Syria's Kurds hold 12 parliamentary seats, deserve 30
Shafaq News
Abdul Hakim Bashar, a Syrian Kurdish leader, member of the People's Assembly and member of the political bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party –Syria, spoke to Shafaq News about the first session of the new assembly, the level of Kurdish representation in it, the files Kurdish deputies intend to raise, and the limits of the agreements reached between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The interview was conducted in Arabic. It has been translated and edited for length and clarity.
Q: How do you assess the first session of the People's Assembly?
A: The current assembly is clearly different from the assemblies formed under the previous system, particularly with the absence of the scenes of applause for the president and the glorification slogans that used to accompany its sessions. This change is a positive development that reflects a shift in the nature of the political scene. Still, it is too early to judge the assembly and its ability to establish a new political and legislative phase.
Q: What will determine that judgment?
A: The real test will be the assembly's performance in the coming phase, and its ability to respond to the aspirations of Syrians of all components and to translate them into legislation and policies that strengthen justice, participation, and equal citizenship.
Q: How do you evaluate the Kurdish presence in that first session?
A: The results were not at the hoped-for level. The Kurds are represented by 12 members belonging to different political currents and backgrounds, which means that forming a weighty and effective Kurdish bloc needs more time and coordination.
Q: Why do you describe the representation as insufficient?
A: It is below the deserved level and does not correspond to the Kurdish share of the population, which I estimate at around 15 percent of Syria's population, in the absence of recent and approved official statistics. Representation matching that proportion would have given the Kurds at least between 30 and 32 seats, instead of the twelve they currently hold.
Q: What produced this outcome?
A: Two main factors. The first is the absence of a clear political agreement between the Kurdish movement and the Syrian authorities on the Kurdish question, and responsibility for that is shared between the two sides. The Kurdish movement has not been politically active in Damascus to a sufficient degree, while the Syrian authorities have not moved to launch a serious and comprehensive political dialogue with it.
Q: And the second factor?
A: It is linked to the mechanism by which the assembly was formed, which did not rely on free and direct popular elections, because of the exceptional circumstances Syria is passing through. That affected the level of representation of the Kurds and of the other components.
Q: Did the timing of the selection process play a role?
A: The selection of assembly members in the Kurdish areas took place late compared with other Syrian areas, which gave deputies chosen earlier more time to reach understandings and build alliances over the distribution of the assembly's posts and bodies. Information also circulated about certain figures receiving support during the competition for positions, and in my assessment that was reflected in the final results of the formation of the assembly's bodies.
Q: Are the Kurdish deputies working as a bloc?
A: The Kurdish deputies have held several meetings and agreed during them to work in a team spirit and to coordinate on general national issues, alongside files related to Kurdish society. This coordination is still in its early stages and needs more time and effort to reach a more effective formula for cooperation. Collective work is the best way to strengthen the presence of Kurdish deputies and to serve the national interest at the same time.
Q: How do you define the balance between national and community work inside the assembly?
A: National work must be the basis inside the assembly, and the priority must be to serve all Syrians, away from narrow partisan, nationalist or sectarian calculations. At the same time, the existence of parties and political currents is a fundamental pillar of any sound political life, and the presence of a responsible national opposition inside or outside parliament strengthens democracy, transparency and oversight of the executive authority.
Q: What files do the Kurdish deputies intend to raise?
A: The priorities are divided between general national issues and others linked directly to Kurdish rights and the particularity of the Kurdish areas, but they all fall within the project of building a state of citizenship and justice.
Q: What comes first?
A: A review of the exceptional laws and measures related to land ownership in the Kurdish areas. Large areas still lack the real estate title deeds known as the "green tabu," and proof of ownership rests on judicial rulings or other documents. The deputies will also work to open the files of land expropriation and the exceptional legislation that harmed residents of the Kurdish areas over past decades.
Q: What about services and the economy?
A: The development and services file carries similar importance, particularly improving infrastructure, securing water and electricity, developing road networks and raising the level of education, health and public services. Supporting the agriculture and industry sectors matters as well, in a way that contributes to providing jobs and achieving sustainable development in areas that suffered for years from neglect, war and declining investment.
Q: Are there other consequences that need to be addressed?
A: Yes, the negative effects left by the years of self-administration, among them the dangers threatening the safety of civilians, and the environmental and health damage caused by extracting and refining oil by primitive means.
Q: And at the political level?
A: Recognition of the national rights of the Kurdish people remains a main priority and should be fixed in the new Syrian constitution, in a way that acknowledges national and cultural plurality and guarantees equal citizenship for individuals and ethnic groups. The form of the Syrian state must be an essential part of the national and constitutional dialogue, in a way that preserves the unity of the country and establishes sound governance and a decentralized system that guarantees the participation of all components.
Q: What specific demands does that include?
A: Reconsidering the official name of the state so that it expresses all Syrians, recognizing the Kurdish language as an official language alongside Arabic in Kurdish-majority areas, and addressing the effects of the Arab Belt project according to a just national vision. It also includes completing the treatment of the issue of Kurds deprived of citizenship, fixing the legal status of those who have regained it, and guaranteeing effective Kurdish participation in any committee tasked with drafting the new Syrian constitution.
Read more: Kurds in Syria: From marginalization to a defining political force
Q: Can the assembly deliver on these demands?
A: Some demands related to the form of the state, language and national recognition go beyond the direct powers of the People's Assembly and are tied to the constitutional process and to national political understandings. The assembly can, however, prepare the political and legislative ground for these files and open a serious national discussion leading to just and sustainable solutions.
Q: Has the relationship between the Kurdish forces and the government moved to institutional work?
A: Speaking about such a transition requires first defining what is meant by the Kurdish forces, given the multiplicity of currents and projects inside the Syrian Kurdish political scene.
Q: How do you read the SDF's approach?
A: In my view, the political approach of the Syrian Democratic Forces is not based on a Kurdish national project in the traditional sense, but rests on the concepts of the democratic nation and the brotherhood of peoples, and calls for moving beyond closed national identities.
Q: What has that meant for the negotiations with Damascus?
A: The negotiations focused on the future of the military, security, and civil institutions belonging to the forces and the self-administration, and on the mechanism for integrating them into the institutions of the Syrian state, more than on recognition of Kurdish identity and national rights. The core of the negotiations revolves around the nature of the integration, the distribution of powers and posts inside state agencies, and the arrangement of leadership and administrative structures.
Q: Does the agreement resolve the Kurdish question?
A: The agreement with the SDF does not resolve the Kurdish question and does not guarantee the political rights of the Kurds or their representation in state institutions. It moves within financial, security, military, and administrative arrangements, and it cannot be a substitute for a comprehensive political solution to the Kurdish question in Syria.
Q: Where do the other Kurdish parties stand?
A: The Kurdish National Council and other Kurdish parties proceed from a different vision that focuses on fixing Kurdish rights within the framework of the Syrian state. Their communication with the authorities has so far been limited to meetings between the council's leadership and some Syrian officials, among them the foreign minister and transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa. These meetings are important steps toward opening channels of communication, but they remain far from the level of political negotiations that could produce a clear institutional framework for the relationship between the Kurds and the state.
Q: So how would you describe the current stage?
A: What Syria is witnessing now is the beginning of negotiating tracks and uneven political contacts between different parties, not a comprehensive institutional agreement defining the nature of the future relationship. Building a stable institutional relationship needs a political dialogue that includes the various concerned forces, followed by legal and constitutional arrangements that guarantee rights and define responsibilities and powers. Institutions are not built only through merging existing structures, but through a political consensus that determines the form of the state and the relationship of its components to it.
Q: What role has the Kurdistan Region of Iraq played?
A: The Kurdistan Region and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani played an influential role in bringing the viewpoints of the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces closer, and in contributing to opening channels of communication between the two sides. Erbil's role stood out during sensitive stages through efforts to avoid military escalation in the Kurdish areas and to limit the transformation of political disputes into a wider Arab-Kurdish clash. That role has made the Kurdistan Region an important station for regional and international parties concerned with Syria's stability and the future of the relationship between Damascus and the Kurdish forces.
Q: What about outside mediation?
A: The efforts of the Kurdistan Region were accompanied by direct American mediation and French support for the negotiations, with the aim of reaching a formula that prevents a return to confrontations and opens the way to clearer political and institutional arrangements. But the success of the coming understandings does not depend on external mediation alone. It is linked above all to the ability of the Syrian parties to reach a comprehensive political agreement that addresses questions of power, administration and rights.
Q: What is required now?
A: What is required is turning the temporary understandings into a sustainable institutional framework that guarantees Syria's unity and the rights of all its components and prevents the country from returning to the conflicts and divisions that accompanied it during past years.
