Shafaq News

For years, calls to restrict weapons to state control in Iraq have resurfaced periodically, often framed as a technical security reform or a political slogan. But the renewed debate over disarmament in late 2025 exposed a deeper reality: Iraq’s most powerful armed factions are not a single bloc, nor do they respond uniformly to pressure from the state, the judiciary, or foreign actors.

While many of these groups operate under the legal umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and coordinate through a shared “resistance framework”, their reactions to disarmament proposals have diverged sharply. Some factions signaled conditional openness to placing weapons under government authority, while others rejected the very premise of the discussion, insisting that armed forces remain a permanent necessity as long as foreign forces remain in Iraq.

These divisions have drawn renewed attention from Iraqi officials of different components, regional powers such as Iran, and Western governments, mainly the United States, seeking to understand why disarmament remains elusive more than two decades after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and nearly a decade after the PMF’s formal incorporation into the Iraqi state.

At the center of this debate lies a paradox that defines Iraq’s contemporary security order: armed factions that are simultaneously state-sanctioned and autonomous, coordinated yet independent, political actors and military forces, all operating within a system that blurs the line between legality and leverage.

Beyond the PMF: Coordination Without Uniform Command

Since their rapid expansion during the fight against ISIS in 2014, Iran-aligned Shiite armed factions have embedded themselves deeply within Iraq’s security and political institutions. The Iraqi parliament’s 2016 PMF law granted these groups legal status, salaries, and formal ranks, integrating them into the state’s defense architecture while allowing them to retain their original command structures, ideological identities, and external alliances.

In parallel, these factions coordinate through what is known as the Resistance Coordination Committee, a framework that enables aligned groups to synchronize messaging, manage escalation, and project collective deterrence, particularly against US and coalition forces, without dissolving their individual chains of command.

The committee seems less like a unified command than a coordination mechanism, one that balances shared strategic objectives with factional autonomy. This structure has allowed different groups to calibrate their level of involvement in military actions, political engagement, and public positioning, depending on their interests and risk calculations.

The result is a landscape in which factions may speak under a common “resistance banner” while pursuing sharply different strategies on the ground, especially when confronted with sensitive domestic issues such as disarmament, accountability, and relations with the Iraqi state.

October 7 and Limits of Collective Action

These internal distinctions became more visible after the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war on October 7, 2023. In the weeks that followed, a coalition of Iran-aligned Iraqi factions operating under the banner of the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” claimed about 265 attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria, linking their actions to broader regional escalation.

However, participation in these attacks was not uniform across all factions involved in the coordination framework.

While groups such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujabaa took a direct role in military operations and publicly embraced escalation, others adopted more ambiguous positions. Notably, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a major Iran-aligned group with a significant political presence, did not publicly claim or carry out attacks against US bases during this period. At the same time, it did not issue statements condemning the attacks or distancing itself from the “resistance framework.”

This stance reflected a deliberate strategy within some group that is preserving alignment within the same camp while limiting direct exposure to retaliation or additional international sanctions. It also underscored how coordination does not translate into uniform behavior, a pattern that would later resurface in the disarmament debate.

Disarmament as a Political Test, Not a Security Measure

When Iraq’s senior judicial authorities renewed calls in December 2025 for restricting weapons to state control, the responses from armed factions mirrored these earlier fault lines.

Some groups, such as Kataib Imam Ali, framed the proposal as a potential starting point for gradual regulation, contingent on guarantees of sovereignty and the withdrawal of foreign forces. Others, including Kataib Hezbollah and Al-Nujaba, dismissed the discussion outright, arguing that disarmament under current conditions would weaken Iraq’s deterrence and expose the country to external threats.

These contrasting reactions were not shaped solely by ideology, but by a complex mix of factors: each faction’s relationship with the state, degree of political integration, regional role, and reliance on armed leverage as a source of influence.

Understanding these distinctions is essential for grasping why Iraq’s disarmament debate repeatedly stalls. The issue is not simply whether armed groups accept or reject state authority, but how power is distributed within a system that allows armed actors to operate both inside and beyond the state, coordinated, yet fundamentally divided.

Ideological Foundations of Armed Autonomy

Within Iraq’s armed landscape, two factions stand out for their categorical rejection of disarmament under current conditions: Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. While both operate within the formal structure of the Popular Mobilization Forces, they continue to define themselves primarily as “resistance movements” whose weapons are not subject to exclusive state control.

Their position is not tactical or temporary. It is rooted in ideology, regional role, and a conception of sovereignty that places armed deterrence above institutional subordination, particularly while foreign forces remain in Iraq and the region.

Kataib Hezbollah: State Presence Without State Subordination

Kataib Hezbollah (KH) occupies a unique position within Iraq’s security architecture. Widely described by Western governments and research institutions as one of the most influential Iran-aligned factions, the US-sanctioned KH blends formal integration with operational autonomy. It maintains brigades 46,46, asd 47 inside the PMF and is widely assessed to exert influence over sensitive PMF departments, while simultaneously operating as a core pillar of the broader so-called resistance network.

Founded by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed alongside IRGC-Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani in a US strike in Baghdad in January 2020, KH openly embraces the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and recognizes Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as its highest religious authority. This ideological alignment underpins the group’s rejection of disarmament, which it frames as incompatible with what it describes as an ongoing confrontation with foreign military presence.

KH’s posture hardened further after October 7, 2023, when it emerged as one of the factions most visibly involved in attacks claimed under the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” banner. Operating within the Resistance Coordination Committee, the group played a direct role in escalation against US forces in Iraq and Syria, while insisting that such operations were defensive and deterrent in nature. The most significant escalation occurred in January 2024, when a drone attack on Tower 22 in Jordan killed three US soldiers. The United States has responded with multiple retaliatory strikes on KH targets in Iraq and Syria, including a February 2024 targeted strike in Baghdad that killed senior KH figure Abu Bakr al-Saadi.

The group’s influence has also been linked to contested security dynamics in parts of Iraq, including areas such as Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil province, where displaced residents have remained unable to return for years after the territorial defeat of ISIS. Iraqi officials have acknowledged that the issue carries security and political layers beyond civilian authority, while local and human rights reporting has raised concerns about prolonged displacement and restrictions on access.

For KH, disarmament is conditional not on domestic consensus, but on regional outcomes. In public statements issued in late 2025, the group said any discussion of placing weapons under state control could only follow the withdrawal of US, NATO, and Turkish forces from Iraqi territory, effectively positioning armed actions as a prerequisite for sovereignty rather than a challenge to it.

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba: A Transnational Armed Agenda Beyond the Iraqi State

If Kataib Hezbollah represents armed autonomy within state institutions, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba embodies resistance beyond the state altogether.

Founded in 2013 by cleric Akram al-Kaabi following a split from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, al-Nujaba is widely regarded as one of the most ideologically rigid Iran-aligned factions in Iraq. While formally incorporated into the PMF (Brigade 12), it retains independent command, media, and mobilization structures and has consistently rejected the notion that the Iraqi state holds ultimate authority over its weapons.

Al-Nujaba’s priorities are explicitly transnational. The group played a prominent role in Syria’s war, deploying fighters alongside Syrian government forces and Iran-backed militias, and later announced the formation of a “Golan Liberation Brigade,” signaling an intent to confront Israel as part of a broader regional struggle. Unlike factions that invest in parliamentary politics or local governance, al-Nujaba does not maintain a formal political party or electoral bloc, relying instead on ideological mobilization and armed action to assert influence.

After October 7, 2023, al-Nujaba took a direct and public role in attacks against US targets under “the resistance umbrella,” reinforcing its position as a frontline actor in regional escalation. Its leadership has repeatedly argued that “armed resistance is a permanent religious and strategic obligation,” rejecting disarmament as long as US forces remain present anywhere in Iraq or the wider region.

The United States has designated al-Nujaba and its leader as terrorist entities, citing involvement in attacks against US forces. The group rejects these designations, describing US troops as an occupying force and portraying its operations as a legitimate defense of Iraqi and regional sovereignty.

Why Rejection Is Structural, Not Tactical

Despite differences in style and scope, Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba converge on a central principle: weapons are not merely tools of security, but instruments of political leverage and ideological identity. Their rejection of disarmament reflects three shared factors:

-Ideological framing: Both view armed resistance as a long-term obligation rather than a temporary response.

-Regional entanglement: Their operations extend beyond Iraq’s borders, tying their posture to broader regional dynamics.

-Limited reliance on electoral politics: Unlike factions with parliamentary blocs, they face fewer incentives to accommodate domestic pressure for regulation.

This combination places both groups -at least for now- outside the spectrum of factions willing to negotiate weapons control under current conditions. Their stance also shapes the boundaries of Iraq’s disarmament debate, effectively setting red lines that constrain how far the state can go without triggering confrontation.

Factions Willing to Negotiate, but Not Surrender

A second cluster of Iraq’s armed factions has approached the disarmament debate with conditional pragmatism rather than outright rejection. Groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib Imam Ali have signaled varying degrees of openness to placing weapons under state authority, while stopping short of endorsing immediate or unconditional disarmament.

Their positions reflect a shared calculation: armed leverage remains essential, but political participation and institutional access require a degree of accommodation with the state. Unlike factions that define themselves almost “exclusively through resistance,” these groups operate at the intersection of arms, politics, and bureaucracy.

All three remain integrated within the Popular Mobilization Forces and coordinate with other Iran-aligned actors through the Resistance Coordination Committee, yet their willingness to engage publicly with judicial and political calls for weapons regulation sets them apart.

Asaib Ahl al-Haq: Armed Influence with Parliamentary Stakes

Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) represents the most politically embedded model among Iraq’s Iran-aligned armed factions. Formed in 2006 after splitting from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, and currently within the PMF’s 41,42, and 43 brigades, the group has combined military activity with sustained participation in electoral politics through the Sadiqoon bloc, now part of the Shiite Coordination Framework.

This dual role has shaped AAH’s posture on both escalation and disarmament. After October 7, 2023, the group remained within the resistance coordination framework but did not publicly claim or carry out attacks against US forces in Iraq or Syria. At the same time, it did not condemn those attacks, maintaining alignment without direct operational exposure. This approach of deliberate ambiguity, designed to preserve armed deterrence while limiting political and diplomatic costs.

When Iraq’s judicial authorities renewed calls to restrict weapons to state control, the US-sanctioned AAH responded with cautious signals of conditional acceptance. The group emphasized that any such process must be gradual, legally grounded, and tied to guarantees of sovereignty, particularly the withdrawal of foreign forces. Its stance underscored a key distinction: AAH’s weapons are a bargaining asset, not an ideological end in themselves.

Kataib Imam Ali: Pragmatism After Mobilization

Kataib Imam Ali (KIA), also known as the Imam Ali Brigades, emerged in 2014 during the mass mobilization that followed Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call to fight ISIS. Operating as the PMF’s 40th Brigade, the group presents itself as rooted in Shiite religious doctrine and loyalty to Imam Ali bin Abi Taleb, while maintaining ideological alignment with Iran.

Unlike factions that reject state authority outright, KIA has shown signs of pragmatic adjustment in recent years. In December 2025, it joined other politically engaged factions in signaling conditional acceptance of restricting weapons to state control. Its leadership framed the issue as one of sequencing rather than principle, arguing that regulation must follow guarantees of national security and sovereignty.

This position reflects KIA’s trajectory from emergency mobilization to institutional actor. Having secured formal status and state resources through the PMF, the group faces incentives to avoid confrontation with judicial and political authorities, even as it retains armed capabilities and regional ties.

Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Entrenched Influence, Selective Engagement

Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), operating as the PMF’s 14th Brigade, represents a faction whose influence is widely viewed as durable but whose public positioning is carefully managed. The group emerged publicly in 2013 amid the Syrian war and later integrated into the PMF structure after the 2014 anti-ISIS mobilization, receiving formal legal recognition under Iraq’s 2016 PMF law.

KSS has sustained a military presence beyond Iraq, particularly in Syria, where it has operated alongside Syrian government forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other Iran-backed groups. After October 7, 2023, it joined operations claimed under the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” banner, underscoring its integration into the wider resistance ecosystem coordinated through the Resistance Coordination Committee.

When the disarmament debate resurfaced in late 2025, the US-sanctioned KSS officials publicly said that the public calls by several parties to limit weapons to the hands of the state and move toward political engagement reaffirm an existing reality and a long-standing principle: that these weapons “should not operate outside the framework of the state.”

This could be interpreted as a balancing act: resisting domestic pressure for state authority while avoiding internal friction within the broader resistance camp.

Why Conditional Acceptance Stops Short of Disarmament

Despite their willingness to engage rhetorically with calls for weapons regulation, these factions converge on a shared red line: none endorses immediate or irreversible disarmament. Their conditional flexibility is shaped by three factors:

-Political exposure: Parliamentary blocs and public-facing leadership increase sensitivity to domestic pressure.

-Institutional embedding: Formal PMF integration creates incentives to appear responsive to state authority.

-Retained leverage: Weapons remain a safeguard against political marginalization and regional uncertainty.

This category illustrates why Iraq’s disarmament debate produces signals of progress without decisive outcomes. Engagement does not equate to surrender, and accommodation does not eliminate armed autonomy.

Ambiguous Actors and Facade Groups

Not all armed factions in Iraq engage the disarmament debate directly. A third category operates in ways that blur responsibility, dilute visibility, and complicate any attempt to restrict weapons to state control. This group includes factions that maintain entrenched influence but avoid clear commitments, as well as so-called “facade groups” that claim operations publicly while masking the role of stronger parent organizations.

To date, about 16 Iraqi “resistance” groups have publicly declared their formation to “confront the US presence,” including: Qasim al-Jabbarin, Saraya Awliya al-Dam, the International Resistance Faction, Saraya 1920 Revolution, Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya, Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds, Usbat al-Thaerin, Ulu al-Azm, Katibat al-Sabiqoon, Liwa Khyber, Tha’r al-Muhandis, Quwat Dhu al-Fiqar, Aba al-Fadl al-Abbas, Saraya al-Muntaqim, al-Shaheed Karim Daraam, Ashab Al-Kahf, Liwa Muntaqimoon, and Liwa al-Thaerin.

Two cases, which have the largest members compared with others, illustrate the problem clearly: Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya and Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds, a rebranded front group whose primary presence is online rather than on the ground.

Together, these actors highlight a structural constraint confronting Iraqi decision-makers: even when a disarmament debate gains traction politically, opacity and deniability mechanisms can keep armed power beyond enforceable state control.

Ansar Allah al-Awfiya: Quiet Alignment, Conditional Compliance

Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (AAA), operating as the PMF’s 19th Brigade, occupies a narrower public profile but follows a similar strategic logic. Formed in 2013 and later integrated into the PMF after the 2014 anti-ISIS mobilization, the group maintains political activity through affiliated movements while keeping its military operations largely insulated from public scrutiny.

Following the October 2023 escalation, the US sanctioned AAA joined attacks claimed under the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” banner, placing it more firmly within the armed escalation track than AAH. Yet despite this role, the group appeared among those signaling willingness in late 2025 to place weapons under government control, following statements by Iraq’s senior judicial leadership.

This position seems transactional rather than transformative. AAA’s conditional openness reflects an effort to navigate domestic pressure without relinquishing its capacity for armed action, particularly as long as regional confrontation and foreign troop presence persist.

Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds: A Front Group Built for Messaging

Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds (KSQ), also known as the Jerusalem Cry Brigades, represents a different phenomenon: a group defined less by visible infrastructure and more by communicative and operational ambiguity.

KSQ emerged through the rebranding of Ashab al-Kahf, which appeared in 2019 and announced its transformation into Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds in August 2024. Research institutions describe Ashab al-Kahf, and by extension KSQ, as a “facade group,” designed to claim responsibility for attacks while obscuring the involvement of larger, better-established factions.

Unlike major groups with formal PMF brigades, KSQ does not maintain a significant and verifiable military presence inside Iraq. Its operations are expressed primarily through online statements and media claims, a model analysts say provides plausible deniability for established armed actors conducting sensitive operations.

After the January 2020 killing of Qasem Soleimani, Ashab al-Kahf increased its claimed attacks, including rocket and IED operations against US-linked targets. Following the October 7, 2023, regional escalation, the rebranded KSQ adopted an even more explicitly transnational language, issuing threats against Israeli and regional targets, though independent verification of such operational capacity remains limited.

In practical terms, KSQ’s relevance to the disarmament debate is indirect but significant. If Iraqi authorities attempt to regulate weapons through formal PMF channels, facade groups can continue to claim attacks, shift attribution, and complicate legal enforcement, because the public-facing actor may not be the operational decision-maker.

Why Ambiguity Undermines Disarmament

AAA and KSQ represent two different obstacles to disarmament:

-Entrenchment with denial: a formal PMF actor that resists public commitments and remains shielded by institutional and regional ties.

-Plausible deniability: an operational front that can absorb blame, claim attacks, and obscure the chain of command.

These models help explain why Iraq’s disarmament debate often produces statements without enforceable outcomes. Even if a political consensus forms around restricting weapons, the mechanisms that protect armed autonomy, denial, opacity, and proxy branding remain intact.

What These Factions Share, and What Divides Them

Iraq’s armed factions are often presented as a single Iran-aligned bloc operating under the PMF umbrella. In practice, they form a shared ecosystem, coordinated through the Resistance Coordination Committee and intertwined through political, security, and financial networks, yet they are not uniform actors. Their differences matter because they determine who can bargain with the state, who refuses bargaining altogether, and who can evade accountability through deniability.

The disarmament controversy illustrates this clearly. It has not produced a clean split between “state” and “militias,” but rather a spectrum of positions shaped by each group’s ideology, degree of political integration, regional role, and reliance on armed leverage.

What They Share

Despite their differences, the factions share several core features that define Iraq’s post-2014 security order:

1) Institutional cover through the PMF

Most of these factions operate formally within the Popular Mobilization Forces, holding brigade designations, receiving state resources, and benefiting from legal recognition. This status complicates efforts to treat them purely as illegal armed actors, even when their command structures remain independent.

2) Alignment within an Iran-linked resistance framework

These groups converge around a narrative that emphasizes confronting Israel and the US military presence, framing armed action as deterrence and sovereignty protection. Coordination through the Resistance Coordination Committee allows them to align politically and, in some cases, operationally, without dissolving autonomy.

3) Armed leverage as a political instrument

Across categories -rejectionist, conditional, ambiguous -the central constant is that weapons are not simply battlefield tools. They are leveraging: shaping negotiations with the state, influencing political outcomes, deterring rivals, and securing long-term influence.

4) Regional entanglement beyond Iraq

Several factions have operated in Syria and positioned themselves within wider regional confrontations. This expands their security logic beyond Iraqi domestic considerations and makes their posture responsive to regional escalation, not only Iraqi state priorities.

What Divides Them

The disarmament debate exposes four key dividing lines that shape behavior more reliably than labels such as “PMF” or “Iran-aligned.”

1) Ideology: Wilayat al-Faqih vs Pragmatic Power

Other factions may align ideologically with Iran and maintain close ties, but operate with greater pragmatism, adjusting language and timing to domestic political constraints. This does not make them moderate; it makes them adaptive.

2) Political Integration: Who Has Electoral Stakes

Groups with parliamentary influence and public-facing political wings, particularly Asaib Ahl al-Haq and, to a lesser degree, actors such as Ansar Allah al-Awfiya through affiliated fronts, face incentives to navigate domestic legitimacy. This helps explain why they can signal conditional acceptance of regulating weapons under state authority, especially when pressure comes from senior judicial institutions.

By contrast, factions such as al-Nujaba, which avoid formal electoral participation, have fewer reasons to compromise rhetorically or institutionally.

3) Operational Geography: Iraq-Centered vs Transnational

The most consequential distinction is whether a faction views Iraq as its main arena or as one front in a broader regional struggle.

-Transnational framing: al-Nujaba’s Syria deployment and “Golan Liberation Brigade” messaging underscores a regional orientation.

-Hybrid transnational posture: Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada combine Iraq-based institutional presence with regional operations.

-Limited on-ground footprint but transnational messaging: facade groups like Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds adopt regional confrontation language while remaining largely online-driven.

The more regional the mission, the less likely a group is to accept state constraints tied to Iraqi domestic politics.

Managed Containment, Not Disarmament

The current controversy reveals three broad tracks:

-Principled rejection: Kataib Hezbollah and al-Nujaba reject disarmament unless foreign forces withdraw, treating armed deterrence as a prerequisite for sovereignty.

-Conditional negotiation: Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and Kataib Imam Ali signal flexibility tied to guarantees, sequencing, and sovereignty conditions, engaging without surrendering autonomy.

-Denial and ambiguity: Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada denies disarmament discussions outright, while facade groups like Kataib Sarkhat al-Quds complicate enforcement by obscuring who controls operational decisions.

Taken together, the positions outlined above suggest that Iraq is unlikely to witness comprehensive disarmament of armed factions in the foreseeable future. What is emerging instead is a familiar reality: managed containment, a process in which the state seeks to regulate, absorb, or neutralize armed power incrementally without confronting it head-on.

The late-2025 debate revealed the limits of what Iraqi institutions can realistically enforce. Even when senior judicial authorities raise the issue of restricting weapons to state control, implementation depends on political consensus, factional consent, and regional conditions that lie largely outside Baghdad’s control. The resistance ecosystem, coordinated yet fragmented, retains sufficient leverage to block any move perceived as threatening its strategic depth.

What the Iraqi State can do is to shape the discourse by framing weapons control as a legal and sovereign issue rather than a political confrontation. It can also pursue selective regulation, including tighter oversight of PMF financing, deployment mandates, and chain-of-command formalities.

However, what it cannot do, at least under current conditions, is to impose unilateral disarmament on factions that define their weapons as existential or dismantle coordination frameworks that link domestic armed actors to regional deterrence strategies.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.