Shafaq News

In the hours following confirmation that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in joint US–Israeli strikes on February 28, 2026, the images of smoke over Tehran were no longer the only headline. The more consequential development was the institutional vacuum left by a position designed as both the regime’s ultimate arbiter and its stabilizing anchor.

As military pressure mounted and senior commanders were reportedly killed in the same wave of strikes, Tehran moved quickly to prevent paralysis at the top. The Iranian political circles formed a temporary leadership council composed of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei, and cleric Alireza Arafi. Yet behind this arrangement, one name resurfaced with unusual weight: Ali Larijani, described by insiders less as a contender for the supreme post than as a crisis coordinator tasked with holding the system together.

At stake is not simply the question of who will succeed Khamenei, but which network can maintain cohesion between Iran’s religious establishment, its security institutions, and a sanctions-strained bureaucracy managing a country under wartime conditions. In that equation, the Larijani family stands out.

The strike not only removes the apex of Iran’s political pyramid. It also reportedly weakened what is often referred to as the “House of the Leader” —the tightly knit family and advisory circle around Khamenei. The fate of Mojtaba Khamenei, long viewed by some as a potential successor, remained unclear in circulating reports, further deepening uncertainty about dynastic continuity.

In contrast, the Larijanis represent not a single figure but a distributed network. Five brothers have, over decades, occupied pivotal posts across Iran’s security, judicial, legislative, and bureaucratic institutions. In moments of systemic stress, such dispersion can translate into leverage. Rather than functioning as a political party or tribal bloc, the family exemplifies what Iranian political discourse calls “Aghazadeh” dynamics —elite networks in which kinship and marriage alliances reinforce institutional trust and access.

Research from the Dutch think tank Clingendael Institute has highlighted how family ties within Iran’s clerical and political elite often serve as channels of confidence in sensitive appointments, creating what analysts describe as “politics of trust” —privileging reliability over purely technocratic merit in strategic positions.

Ali Larijani reemerged prominently in August 2025 when he was reinstated as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, amid efforts to recalibrate security institutions after a brief confrontation with Israel. That role grants oversight of the nuclear file, regional coordination, and internal crisis management.

Following Khamenei’s death, Larijani appears to have become the key broker behind the temporary council formula. His influence derives less from popular charisma than from decades navigating the regime’s inner corridors —from heading state broadcasting to serving as parliament speaker and nuclear negotiator.

Read more: A pragmatist between two worlds: Khamenei entrusts Tehran’s security to Larijani

Yet his ceiling is clear. Iran’s constitution assigns the selection of a new Supreme Leader to the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member clerical body whose candidates themselves are vetted by conservative oversight institutions. Larijani’s likely function, therefore, is to calibrate consensus between competing centers of power rather than to ascend to the leadership himself.

Sadeq Amoli Larijani, appointed Judiciary Chief in 2009 by Khamenei and later named head of the Expediency Discernment Council in 2018, occupies a quieter but crucial position. The council often arbitrates disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council, serving as a pressure valve when legislative deadlock threatens stability.

In transitional periods, such institutions gain strategic importance. They can delay confrontation, manufacture compromise, or provide religious-legal cover for extraordinary measures.

Mohammad Javad Larijani has long acted as a bureaucratic defender of the regime in international human rights forums, countering Western criticism and shaping Iran’s narrative abroad.

Fazel Larijani entered public controversy during the 2013 confrontation between then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Larijani, when corruption allegations and leaked recordings exposed deep factional rivalries.

Bagher Larijani, through senior roles in the medical and academic sectors, illustrates a different layer of influence —control over technocratic and institutional nodes that appear apolitical but remain vital to state continuity.

Together, the brothers’ positions form a web rather than a hierarchy.

The Larijanis’ power has always been institutional rather than electoral. Ali Larijani’s disqualification from the 2021 presidential race underscored the regime’s reluctance to allow any family, however embedded, to consolidate dynastic legitimacy through popular mandate. Some in Tehran interpret that episode as evidence that the system balances managerial pragmatism against ideological guardianship, excluding figures at the ballot box while recalling them during crises.

Their core strength lies in bridging clerical legitimacy with bureaucratic skill. Yet that same interconnectedness can be politically costly. In a society strained by economic hardship and sanctions, elite networks risk being perceived as symbols of entrenched privilege.

The 2013 public clash with Ahmadinejad revealed how intra-elite disputes can weaponize allegations of favoritism and corruption. Since then, the family has remained influential but acutely aware of the thin line between indispensability and overreach.

Any transition scenario inevitably intersects with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which remains a decisive pillar in stabilizing or reshaping the system. The Guard’s institutional weight does not bend to familial coordination alone, nor does the Assembly of Experts operate as a routine appointments committee.

The regional environment further complicates the picture. Ongoing confrontation with the United States and Israel binds domestic succession to external deterrence calculations. Every internal move reverberates across battle lines.

The prevailing reading of Iran’s institutional logic suggests that the Larijanis will function as heavyweight intermediaries rather than heirs. Their role would center on managing the transition, securing procedural cover, and facilitating alignment between clerical authorities and security centers until a new leadership formula emerges.

Their influence may be greater now than in ordinary times —but also more fragile. A misstep could be interpreted as an attempt by a family to monopolize a state moment.

For now, the Larijani network appears to hold spare keys to the regime’s vault. Whether it can shape the next chapter —or merely ensure the system survives long enough to write it —will depend less on lineage than on its ability to navigate Iran’s most dangerous crossroads since the 1979 revolution.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.