Shafaq News

Ahead of Iraq’s November 11 elections, Iran bets on deep bonds while Washington banks on state control — and Baghdad struggles to turn exposure into leverage.

As Iraq moves toward the parliamentary elections — preceded by special voting on November 9 — the country finds itself once again pulled between two gravitational centers: Iran’s entrenched networks of influence and Washington’s strategic leverage.

Both claim to seek a “stable, sovereign Iraq,” yet each defines stability on its own terms — and their competing expectations will frame the reality Iraq’s next government must navigate.

Tehran’s Thesis: Deep Ties as Shock Absorbers, Not Shock Troops

For Tehran, Iraq’s elections are not a fleeting contest but part of a long continuum linking two nations by faith, geography, and shared blood. Iranian policymakers — across conservative and reformist lines — see Iraq’s stability as inseparable from Iran’s own security.

“Iran does not feel any real concern about the elections,” said Ali Akbar Barzanouni, Iranian writer and political commentator, “because the relationship between the two peoples and governments is deep-rooted and cannot be shaken by temporary political changes or foreign attempts to sow discord.”

Barzanouni described the vote as an internal Iraqi matter that Tehran respects, stressing that Iran’s approach has never been about control but about “supporting Iraq’s sovereignty and stability.”

In Tehran’s calculus, a strong, independent Iraq is not a threat but an asset — a bulwark against chaos, terrorism, and Western pressure.

Over the past two decades, Iran has built an intricate web of political, cultural, and security linkages inside Iraq — most visibly through its relations with the Coordination Framework (CF), the Shiite alliance currently steering Baghdad’s government. Iranian officials often frame this network as a stabilizing structure rather than a lever of dominance, citing episodes such as the 2021 government impasse, when CF channels and Tehran’s mediation helped prevent escalation.

Tehran also points to coordination in the anti-ISIS campaign as proof that its engagement has served Iraq’s stability, not its division.

Iranian researcher Saleh al-Qazwini described this as a strategy of “preventive caution.” He told Shafaq News that Tehran does not fear the election results “as long as they bring political and economic stability to Iraq, because turmoil in any neighboring state inevitably affects Iran.”

Regarding Iran’s relations with Iraqi parties, whether CF members or independents, he affirmed that they are designed “to preserve dialogue and institutional continuity, not domination.”

Jalal Joraghi, director of the Afaq Center for Iranian–Arab Studies in Tehran, explained that Iran’s confidence rests not in political blocs but in the Iraqi electorate itself. “Tehran counts on the awareness of the Iraqi people in choosing their representatives,” he said, especially amid what Iran perceives as US efforts to sway the outcome.

Joraghi emphasized that Tehran hopes for broad participation across communities, arguing that “high turnout would reinforce Iraq’s political stability and reflect positively on the region — and on Iran in particular — since Iraq’s security is Iran’s security.”

He also cautioned that weak participation “could open the door to American and Zionist conspiracies,” echoing Tehran’s view that legitimacy through the ballot box is the surest shield against external interference.

Tehran’s approach, according to Mehdi Azizi, a scholar of Iranian–Iraqi relations, remains pragmatic. “Iran is not afraid of Iraq’s elections,” he said, “but it is concerned about American, Turkish, and certain Arab attempts to reshape the regional political order.”

Azizi added that Iran’s engagement has historically reinforced Iraq’s institutions and defense coordination, while also acknowledging Iran’s fears that extremist remnants or former Baathist elements could resurface “under new political fronts.”

Ultimately, the Iranian consensus is that Iraq’s democratic process — however imperfect — has proved resilient and continues to buffer both countries against larger regional shocks.

Washington’s Thesis: Stability Through State Control

In Washington, Iraq’s vote is viewed as a strategic test, not just a democratic ritual. US officials and policy analysts see it as a moment that could redefine influence across a region still reeling from the Israel–Iran confrontation, Syrian instability, and shifting Gulf alignments.

“Washington’s top priority is a stable, representative, and nationalist government in Baghdad — one capable of curbing Iranian influence and ensuring all armed groups operate under state authority,” said Frank Mesmar, Republican Party member and Chair of the Advisory Council at the University of Maryland.

His view mirrors that of Nabil Mikhael, a political analyst, who told Shafaq News that the US favors continuity under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, citing “positive indicators in governance and the economy” during his tenure.

Former US ambassador to Iraq James Jeffrey also praised the relationship with al-Sudani, describing it as “solid and functional.” In a lecture at the Washington Institute, he said Washington “prefers to continue working with al-Sudani,” citing Baghdad’s restraint during the recent Israel–Iran confrontation as proof of “growing policy independence.”

Mesmar agreed that al-Sudani’s reconstruction agenda and steps to reduce reliance on Iranian gas are “positive outcomes” from Washington’s standpoint. Yet, he and other experts warned that progress will be measured by Iraq’s ability to bring militias under state control and keep its financial system compliant with global standards.

Washington’s leverage still lies primarily in its control over dollar liquidity and banking compliance, giving it quiet but decisive influence over Baghdad’s fiscal breathing room.

Yet Baghdad has quietly widened its external bandwidth — expanding oil contracts with China, deepening trade with Turkiye, and reopening Gulf financial channels — signaling that the new Iraq no longer defines sovereignty as equidistance but as multidimensional engagement.

Even among optimists, caution prevails. Mesmar noted that the Trump administration — under its “New Middle East” vision — wants stability chiefly to avoid a security vacuum that could enable ISIS’s return or widen Iran’s regional leverage.

Jeffrey, meanwhile, told Shafaq News that Iraq’s elections should produce “a stable, representative government that limits Iranian influence and maintains political balance to prevent the return of authoritarianism.”

He lauded Iraq’s parliamentary system as a “safeguard against one-man rule,” in contrast to Iran and Syria.

A US State Department spokesperson echoed this, saying Washington continues to urge Baghdad to “disarm and dismantle militias aligned with Iran.” On social media platform X, Mark Savaya, the US presidential envoy to Iraq, reaffirmed US support for “a future free of militias.”

Mesmar told Shafaq News that Washington’s policy relies on a “carrot and stick” approach: economic incentives and security cooperation balanced by conditional pressure. He said future engagement may hinge on Baghdad’s progress in integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into state institutions and addressing human rights concerns.

At the same time, Robert Gulotty, an associate professor at the University of Chicago, warned that the US could “refuse to recognize the next government if it proves excessively inclusive of Iran-backed factions.”

Jeffrey acknowledged that while Iran’s influence has receded, it remains potent. “Tehran will likely try to capitalize on it after the elections,” he said, adding that the PMF — unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Houthis — “is not an effective tool against Israel or the US, which makes its containment within state structures acceptable to Washington.”

Mikhael predicted that the Trump administration might apply “last-minute pressure” to boost pro–al-Sudani lists, warning that an electoral setback for the prime minister “would be a major blow to Trump’s Middle East strategy.” However, he doubted Washington would resort to sanctions, saying that doing so could “politically burn al-Sudani” by branding him too close to the US while "militias regain ground."

“Yet even as Washington fine-tunes its conditional engagement, both powers increasingly find themselves managing expectations rather than dictating outcomes.

Converging Interests, Divergent Methods

Both Tehran and Washington agree on the need for a functioning Iraqi state, the containment of ISIS, and the continuation of oil flows. But beyond those basics, their priorities diverge sharply.

-Command of Force: The US demands strict subordination of “militias” to the state; Iran views their integration as stabilizing.

-Financial Control: Washington pushes banking compliance; Tehran fears such measures as tools of political coercion.

-Energy: The US seeks diversification away from Iranian gas; Iran depends on that trade as a political and economic lifeline.

-Regional Posture: Washington fears Iraq as a corridor for Iranian logistics; Tehran fears Iraq becoming a staging ground for US containment.

The Election as Pressure Cooker

Iraq’s proportional representation system ensures fragmented results and forces post-election coalition building — a process that both Tehran and Washington attempt to influence indirectly.

For Iran, a high turnout signifies legitimacy and insulation from outside manipulation. For the US, post-election cabinet composition — especially portfolios like Defense, Interior, Finance, and Oil — will signal which camp holds sway.

Four Post-Election Pathways

1) Continuity-Plus

Al-Sudani or a consensus figure returns with a balanced cabinet.

-Tehran: Accepts continuity, keeps CF networks intact.

-Washington: Strengthens economic and security cooperation conditioned on PMF discipline.

2) CF-Dominant Cabinet

The Coordination Framework secures a commanding majority.

-Tehran: Comfortably positioned but wary of overreach.

-Washington: Tightens financial pressure; limits engagement.

3) Fragmented Parliament, Prolonged Negotiations

Months of deadlock before forming a government.

-Tehran: Mediates among Shiite factions.

-Washington: Supports technocratic caretakers.

4) Upset Coalition with Nationalist/Independent Surge

A mixed alliance challenges CF dominance.

-Tehran: Expands outreach, hedges influence.

-Washington: Welcomes rhetoric, waits for actions.

Read more: The Battle for Iraq’s “Largest Bloc”: A Renewed Struggle over Power and Definition

Whatever the scenario is, the next Iraqi government’s survival will depend on pragmatic sequencing: giving each power enough to stand down while delivering domestic wins.

Neither Tehran’s faith in “deep bonds” nor Washington’s reliance on “conditional partnership” guarantees Iraq a stable future. What Baghdad can achieve, however, is managed equilibrium — turning its exposure into leverage.

Between these two fires, Iraq’s best defense may lie not in choosing sides, but in sequencing deliverables that keep both powers engaged — just enough to contain pressure and shift the narrative from survival to governance.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.