Shafaq News
Iraq’s sixth parliamentary elections — held through special and general voting on November 9 and 11 with a turnout of 56.11% — revived an old argument about how the country’s electoral rules are drawn, and who they ultimately serve.
The 2025 vote was the first major test of the amended Election Law No. 9 of 2020, reinstated in March 2023, and its impact was felt immediately across the political map.
The amended Law restored each province as a single electoral district and brought back a modified Sainte-Laguë formula with a first divisor of 1.7. The shift effectively reversed the 2021 model inspired by the 2019 Tishreen protest movement, which had divided provinces into dozens of smaller constituencies and opened a door — briefly — for independents, protest-linked groups, and smaller alliances to break into parliament. By raising the threshold and reintroducing large districts, the 2023 changes once again tilted the playing field in favor of long-established parties with stronger networks and deeper funding.
Read more: Iraq’s 2025 Elections: Voter turnout formula sparks controversy
A Divisor That Redraws Power
Under the system used in November 2025, each list’s votes are divided by sequential odd numbers starting at 1.7, then 3, 5, 7, and so on. The first divisor is the most decisive: at 1.7, it raises the number of votes required to secure a list’s initial seat, giving major blocs an early advantage and tightening the entry point for newcomers.
The 329 parliamentary seats are allocated first to lists based on these calculations, then awarded to the highest-voted candidates within each list.
In global practice, Sainte-Laguë usually begins at 1.1 — a far more accessible threshold for smaller parties. Iraq has previously used divisors as high as 1.9, and the return to 1.7 reignited concerns that electoral engineering remains a political tool.
The Law also maintains a 25% quota for women and reserves nine seats for minority communities. These nationwide minority districts often attract heavy campaigning from larger sectarian parties, giving them indirect influence over communities with smaller populations and lower turnout.
Undoing the 2021 Experiment
While the amended Law mirrors the approach used in 2018, it marks a major departure from the 2021 elections, which divided Iraq into 83 micro-districts. Smaller districts meant lower entry barriers — allowing candidates with strong local support, even without party machinery, to win seats.
Combined with a first divisor of 1.0, the 2021 system produced one of Iraq’s most diverse parliaments since 2003. It rewarded independents, Tishreen-linked actors, and local reformist groups.
When the Law Changes, the Map Changes
In 2018, the newly formed Sairoun list (Sadrists), backed by Muqtada Al-Sadr, led the results with 54 seats, followed by the Fatah Alliance under Hadi Al-Amiri with 48. Nouri Al-Maliki’s State of Law secured 25 seats.
Sunni factions, including Iyad Allawi’s Al-Wataniyah, won 21, while Kurdish parties held steady: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) with 25 seats and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) with 18.
But the 2021 elections — held under smaller districts and a 1.0 Sainte-Laguë divisor — produced a dramatically different landscape. The Patriotic Shiite Movement (Sadrists/Sairoun) jumped to 73 seats, the Fatah Alliance collapsed to 17, and Al-Maliki climbed to 31. Mohammad Al-Halbousi’s new party, Taqaddum, surged to 37 seats.
Kurdish representation remained broadly stable. Reformist groups such as Emtidad and New Generation (Al-Jeel Al-Jadeed) captured nine seats each, and 40 independents made it into parliament.
Most of that shifted again in 2025.
With Iraq reverting to a system similar to 2018, the major alliances regained ground:
-Reconstruction and Development (Al-Ima’ar wal-Tanmiya), led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, won 46 seats (the alliance includes several political parties).
-State of Law secured 29.
-Taqaddum won 27.
-Badr — a core party within the Fatah Alliance — won 21 seats.
Kurdish parties also maintained almost the same overall share of seats. Meanwhile, Ishraqat Kanoun was one of the few exceptions, rising from six seats in 2021 to ten in 2025.
“Built for the Big Blocs”
Legal expert Mohammed Jumaa told Shafaq News the amended Law was “designed from the outset for the major blocs,” adding that when the starting divisor exceeds 1.5, the system “overwhelmingly favors” large alliances.
“At 1.7, it becomes nearly impossible for small lists to win at all,” he said, noting how powerful parties pushed to undo the 2021 district system.
Independent politician Athir Al-Shar’a described the framework as “a form of disguised authoritarianism,” arguing that major parties leveraged their financial, organizational, and media capacity to secure their advantage and limit new entrants. He said that a cleaner version of Sainte-Laguë — used within multiple districts — could have offered fairer chances. Instead, “administrative barriers” and “politically engineered districts” blocked civil groups, business figures, and tribal leaders from winning seats even when joining larger alliances.
Reformists Hit the Wall
Zuhair Al-Fatlawi, leader of Ishraqat Kanoun, outlined the practical effects of the 1.7 formula, arguing that the revised Sainte-Laguë system significantly increased the difficulty for small lists and independents. Many MPs who held seats under the 2021 system were swept out because the higher divisor raised the entry threshold beyond their reach.
He pointed to his own list’s doubled vote count — from 102,000 to 204,000 — and ten seats as proof that the system does not entirely shut out smaller players, but acknowledged it heavily favors well-funded parties with organized, loyal bases.
“The new parliament must revisit the Law and lower the threshold. The effective representation threshold begins at 1.7 when it should have been 1.4.”
Predictability for the Major Blocs, Barriers for Everyone Else
The 2025 results reveal a clear trajectory: Iraq’s return to the 1.7 threshold has produced a parliament dominated by established blocs, reduced the visibility of new forces, and raised the cost of political entry. It delivers stability for the large alliances that shape governments, but narrows the space for alternative voices.
The consequences, according to experts, are likely to stretch beyond this cycle:
• Coalition building becomes more predictable, with fewer independent actors at the table.
• Parties with strong machinery consolidate local influence, especially in provinces that reverted to single-district voting.
• Reformist groups and independents face a strategic dilemma: organize like major parties or risk fading entirely.
• Any future amendments become harder, as those who benefit from the Law now dominate the chamber produced by it.
Read more: Iraq’s 2025 Elections: Old lines, new margins
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.