Shafaq News

More than a decade after the US-led Global Coalition was formed to defeat ISIS, Iraq is entering a decisive phase. The September 2025 deadline for US troop withdrawals, set in the 2022 Baghdad–Washington agreement, coincides with renewed American warnings of ISIS expansion.

Iraqi and Syrian experts interviewed by Shafaq News say these warnings are not exaggerated—but they stress that Iraq’s political divides and Syria’s porous desert terrain are what truly determine the threat’s trajectory.

US Warnings vs. Iraqi Divides

The US Embassy in Baghdad voiced “deep concern” this week about ISIS and al-Qaeda’s regional operations, underscoring that the United States continues to “prioritize partnerships with allies and regional actors to combat terrorism.”

Security analyst Sarmad al-Bayati said Washington sees ISIS as “a regional power threat, with Iraq part of this danger.” Yet he argued the group’s footprint inside Iraq is now confined to “small detachments unable to seize territory,” and that the greater risk comes from potential surveillance gaps once coalition forces consolidate in Erbil.

By contrast, Military Expert Alaa al-Nashou stressed that the danger is real, pointing to ISIS activity in three key zones: Wadi Hauran in Al-Anbar—the country’s longest valley—Hamrin’s rugged mountain range in Diyala near the Iranian border, and the Syrian Badia, a vast desert expanse stretching from northern Saudi Arabia across Jordan and Syria into western Iraq.

Geographically, these areas form a connected network of hideouts that ISIS exploits to survive and maneuver. Wadi Hauran connects directly to the Syrian Badia, enabling militants to move freely across the Iraq–Syria frontier, while Hamrin’s hills and caves on the opposite side of the country provide secluded sanctuaries near Iran. Together, they illustrate how ISIS leverages Iraq’s peripheral terrain to disperse cells, regroup, and sustain cross-border supply lines, keeping pressure on security forces despite losing territorial control.

“The problem is that Iraqi leaders lack a clear strategic vision and adequate aerial coverage. Add to this sectarian rhetoric ahead of the November elections, and you have a formula for renewed instability,” Al-Nashou said.

Syria as the Border Weak Link

For Researcher Ahmed al-Yasseri, the center of gravity lies west of the border. “There is a real threat from Syria, where ISIS is exploiting fragile security to rebuild itself. Baghdad cannot leave national security decisions to partisan militias. It must reconfigure alliances with Washington and regional partners.”

Syrian scholar Lezgin Ibrahim agreed that “most active ISIS leadership in Syria is Iraqi.” That assessment was reinforced last week, when senior ISIS figure Salah Nouman Abd Nayef al-Jubouri—ranked as the fifth most important leader in Syria—was killed in northwestern Idlib during a joint operation supported by Iraqi intelligence, the US-led Coalition, and Syrian security forces. Security sources told Shafaq News that Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Service provided “essential intelligence” that enabled the raid.

Ibrahim warned that unless Baghdad expands coordination with both the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Damascus’s new authorities, the border could again become as vulnerable as it was before ISIS’s 2014 takeover of Mosul in Al-Anbar.

Syrian Military Expert Mohammed Abbas argued that ISIS has long been “an American instrument, invoked to justify US redeployment in 2014 and again today during its staged withdrawal.” His view reflects a wider current in regional politics: skepticism that Washington amplifies ISIS warnings to extend its presence, though such claims remain politically charged rather than established fact.

ISIS’s Tactical Shift: From Battles to Cells

Independent trackers and Coalition reports suggest that ISIS has shifted strategy: fewer mass-casualty operations, more assassinations, IEDs, and small-unit raids. According to Western security estimates, roughly 1,000 fighters remain active in Iraq, while 150–200 micro-cells straddle the Syria–Iraq and Syria–Lebanon belts.

This tactical adaptation, al-Nashou warned, “is enough to destabilize border communities if political fractures continue in Baghdad.” Ibrahim added that repeated targeting of Iraqi commanders in Syria, including last week’s raid in Idlib, shows that “ISIS is not just sheltering in the Badia but actively managing cross-border connectivity.”

Iraq’s Dilemma: Sovereignty or Security?

The expert warnings unfold against a contested backdrop. After ISIS’s territorial defeat in 2017, demands for US withdrawal escalated—especially after the January 2020 killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi PMF leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in Baghdad.

In 2024, a joint Iraqi–US commission set the current timetable, with withdrawals from Ain al-Asad and Camp Victory scheduled by September 2025.

Troop levels are expected to fall from about 2,500 to fewer than 500 in Erbil. Some pro-Iran factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces, who had paused their attacks since early 2024, continue to threaten retaliation if deadlines slip.

With the coalition’s combat mission near ending, Iraq faces a dual challenge: proving sovereignty through troop reductions while preventing an ISIS rebound. Experts stress that Baghdad must strengthen aerial surveillance, unify security decision-making, and expand regional coordination.

If not, the combination of porous Syrian terrain, internal political rivalries, and the approaching election season could recreate conditions for ISIS’s resurgence—not as a territorial caliphate, but as a persistent, border-hopping insurgency. Such a scenario would not only test Iraq’s security architecture but could also ripple across Jordan, Turkiye, and the Gulf, reactivating the very regional anxieties that the 2014 crisis unleashed.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.