Shafaq News
The financial and oil dispute between Iraq’s federal government and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) dates to 2005, with January 2014 marking a turning point when Baghdad suspended the KRI’s share of the federal budget. The crisis has continued amid disagreements over oil and non-oil revenues, public-sector salaries, and the mechanisms used to calculate financial entitlements.
Despite repeated visits by technical delegations between Baghdad and Erbil, efforts to reach a settlement continue to be hindered by disagreements over the obligations of both sides.
The latest round of talks has produced some movement. On November 9, Prime Ministers Ali al-Zaidi and Masrour Barzani agreed on a unified budget allocation covering all parts of the Kurdistan Region, but the percentage, calculation mechanism, and other disputed provisions have yet to be fully settled.
Dispute Roots
The origin of the crisis lies in differing interpretations of provisions in Iraq’s 2005 Constitution concerning the management of oil and gas. Tensions deepened in 2007 after the Kurdistan Region enacted its own oil and gas law and signed contracts with foreign companies, moves opposed by Baghdad.
The dispute escalated in January 2014, when the federal government cut the KRI’s 17% share of the federal budget over its independent oil exports through Turkiye, without coordination with Iraq’s State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO).
Since then, the crisis has expanded beyond the KRI’s share of public spending to include oil resource management, revenue transfers, payments owed to foreign companies, public-sector salaries, and the amount of non-oil revenue that must be transferred to the federal treasury.
In March 2023, an international arbitration ruling found that Turkiye had breached its pipeline agreement with Iraq by facilitating unauthorized Kurdish oil exports. Flows through the Iraq-Turkiye pipeline were subsequently halted, further complicating negotiations over oil revenues and financial obligations.
Read more: Pipe dream or partnership? Oil restart tests a fragile federal compact
Accumulating Disputes
Jamal Kocher, a member of the Iraqi parliament’s Finance Committee, said the crisis persists because of “a lack of seriousness in reaching solutions and insufficient reliance on the Constitution and applicable laws.”
Speaking to Shafaq News, Kocher added that the roots of the problem date back to the period after 2003, when no clear foundations were established to regulate financial and administrative relations between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region. “This allowed disagreements to accumulate as resources expanded and laws changed.”
The current disputes have political and administrative dimensions, he noted, arguing that leaving the issues to technical and administrative officials without political or personal interference could have helped resolve them.
Kocher said that agreements reached between the two governments do not necessarily guarantee a lasting settlement, citing the 2023 agreement, signed in the presence of both prime ministers, the oil ministers, and other relevant officials, “which was subsequently obstructed in parliament.”
On April 4, 2023, Baghdad and Erbil signed an interim agreement to resume oil exports from the region through Turkiye. Under the deal, SOMO would market the oil, while revenues would be deposited into an account subject to federal auditing. However, the agreement failed to resolve disagreements over oil management, revenues, and the KRI’s financial entitlements, despite the inclusion of related arrangements in Iraq’s three-year budget law, approved on June 12, 2023.
Read more: Into 2026, Baghdad and Erbil face the same disputes—with higher stakes
Calculating the KRI’s Budget Share
Yassin Aziz, a political analyst based in Erbil, told Shafaq News that disputes over the Kurdistan Region’s budget allocation became particularly pronounced in 2016, when the federal government, then led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, began linking the allocation to financial terms and conditions without establishing a clear and transparent mechanism to ensure its stability.
The debate resurfaces with every budget proposal, particularly over whether the region’s allocation reflects its share of Iraq’s population, Aziz said.
He also noted that Iraq’s 2024 census put the Kurdistan Region’s population at approximately 14.14% of the national total, while the percentage proposed in the budget stands at 12.67%.
The Kurdistan Region Government (KRG) rejects that figure, arguing that it does not reflect its actual entitlements. Aziz said the amount ultimately reaching the KRI could fall to approximately 6.1% if its allocation is calculated after excluding sovereign and central government expenditures.
A major point of contention is whether the KRI’s share should be calculated from total public spending or after sovereign expenditures are deducted. The two sides also disagree over whether legal budget allocations or actual spending should serve as the basis for disbursement.
The deductions made before distribution reduce the final amount received by the KRI, even when the announced percentage remains unchanged. As a result, the dispute concerns the calculation formula as much as the allocation percentage itself.
Oil And Non-Oil Revenues
The oil dispute is equally complex, with disagreements over the volume of crude the region must deliver to SOMO, actual production levels, domestic consumption, production and transportation costs, and payments owed to foreign oil companies.
According to Aziz, Baghdad is demanding that the KRI deliver 445,000 barrels of oil per day, while current production does not exceed 265,000 barrels per day, including approximately 50,000 barrels consumed locally.
He said the KRI had proposed delivering 300,000 barrels per day in exchange for guarantees protecting its airspace and oil facilities and addressing outstanding payments to producing companies. Alternatively, it has proposed using actual production as the basis for determining the volume of oil to be delivered.
The disagreements also extend to non-oil revenues, including customs duties, taxes, and income from border crossings.
The federal government is demanding that part of these revenues be transferred to the national treasury, while the KRG is calling for clear figures and assessments based on actual commercial activity and collected revenues.
Aziz said technical delegations have intensified their movements between Baghdad and Erbil as the draft federal budget approaches parliamentary consideration, adding that the Kurdistan Region is prepared to show flexibility on certain issues, provided its financial entitlements are guaranteed, and its budget allocation is not turned into an instrument of political disputes.
Read more: Erbil-Baghdad disputes: A cycle of missed opportunities and deep-seated divides
Salaries and Financial Settlements
Alongside the oil disagreements, public-sector salaries in the KRI have become one of the most pressing issues. Payments are linked to the auditing of employee lists, the identification of financial obligations, and the mechanisms for transferring salaries through banks.
On February 21, 2024, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court issued a ruling concerning the localization of salaries for the KRI’s public employees under a specified mechanism. The ruling stipulated that salaries should be financed from the Kurdistan Region’s budget allocation without resorting to loans. However, ensuring regular salary payments requires more than judicial rulings. It also depends on a stable implementation mechanism and accurate, mutually agreed data to prevent monthly entitlements from becoming leverage in disputes between the two governments.
Financial expert Diaa Mohsen told Shafaq News that the crisis goes beyond disagreements over KRI’s budget percentage, involving the rules governing revenue management and distribution, the limits of each side’s authority, and guarantees that both governments fulfill their obligations.
Technical delegations may succeed in resolving an individual payment or auditing salary records, but they cannot end the crisis without a binding institutional settlement that does not have to be renegotiated every month, he said.
Mohsen added that some issues referred to technical committees exceed their mandate. While experts can audit oil production figures and salary records, resolving questions of authority, defining excluded expenditures, and addressing breaches by either side require clear political and legal decisions.
“The continued absence of binding decisions turns joint committees into mechanisms for managing and postponing the crisis rather than addressing its underlying causes,” Mohsen warned.
Proposals for a Lasting Settlement
Mohsen proposed establishing a legally defined formula for distributing the federal budget that specifies the applicable percentage, the spending base used to calculate it, and the expenditures to be excluded. He also called for applying comparable standards to the Kurdistan Region and Iraq’s other provinces.
The expert urged the completion of the legislative framework governing oil and gas and revenue sharing, including clear definitions of management, contracting, and marketing powers, as well as the settlement of outstanding payments to oil companies in accordance with the Constitution and applicable judicial rulings.
He also called for establishing a shared, auditable accounting system linking data on oil production, exports, oil and non-oil revenues, and financial transfers, with periodic settlements published and approved by both sides.
Other proposals include guaranteeing the funding of audited salaries according to a fixed timetable and conducting financial offsets between claims made by the two governments within a clear legal framework.
Mohsen also recommended establishing a binding dispute-resolution mechanism that sets deadlines for auditing, objections, and settlements, while identifying the authority responsible for resolving disagreements.
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.