Iraq's disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions
Shafaq News
Iraq is entering a period of heightened tension as September 30, 2026 approaches, the deadline set by the State Administration Coalition, which brings together the country's leading Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish political forces, to bring all weapons under state control.
The deadline comes amid diverging positions among armed factions, with some supporting the principle while others rejecting it. Tensions have also intensified following increasingly sharp rhetoric from Kataib Hezbollah in its latest statement against Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi.
Two competing positions drive the crisis. Baghdad maintains that control over weapons is a sovereign state responsibility, while several armed factions insist that any discussion of their weapons must be tied to the withdrawal of US and Turkish forces, the dissolution of the Peshmerga, and an end to "foreign domination over Iraqi decision-making."
Several questions remain unanswered in Iraq: Could the crisis move from political tension to armed confrontation? And what impact will external actors, from the United States to Iran, have on the dispute?
Former State of Law Coalition lawmaker Arif al-Hamami calls the situation critical as regional and international pressure builds, calling for the weapons issue to be addressed without "imposition or threats."
In an interview with Shafaq News, al-Hamami says "everyone supports upholding the law and placing weapons under state control," but any solution must weigh the range of security threats facing Iraq, among them the activities of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups operating from Iraqi territory, the presence of Turkish forces, and wider regional developments.
He proposes folding the armed factions into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the state-linked security body —a step that would, in practice, formalize much of their existing footprint, since most of the factions already field brigades within the PMF.
Al-Hamami also expresses confidence in the "ability of the leaders of the Coordination Framework to contain the crisis" and hopes the Shiite religious establishment in Najaf, Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, will intervene "to end the dispute."
Read more: Jurf al-Sakhr and Iraq's push to disarm factions
The Religious Establishment's Position
Debate over a possible role for the religious establishment draws on previous positions by al-Sistani regarding state control over weapons.
On April 11, 2024, during a meeting with the UN secretary-general's representative in Najaf, al-Sistani stressed the need to prevent foreign interference, uphold the authority of the law, and place weapons under state control.
On June 26, 2025, his representative in Karbala, Abdul-Mahdi al-Karbalaei, renewed the call for the state to hold a monopoly on arms, foreign interference to be prevented, and the law to be upheld amid the military escalation between Iran and Israel at the time.
More recently, in May 2026, reports emerged that Patriotic Shiite Movement leader Muqtada al-Sadr and Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had asked al-Sistani to issue a new religious ruling titled "Placing Weapons Under State Control." According to those reports, the move sought to provide religious cover for efforts to end the presence of weapons outside official institutions.
No such ruling has been issued so far.
Read more: Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality orgrowing isolation?
Diverging Positions
The positions of the various parties remain complicated. The government maintains that any armed activity outside the state framework after September 30 will be dealt with according to the Anti-Terrorism Law, while Iraq's four top state authorities remain committed to disarming groups outside the state.
In contrast, Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada insist on retaining their military capabilities. Other factions, including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali, have taken steps to bring their armed activities under state authority.
The government has also begun taking practical steps, including forming a committee to address the situation in Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil province. The panel includes representatives from the ministries of Interior, Justice and Agriculture, as well as the PMF.
These moves have coincided with serious security incidents, most notably a drone attack on 17 August targeting the private office of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, along with the residence of the intelligence chief.
The KRI's Counter-Terrorism Service said the two explosive-laden drones were launched from Iranian territory, though it offered no supporting evidence. Iran rejected the accusation: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called the attack "reckless" and warned Kurdish authorities against "false-flag ploys" designed to sow discord between the two neighbors, affirming that Tehran's ties with the Kurdistan Region remain friendly. No Iraqi armed faction claimed responsibility.
Read more: Days to disarm Iraq's factions: deadline or negotiable ceiling?
Escalation and Factional Demands
The latest escalation also came when Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, a security official with Kataib Hezbollah, warned that "patience is running out" over the government's "provocative and irresponsible actions," threatening a response based on the principle of "an eye for an eye, and the aggressor is the wrongdoer."
The group has set three conditions for any talks with the government over the weapons issue: the complete withdrawal of US forces and guarantees that they will not return; an end to what it describes as American domination of Iraq's political and economic decisions; and the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Iraq and dissolution of the Peshmerga.
The conditions sharply widen the gap between the factions and Baghdad and could complicate efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.
Kataib Hezbollah issued the statement days after an unannounced visit to Baghdad by Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran's Quds Force, on August 10. Iraqi sources told Shafaq News that the visit addressed the weapons issue and that Qaani urged the factions not to surrender their weapons for now, while avoiding confrontation with the government and seeking a political settlement.
Meanwhile, some political forces have sought to keep the crisis within the political sphere to prevent it from developing into an armed confrontation. Signs of such a possibility emerged following the arrest of a PMF officer, who was subsequently handed back to the PMF following rapid political intervention.
The Dialogue Track
Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, said the committee formed by the Coordination Framework to address the issue of state control over weapons would begin its work soon in coordination with the government to establish appropriate mechanisms for implementation.
His position is significant partly because of its timing. During a meeting with US Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad Joshua Harris, al-Maliki stressed that the issue should be addressed through "dialogue and understanding," while emphasizing that the state and its constitutional institutions must remain the ultimate authority over security and military affairs.
Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Organization, called on all sides to exercise restraint and avoid inflammatory statements. He expressed confidence in the "good intentions" of the prime minister and faction leaders while warning against steps that could give external actors grounds to interfere in Iraqi decision-making.
A US Perspective
In an interview with Shafaq News, Former US Department of Defense official David Des Roches views the establishment of a deadline as "a positive step," but warns that resistance from factions “taking orders from Iran” rather than Iraq could prove "potentially lethal."
The central question, he argues, is whether the Iraqi state is prepared to confront "the Iranian agents in its midst," or whether it will accept a compromise that amounts to "a new validation of an unacceptable status quo."
In Des Roches' assessment, "Iraq is not a sovereign nation" and does not appear ready to confront the internal forces he believes are necessary to establish full sovereignty. He argues that maintaining "a thinly-veiled Iranian presence" may be politically acceptable, but would not be sufficient to lift restrictions on bank transfers and other mechanisms Iran uses to evade international and US restrictions, particularly as "the Iranian economy continues to crater."
If armed factions refuse to disarm, Des Roches believes Iraq will either "continue to be a partially sovereign nation" or face "a period of civil war against Iranian proxies," adding that "there really is no other way." He also expects the KRI to "continue to have its own dynamic, separate from the rest of Iraq."
Separating the Two Tracks
In August 2026, the State of Law Coalition reportedly proposed separating the US withdrawal timetable from the process of disarming the factions, according to a Coordination Framework source who spoke to Shafaq News. Under the proposal, a transitional period would provide time to build confidence and reassure parties opposed to disarmament.
These concerns coincide with the process of ending the Global Coalition's mission in Iraq, scheduled to be completed on September 30, 2026. Factions determined to retain their weapons have cited this deadline as a central justification for maintaining their military capabilities.
That raises a fundamental issue: Would confrontation at that point become inevitable if the factions refuse to surrender their weapons?
Confrontation or Integration?
Independent politician Aaed al-Hilali describes the approaching deadline as making the issue "highly complicated," but does not believe armed confrontation is inevitable.
Speaking to Shafaq News, al-Hilali argues that Iraq's security institutions are more experienced and capable of managing crises. He also believes political forces understand that any internal confrontation would represent a loss for everyone and could trigger economic and institutional fallout.
"The real danger is not the weapons alone, but the crisis of trust between the state and the factions and linking the weapons issue to the question of the foreign presence," he explains, stressing that "a purely security-based approach could be a gateway to escalation, and armed confrontation must be the last option, not the first."
Political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi shares this assessment, considering the risk of confrontation real but not inevitable. " Iraq has the institutional, legal, and security levers to contain escalation, provided there is a unified government position and no rush to use force," he told Shafaq News.
For al-Tamimi, the core of the crisis lies in the state's ability to turn disarmament into a phased process negotiated through law and politics, supported by broad backing. He also warns that rejection of the decision by some factions, combined with rifts inside the government or the security establishment, could turn the dispute into open fighting, threatening the country's stability.
Security expert Safaa al-Aasam almost completely rules out a confrontation between the government and the factions.
"There is no armed faction prepared to harm the country's security because they are sons of Iraq," he told Shafaq News, arguing that the dispute is political rather than an indication of an impending armed confrontation.
He regards placing weapons under state control as a "popular demand" and points to the religious establishment's position that there should be a single authority holding weapons.
In his assessment, the dispute is likely to be resolved through political agreements involving government positions, integration into state institutions, or arrangements under which the weapons would be brought under the authority of official security institutions.
Read more: Iraq's September deadline undercuts armed factions' case for weapons
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.