Shafaq News

Iraq’s new Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, entered office under the shadow of an incomplete parliamentary mandate after the Iraqi parliament approved only 14 cabinet ministers, leaving nine key sovereign and service portfolios unresolved, including the ministries of Interior, Defense, and Planning.

The delay has not been viewed as a routine political dispute over appointments. Instead, it reflects deeper tensions tied to the restructuring of Iraq’s post-2003 political order and the future role of armed Shiite factions within the state apparatus.

Vacant ministries encompass some of Iraq’s most critical institutions, overseeing security, administration, and economic planning. The Interior and Defense portfolios, in particular, remain highly contentious because they are directly tied to the issue of weapons control and the influence of armed factions, a file that lies at the heart of both Baghdad’s relationship with Washington and rivalries within the Shiite political camp.

Amid a highly sensitive regional and international climate, Baghdad faces increasing US pressure alongside escalating competition among factions within the Coordination Framework. At the same time, Iraqi political forces are attempting to craft a governing arrangement capable of containing external demands without upsetting the country’s fragile internal equilibrium.

Read more: Iraq’s armed factions, state authority, and the battle over disarmament

Armed Factions and the Post-2003 Order

One of the most significant transformations in Iraq since 2003 has been the evolution of armed factions from military actors into influential political stakeholders with direct leverage over state institutions. Many of these groups expanded their influence during the war against ISIS and now maintain substantial parliamentary, political, and economic power that major Iraqi parties can no longer ignore.

Political researcher Ramadan Al-Badran told Shafaq News that the issue of armed factions is simultaneously a domestic Iraqi crisis and part of a broader regional confrontation. “The factions’ relationship with Iran makes them part of the wider tension between Tehran and Washington,” Al-Badran said, arguing that the post-2003 political system, particularly during the governments of former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki between 2006 and 2014, “effectively legitimized the presence of these groups by presenting them as defenders of Iraq’s political order.”

He questioned the current calls to limit factional influence, asking why parallel military formations were established outside the traditional army structure in the first place and why they are now being asked to retreat after years of participating in protecting the state.

Read more: Ali Al-Zaidi sworn in as Iraq's prime minister with a program already failed

A Consensus Prime Minister

Observers interviewed by Shafaq News said Al-Zaidi’s selection was less the result of political dominance within the Coordination Framework than a compromise among competing Shiite forces seeking a figure capable of managing internal rivalries.

Haitham Hadi Numan, Professor of Political Science at the University of Exeter, noted that Al-Zaidi emerged as a consensus candidate acceptable to the major factions inside the alliance, and the forces within the Coordination Framework now possess relatively balanced influence that prevents any single party from dominating. “Therefore, they chose a figure who can be politically managed.”

According to Numan, confrontation with armed factions “remains unlikely” in the current phase. Instead, Iraq’s ruling forces appear more inclined toward the “legal institutionalization” of these groups within state structures.

Read more: The Shiite Coordination Framework: Can govern Iraq, but cannot agree on a primeminister

Factions Push Back

Pillar One of al-Zaidi’s program commits the government to consolidating all weapons under exclusive state authority, meaning no armed group outside the formal military and security structure should operate independently. In most countries, this would be an unremarkable statement, but in Iraq, it is the central unresolved dilemma of the post-2003 political order.

Signs of resistance quickly emerged. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba rejected suggestions that the government’s pledge to limit weapons to state authority applies to what it called “resistance weapons.”

The group’s Executive Council chief, Nazem Al-Saadi, stressed that the term “uncontrolled weapons” referred only to illegal arms that create “chaos,” insisting that it did not include weapons held by fighters who “defended Iraq, its holy sites, and its people during the most difficult circumstances.”

At the same time, new fractures appear to be emerging within the Coordination Framework itself.

A well-informed source revealed to Shafaq News that five influential Shiite leaders are holding advanced discussions to establish a new parliamentary alliance that could significantly reshape Iraq’s ruling coalition landscape.

The figures involved include Nouri Al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition; Hadi Al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Organization and head of the Fatah Alliance; Faleh Al-Fayyad; Humam Hamoudi; and Ahmed al-Asadi.

According to the source, the proposed bloc could include between 75 and 100 lawmakers, potentially making it one of the largest organized opposition forces in parliament despite originating from within the Shiite political establishment itself.

If formed, the alliance would signal not only dissatisfaction with Al-Zaidi’s government arrangements but also deeper competition over the future leadership of the Coordination Framework and the distribution of influence inside the Shiite camp.

Washington Pressure and Baghdad’s Balancing Act

In recent months, Washington has intensified sanctions targeting individuals linked to armed factions while repeatedly stressing that restricting weapons to state control remains a prerequisite for deeper bilateral cooperation with Baghdad.

Iraqi political sources have also spoken of an undeclared American veto against the participation of armed factions in government institutions.

The US Department of State has indicated that its relationship with the new Iraqi government will be judged “by actions, not words,” placing Baghdad in a difficult position. The Iraqi government must preserve the cohesion of its internal alliances while simultaneously avoiding confrontation with Washington, whose support remains critical for Iraq’s economic stability, security cooperation, and international relations.

Read more: Ali al-Zaidi named Iraq's prime minister: Easy nomination, harder road ahead

Iraq’s Unresolved State Dilemma

According to analysts, the troubled birth of Al-Zaidi’s government underscores a structural crisis that extends far beyond cabinet formation or ministerial quotas.

At its core, the conflict concerns the nature of the Iraqi state itself: the limits of armed faction influence, the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and Baghdad’s relationship with competing regional and international powers.

Caught between American pressure, Iranian calculations, and the internal balance of the Coordination Framework, the new prime minister faces a defining challenge: either engineer a new political settlement capable of reorganizing the relationship between the state and armed factions or enter another prolonged phase of political paralysis.

One notable indicator of the current compromise is the absence of any explicit commitment in the government program regarding the future of the PMF or its weapons. That omission raises a central question now dominating Iraq’s political debate: can the PMF become the foundation for a broader political settlement between the state and the factions, or has the issue already moved beyond the limits of purely Iraqi solutions?

Read more: Iraq's new political equation: Armed groups' gains put pressure on US

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.