Soft coup d’état.. Al-Kadhimi, PMF, the military and the Americans

Shafaq news/After nearly a month of taking the helm of the Iraqi government, the new prime minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi has made a tremendous headway so far, to bring a substantial change to the power structure and consolidate his hold on the military-security joints, at a time the security challenge is one of the most sensitive files facing his reign, in conjunction with internal and external fluctuations ravaging the popular mobilization forces (PMF).

The dangerous aspect of these developments is that it coincides with the launch of the “strategic dialogue” between Baghdad and Washington, as parliamentary voices are demanding a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq; and a quiver in the Iranian hegemony in association with the destabilization among the PMF, as Donald Trump’s administration threatened with new sanctions, only a few months after the assassination of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.

As Prime Minister, Al-Kadhimi finds it his natural prerogative to implant the required changes among the figures assisting him on the impossible task of leading Iraq at this complex stage, whether at the level of the government, provinces or ministerial departments and at the level of military commanders. However, it is remarkable that the military adjustments he targeted, were instituted in a relatively short time, despite targeting a wide array of ranks and figures. As if Al-Kadhimi is carrying out a positive soft coup d’état. Apparently al-Kadhimi is aware that enhancing the armed forces is the key to pave the road for his government to apply game changing decisions against the security challenges.

Considering the names and positions swept by al-Kadhimi’s wind of change in the military, reveals the significance of what has been going on- gradually and quietly- behind the scenes, since he took office on May 7th.

Lt. Gen. Abd Al-Amir Yarallah was assigned to the post of Chief of Staff of the Army, Lt. Gen. Abd Al-Amir al-Zaidi as the assistant to the army chief of staff for operations, while Lt. Gen. Othman Al-Ghanmi took over as Minister of Interior, and Lt. Gen. Abdul Amir Al-Shimmary was assigned to the post of Commander of Joint Operations (which was headed by Abd Al-Amir Yarallah). Lt. Gen. Basim Al-Taai was assigned to the post of deputy chief of staff for administration affairs. Al-Kadhimi also assigned Lt. Gen. Abd Al-Wahab Al-Saadi as commander of the Iraqi counter-terrorism service (ICTS), and major general Qasem Mohammed Al-Mohammadi as commander of ground forces.

It is hard to imagine that such a major shuffle in the military leadership is not linked to booby-trapped files that Al-Kadhimi must dismantle in the coming days. In the background of this scene, the Americans are extensively dissecting the PMF file on the table of the strategic dialogue, the media platforms and specialized security studies; marking it as a priority item in the American-Iraqi negotiation. The American desires in this context are clearly evident, as they enlisted Badr Organization and its leader, Hadi Al-Amiri, on the American terrorism list, in an intense American effort to put more pressure Iran-linked Iraqi militias.

It is remarkable that the PMF has so far sent messages of implicit calm, taking into consideration several factors; including the signs of destabilized Iranian influence due to U.S. sanctions and the assassination of Soleimani and Al-Muhandis, the confusion that has afflicted its ranks and the defection of some factions, the escalation of the American pressure and last point –but not least -  the leaders of PMF expressing willingness to give Al-Kadhimi a political opportunity to succeed in his reign.

Hisham Al-Hashimi, an armed-groups researcher, stated to Shafaq news agency, "The Shiite factions have clearly retreated twice; first when they accepted the dialogue after their adamant objection, and second by accepting the stay of U.S. forces”.

Since its establishment in 2014, after the fatwa (a nonbinding legal opinion on a point of Islamic law, given by a qualified jurist) of the religious reference Ali Al-Sistani, the PMF factions have maintained much of their political and military unity until the former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi officially announced the elimination of ISIS in December 2017. According to a law, the PMF became part of the Iraqi armed forces and was linked to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. However, internal and external pressures were exerted to resolve it, and some of its factions were subjected to U.S. airstrikes; while the assassination of Soleimani and Al-Muhandis contributed to the fragmentation of some of the PMF ranks.

Some of the PMF factions, associated to Al-Sistani announced that they will receive orders from the PM and not from the PMF leadership falling within the orbit of Tehran. This polarization was obvious, when Al-Kadhimi recently visited the headquarters of the PMF. As on his right, figures close to Tehran sat; and on his left, those associated to Al-Sistani sat.

However, Hisham al-Hashimi declares to the Shafaq News agency, “The refusal of Shiite political parties to approve an Iraqi-American strategic agreement indicates that they are not serious about entering into any negotiations involving the preservation of the American forces inside Iraq, and that they will not be satisfied with any solution that does not include scheduling their full exit".

 Al-Hashimi noted, " as the Green Zone was targeted on the strategic dialogue’s eve, the pacification with the Katyusha cells and the armed militaries are not proven to be efficient yet. Therefore, the Iraqi negotiation team may tend to prolong the negotiations to gain more time, and –hopefully-  neutralize of the factions’ expansion".

Al-Kadhimi is conscious of these tricky facts. Perhaps those are the reasons behind his balanced statement, "The dialogue between Iraq and America will depend on the opinion of the religious reference, the parliament and Iraqi’s needs".

Al-Hashimi added, “Al-Kadhimi has not determined his final decision yet; whether to proceed with a treaty as in 2008, or to go to a memorandum of understanding that does not need to be approved by the parliament". 

However, Al-Kadhimi took notes from the statement made by Kareem Alawi (a member of Al-Fateh alliance and the Parliamentary Security Committee) to Shafaq News agency, "The majority of the negotiators in the strategic dialogue are either former ambassadors to U.S. or hold U.S. citizenship and support its policies and Iraqi’s presence".

The same was expressed by the leader of Al-Fateh Alliance, secretary-general of Badr organization, Hadi Al-Amiri, in a statement to Shafaq News agency, “the members of the Iraqi delegation should keep in mind the decision of the Iraqi Parliament on 05/01/2020 and the demonstrators’ demands to remove foreign forces from Iraq and achieve full national sovereignty”. He also noted, “activating the Strategic Framework Agreement in aspects that serve the Iraqi reality in accordance with the law and the constitution is required”.

Al-Kadhimi also took note of a tweet by Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq movement’s leader, Qais Al-Khazali, who said that, "the U.S. administration should realize by demanding its military forces remain in Iraq, they will be governed by the Iraqi law and they will not be granted any political immunity."

In the light of these positions, what are the possible scenarios on the part of the dominant political parties about the outcome of the Iraqi-American dialogue, according to estimates by the researcher Hashim Al-Hashimi?

First, political escalation and the expansion of the armed militias’ operations: This scenario will not be devoid of religious fanaticism and polarization based on sectarian affiliation linked to Iran, which is a possible scenario if the U.S. refuses to accept the scheduling of the withdrawal of its forces and imposes its presence as an international force that does not accept the decision of Shiite parties on January 5th, 2020. It is risker since it may lead to declaring the armed resistance and classifying the foreign presence as an invasion. By that, the Iraqi Government is losing the fugacious calm it has created lately.

Second, the settlement of economic conciliation: the outbreak of internal conflicts’ fears with the Katyusha cells armed factions may prompt a group of Shiite political forces - that tend to peaceful solutions – and religious references to intercede to prevent the deterioration of the situation and settle the conflict economically. Maybe by agreeing on the withdrawal files - as in 2008 negotiations which contained and alleviated the situation - or by renting Ain Al-Assad military base as in the case of U.S. bases in the Arabian Gulf and Turkey and initiating a new phase through a known convention.

However, Al-Hashimi considered, " Iran's allies will not accept this scenario because it could damge the Tehran-Beirut route, and it would tether the fate of the “axis of resistance” regarding land-based communication, where it will face a great debate by many prominent Kurds and Sunni politicians, who see this as the logical solution and it would be accepted by Iran loyal Shiite parties, or would go to sign a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. until the rejection complication is solved". Adding that, "The results of rejecting this solution are disastrous if America decides to leave and consider Iraq loyal to Iran, as it means political, economic and military sanctions from the United States, Europe and the Gulf".

Al-Kadhimi is aware of the ductility shown by Al-Fateh alliance - the main force in the parliament - which voted for him as prime minister, and Al-khazali's position, therefore he will seek to find a convincing and rational balance between the positions of the religious reference, the parliament and the need of Iraq.

In order to be able to do so, and in order for Iraq to reach a formula that satisfies everyone, there must be an effective dialogue that includes all parties of power as well as public opinion makers in order to achieve Comprehensive participation between all Iraqi parties for the benefit of Iraq, and to follow the approach of 2008’s political agreement to reach national solutions, create a reality that goes beyond the idea of serving the interest of Iran at the expense of Iraq, managing the financial resources fairly, fight against corruption at military, service and economic levels and to develop a recovery plan for all the provinces of Iraq".

 Al-Hashimi added, “The dialogue should also work on disarming and reforming the structure of the PMF within the framework of the Iraqi law".

So the PMF is in front of a confusing crossroads unless Al-Kadhimi succeeds in consolidating this supposed dialogue with the leaders of the PMF, and in return convincing the Americans of the equation of "neither dominant nor defeated" that can be followed in dealing with the PMF and with Iran. As U.S. experts recommend not pushing Al-Kadhimi to the point of permanently breaking the relations with the Iranians, and a possible clash with the PMF does not serve the interests of Iraq or the U.S. in the foreseeable future, nor certainly does it serve the stability of the newly born Iraqi government.

These developments coincide with a recommendation by the Republican Congressional Study Committee to include pro-Iranian Armed Iraqi militias - including Badr Organization – in the list of terrorist groups, as a part of a lengthy report on the activities of the parties and figures involved in passing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)'s agenda in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

The report accused Hadi Al-Amiri of involving in a terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in December 2019. The report pointed out that despite the inclusion of many Iranian groups in the terror list, such as Liwa Fatemiyoun, Liwa Zainebiyoun, Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq, many of the movements that are Supported by IRGC are not yet classified in the list. Therefore, the report recommended that Badr organization and al-Amiri be included in the list of terrorism, as well as Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali, Saraya Al-Khurasani, Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Liwa Abu Al-Fadhal Al-abbas,  Al-Aufiaa movement, Jund Al-Islam movement and Saraya Ashura.

The report also noted that, although the Iraqi Interior Ministry is no longer under the control of Badr organization after Qasim Al-Araji's departure, it still plays a main role in it. As the federal police leaderships are activists in Badr organization.

Meanwhile, representatives in the U.S. Congress said on Tuesday that they were preparing a bill to impose "the toughest sanctions" on Iran and its armed factions in Iraq, with the aim of stopping Iran's terrorism and bankrupting the regime. Lawmakers in Congress revealed that the bill contains 140 new proposals against Iran.

It is not clear whether the stance of the Republican Party or the congressmen comes at this time to exert additional pressure on the Shiite forces and the factions of the PMF, and to extract political and security concessions from them with the start of the strategic dialogue, at a time when the Kurdish and Sunni political parties are reticent about the issue of the withdrawal of the American forces in a scene that recalls the scenario of the Iraqi parliament voting on a decision to withdraw foreign troops six months ago.

The conservative positions were not limited to Al-Fateh alliance, Badr organization, and Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haq. As Shafaq News also quoted the member of security and parliamentary defense of the Coalition of the State of Law (led by Nouri al-Maliki), Ali al-Ghanimi, saying that "the most important national lines that we have identified in the dialogue rejected the military bases’ presence in Iraq, and this file should be subjected to the acceptability of Iraq, especially in the fields of training and technical consultation, as well as the rejection of any calls to resolve the PMF as it’s an official security force subjected to the security system of the state".

Al-Ghanimi added, "We fear that the U.S. is the one who runs the dialogue, as we reject its interference in drawing up mechanisms for dealing with neighboring countries, especially Iran, and we refuse any interference in Iraq's relations with its neighbors”

Al-Kadhimi's visit to Mosul on the eve of the strategic dialogue on the occasion of the anniversary of its invasion by ISIS, resembles an intense symbolism in this atmosphere, especially his clear statement, "achieving sovereignty and taking into account the interests of the country is one of the priorities of the strategic dialogue”.

The white smoke has not yet emerged from the channels of dialogue, and the next few days will show the strategic dialogue’s effect on the stability of Iraq, and the possible revenues of these internal and external entanglements, and how Al-Kadhimi will proceed in the stage of completing his new rules in the political game.