Shafaq News

In a move hailed as a “historic solution” to Iraq’s deepening water crisis, Baghdad and Ankara finalized an accord on November 2, 2025, pledging substantial investment in the water sector and marking what many view as a pivotal moment in the country’s long struggle to secure its water future. Yet, experts caution that while the agreement offers immediate relief, it may not represent the ultimate solution Iraq urgently requires.

Oil Buys Water

The newly signed agreement establishes a financial mechanism linking Iraq’s oil exports to Turkiye with funding for water infrastructure projects in Iraq. Under the arrangement, revenues will be deposited into a dedicated account to finance projects implemented by Turkish companies. Iraqi officials will oversee the program through a specialized committee, managing tenders and payments exclusively from the funds generated by this mechanism.

Read more: Iraq and Turkiye finalize infrastructure deal: What we know

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the agreement as "the largest infrastructure investment in Iraq's history." In turn, his Iraqi counterpart, Minister Fuad Hussein, referred to it as a “first-of-its-kind partnership on water management,” emphasizing its “unprecedented scale and structure.”

The deal immediately targets three dam-construction and three land-reclamation projects to address Iraq's urgent need for water infrastructure modernization. These projects will focus on restoring irrigation systems, improving water quality, reducing river pollution, and rehabilitating farmland severely affected by neglect, as part of a broader plan to expand sustainable water governance practices.

However, a critical feature of the deal is that Turkiye will supervise all water releases and dam operations for the first five years before transferring responsibility to Iraqi authorities, raising concerns over Iraq’s long-term control of its water resources.

Missed 2010 Deal

While the agreement has been seen as a breakthrough, Iraqi economist Ziad al-Hashemi observed that this situation could have been avoided years earlier.

In a post on X, Al-Hashemi highlighted that Iraq missed a pivotal opportunity in 2010 to negotiate a more advantageous deal with Turkiye, following preliminary discussions with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

At that time, Iraq could have secured a stable water quota from Turkiye in exchange for joint economic cooperation, including inviting Turkish agricultural companies to modernize Iraq’s irrigation systems and rehabilitate farmland in central and southern regions.

Al-Hashemi argued that the 2010 deal would have provided lasting benefits, including higher agricultural output for domestic consumption and export, job creation, training for young workers in modern farming techniques, as well as additional state revenue.

He also noted that Iraq’s leadership, under then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, rejected the deal over concerns it might give political leverage to a rival faction before the 2010 elections.

“Now, Iraq faces a deal that is more costly and less certain,” Al-Hashemi warned, stressing that tying water projects to oil exports could compromise Iraq’s resource autonomy.

Read more: A century of promises: Iraq’s water diplomacy with Turkiye and Iran

At What Cost?

One of the most debated aspects of the agreement is the oil-for-water financing mechanism. Iraqi experts, including energy analyst Dr. Ahmad Jassim, have raised concerns about linking Iraq’s oil revenues to a deal “that largely benefits Turkiye.”

“Iraq’s oil wealth should be deployed strategically for domestic development rather than exchanged for water relief from a neighboring country,” Jassim remarked to Al-Hadath.

Dr. Omar al-Hasan, another energy analyst, shared similar reservations. Speaking to TRT Haber, a Turkish news network, he pointed to existing inefficiencies in Iraq’s management of oil revenues. “By connecting those revenues to a deal with Turkiye, the country risks surrendering control over one of its most valuable assets.”

A central criticism of the deal is the potential sale of Iraqi oil at a discounted rate to fund water infrastructure projects, with both analysts warning that, given persistent corruption and mismanagement in Iraq’s oil sector, such an arrangement could leave the country more exposed to external pressures.

Legal Edge Lost

Economic concerns are closely intertwined with legal vulnerabilities. Eco Iraq, an economic observatory based in Baghdad, sharply criticized the government for finalizing the water accord, describing it as a decision that weakens Iraq’s legal standing and limits its ability to defend its water rights under international law.

In a statement, Eco Iraq highlighted that Baghdad already has numerous legal and institutional frameworks — including 14 key international, bilateral, and environmental mechanisms — that could have been mobilized to secure its fair water share from the Tigris and Euphrates.

These include established international conventions such as the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, the 1966 Helsinki Rules, and the 2004 Berlin Rules, which collectively outline principles of equitable water sharing and the prevention of significant harm among riparian states.

At the bilateral level, Iraq could have relied on existing accords, including the 1946 Iraq–Turkiye Protocol, the 1978 Protocol on Economic Cooperation, and the 1987 Turkiye–Syria Agreement, later expanded to include Iraq — along with decades of joint Iraqi–Turkish committee records that remain legally relevant.

Additional measures noted by the observatory included invoking the international law principle of “significant harm,” pursuing regional arbitration under the UN or World Bank, as well as employing environmental agreements such as the Paris Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity to frame Turkiye’s upstream dam activity as a cross-border ecological issue.

By bypassing these legal and diplomatic avenues, Eco Iraq argued that Baghdad effectively handed Ankara a political and legal advantage in a dispute that continues to threaten Iraq’s long-term water security and economic stability.

Drought Deepens Crisis

Despite hopes that the agreement will alleviate the crisis, Iraq’s water situation remains critical. The country is experiencing its worst drought in nearly a century, with water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers down by 27% from last year and national reserves plummeting to a record 10 billion cubic meters—far below the seasonal average of 18 billion.

A 2024 UN report indicated that 90% of Iraq’s surface water is contaminated, heightening the scarcity of clean water. Around 37,000 people have also been displaced due to climate-induced water shortages, while regions such as Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar face rising salinity and pollution in their water supplies.

Read more: From drought to saltwater: Iraq's deepening water crisis

Although the new agreement represents progress, many experts remain cautious about its effectiveness. Abdul Mutalib Rafaat, a water-resources specialist at Garmian University, noted that past Iraq–Turkiye deals delivered limited results.

Water releases from Turkiye increased temporarily in mid-2025, but flows soon declined, further raising doubts about whether this latest deal will achieve sustained improvements.

Previous agreements, such as the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding on Water Resources (officially enforced in 2021), faced similar hurdles due to political tensions, diverging national interests, and weak implementation mechanisms, preventing them from meeting their objectives fully.

Rafaat also raised concerns that the current deal, “while politically advantageous for Turkiye, may limit Iraq's sovereignty over its water resources.” The absence of enforceable quotas, clear timelines, and robust monitoring raises uncertainty about Iraq’s capacity to manage its water independently.

Can the Deal Deliver?

While the agreement may provide temporary relief, Iraq cannot rely solely on foreign partners to resolve its water crisis. A 2025 report from the Ministry of Water Resources urged a comprehensive domestic strategy — modernizing irrigation systems, reconstructing water-storage infrastructure, and strengthening national water governance.

Following the November 2 signing, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani framed the deal as a “sustainable solution” to the country’s water emergency. Its promise, however, depends on transparency, clear monitoring frameworks, and rigorous implementation that ties foreign assistance to measurable domestic reforms.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.