-based politicalanalyst, told Shafaq News that Barrack's mandate reflects a US desire to manageIraq, Syria, Turkiye, and Iran as a single interconnected file, and that"the weapons question is one instrument within that larger arrangement,not an end in itself."

Iraqi politician Mithal al-Alusi argued thatIraq and the region need the "institutional United States" more thanthey need a presidential envoy, warning that handling Iraq through the samelens as Syria “risks misreading the country's political complexity andundermining the strategic partnership between Baghdad and Washington.”

Haitham Numan, professor of political scienceat the University of Exeter, assessed Barrack as oriented toward strong centralstates rather than consociational arrangements. This preference aligns withal-Zaidi's government program but sits uneasily with the federal and pluraliststructure Iraq has operated under since 2003.

Read more: Multiple actors, one battlefield: Iraq since the US-Israel-Iran war began

WashingtonCannot Answer This

Iraq's weapons restriction process hasreached a threshold it has approached and retreated from before. The differencethis time is the accumulation of external pressurث —legislative, diplomatic, financial, and military— that has raised the cost of inaction to a level that several CF-aligned factions now judge unsustainable. The Samarra handover, theCF's authorization, the Harris-al-Araji meeting, the Petraeus visit, and theeconomic incentive framework: these are the visible outputs of a sustainedpressure campaign Washington has been constructing for over a year.

Despite these developments, the campaigncannot resolve the internal fracture it has helped produce. Kataib Hezbollahand Harakat al-Nujaba's refusal is strategic and rooted in a calculation thattheir weapons are the only guarantee of their survival in anypost-accommodation environment. The CF split over the American investmentproposal signals that even among compliant factions, the terms of complianceremain contested. If al-Zaidi's government formation proceeds without resolvingthat fracture, Iraq enters the final phase of the US withdrawal agreement with abifurcated security landscape: factions nominally integrated and others openlydefiant, and no unified position capable of holding both.

Read more: Ali Al-Zaidi's incomplete cabinet faces Iraqi armed factions test

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

In the southernIraqi city of Najaf, the modest houses and narrow streets of the old quarterconceal one of the country's most influential religious and political centers.The city hosts the leading figures of Iraq’s Shiite religious establishment,foremost among them Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Despite their simplelifestyle and reputation for asceticism, the decisions and guidance issued fromNajaf have repeatedly shaped major developments in Iraq and beyond.

For nearly athousand years, the Najaf seminary has maintained a moderate approach to politicaland social affairs. Throughout Iraq’s various historical periods, the religiousauthority has consistently emphasized national interests and social stability,advocating dialogue, political solutions, and diplomacy over violence andinternal conflict.

While urgingcalm and peaceful coexistence, the religious authority has also demonstrated awillingness to take decisive action when Iraq faced existential threats. Themost prominent example came after the rapid expansion of ISIS across severalIraqi cities. At a time when both the state and society faced grave danger, thereligious authority issued the historic “sufficient jihad” fatwa* in June 2014,calling on Iraqis to defend their country.

Read more: Ayatollah Al-Sistani's authority rejects role in Iraq PM selection

The broadpublic response to that decree underscored the religious authority’s ability tomobilize society during critical moments. The fatwa became a turning point inIraq’s campaign against terrorism and contributed to restoring security andstability not only within Iraq but across the wider region during that period.

Also, on veryspecific occasions, the religious authority outlines its vision for Iraq’spublic policies through brief and clearly defined points. On November 4, 2024,after a meeting with the UN Envoy, Mohammed Al-Hassan, Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistanioutlined seven factors necessary for the "stability of the country,"emphasizing that Iraqis have a "long path" ahead to achieve thisgoal. One of these factors is extremely related to the key issues in Iraqtoday. The restraint of weapons on the state. In his seven factors, Ayatollahal-Sistani talked clearly about “confining arms to the authority of the state,”with the other six points focused mainly on preventing foreign interference andenforcing the rule of law.

Historicalprecedents also highlight the institution’s long-standing opposition tointernal conflict. During the 1960s, the late religious authority Mohsenal-Hakim issued positions and rulings urging Iraqis to avoid fighting betweenArabs and Kurds amid the conflict between the Iraqi government and the Kurdishmovement. He called for dialogue and peaceful solutions, describing internalbloodshed as harmful to national unity and social cohesion.

The religiousauthority occupies the highest religious status among Twelver Shia Muslimsduring the period known as the Major Occultation of the Twelfth Imam. As aresult, followers are expected to adhere to its religious guidance, reflectingthe significant influence it exercises over its constituency.

The fall of theregime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 further expanded the authority’s role in Iraqipublic life. The political environment that emerged afterward ended decades ofrestrictions, persecution, house arrests, and assassinations that had targetedsenior clerics under previous governments, allowing the institution to operatemore openly and exert greater influence.

Read more: Fatah Alliance anticipates jihad fatwa from al-Sistani amid Israeli strikes onIran

Speaking toShafaq News, Iraqi researcher Raji Nasser argued that the Najaf religiousauthority played a “central role” in preserving Iraq’s unity and preventing thecountry from sliding into civil war after 2003.

According toNasser, the institution consistently promoted de-escalation, dialogue, and therejection of sectarianism despite waves of violence and bombings that targetedcivilians and religious shrines. He recalled several major crises that were metwith restraint by Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, including the assassination ofMohammed Baqir al-Hakim in 2003 and bombings in Karbala, Baghdad’s al-Kadhimiyaand Buratha Mosque, Babil’s Hilla, and other cities.

“The religiousauthority stressed in its statements the need for awareness and cautionregarding parties seeking to tear apart Iraq’s social fabric,” Nasser said,adding that it consistently called for resolving crises “through wisdom,self-restraint, and avoiding sectarian reactions.”

He also pointedto the 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Shrine, one of the most sacred TwelverShia Muslim holy sites, in Samarra of Saladin Province, describing it as “themost dangerous test of Iraqi unity.” Nasser noted that the religious authorityhelped contain public anger by encouraging peaceful demonstrations andprohibiting attacks on mosques and shrines belonging to all sects, whileemphasizing that internal conflict would only benefit terrorist groups.

Read more: On the 8th anniversary of al-Sistani's fatwa, Defense Mobilization in Diyalaorganizes a "celebratory protest"

“The positionsof the religious authority, particularly the statements of Grand Ayatollah Alial-Sistani, played a major role in calming the Iraqi street and preventing itsdescent into a comprehensive civil war despite the severe sectarian tensions atthe time,” Nasser stressed, describing the institution’s discourse as amoderate national approach based on dialogue, coexistence, and respect for allcomponents of Iraqi society.

The researcherfurther argued that, in the years following the fall of the former regime, thereligious authority helped shape public opinion toward political participationand the building of a constitutional civil state, while also underminingefforts to fuel sectarian division and preserving Iraq’s unity and stability.

A source closeto the religious authority in Najaf told Shafaq News that “after this scale ofcorruption and theft, it has become difficult to find a trusted representativeof the people capable of negotiating politically or diplomatically on behalf ofIraqis.”

That distancehas been made explicit across successive electoral cycles. In 2018, speaking onal-Sistani's behalf, Deputy Ahmad al-Safi stated that the religious authoritywas "maintaining a distance from all candidates and electoral lists"and would not back any individual or political grouping. In the elections of2021 and 2025, al-Sistani reiterated that position while urging voters to treateach cycle as an opportunity for genuine change —to remove corrupt andincompetent figures from power and to participate consciously rather thanrepeat the failures of previous parliaments and governments. The most recentsignal came in 2026, when Mohammed Reza al-Sistani, the cleric's eldest son,delivered a response to the Coordination Framework, the Shiite alliance thatemerged as the largest parliamentary bloc, voicing the authority's discomfortover repeated attempts to draw it into the selection of a prime ministercandidate, a source told Shafaq News.

Beyondelectoral politics, the authority draws an equally firm line on armed conflict.

Read more: Report: Who will succeed Ayatollah al-Sistani, and what will become of hismethodology?

Ali Baqir, aprofessor at the Najaf seminary, told Shafaq News that “the religious authoritydoes not believe in fighting and bloodshed unless it sees an external threat tothe state and its sovereignty.”

According toBaqir, the institution has issued calls for jihad only when the state faceddangers threatening its existence and sovereignty, or when citizens weresubjected to killing, displacement, and other violations. He added that theNajaf authority consistently urges respect for state laws when they serve thepublic interest.

Baqir alsohighlighted differences between the Najaf school and the religious authority inQom, Iran, particularly regarding the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (TheGuardianship of the Jurist), explaining that the current Najaf authority underal-Sistani intervenes in political affairs only when public and religiousinterests require it under the principle of limited guardianship, rather thanadopting a doctrine of direct political rule by religious authorities.

The experienceof Iraq’s religious authority suggests a model centered on mediation,restraint, and the prioritization of national stability over politicalcompetition. Throughout periods of terrorism, sectarian violence, and politicalturmoil, the institution has sought to promote dialogue while reservingexceptional intervention for moments when the state itself faced seriousthreats.

Baqir concludedby urging Iraq’s political blocs to follow the guidance of the Najaf religiousauthority and “work toward an Iraq free from conflict” while avoidingentanglement in the disputes and confrontations of regional powers.

*Fatwa is aformal religious ruling or legal opinion issued by a qualified Islamic scholaror religious authority on matters of Islamic law and practice.

Read more: Al-Sistani reiterates non-intervention in Iraq’s prime minister choice

Written andEdited by Shafaq News Staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq's rulingShiite Coordination Framework (CF), the political alliance that dominates thecountry's government, formally tasked Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief ofthe Armed Forces Ali al-Zaidi on Monday with taking the necessary measures tobring all weapons under state control. This was followed by several of Iraq'smost powerful Iran-aligned armed factions announcing steps toward disengagementfrom the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and transferring their weapons andpersonnel to state authority.

Consolidatingweapons under exclusive state authority is the first pillar of al-Zaidi'sgovernment program, a commitment that, in most countries, would be procedural,but in Iraq represents the central unresolved dilemma of the post-2003political order. The program does not dissolve the PMF. It commits to enhancingthe force's combat capabilities while formally defining its responsibilitieswithin the military structure according to law.

The PMF is astate-sanctioned paramilitary umbrella formally incorporated into Iraq'ssecurity apparatus following the mobilization against ISIS after 2014. Many ofits constituent factions have simultaneously operated under the banner of theIslamic Resistance in Iraq, maintaining independent command structures, fundingchannels, and a declared alignment with Iran's regional network.

Factions In,Factions Out

Two of the mostconsequential announcements came from Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and Kataib al-Imam Ali, both Iran-aligned armed groups that operate brigades inside the PMF whileretaining independent organizational identities.

AAH announcedthe formation of an internal central committee to implement its disengagementfrom PMF structures and the transfer of its weapons, personnel, and equipmentto the state authority. The group said the decision was taken in alignment withthe call of the supreme religious authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, inresponse to the national position of the Coordination Framework, and inaffirmation of a declaration made by AAH Secretary-General Qais al-Khazali onDecember 13, 2017, calling for the severance of armed faction ties with the PMFand the consolidation of weapons under the state. AAH currently operatesBrigades 41, 42, and 43 within the PMF.

Kataib Imam Alisimilarly announced it would sever its organizational ties with the PMF andbegin procedures to place weapons under state control, describing the move ascompliant with the CF's position and consistent with its national commitments.

Ansar Allahal-Awfiya and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada issued statements expressing support forrestricting weapons to state authority but stopped short of announcing anyconcrete steps toward implementation.

The catalystwas a decision by Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Patriotic Shiite Movement andone of Iraq's most influential Shiite clerics, to place Saraya al-Salam —thearmed wing of his movement— under state control. Al-Zaidi welcomed the movepublicly, describing it as a step that would strengthen Iraq's securityinstitutions in performing their constitutional duties, and called on otherarmed factions to follow through.

Read more: Why Iraq’s PMF disarmament is a different battle from Lebanon’s Hezbollah

The Holdouts

KataibHezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba rejected disarmament outright, conditioning anydiscussion of limiting weapons to the state on the restoration of Iraq's fullsovereignty, the security of the country, and the prevention of foreigninterference. Ashab al-Kahf, one of Iraq's prominent clandestine armed groups,rejected any political calls for factions to surrender their weapons,dismissing arguments invoking the supreme Shia religious authority in supportof disarmament as false.

Kataib Sayyidal-Shuhada took a more qualified position. Its spokesperson, Kazem al-Fartousi,told Shafaq News the group supports al-Zaidi in managing the state andmaintaining stability but opposes disarmament at the current stage, arguingthat the faction's weapons are tied to ongoing threats facing Iraq rather thanbeing personal arms.

TheGovernment's Framework

The CF andal-Zaidi agreed in May to establish a committee tasked with overseeing thedisarmament of armed factions. A government source told Shafaq News that somepolitical forces and armed groups had shown greater flexibility regardingefforts to place all weapons under state control, adding that any handoverprocess would be implemented according to a specific timetable.

Another sourcesaid that al-Zaidi separately proposed a plan to the United States that wouldlink the expansion of US-led service and investment projects in Iraq to effortsto restrict weapons to state control and facilitate the disarmament of armedfactions, a political source told Shafaq News.

On thefinancial side, Iraq's government plans to seek the release of frozen statefunds held in the United States and several European countries to finance theintegration of more than 800,000 armed faction members into the PMF and othersecurity institutions, another source told Shafaq News.

Politicalforces within the CF have also asked international mediators to provideconcrete guarantees that armed factions will not be targeted during efforts todissolve them and integrate their members into state security institutions. Theproposed guarantees include assurances that the factions will not be attacked ortargeted during the process, and that the dissolution and integration stepswill not be tied to a fixed timeline, as the initiative is intended to remainan internal Iraqi process.

Read more: After Al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam decision, is Iraq closer to restricting weapons to the state?

Us Pressure AndThe September Deadline

Washington hasapplied sustained pressure on Baghdad to bring all weapons under stateauthority. The US State Department dismissed a prior Iraqi attempt to linkdisarmament to the future of the US-led Global Coalition in Iraq, urgingBaghdad to dismantle “Iran-backed militias.” A Department spokesperson toldShafaq News earlier that these groups engage in violent and destabilizingactivities in Iraq, adding that their actions drain the country's resources andact against its national interests.

Baghdad andWashington finalized an agreement last year setting a roadmap for the fullwithdrawal of American forces by September 2026. The approaching deadline hascompressed the timeline for any settlement on the weapons file.

ExpertAssessment

Iraqi expertswho spoke to Shafaq News urged caution. Legal expert Mohammad Jumaa noted thatIraqi law, including the Weapons Law and Penal Code, criminalizes thepossession or use of arms outside state authority, stressing that any weaponoutside the state's structure is illegal, whether licensed without officialpermission or entirely unlicensed.

Strategicanalyst Ahmad al-Sharifi argued that dismantling armed factions in Iraq isblocked by entrenched power-sharing and the dominance of the Shiite CoordinationFramework, which backs the current government, saying that the government, as aproduct of that framework, cannot make decisions that run counter to itsinterests or Iran's preferences.

Al-Zaidi'sgovernment program frames the weapons file as non-negotiable. Whether thecommittee the CF has mandated him to lead can translate that commitment intoverified transfers —across factions with divergent interests, independentfinances, and regional patrons— remains, as of the date of this report,unconfirmed.

Read more: Iraq’s armed factions and the disarmament debate: Why unity masks deep divisions

Shafaq News

A mass fish die-off along the Tigris River in Wasit province, 180 kilometers southeast of Baghdad, has left millions of fish dead and livelihoods shattered —exposing a widening environmental and regulatory crisis across Iraq’s river systems. While the immediate losses remain concentrated in floating cages in Kut, al-Aziziyah, and Numaniyah, the scale of the disaster points to upstream contamination, long-standing failures in water governance, and a broader ecological breakdown spanning multiple provinces.

Fish farmers report thousands of tons of losses as untreated sewage, industrial discharge, declining water levels, and years of accumulated pressure on waterways converge into a single destructive episode.

At the hydrological level, the Tigris–Diyala system operates as a single interconnected pollution corridor. Contamination introduced upstream does not remain contained within administrative borders; it moves across provinces, carried by seasonal flow variations, rainfall surges, and regulated water releases —expanding the impact far beyond its original point of origin.

Sudden Aquatic Ruin

For Rasool Karim Ali, executive director of the Al-Baraka fish farming project in Wasit, the collapse came without warning. “This is not just a scene; it is a tragedy that breaks the heart,” Ali recalled in an interview with Shafaq News. “We woke up expecting a normal working day, only to find our livelihood, built over years, dying before our eyes.”

What unfolded in those hours was not an isolated incident, but the visible outcome of deeper, long-unresolved structural failures. Ali pointed to contaminated, slow-moving water “loaded with toxins” that had been left untreated in the Diyala River before being released into the Tigris.

“We were only asking for a lawful livelihood, but in a moment, due to deadly negligence, everything turned into mass death,” he continued, describing how the discharge triggered a disaster that wiped out thousands of tons of fish.

At such levels, fish mortality is rarely random. It typically occurs when oxygen levels fall below biological survival thresholds, when sudden spikes in ammonia or sulfides overwhelm aquatic systems, or when heavy metal toxicity exceeds tolerance limits. Yet despite these possibilities, no publicly released laboratory data has clarified which threshold was ultimately breached.

According to Iyad al-Talibi, head of the Iraqi Association of Fish Producers, the trigger began days earlier in the Diyala River. “Four days earlier, there was a leakage of sewage water in the Diyala River,” al-Talibi explained. “These waters had accumulated over years and came from northern areas quickly, stirring up sediments and sharply increasing pollution.”

Compounding the situation, seasonal rainfall upstream likely intensified the crisis. Such conditions can re-suspend riverbed sediments containing decades of industrial and municipal waste —a process known as “legacy pollutant remobilization”— suddenly reintroducing buried toxins into the water column.

From there, the contaminated flow moved into the Tigris north of Kut, spreading rapidly across fish farming zones. For farmers like Ali, the consequences were immediate and devastating. Al-Talibi estimates that around 95% of floating cages in Kut were affected, with losses ranging between 1,000 and 1,200 tons of fish.

“The dead fish include carp and grass carp, and virtually all aquatic life,” he added.

Market Under Siege

As the die-off spread, its economic repercussions were already taking shape in a sector under growing strain. The Iraqi fish market is currently experiencing an unprecedented downturn following government campaigns to remove unauthorized farms that once supplied large volumes to local markets. Prices have dropped to around 4,500 Iraqi dinars ($3) per kilogram, while production costs remain near 6,000 dinars ($4), placing farmers in direct and unsustainable loss.

This inversion —where production costs exceed market price— signals a structurally unviable sector, often preceding large-scale withdrawal from production. Pressure is expected to intensify further. A seasonal shock is looming with the spread of a deadly herpes virus capable of killing up to 80% of fish stock. To avoid catastrophic losses, farmers often rush to sell before October, flooding the market and driving prices down even further.

Globally, such outbreaks intensify under stress conditions, particularly during temperature shifts between summer and winter, in oxygen-poor waters, and in systems with high stocking density —all conditions increasingly present across Iraq’s aquaculture sector.

Despite the scale of the threat, authorities have yet to address the herpes virus crisis, with no vaccine available and no clear mitigation strategy in place.

Flowing Toward Collapse

Beyond immediate losses, the incident exposes a deeper imbalance in water use and regulation. Data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) shows that fish farming expansion in Iraq has accelerated rapidly and largely without control. Unauthorized farms grew from nearly 2,000 between 2014 and 2017 to more than 5,000 in 2023, far exceeding the government’s sectoral limit of 330 million cubic meters.

These operations now consume around 2 billion cubic meters of water annually —double Jordan’s entire yearly supply— while contributing to the shrinking of natural water bodies such as Lake Habbaniyah. At this scale, water extraction is no longer a neutral process. It alters river flow regimes, reduces the natural dilution of pollutants, and concentrates contaminants in slower-moving sections of the river.

Toxins without Borders

Field evidence indicates that the contamination affecting Wasit is not an isolated occurrence, but part of a wider and interconnected pollution network. According to Amer Shafiq al-Hamdani, deputy head of Iraq’s veterinarians’ syndicate, polluted waters originate in northern regions, including the Zagros mountain areas, before passing through Khanaqin and Muqdadiya via the Diyala River, finally merging with the Tigris north of Kut.

Along this path, the water accumulates untreated sewage, medical waste, industrial discharge, heavy metals, and scrap materials, steadily increasing its toxic load as it moves downstream. Environmental chemistry further explains this accumulation. Heavy metals bind to sediments and are later released under acidic or oxygen-poor conditions, accelerating oxygen depletion, while stagnant flow concentrates pollutants even further.

Al-Hamdani identified al-Rustumiya area southeast of Baghdad as a major discharge point, where untreated waste continues to enter the Diyala River. In addition, regulated water releases by the Ministry of Water Resources have contributed to pushing contaminants downstream toward Kut, expanding rather than containing the pollution footprint.

What unfolded in Wasit mirrors a broader and increasingly documented national pattern. In Babil province, large numbers of dead fish were found in the Yahudiya River, where residents reported tanker trucks dumping wastewater at night into already stagnant and visibly polluted waters.

In June, thousands of fish died in the Ibn Najm Marsh, which spans Najaf, Babil, and Al-Diwaniyah. A technical assessment by the Najaf Environment Directorate confirmed that a sharp drop in dissolved oxygen triggered the collapse.

The marsh system —spanning three provinces— has repeatedly been described in local reports as an “escalating environmental emergency,” with oxygen depletion emerging as a recurring structural failure rather than an isolated event.

Such incidents tend to cluster under specific conditions: during low-flow seasons, periods of high temperatures, or when critical infrastructure such as pumping stations fails —conditions that are becoming increasingly frequent across Iraq’s water systems.

Poisoned Public Silence

The consequences extend beyond environmental and economic losses into long-term public health risks. “These elements are not properly metabolized by fish, and when consumed, they can transfer to humans,” al-Hamdani warned, referring to heavy metals such as lead and cadmium.

“Their effects may not appear immediately but after months or years.”

Even low-level exposure to such metals can accumulate in human tissue over time, affecting neurological and renal systems. Rainfall further complicates this cycle, dissolving toxic elements into soil before reintroducing them into river systems, creating a continuous loop of environmental contamination.

“If sewage contamination is confirmed, these fish should not be consumed because they are dangerous to public health,” he cautioned.

Despite repeated incidents across multiple provinces, environmental governance continues to face critical gaps in monitoring, weak enforcement of discharge regulations, and limited public disclosure of water quality data.

What remains unresolved is not only the precise cause of the Wasit fish die-off, but whether it marks another isolated shock —or a clear and irreversible rupture in a system already under years of visible, cumulative strain.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Washington

When US President Donald Trump named Tom Barrack as special presidential envoy toboth Iraq and Syria on Sunday, he was doing more than filling a vacancy; hewas, according to analysts, signaling that Washington no longer sees the twocountries as separate files.

Patrick Clawson, the Morningstar senior fellow at the WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy, told Shafaq News the move was hardly asurprise. "Mr. Barrack has effectively been doing this for quite sometime," he said. "He has become quite an important figure for theTrump administration's dealings in that part of the world." Theappointment follows the short and troubled tenure of Mark Savaya, whosedismissal, Clawson said, "was widely welcomed both in the State Departmentand in Iraq."

Barrack, who serves concurrently as US ambassador to Ankara, took on theSyria brief in May 2025. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed Saturday thathe would continue in a leading role on both files. Trump announced the formalexpansion of his mandate on Sunday via Truth Social, stating Barrack wouldcarry out his new duties "with the full support of the StateDepartment."

Read more: Iraq after the regional ceasefire: US bases and unresolved political questions

For Dler Awsman, an international relations researcher at the Universityof Tennessee, the merger of the two briefs reflects something moreconsequential than a personnel decision. “It marks a shift away from thepost-2003 American focus on democracy and development toward a regionalsecurity framework aimed at curtailing Iranian influence and realigning bothcountries with US strategic interests.”

Barrack's Iraq assignment, Awsman told Shafaq News, will besignificantly harder than Syria. In Damascus, Turkiye —a US ally— was thedominant external force after Bashar al-Assad's fall. In Baghdad, he inheritsdeep and entrenched Iranian influence with no equivalent counterweight, and apolitical landscape fragmented across multiple factions and power centers withno single actor in control.

Clawson identified the central challenge plainly: bringing the PopularMobilization Forces, a state-affiliated umbrella of predominantly Shiite armedfactions, to heel. "The big issue is wanting to see that they do not havea major influence in the new Iraqi government, and that the new Iraqigovernment controls them, and stops any attacks they might make on USinstallations or US forces. That's the biggest single issue."

Awsman added that Barrack's America First orientation suggests his focuswill fall on strengthening Iraq's central state and security institutionsrather than on democracy or federalism, with the longer-term goal of reducingthe need for a direct US military footprint in the country.

Shafaq News

Four thousand years after the Sumerians built the world's first cities on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, Iraq cannot build a hotel near one of them.

That is not a figure of speech. The Great Ziggurat of Ur —ancient Sumerian capital, birthplace of Prophet Abraham according to three of the world's major religions, and one of the best-preserved ziggurats on earth— sits near Nasiriyah with no hotel of international standard nearby, no signage on the roads leading to it, and no visitor infrastructure of any kind.

Iraq's Tourist Guides Syndicate president Mohammad Ouda al-Obaidi told Shafaq News that the country holds 150,000 registered archaeological sites, and “the state that owns them has not developed them in two decades, and the reason is that the oil always covers the bill.”

Iraq cannot develop its touristic assets, not primarily because of what was destroyed, but because the political economy, built on oil, has never built the institutional conditions that archaeological tourism requires. The infrastructure, the trained workforce, the transportation links, the visitor facilities —none have materialized, and the fiscal architecture of the Iraqi state explains precisely why.

What Was Lost

Over 36 hours in April 2003, 15,000 artifacts were stolen from the Iraq National Museum, according to UNESCO documentation. US-led Coalition forces established a military base inside the ancient city of Babylon, with damage documented in formal Iraqi Ministry of Culture complaints to the World Heritage Committee.

Then came ISIS. The ancient city of Nimrud, capital of the Assyrian Empire under Ashurnasirpal II, inhabited continuously from the 13th century BC and home to the most extensive surviving record of Assyrian royal bas-relief iconography, was stormed by ISIS fighters in March 2015. The five-meter-tall Bull of Nimrud, a lamassu, the winged bull with a human head that stood as a guardian to the palace gates, constructed in the ninth century BC, was destroyed with bulldozers and explosives. By the time Iraqi forces retook Nimrud in November 2016, 90% of its excavated zone had been completely destroyed, according to UNESCO's state of conservation records for Iraqi World Heritage sites. Hatra was bulldozed. The Mosul Museum was ransacked on camera. Antiquities looting became ISIS's second-largest source of income after oil, with some estimates suggesting the group earned up to $100 million annually from the illicit trade.

Tourism researcher Ayid Ghalib al-Taai, speaking to Shafaq News, noted that the withdrawal of foreign archaeological missions —the ministry's deputy minister confirmed more than 60 were active before the recent regional conflict— left sites undocumented, unexcavated, and unable to attract the infrastructure investment that turns a ruin into a destination.

International Efforts

The international response to Iraq's heritage destruction has been genuine and, in specific locations, consequential, but monument restoration and tourism infrastructure are two different problems, and only one has received sustained international attention.

On September 1, 2025, Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani inaugurated three major landmarks in Mosul: the Al-Nouri Mosque complex, Al-Saa'a Convent, and Al-Tahera Church, completing a UNESCO-led restoration project that UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay described as "unprecedented in its complexity" as 80% of Mosul's Old City had been destroyed.

Read more: Al-Nouri Mosque: a historical and architectural examination

Italy also contributed to a full-scale 3D-printed replica of the Bull of Nimrud, relocated at the entrance of the Basrah Museum in February 2024, following display at the Colosseum in Rome and UNESCO's Paris headquarters. At Babylon, Iraq's sole UNESCO World Heritage Site, inscribed in 2019, restoration work at the Temple of Ninmakh and the Ishtar Gate continues under the World Monuments Fund, documented in Iraq's state of conservation report submitted to the World Heritage Committee in September 2024, according to the UNESCO World Heritage Centre.

Read more: From Babylon to Erbil: Iraq’s UNESCO sites and those next in line

What these initiatives have not resolved is the infrastructure gap. A 2026 academic study in the International Journal of Tourism Research, identifying Iraq's persistent challenges, noted security concerns, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient professional training as the primary barriers to attracting international visitors, barriers that exist independently of heritage restoration progress.

Pope Francis's 2021 visit to Ur, the first papal visit to Iraq in history, illustrated the same dynamic precisely. Before the visit, archaeological director Ali Kadhim Ghanim told reporters: "We are counting on the Pope's visit, because it will increase the number of tourists in the city of Ur." The visit generated global media coverage and brought inter-religious significance to the Sumerian heartland. According to the Iraqi Tourism Authority, around 556 European and American tourists visited Iraq in 2024, three years after the papal visit. Tourism income in 2023 stood at $4.6 billion, a figure driven overwhelmingly by religious pilgrimage, not archaeological tourism. The symbolic moment did not translate into sustainable visitor flows because the infrastructure to receive those visitors was not built before, during, or after the visit.

Recognition Without Capacity

The Arab Tourism Organization's designation of Baghdad as the Arab Capital of Tourism for 2025 was the most significant institutional recognition Iraq's tourism sector had received in decades. Iraq's tourism income grew 25% in 2024 to $5.7 billion, up from $4.6 billion in 2023, and the Interior Ministry confirmed a sharp increase in Arab and foreign tourist arrivals in 2025 and early 2026, with Baghdad topping visitor numbers.

Read more: Discover Iraq: Baghdad, a city shaped by conflict and enduring hope

The growth is real, but its composition reveals the structural problem. The majority of foreign visitors in 2025 came for religious tourism, with more than 20 million pilgrims participating in Arbaeen, the world's largest annual religious gathering. European and American archaeological tourists numbered 556 in 2024, according to the Iraqi Tourism Authority —a negligible fraction of total arrivals. Jordan, with no Mesopotamia and a fraction of Iraq's archaeological inventory, generates comparable tourism revenues from a genuinely diversified international visitor base, according to World Bank tourism data.

Read more: Faith and finances: Religious tourism fuels Iraq’s economy

The Iraqi Tourism Authority acknowledged that the sector faces obstacles, including security warnings issued by European countries, China, and the United States against visiting Iraq, calling on foreign governments to reconsider those classifications.

Read more: Baghdad crowned Arab Capital of Tourism 2025: A turning point for Iraq's future

Then the US-Iran war began on February 28, 2026, in which Iraqi factions were involved and attacked American sites within the country. Tourism Economics, a division of Oxford Economics, projected that a two-month escalation could lead to a drop of as much as 27% in regional tourist arrivals across the Middle East in 2026, with non-GCC countries potentially seeing declines of up to 34% instead of a projected 33% increase. Iraq, sitting geographically between the conflict's primary parties, faced immediate travel advisory upgrades from multiple governments, erasing the gains the Baghdad Capital of Tourism designation had been designed to consolidate.

Built on Oil

Deputy Minister of Culture Fadel al-Badrani confirmed to Shafaq News that the ministry is operating on old plans and mechanisms currently in the process of being updated. Al-Taai told Shafaq News directly that the availability of oil resources is itself one of the causes that limited the turn toward archaeological tourism investment.

The fiscal data from Iraqi government sources explains the mechanism. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance's 2025 budget execution reports, salaries and pensions consumed more than 60% of federal expenditure, with investment spending falling to just 6.9% of total expenditures in the first half of 2025. The IMF's 2025 Article IV mission, citing Iraqi federal finance data, found that the oil price required to balance the budget rose to $84 per barrel in 2024, up from $54 in 2020. A state in which development spending is the first casualty of every fiscal squeeze has not built the hotels, roads, visitor infrastructure, and trained workforce that archaeological tourism requires; the fiscal calculus has consistently prioritized salary obligations over capital investment.

Al-Taai told Shafaq News that "necessity is the mother of invention," pointing to fiscal pressure rather than policy planning as the more likely driver of change in the sector.

Iraq's National Development Plan for 2024–28, with an estimated budget of $184 billion, lists tourism as a priority alongside anti-corruption reforms and governance improvements —a structure consistent with previous diversification plans Iraq has produced since 2003.

The Ziggurat of Ur will keep rising from the Mesopotamian plain, built by the Sumerians, survived by four thousand years of history, and still waiting, on a road with no signage, for the infrastructure that would allow the world to reach it.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Long before the expansion of Iraq’smodern security institutions, the “Shagawat” stood among the most influentialfigures in neighborhood life —men remembered by some as protectors who settleddisputes and defended local markets, while others recall them as symbols ofintimidation, street violence, and informal power.

The phenomenon became increasinglyvisible during the 1930s and 1940s, when Baghdad and other Iraqi citiesexpanded rapidly under waves of migration from rural areas. Working-classneighborhoods grew faster than municipal services and security institutions,creating spaces where local strongmen gained influence through personalreputation, physical strength, and close ties to their communities.

Researcher Dr. Abdul Karim Khalafiyalinked the rise of the Shagawat to those shifting urban conditions, where weakstate presence allowed alternative forms of authority to emerge inside crowdeddistricts.

“There was never one fixed model forthe Shagawah,” Khalafiya noted. “Their role differed from one area to anotheraccording to the social environment and the strength of state institutions.”

In some neighborhoods, residentsrelied on such figures to mediate disputes, recover stolen property, orintervene before local tensions escalated. In others, rivalries betweenShagawat fueled violent confrontations that deepened instability inside denselypopulated districts.

Their influence often extendedthrough Baghdad’s coffeehouses and tightly connected alley networks, wheresocial and political relationships shaped daily life in many traditionalneighborhoods.

Among the areas most closelyassociated with the phenomenon was al-Ardha district in Baghdad, where severalnames remained embedded in popular memory, including Sayyid Naji Hashimal-Baldawi, Sayyid Hassan Karim al-Atrash, Sayyid Ali Shaib, and Sayyid JumaaShanin al-Saadi.

As Iraq’s state institutionsgradually expanded, the influence of the Shagawat began to recede, though theirimage survived through oral history, neighborhood storytelling, and laterthrough Iraqi television dramas. That memory still resonates with many Iraqiswho witnessed later phases of the phenomenon.

Writer and journalist MoayyadMohammed Qadir recalled personally knowing several figures associated with theShagawat during the 1980s and 1990s. Frequent meetings with some of them, herecalled, revealed personalities that often differed from the stereotypessurrounding their reputation.

For Qadir, the phenomenon reflectedthe realities of the periods in which it emerged, particularly during times ofeconomic hardship and weakened institutional control. Similar figures, heargued, could reappear in different forms under comparable conditions today,though far removed from the traditional image associated with Iraq’s olderdistricts.

Kirkuk police, however, maintainthat no such structures currently exist in the province.

“Cooperation between citizens andsecurity forces remains essential for maintaining stability,” Kirkuk PoliceCommand spokesman Amer Nuri al-Shwani urged, calling on residents to reportsuspicious activity and violations that could threaten public order.

Al-Shwani credited the disappearanceof such manifestations to strict law enforcement measures and expanded securitydeployment across the province, adding that current security assessments showno indication of organized Shagawat-style structures operating in Kirkuk today.

Though the traditional image of theShagawah has largely faded from Iraqi streets, memories of those figurescontinue to reflect a period when many communities relied on informal authorityto fill gaps left by an absent or weakened state.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Shafaq News

Debate over armed factions in Iraq has resurfaced after Iraq’s Patriotic Shiite Movement (PSM – formerly Sadrist) leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced the separation of Saraya al-Salam from his movement and its integration into the state, reviving questions over uncontrolled weapons and their relationship with state institutions.

Welcomed by Iraq’s newly formed government headed by Ali al-Zaidi, the move comes amid broader international pressure, particularly from the United States, which has tied its support for Baghdad to efforts aimed at controlling armed factions and limiting their military and political influence within state institutions.

Origins of the Factions

Most of Iraq’s current armed factions emerged in the aftermath of the US 2003 invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. Their influence expanded significantly after ISIS seized large Iraqi cities in 2014.

At that stage, Saraya al-Salam was formed as a military force following al-Sadr’s call to protect Shiite holy sites, while other factions were incorporated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which later evolved into an official umbrella organization for numerous armed groups.

Rather than ending competing centers of power, that integration produced a complex structure involving the state, armed factions, political authorities, and parties, making the issue of restricting weapons to state control one of Iraq’s most difficult challenges.

Al-Sadr and Weapons

Considered one of the central figures in this issue, al-Sadr previously established the al-Mahdi Army after 2003 before dissolving it and later reconstituting Saraya al-Salam in 2014.

In his latest announcement, al-Sadr said the separation of Saraya al-Salam “comes in the public interest and to avoid dangers surrounding the country,” while calling for all civilian bodies affiliated with the group to become unarmed civilian institutions and for all military matters to be transferred entirely to the state.

For observers interviewed by Shafaq News, the move signals a shift from rhetoric advocating state control of weapons toward practical implementation within al-Sadr’s own movement, placing other factions under direct political pressure.

Read more: Iraq’s armed factions and the disarmament debate: Why unity masks deep divisions

State Priority

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi described the initiative as “an important step to strengthen stability and consolidate the principle of the state’s monopoly on weapons,” calling on all factions to operate under state authority. “The state is the only entity authorized to carry weapons and enforce the law.”

Researcher and academic Alaa Najah told Shafaq News that the government’s position was longstanding, noting that the prime minister had repeatedly emphasized the importance of restricting weapons to the state to strengthen institutions, preserve internal stability, and reassure the Iraqi public.

According to Najah, building a strong state begins with consolidating the monopoly of weapons in the hands of official institutions, “as a fundamental step to protect sovereignty and enhance security and stability, away from escalation or division.”

Divisions Among Factions

Despite the official welcome, positions among armed factions remain divided. Circulating reports and statements indicate that some factions have shown preliminary willingness to engage in a process of “regulating weapons,” while others, most notably Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, reject any path leading to disarmament.

Political writer and researcher Mohammed al-Yasiri said the issue is not about surrendering weapons, but regulating and restricting them. Speaking to Shafaq News, he added that while some factions support the project of restricting weapons, “others are seeking guarantees related to responding to any potential external threat.”

Al-Yasiri also pointed to a difference between the Iraqi and American visions, noting that Washington focuses on stopping the use of drones and missiles, whereas Iraq is discussing the regulation of medium and heavy weapons.

Multiple Centers of Decision-Making

Political analyst Ramadan al-Badran noted that al-Sadr’s latest move “reflects a national orientation that supports the state,” but other factions “differ like their affiliations, as some are influenced by external powers and do not possess full independence in decision-making.”

Al-Badran told Shafaq News that factions closely linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) require “solutions that go beyond Iraq” and involve broader regional coordination, stressing, “the Iraqi political system itself contributed to producing this structure during previous stages.”

Read more: Multiple actors, one battlefield: Iraq since the US-Israel-Iran war began

US Pressure

International pressure from the United States has also intensified, with Washington linking support for the Iraqi government to distancing armed factions from state institutions.

Earlier, the United States opposed the participation of armed factions in government unless they are disarmed, while also demanding an end to state funding for some groups, further complicating Iraq’s internal political landscape.

Observers concluded that Iraq now faces two options. Continuing the policy of “containment” adopted by previous governments, or moving toward a genuine restructuring of the relationship between the state and armed factions.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The most effective rebuttal tothe Lebanese politicians arguing that Israel's war represents a historicopportunity for Christians has not come from their opponents, but from the waritself —a campaign that has struck Christian, Sunni and Shiite villages insouthern Lebanon with the same artillery, issued evacuation orders to Christianand Shiite communities in the same breath, and destroyed Christian churches andShiite shrines with the same indifference to the distinction its Lebaneseproponents were drawing.

The argument that a foreignmilitary campaign can be read as a sectarian opportunity requires, at aminimum, that the military in question share the reading. Eighteen months ofdocumented strikes on southern Lebanon make clear it does not —and the evidencearrived, with particular precision, in the village of Debel.

In Debel, a Christiancommunity a few kilometers from the Israeli border, a statue of Jesus Christhad stood at the village entrance for decades, the kind of marker that tells atraveler what kind of place they are entering, and what its people hold sacred.In April 2026, images circulated online showing an Israeli soldier smashing itwith a sledgehammer. A few weeks later, another image appeared from the samevillage: a different soldier, cigarette in mouth, pressing a second cigarettebetween the lips of a statue of the Virgin Mary. The Israeli army'sspokesperson said the military "views the incident with utmostseverity" and that the soldier's conduct "completely deviates fromthe values expected of its personnel" —the same statement, word for word,that Israel had issued less than three weeks earlier in response to the firstdesecration.

No Exemption

The Amnesty Internationalsatellite analysis of Israeli strikes between September 2024 and January 2025found near-total destruction across the southern border zone. Southern villageswith a majority Christian population —including Rmaysh and Aalma ash-Shaab—were largely spared during the initial phase of the 2023–2024 conflict. Thatchanged after October 2024, when Israeli airstrikes and expanding evacuationorders reached areas not aligned with Hezbollah, resulting in extensivedestruction of predominantly Christian villages as well. Signs mounted thatIsrael sought to establish a new demographic reality in southern Lebanonthrough deliberate displacement and destruction, one that no longer exemptedcommunities outside Hezbollah's orbit.

The destruction of religiousheritage has been systematic across both communities. Melkite churches inYaroun and Derdghaya, both listed as Lebanese cultural heritage sites, weredestroyed in 2024. A convent and former school belonging to the SalvatorianSisters in Yaroun were demolished in May 2026. The St. George Melkite CatholicChurch in Dardghaya was destroyed in a December 2024 airstrike. The MaqamShamoun Al-Safa shrine in Chamaa —venerated by both Christians and Muslims andassociated with Saint Peter— was heavily damaged by Israeli shelling. The mayorof Debel stated that Israeli soldiers broke many statues of saints found insidehomes across the village.

The town of Qulay'a,predominantly Christian, was targeted, and its parish priest, Pierre al-Rai—who had publicly pledged to remain on the land— was killed. Residents ofRmeish rang church bells in defiance as evacuation orders arrived. According tothe Religious Freedom Data Centre, 181 incidents of harassment targetingChristians, Christian symbols, and institutions were recorded in Israel in 2025alone.

Easter in the Crossfire

The scale of what washappening forced the Vatican into an unusual operational role. Archbishop PaoloBorgia, the Apostolic Nuncio to Lebanon, made multiple trips to the southernborder zone carrying humanitarian aid. On March 16, 2026, Borgia traveled fromBeirut to the Blue Line itself, visiting Rmeish, Debel, and Ain Ebel, hissecond trip to the south in just a few days, covering Christian, Muslim, andmixed villages under Israeli bombardment. An Easter Sunday convoy was forced tosuspend its mission three kilometers from Debel after becoming trapped in heavycrossfire, with those on board waiting under gunfire and explosions beforeconcluding they could not proceed.

On May 6, Borgia met Pope LeoXIV at the Vatican and then connected him in a video call with thirteenCatholic priests still serving in southern villages. Father Toni Elias,Maronite parish priest in Rmeich, described the encounter as "first asurprise, then a great joy." A few days before the call, the Israelimilitary had demolished the last standing building in Yaroun —the convent— andItalian UNIFIL soldiers donated a replacement crucifix to Debel after theoriginal was destroyed. A Vatican convoy, on Easter, could not reach aChristian village in southern Lebanon. The politicians arguing that the warrepresents a Christian opportunity had no comment on the convoy.

The Numbers Don't Lie

The data on Lebanese Christianattitudes toward normalization with Israel reveals precisely how detached thepolitical entrepreneurs promoting that argument have become from their owncommunity's position. Arab Barometer polling from 2021–2022 found that 38% ofLebanese Christians favored normalization —significantly higher than the 5% ofLebanese Muslims who did— reflecting a long-standing difference in howLebanon's communities relate to the regional order Hezbollah represents. Thatwas the high-water mark. It preceded Gaza, the Lebanon war, the destroyedchurches, and the smashed statues.

In post-October 7 surveysconducted in 2023–2024, support for normalization across all communitiescollapsed, with no surveyed country showing more than 13% in favor. The 2025Arab Opinion Index found that 89% of Lebanese respondents opposed their countryrecognizing Israel. The community whose support for normalization was highestbefore the war has watched Israeli soldiers desecrate its churches, destroy itsconvent schools, and evacuate its border villages. The argument fornormalization is being made, with increasing volume, by politicians whose ownconstituents have largely abandoned the position.

Washington Institute pollingcaptures the remaining differentiation in 2024: while 93% of Shiites expresseda positive view of Hezbollah, only 29% of Christians did —but 59% of Christiansexpressed a positive opinion of Hamas, demonstrating that opposition toHezbollah's political project does not translate into sympathy for Israel'smilitary campaign. Lebanese Christians have legitimate grievances aboutHezbollah's unilateral decision to drag Lebanon into war —grievances shared bymany Sunnis. Those grievances are not the same thing as a desire for peace withthe state whose army smashed their saints.

Read more: Ceasefire without sovereignty: Lebanon's fragmented power blocks peace with Israel

The South They Share

Southern Lebanon's demographicreality cannot be reduced to a Shiite region with Christian enclaves.Statistics Lebanon estimates the country is approximately 32.2% Shiite, 31.2%Sunni, and 30.5% Christian overall, and in the south specifically, Christianvillages, predominantly Maronite and Melkite, are interspersed throughout theJezzine, Marjeyoun, Nabatieh, and Bint Jbeil, Tyre, al-Zahrani, and Saidadistricts alongside Shiite-majority communities, some directly on the border.Rmeish, Debel, Ain Ebel, Marjeyoun, Yaroun, and Derdghaya have coexisted withShiite-majority neighbors for centuries.

That coexistence has beenfunctional rather than merely tolerant. Hezbollah's social institutions operateover 80 clinics across the South and Beqaa. According to the group’s data,nearly 10% of beneficiaries are non-Shiite. In mixed municipalities, jointprojects for roads, street lighting, and irrigation have been collaborativelyimplemented by Christian institutions and Hezbollah-affiliated networks,creating a pattern of functional coexistence that both communities viewed as aguarantee of local stability. The tobacco farming and olive groves that definethe rural south are tended by people from both communities. The water sourcesand irrigation networks they share do not follow sectarian lines.

The solidarity that emergedduring the displacement crisis confirmed what the political rhetoric denied.Deir el-Ahmar, a predominantly Maronite village in the Beqaa, opened at leastsix shelters for displaced persons from neighboring Shiite and Sunni communities,receiving thousands from Baalbek. Nicole Kamatou, active in relief efforts fordisplaced southerners, told Shafaq News that the segment of the Christianstreet promoting sectarian division was the same segment that benefited fromthe civil war's logic, and that most Christians remember the isolation and costof that period too well to accept its revival. Volunteer Nabil Yacoub,overseeing a Beirut relief center, told Shafaq News: "I am from adifferent sect, but serving displaced people from another sect is a human dutyrooted in my patriotism. We are all children of this country."

In Yaroun, the last buildingstill standing after Israel's 2024 campaign was the Salvatorian convent.Israeli forces demolished it in May 2026. The village had been emptied of itsChristian residents long before. The politicians who described the war as aChristian opportunity were not in Yaroun when the convent fell. The people whohad lived beside it —Christian and Shiite, farmers and nuns and volunteers—were already gone.

Written and edited by ShafaqNews staff.

Shafaq News

Before sunrise on Eid al-Adha morning, the roads leading into Najafbegin to fill with headlights. Families drive through the night from Baghdad,Basra, Diyala, and other provinces —not toward celebration, but toward graves.

By dawn, the narrow lanes of Wadi al-Salam Cemetery are already crowdedwith mourners dressed in black. Some carry candles and incense. Others holdbottles of rosewater or bags of Kleicha, the traditional date-filled pastrydistributed as sadaqa, a form of charity offered in the name of the dead.Between rows of graves, families recite the Fatiha, the opening chapter of theQuran, while the sound of weeping drifts quietly across the cemetery.

Children weave between tombs carrying plastic chairs. Elderly men leanagainst gravestones, reading verses under the early morning light. Workers movethrough the lanes sweeping dust from family plots before visitors arrive. Evenon Eid, when much of Iraq turns toward gatherings and celebrations, Wadial-Salam moves to a different rhythm, one shaped by memory, ritual, and loss.

Known in Arabic as the Valley of Peace, Wadi al-Salam stretches acrossthe western edge of Najaf, roughly 160 kilometers south of Baghdad. Consideredthe largest Islamic cemetery in the world, it surrounds one of Shia Islam’sholiest cities, home to the shrine of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib. For many Iraqis,visiting the cemetery and praying at the shrine are inseparable acts, part of aspiritual journey that moves between mourning and devotion.

Read more: Wadi Al Salam: Najaf’s ever-growing city of the dead

Fourteen centuries of continuous burial transformed the cemetery intowhat many Iraqis describe as a city of the dead. Mausoleums rise above theground while catacombs extend beneath it. Some grave markers carry classicalArabic poetry. Others display fading photographs of the deceased —soldiers,clerics, tribal figures, poets, and political leaders whose stories remainfixed to stone walls and plaster tombs.

Historical researcher Hassan al-Hakim told Shafaq News that thecemetery existed long before the rise of Islam, when the area was known asal-Thawiyya, an ancient burial ground. The discovery of Imam Ali’s tomb laterturned Najaf into the most important Shia burial destination in the world.

“Burial near the Imam became something people actively sought,”al-Hakim explained. “Over centuries, the cemetery expanded until it became acomplete city for the dead.”

That expansion also created an economy of its own. Along the cemetery’smain roads, hundreds of small offices provide what Iraqis call daffana services,a term derived from the Arabic word for burial. The businesses handle graveconstruction, catacomb excavation, plot sales, and long-term maintenance forfamilies who may live hundreds or thousands of kilometers away.

Abbas al-Najafi, who inherited one of the offices from his father andgrandfather, said many Iraqi families maintain relationships with cemeterycaretakers across generations.

“People trust those who look after their dead,” he told Shafaq News.“Now Iraqis living abroad contact us through social media asking us to locategraves belonging to relatives buried decades ago.”

He noted that burial customs have also changed over time. “In the past,burial was communal. Today, nearly ninety percent of families own privateplots.”

Near one of the side lanes, workers repaint names on old gravestoneswhile others repair damaged tombs cracked by time and weather. Some familiesinstall small trees or metal canopies to shield graves from the scorchingsummer sun. Others leave framed photographs, prayer beads, or handwritten notestucked into the edges of stone.

Beneath the cemetery, however, lies another history.

During the years of mandatory military conscription under SaddamHussein’s regime, many draft evaders and fugitives hid inside Wadi al-Salam’ssprawling underground catacombs. Al-Najafi remembers those years clearly.

“We spent nights underground by candlelight. We used candle stubs leftnear the graves and followed the news on an old radio. Sometimes we survived onfood left behind by grieving families.”

He paused before recalling the dangers below ground. “The scorpionsfrightened me more than anything. Sometimes we woke up and found snakes movingthrough the tunnels searching for scraps.”

After the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein, Iraqi security forcestightened control around the cemetery, making the catacombs difficult to use ashiding places. Many who had escaped conscription eventually returned followinglater government amnesties.

Yet on Eid morning, the cemetery’s older memories blend almostseamlessly into present-day rituals.

A middle-aged laborer carrying a sack full of empty rosewater bottlesmoved quietly between graves, collecting discarded containers. He barelystopped when approached by Shafaq News correspondent.

“We collect them for the owner,” he said while continuing through thecrowd. “They get washed, refilled, and sold again.”

Nearby, a woman from Baghdad sat beside the grave of her son beneath asmall canopy she had installed to create shade. She had left her home shortlyafter midnight to arrive in Najaf before dawn. A young tree planted beside thegrave swayed lightly in the afternoon wind.

Her son, Ali, was killedin combat. “He broke my back when he left,” she said through tears. “I becamealone, even though my daughters are still with me.” She paused while adjusting flowers near the gravestone. “I dreamed ofseeing his wedding and his children, but fate stood between me and myhappiness.”

Around her, visitors continued arriving in waves, some carrying traysof sweets, others reciting prayers quietly beside newly painted graves.Loudspeakers from nearby mosques echoed across the cemetery as the afternoonheat intensified.

At one point, the woman looked up and asked a question that seemedlarger than her own grief.

“Why can’t we live the way we see on television?” she said. “Countriesenjoying celebration and abundance without losing their sons to wars andfighting.”

By midday, the crowds slowly begin to thin. Families leave the cemeteryon foot toward the nearby shrine of Imam Ali, completing a ritual that hasshaped Najaf for generations. The burial offices close their shutters one byone. Workers gather abandoned bottles and extinguished candles from thepathways.

Under the afternoon sun, the small tree beside Ali’s grave continuescasting its narrow patch of shade.

Wadi al-Salam will not remain quiet for long. It never does.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.