Shafaq News

The security map of eastern and northern Syria is shifting again, and for Iraq, the danger is neither conventional nor distant. The risk lies in the fragility of control over prisons and displacement camps holding thousands of ISIS detainees and their families. As clashes edge closer to these facilities, Iraqi officials and security analysts warn that the threat is structural, not hypothetical, and could materialize with little warning.

At the center of concern are detention centers and camps run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), most notably al-Hol Camp. Any disruption to these sites, analysts told Shafaq News, risks triggering a chain reaction that would not stop at Syria’s borders.

Why the Prison File Matters More Than Frontlines

Unlike earlier phases of the Syrian conflict, Iraq’s exposure today does not stem from advancing battle lines but from instability around facilities that house the remnants of ISIS. The SDF has repeatedly cautioned that international disengagement and mounting military and political pressure have strained its ability to secure prisons and camps.

Al-Hol, located in Syria’s al-Hasakah Governorate, remains the most sensitive file. The camp hosts tens of thousands of people linked to ISIS, including more than 3,500 Iraqis, within a total population exceeding 24,000. For Iraqi security planners, al-Hol represents more of a humanitarian challenge, but it is also seen as a long-term incubator for radicalization, recruitment, and logistical coordination.

Parallel concerns surround detention centers scattered across northeastern Syria. The SDF says it holds between 9,000 and 10,000 ISIS fighters, many of them hardened operatives with cross-border experience. Any lapse in control —whether caused by clashes, political bargaining, or a sudden transfer of authority—could result in escapes, releases, or unmanaged relocations.

Recent tensions and conflicting accounts surrounding control of facilities such as al-Shaddadi and al-Aqtan prisons have reinforced these fears. For Baghdad, the concern is how quickly its consequences would travel.

Geography as a Force Multiplier

The threat emerging from eastern Syria could be geographically defined. Al-Hol lies near Syria’s northeastern desert belt, within reach of smuggling routes extending south and east toward the Iraqi border. Historically, these corridors facilitated militant movement during periods of weakened state control.

The camp’s population, in Baghdad’s eyes, is a mobile reservoir of ideological and logistical support for ISIS. Any security breakdown or forced displacement from al-Hol would likely push movement toward Iraq’s western provinces, where terrain and tribal networks have previously been exploited by militant groups.

Further south, al-Shaddadi prison sits near desert corridors linking Syria to Iraq’s Al-Anbar province. These routes were heavily used between 2014 and 2017 to move fighters, weapons, and funds. Loss of control there would allow escapees to disappear into sparsely populated terrain and reconnect with dormant networks.

Al-Aqtan prison, south of Raqqa, adds another layer of risk. Its location near the Euphrates basin —a historical population and logistics artery— means instability could facilitate movement along the river corridor and reactivation of networks stretching toward northern Iraq.

Taken together, these sites form a north–south arc of vulnerability from al-Hasakah through Raqqa toward Iraq’s western frontier. Iraqi officials stress that the danger lies not in mass movement or visible offensives, but in gradual leakage, small groups exploiting terrain, distance, and pre-existing ties. In this context, geography itself amplifies risk, turning localized instability into a direct challenge for Iraq’s border provinces.

Political Shifts, Security Vacuums

The risk has intensified following a fragile ceasefire framework between Damascus and the SDF aimed at integrating Kurdish forces into state structures and transferring control over parts of eastern Syria. Presented initially as de-escalation, the process quickly faltered amid disputes over authority, timelines, and governance, particularly in al-Hasakah.

As negotiations stalled and Damascus signaled a willingness to impose control by force, Iraqi analysts warned that transitional phases are historically the most dangerous for prison security. Redeployments and blurred chains of command create openings that militant groups have repeatedly exploited.

Political analyst Imad al-Musafir describes eastern Syria as having shifted from proxy competition to “direct existential struggles among multiple actors,” arguing that overlapping US, Turkish, Israeli, Syrian government, jihadist, and Kurdish interests have turned the region into a regional fault line. In such an environment, prisons become bargaining chips—and vulnerabilities.

Where Iraq Is Most Exposed

Contrary to common assumptions, Iraqi officials say the greatest risk may not fall on Nineveh alone, despite its long border with Syria. Mukhtar al-Moussawi of the Badr Organization warns that Al-Anbar province could face greater exposure due to dormant ISIS cells, smuggling routes, and social networks capable of absorbing returning operatives.

Even limited infiltration —individuals rather than units— could revive operational cells if paired with financing, propaganda, or logistical support. The threat, security officials say, is not invasion, but reactivation.

Is Iraq Prepared?

Iraq’s posture reflects heightened awareness, but also clear limits.

Along the border, forces have reinforced deployments, expanded thermal surveillance, increased drone patrols, and continued building barriers and trenches. These measures raise the cost of infiltration but do not fully seal the frontier.

Interior Minister Abdul Amir al-Shammari has also conducted inspection visits, asserting that Iraq’s entire border with Syria remains under continuous monitoring.

Al-Moussawi stresses that “readiness must be practical, not rhetorical,” focused on logistics, sustained surveillance, and strict control of cross-border movement until Syria’s situation stabilizes.

Officials aligned with the Popular Mobilization Forces emphasize that all units operating along the border do so under state authority, seeking to counter concerns about fragmented decision-making. “Iraq’s security institutions must prepare for a real confrontation in terms of logistics, weapons, and both aerial and ground surveillance, rather than relying on media-driven preparedness,” al-Moussawi told Shafaq News.

Addressing concerns over armed factions affiliated with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Hussein Ali al-Sheihani of the Sadiqoun Movement —the political wing of Asaib Ahl al-Haq— said all forces operate on the borders under state authority and the commander-in-chief, adding that border measures were reinforced more than a week ago as preemptive steps.

Scenarios That Worry Baghdad

Security assessments in Baghdad focus on a narrow set of scenarios that, while different in their immediate triggers, all point toward the same strategic risk: renewed cross-border pressure on Iraq. Chief among these concerns is the possibility of losing full control over ISIS detention facilities as a result of fighting or political breakdowns, a scenario that could rapidly translate into escapes or uncontrolled releases. Closely linked is the risk of a security collapse at al-Hol camp, where any disruption could facilitate recruitment, enable movement of extremist elements, or lead to forced displacement toward Iraq’s western provinces.

Another source of anxiety is a prolonged confrontation between Damascus and the SDF, which could produce extended periods of instability and poorly managed transitions of authority —conditions that have historically proven most vulnerable to exploitation by militant groups. Iraqi officials are also wary of Turkish or Global Coalition redeployments that may leave temporary security gaps during realignment phases, creating openings for ISIS remnants to move or reorganize.

What Still Needs to Be Done

Despite visible preparedness, Iraqi planners acknowledge that deterrence alone is insufficient. A worst-case scenario would require tighter intelligence fusion across border commands, sustained monitoring of hotspots in Al-Anbar and Nineveh, and calibrated displacement and return policies balancing security with humanitarian obligations.

Equally important is sustained communication with Damascus to reduce surprises along the border. Al-Moussawi confirmed that government-level contacts remain active, warning that Al-Anbar’s risk may exceed Nineveh’s due to sleeper cells and enabling local environments.

Iraq is now approaching a more familiar and dangerous test: whether it can prevent ISIS remnants from exploiting chaos next door to rebuild influence at home. The outcome will depend less on troop numbers than on timing, intelligence, and the ability to act before instability in Syria’s prisons migrates westward once again.

Read more: Syria’s calm: An end to threat or a start of a complex security phase for Iraq?

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.