Financial muscle: How money shapes Iraq's upcoming elections

Shafaq News/ With Iraq’s parliamentary elections set for November 11, 2025, political parties are intensifying their campaigns, directing substantial funds toward candidate recruitment and voter outreach in what is shaping up to be a highly competitive race.

According to political figures involved in the process, billions of dinars are being funneled toward candidates with strong tribal support or established party affiliations. The scale of spending, already evident across several provinces, is drawing growing attention from civil society groups and election observers.

Analysts caution that the increasing role of financial influence may distort the electoral landscape, deepening the divide between dominant parties—whether Shiite, Sunni, or Kurdish—and independent or smaller contenders who lack comparable resources.

Old Guard Rule

Iraq’s 329-seat Council of Representatives remains dominated by long-standing political blocs, leaving little room for new actors to reshape the balance of power in the next parliamentary elections.

Allegations of vote-buying and financial misconduct continue to shadow Iraq’s electoral process. During the 2018 elections, ballot cards in southern provinces were reportedly sold for between 50,000 and 150,000 Iraqi dinars ($35–$105). The Al-Rafidain Center for Dialogue estimated that year’s undeclared campaign spending at over $250 million.

In 2021, campaign financing became more difficult to trace but appeared even more extensive. Iraq’s Integrity Commission opened 15 investigations related to the misuse of public resources, focusing on cases where governors and ministers distributed state-funded food baskets and services during the campaign period.

Former MP Razzaq al-Haidari pointed to what he described as entrenched abuse of state power for electoral advantage. “There are reports of offers reaching billions of dinars for individuals with tribal and political weight,” he stated in remarks to Shafaq News. “This poses a threat to the political process and risks further alienating the public.”

Zuhair al-Jalabi, a member of the State of Law Coalition, highlighted the influence of ruling blocs that control public funds and institutions. “The political money in the hands of ruling parties is unmatched, giving them a growing base of dependents,” he observed.

Al-Jalabi also referred to the manipulation of special voting groups—particularly state employees and members of the security forces—through pressure and inducements. “These parties exploit state employees and those eligible for special voting through both intimidation and incentives, securing their loyalty.”

Costly Sunni Contest

Despite reforms passed in 2020 aimed at reshaping Iraq’s electoral landscape—such as district-based voting and caps on campaign spending—implementation has remained inconsistent. A 2023 audit by Iraq’s Federal Board of Supreme Audit revealed that fewer than 15% of candidates submitted complete campaign finance disclosures. No violations resulted in legal action, reflecting the broader challenge of enforcing electoral standards.

In this context of limited oversight, Sunni-majority provinces are emerging as focal points for a high-stakes contest. Several prominent Sunni blocs are gearing up for what tribal leader Muzahim al-Huwait described as a fiercely competitive campaign season, with estimated spending surpassing $1 billion across western Iraq.

"Over $1 billion is expected to be spent in the western provinces," he remarked in a statement to Shafaq News, portraying the election as a pivotal moment for the political future of the region.

Many Sunni bloc leaders also entered the race with considerable institutional backing. A number currently occupy influential roles in ministries, security bodies, and local administrations. These positions, al-Huwait noted, will serve as platforms through which financial and administrative resources can be mobilized throughout the campaign. “These resources will be deployed in the political struggle,” he explained, underscoring the depth of their reach.

Expectations for high voter turnout reflect a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with the current legislature. Al-Huwait described the outgoing parliament as the weakest since 2003 and predicted a sweeping overhaul in representation. “There will be a strong push for change, and most of the current faces will be swept out,” he observed.

While Sunni alliances remain dominant in these areas, shifting loyalties are beginning to reshape local dynamics. Al-Huwait noted that several Shiite parties have gained traction in Sunni-majority provinces, particularly among communities that credit them with helping liberate areas from extremist groups. “Some Sunni candidates in Nineveh, al-Anbar, and elsewhere will join Shiite parties,” he added, pointing to evolving alliances and a more fluid political map.

Media Manipulation

Beyond direct cash transactions, political money is increasingly flowing through digital operations and media influence, further deepening concerns over the integrity of Iraq’s electoral process ahead of the 2025 parliamentary elections.

A 2023 report by the Iraqi Network for Social Media (INSM) documented more than 670 coordinated Facebook and Twitter accounts actively promoting political candidates and targeting their rivals. Many of these accounts were run by media outlets affiliated with dominant political parties.

In the final stretch before the last parliamentary elections, these networks escalated their efforts—spreading disinformation, discrediting independent candidates, and shaping public perception through tightly coordinated messaging, the report found.

The scale and precision of these campaigns have intensified concerns among local observers, who point to an increasingly blurred line between media and political power. In Babil province, media researcher al-Haidari highlighted coverage that consistently favors ruling coalitions. “Some media outlets and journalists are cheerleading for the ruling parties,” he remarked to Shafaq News.

He also questioned the broader impact of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s record, noting that while some achievements may be visible in Baghdad, they have yet to reach other provinces. Despite leading a broad coalition, al-Sudani is widely seen as unlikely to garner enough support to challenge the Coordination Framework, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, or Badr Organization Secretary-General Hadi al-Amiri.

Public attitudes have shifted in response. A 2022 survey by the Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies found that 71% of Iraqis believe political money determines election outcomes, while 64% no longer view voting as an effective path to change. Trust in political parties has fallen to just 27%, far below the confidence placed in the religious establishment (54%) and the military (41%).

This disillusionment has been reflected at the polls. In 2021, voter turnout dropped to 41% of Iraq’s 25 million registered voters—the lowest rate since the 2003 invasion. In Sadr City, a key voting bloc in Baghdad, participation fell below 30%, according to the Independent High Electoral Commission.

Analysts warn that without substantial reforms, the upcoming elections may reinforce entrenched power structures rather than create space for meaningful competition.