Shafaq News | Latest breaking news in Iraq and the world

Iraq floats an AI ministry; its institutions are not ready to use it

Wed, 14 Oct 2026 13:01:03 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Political blocs in Baghdad are discussing a new ministry for artificialintelligence, yet Iraq's own National Artificial Intelligence Center reportsthat only 19 of the 64 state institutions it assessed have clear plans toprepare for the technology. The issue points to a recurring dilemma in Iraqigovernance: whether new institutions are built to deliver services or todistribute posts.

The idea entered public debate this week when former lawmaker Amiral-Maamouri told Shafaq News that blocs had reached understandings to add newportfolios to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's unfinished cabinet. They include aministry for artificial intelligence or digital investment and the division ofthe Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Antiquities into two. Nine of al-Zaidi's23 ministries, Planning among them, are still run by acting officials fivemonths after he took office.

In Iraq, cabinet portfolios are traded under muhasasa, an informalpower-sharing system that divides the state among sectarian and ethnic partiesaccording to their parliamentary weight. Each new ministry adds posts to thatmarket. That is why critics read the AI proposal as a question of politicalbargaining as much as technology policy.

A Proposal Without A Sponsor

No one has yet put the ministry forward formally. Hassan Wraiwishal-Asadi, head of the Al-Nahj Al-Watani parliamentary bloc and a member of theparliamentary Electricity and Energy Committee, told Shafaq News that the ideahas not been formally submitted to parliament, arguing that austerity and thecurrent economic conditions weigh against creating new ministries or splittingexisting ones. AI policy, he said, could sit within the Ministry ofCommunications or the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.

A government source, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasnot authorized to comment, said some political figures had raised the idea tokeep pace with global developments. The source said it is not an approvedgovernment project, and there is no current intention to name a minister. Itcould return under a future government.

Government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi did not respond to Shafaq News'request for comment. The National Artificial Intelligence Center, which isattached to the Prime Minister's Office, also had not responded by the time ofpublication.

What The State's Own Data Shows

The strongest case against moving quickly comes from the government'sown figures. According to data published by the National AI Center and cited byresearcher and academic Saif al-Karawi, most institutions covered by itsreadiness assessment have no clear plan for adopting AI. The updated nationalAI strategy has been prepared for circulation to ministries only afterrevisions to meet Ministry of Planning requirements. That ministry currentlyhas no confirmed minister.

The strategy's history shows how slowly Iraq moves from intention toimplementation. Baghdad began developing its first national AI strategy inAugust 2024 under a supreme committee chaired by the prime minister. Two yearsand one change of government later, the document is still being refined.

International benchmarks show the same picture. Iraq ranked 107th of 188countries in Oxford Insights' 2024 Government AI Readiness Index, scoring 40.91out of 100, up from 133rd globally in 2023.

The breakdown in the 2024 index was particularly revealing. Iraq scored32.60 on the government pillar, which covered strategy, regulation, andinstitutional capacity, and 35.87 on technology. Its strongest score, 54.25,came in data and infrastructure. The figures suggested that government capacitywas a greater weakness than physical and data infrastructure —precisely theinstitutional gap a new ministry would be expected to address.

In the latest edition, Iraq ranked 128th in Oxford Insights' 2025Government AI Readiness Index, with an overall score of 29.37. Oxford Insightsrevised the index's methodology that year, meaning the 2024 and 2025 scores arenot directly comparable.

Al-Asadi pointed to a constraint that no institutional chart can solve.Iraq's chronic electricity shortages, he said, pose an additional obstacle torunning the computing systems AI requires. Data centers need stable power, andmuch of Iraq still lives with daily outages.

The Case For An Institution

Former lawmaker Hussein Arab told Shafaq News that an e-governance or AIministry could serve a practical purpose, because "Iraq still lacks anintegrated electronic system linking its ministries, and most currentconnections are partial." He proposed staffing it with existing civilservants rather than building a new bureaucracy.

Haidar Shalal Mutab, an academic specializing in media andcommunication, said a national AI institution could help Iraq keep pace withglobal change, but only after a realistic assessment of the country'sinfrastructure, telecommunications, education and data integration.

He told Shafaq News that a phased approach drawing on universities andresearch centers was more likely to succeed. “A ministry would be judged bywhether it turns plans into working applications backed by sustainable funding,national expertise and measurable targets, not by the fact that it exists.”

No Single Regional Model

Al-Karawi noted that governments have organized AI policy in verydifferent ways. Kazakhstan has a Ministry of Artificial Intelligence andDigital Development, combining AI with e-government, data management,telecommunications, and information security. The UAE assigns the file to aminister of state for artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and remotework applications rather than a standalone ministry. Lebanon took a similarroute in 2025, appointing a minister of state for information technology andartificial intelligence affairs rather than creating a standalone ministry.

Saudi Arabia chose a different path. It built its effort around anational strategy for data and AI with quantified goals: investment of roughly75 billion riyals, training more than 20,000 specialists and supporting morethan 300 startups. A dedicated authority implements the strategy.

According to al-Karawi, these experiences show that what matters is anintegrated system of data, research and digital transformation, not a ministrycarrying the technology's name. The debate in Baghdad, he said, should movefrom what to call the institution to how its budget would be spent. “The realchoice is whether money goes into technical and research capacity, or into anew administrative structure with posts, directorates and operating allowances.”

Regulation Without A Ministry

Part of the work a new ministry would claim is already underwayelsewhere in the state. Iraq's Communications and Media Commission (CMC), thefederal regulator for broadcasting and telecommunications, has said it ispreparing regulations to govern AI applications. In July, CMC spokesman Haidar Najmal-Allaq told Shafaq News that investment in data centers, cloud computing andcommunications networks should come first, alongside training national staffand bringing AI into education.

Posts before capacity

Parliament is expected to meet on Thursday to fill the vacantportfolios, and disputes over several of them persist. If politicalnegotiations create demand for additional cabinet posts, a digital or AIportfolio could become one option. If al-Zaidi holds to his stated interest inmerging ministries to cut costs, the idea is likely to return to the drawerwhere the 2024 proposal ended up.

Either outcome leaves the underlying problem untouched. Iraq already hasa national AI center, a strategy still in draft, and a regulator writing rules.Fewer than a third of the state institutions surveyed know how they would usethe technology. So, would a fourth body succeed where the first three have notyet finished their work?

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq weighs new ministries two days after dinar devaluation

Mon, 12 Oct 2026 20:50:40 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Two days after Iraq devalued the dinar amid mountingpressure to keep public salaries flowing, former lawmaker Amir al-Maamourirevealed that political blocs had reached understandings to add new ministriesto Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's unfinished cabinet.

According to al-Maamouri, the plans include a ministry forartificial intelligence or digital investment, and splitting the Ministry ofCulture, Tourism and Antiquities into separate culture and tourism portfolios.“The new posts would be shared out under the quota system to satisfy theparties.” Separately, Al-Zaidi considered merging ministries to cut costs.

The talks come at a moment of acute fiscal strain. OnOctober 6, the Council of Ministers raised the official end-user rate from1,320 to 1,520 dinars per dollar. Iraq earns nearly all its revenue in dollarsfrom oil, so a weaker dinar gives the treasury more local currency for everybarrel sold. The same change raises the cost of imports for a population whosesalaries, pensions and savings are held in dinars.

The Cost Of Keeping Salaries Paid

Finance Ministry data on budget execution through the end ofJuly put total revenue at 39.1 trillion dinars. Oil supplied 30.4 trillion ofthat, or 78%. Spending reached 65.4 trillion dinars over the same period,leaving a deficit of 26.3 trillion, about $17 billion at the new official rate.Central bank reserves fell from $97.4 billion at the end of 2025 to $80.6billion by the end of July. Over the same months, the US war with Irandisrupted the Strait of Hormuz, the main route for Iraqi crude.

Al-Zaidi defended the devaluation before parliament onOctober 8. He said his government faced three alternatives: compulsory savingsthat would leave employees waiting on promises of future payment, payingsalaries every 45 days, or borrowing on top of a public debt already above 208trillion dinars. The state needs about 10 trillion dinars a month to function.

The 2027 draft budget, due in parliament by October 15, setsspending at 217 trillion dinars against a projected 50 trillion deficit. Itassumes oil at $58 a barrel and fixes the exchange rate at 1,500.

A government source told Shafaq News that party leaders hadendorsed the rate change in meetings with al-Zaidi before it was announced.Many of the political blocs are now negotiating the size of his cabinet.

How Ministries Become Currency

Iraq allocates cabinet posts through muhasasa, an informalpower-sharing system that divides the state among sectarian and ethnic parties.Each bloc earns points according to its parliamentary seats and spends them onportfolios. Legal researcher Saif al-Saadi said that a "sovereign"ministry such as Interior or Defense can cost 15 to 20 points, and a serviceministry 10 to 12. Every new portfolio adds supply to that market, givingnegotiators more posts to trade.

Al-Zaidi, a businessman with no party of his own, tookoffice on May 14 as the nominee of the Coordination Framework, the alliance ofShiite parties that won the most seats in the November 2025 election.Parliament confirmed 14 of his 23 ministers. Nine portfolios, includingDefense, Interior and Planning, are still run by acting officials five monthslater.

The vacancies have drawn in other demands. Several partiesback four new deputy prime minister posts, and a broad agreement provided thedeputies hold no ministry. The candidates include Laith al-Khazali, brother ofAsaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali, whose nomination drew US objections.

The disarmament talks have also fed into the bargaining. Asource told Shafaq News on October 1 that one armed faction, negotiating withthe four-member committee charged with bringing weapons under state control,had asked for a new ministry to support the security ministries.

The Cost Beyond The Minister

Nouri al-Dulaimi, a former planning minister, told ShafaqNews that Iraq needs to restructure the institutions it already has. A newministry, he said, brings deputy ministers, advisers, directorates, offices,buildings, security details and operating budgets, far more than oneministerial salary. “New bodies without clear mandates and measurable targetsdeepen disguised unemployment.”

He also pointed to2015, when Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi abolished the posts of vice presidentand deputy prime minister and cut protection details after protests againstwaste and corruption.

Political analyst Mujasha al-Tamimi also said thatadditional ministries “mean new positions, allowances, guards and buildingswith no guarantee of results, at a time when Iraq should prioritize austerityand the efficiency of existing institutions.”

Former lawmaker Hussein Arab said a ministry fore-governance or artificial intelligence could serve a real administrativepurpose, because “Iraq still lacks an integrated electronic system linking itsministries, and most current connections are partial.” He proposed staffing itwith existing government employees rather than building a new apparatus.

Former lawmaker Mahma Khalil added a differentconsideration. He doubted any new ministry was urgent and warned that disputesover the vacant posts could open the door to extra portfolios created toplacate rival parties. He has, however, called for a ministry for Iraq'sminority communities, including Yazidis, Christians, Sabean-Mandaeans and FeyliKurds, “as a statement of respect for the country's historical diversity.”

What comes next

A source told Shafaq News that parliament is expected tohold a session next week to complete the cabinet. Disputes persist over theLabor, Youth and Sports, Planning, and Construction and Housing portfolios.Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition has formally nominated Yasser Sukhailfor Interior. For Higher Education, it has put forward Haider Bahaa, dean ofthe College of Pharmacy at Al-Nahrain University.

In parallel, the Hoqooq bloc, affiliated with the armedfaction Kataib Hezbollah, has asked the Federal Supreme Court to overturn thedevaluation.

Iraq has adjusted its currency repeatedly in recent years.It devalued in 2020, partially reversed course in 2023, and has now devaluedagain, each time citing fiscal necessity. The last time Baghdad trimmed the toptier of government, in 2015, it acted under pressure from protesters. Thistime, the expansion is being negotiated while the cost of a weaker dinar isonly beginning to reach Iraqi households.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Toxic sewage flows overwhelm Iraq’s declining waterways

Sun, 11 Oct 2026 21:19:43 +0000

Shafaq News

Nearly 6 million cubic meters of wastewater flow directlyinto Iraq’s Tigris and Euphrates rivers every day, according to lawmaker GhaithShabaa. The discharge is intensifying a water crisis already sharpened bydrought and climate change: as river flows decline, less water remains todilute sewage and industrial contaminants.

The consequences are becoming harder to contain. Fieldinspections and laboratory tests have uncovered serious pollution in rivers,while samples from some treatment plants have failed to meet requirements forhuman use. Across the country, sewage, medical waste, and industrial effluentare entering waterways that remain essential to drinking-water supplies,agriculture and the wider ecosystem.

For Iraq, the danger lies not only in the volume of wastebeing released, but also in what the water carries and where it ends up.Contamination can move downstream, pass through inadequate treatment systems,and reach irrigation networks, extending the consequences far beyond theoriginal discharge points.

Toxifying the Flow

Speaking to Shafaq News, Shabaa of the Al-Asas Alliancecited official data from government departments, including test results showing "exceptionally high pollution levels" in water supplied through treatmentplants intended to meet drinking-water standards.

The latest findings reviewed by the parliamentary HealthCommittee showed failure rates of 100% in Maysan, 99% in Al-Muthanna and 97% inBasra. The results prompted the committee to call for urgent governmentintervention.

A substantial share of the wastewater enters rivers beforetreatment. Ordinary sewage is only one part of the problem: medical andindustrial waste, together with discharges from power stations and oilrefineries, introduce chemical and microbial contaminants that existingdrinking-water treatment plants are not equipped to remove adequately.

The Health Committee submitted a comprehensive file toParliament documenting pollution sites, their causes, possible treatmentmethods and proposed remedies. Parliament subsequently approved a specialsession to hear from the ministers of Health, Water Resources, Oil,Construction, Housing, Municipalities and Public Works, and Environment. At thetime of the original report, the session was expected to take place early thefollowing week.

Baghdad illustrates how these failures become visible alongthe waterways themselves. On April 29, 2026, a parliamentary committeeestablished under Parliamentary Order No. 63 to investigate pollution in theTigris identified 24 contaminated outlets and discharge points across thecapital. They included sites associated with the sewerage directorate,hospitals, refineries, and power stations, as well as pollution linked toresidential activity.

One of the main routes carrying contaminants into the Tigrisis the Diyala River. Committee chairman Yusuf Al-Kilabi identified it as amajor pollution hotspot, linking the problem partly to the failure of theAl-Atariyah project* after 2003. He said the theft of its pumps left liquid andsolid pollutants flowing into the Diyala, from where they can reach the Tigriswhen water levels rise.

The pollution does not originate solely upstream. The GreenIraq Observatory reported that large quantities of chemical and organic sewagefrom wastewater discharge stations in Al-Rusafa flow through the river beforereaching the Tigris.

Shafaq News documented sewage pipes discharging directlyinto the Tigris near Al-Ahrar Bridge in central Baghdad in June 2026. Fieldobservations identified more than 10 similar outlets elsewhere along thecapital’s riverbanks, particularly between Bab Al-Muadham and Al-Karrada.

By August, the Green Iraq Observatory had identified about500 permanent pollution sources along the Tigris, including 23 acute pollutionhotspots in Baghdad involving sewage outlets and medical waste. The findings,reported by Shafaq News, pointed to a problem spread across the river systemrather than confined to a handful of visible pipes.

Nor is the material entering the water limited toconventional sewage. The Observatory warned of compounds includingpolychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and phthalates such as diethylhexyl phthalate(DEHP), which can be difficult to remove through conventional treatment.According to the environmental watchdog, exposure to these substances canincrease risks associated with chronic diseases and endocrine disorders.

Widespread Poison

The evidence gathered outside Baghdad suggests thatcontamination takes different forms across Iraq’s rivers. Pollution expertIqbal Latif Jaber reported chemical, microbial, and radioactive contaminationat several locations, based on samples collected from different waterways andsurrounding areas.

In Diyala, samples from the Wand River and soil collected inHassan Qolay village, in Khanaqin district, contained mercury, iron, lead,zinc, copper, nickel, cadmium and chromium at levels above internationallypermitted limits. Jaber singled out mercury as a particular concern. Aradiation-detection device also indicated radioactive contamination in theBaladruz River.

Tests from the Khurasan River revealed another combinationof hazards. Samples collected opposite Al-Batool Hospital and a COVID-19isolation hospital contained several heavy metals at concentrations exceedinginternational limits and Iraqi standards for river water. Elevated nitratelevels, alongside low phosphate levels, pointed to human biological activityand organic matter associated with sewage from the health facilities. Copper,cadmium, lead, and mercury were also detected.

These findings matter beyond the immediate condition of therivers. Heavy metals can enter irrigation supplies, be absorbed by plant rootsand move through the food chain, potentially carrying the consequences ofcontaminated water into agricultural production and public health.

Pollutants also cross provincial boundaries. Water enteringBaghdad through the Tigris and Diyala brings contamination from other areas,while pollution has been reported at Saadiyat Al-Shatt in Saladin and at theSumer outlet in Diyala, where polluted water enters the river system.

Farther south, the contaminants encounter already difficultwater conditions. The Green Iraq Observatory said Basra receives polluted waterfrom upstream provinces while facing rising salinity and the advance of thesaltwater tongue. In Wasit and Maysan, contaminated sediments carried fromBaghdad and the Diyala River create further pressure, with pollutantconcentrations able to increase as water levels fall. Deteriorating waterquality and accumulated pollutants also affect the lower basin, marshes and tributarynetworks in Dhi Qar.

Following contamination from one location to another exposesa central difficulty: authorities must address not only the pollution alreadypresent in the rivers, but also the activities that continue to introduce it.That requires reliable monitoring, functioning treatment facilities, andenforcement capable of preventing further discharges.

Action Over Audits

Jawad Al-Jubouri, the ministry’s technical undersecretary,said field teams and monitoring stations track pollution sources in Baghdad andother provinces, including industrial activity, health-care waste, sewagedischarges and other environmental violations affecting the Tigris andEuphrates.

The ministry has called for a strategic plan to establishand develop sewage treatment plants and reduce the discharge of untreated waterinto rivers. Its monitoring network includes 67 water-monitoring stations: 34on the Tigris, 22 on the Euphrates and five on the Shatt Al-Arab, alongsideother monitoring points.

Al-Jubouri has also called for the integration of monitoringdata and closer coordination with the Ministry of Water Resources and otherinstitutions to identify faults and address them. Field operations extendacross Baghdad and the provinces, while an electronic air-pollution monitoringnetwork operates in the capital, with expansion plans.

The ministry’s work further covers pollution beyond thewater system. Monitoring has recorded elevated air-pollution indicators inareas affected by traffic congestion, while fuel quality and dust stormscontribute to poor air quality. Findings are referred to the relevantauthorities under existing laws.

Water pollution is therefore part of a broader environmentalchallenge involving air, soil, biodiversity and ozone. Addressing thesepressures calls for coordination across government, not a response confined toany single ministry.

Broader meetings involving local governments, ministries,the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, the Supreme Judicial Council and the PrimeMinister’s Advisory Office have produced recommendations ranging from theformation of a national emergency team and the removal of environmentalviolations to river dredging, sewage treatment and improvements to plantefficiency.

Parliamentary action has since advanced beyond the specialsession initially planned. On September 24, the Council of Representativesvoted on recommendations from the committee established under ParliamentaryOrder No. 63 to investigate Tigris River pollution. The ministers ofEnvironment and Water Resources attended the session, and the parliamentaryleadership urged both ministries to accelerate projects and establish a jointgovernment task force. The Iraqi Parliament published the update.

Illusion of Safety

The condition of the rivers is only one part of Iraq’s waterproblem. Equally important is whether the systems designed to treat and deliverthat water can reliably make it safe for consumption.

In Basra, a Federal Board of Supreme Audit report cited bythe Green Iraq Observatory found that drinking water between 2021 and 2024failed to meet Iraqi drinking-water standard No. 417 because of high levels oftotal dissolved solids (TDS). Some household samples also showed microbialcontamination.

The audit found that most water-treatment projects andplants in the province lacked fully equipped laboratories capable of conductingphysical, chemical, and bacteriological tests. Without these facilities,operators face limitations in monitoring water quality continuously andidentifying contamination before supplies reach consumers.

Similar weaknesses affect other provinces. According to theGreen Iraq Observatory, most water-treatment projects across Iraq had reachedthe end of their design life, with many operating for more than 25 years. Thesituation was particularly evident in Babil, Wasit, Al-Anbar and Saladin.

Citing Federal Board of Supreme Audit data, the Observatoryreported treatment-related failure rates of 49% in Al-Muthanna and 41% inMaysan, the highest among the provinces it examined. These figures come from aseparate assessment of treatment infrastructure and should not be conflatedwith the much higher sample-testing failure rates reported earlier by theparliamentary Health Committee.

The weaknesses help explain why access to a water supplydoes not necessarily mean access to water that is consistently safe to drink.UN-Water data cited by Our World in Data in July 2026 showed that about 60% ofIraq’s population had access to safely managed drinking-water services. UnderSustainable Development Goal 6, that designation applies to an improved watersource that is available when needed and free from contamination.

Meanwhile, the volume of wastewater being dischargedcontinues to place pressure on the same system. The Green Iraq Observatoryestimated that about 5 million cubic meters of sewage enter Iraqi water sourcesevery day without adequate treatment, warning of heavy metals and highly toxicsubstances and their potential effects on public health.

That estimate differs from the nearly 6 million cubic meterscited by Shabaa. The two figures come from different sources and coverdifferent scopes; they are not measurements of precisely the same volume. Both,however, indicate the scale of untreated or inadequately treated wastewaterentering Iraq’s water system.

Securing the Source

For water strategy and climate-change expert Ramadan Hamza,pollution cannot be separated from the broader question of water security.

Hamza believes Iraq has the technical capacity to addressthe problem, but that capacity must be matched by implementation, oversight andsustained action. His proposed approach begins before pollutants enter therivers: protecting waterways, expanding sewage treatment, rehabilitatingdrinking-water networks and continuously testing water from its source to theconsumer.

That would mean intercepting wastewater before it reaches ariver, ensuring that treatment plants can handle the waste they receive andsafeguarding distribution networks against further contamination. Reliabletesting is also essential, allowing authorities to identify failures andintervene before pollutants travel farther downstream.

"The pollution problem does not begin with the smell orcolor of contaminated water, and it does not end when a sample is taken," Hamzasaid.

He urged authorities to apply the "polluter pays" principleand impose deterrent fines and penalties on individuals, institutions, andindustrial or agricultural activities responsible for polluting water sources. "Greater environmental awareness and closer coordination among the ministriesof Water Resources, Environment and Health, as well as local administrations,are also needed," he added.

*The Al-Atariyah project is a wastewater treatmentinitiative located in the Al-Atariyah region, aimed at refining and treatingsewage water away from the Diyala River.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

How Iran’s ‘unity of fronts’ strategy is changing across the Middle East

Sat, 10 Oct 2026 14:38:42 +0000

Shafaq News

Iran’s “unity of fronts” strategy is being reshaped across theMiddle East as allied armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere adaptto changing military and political conditions, while maintaining varyingdegrees of coordination and a shared strategic outlook.

The concept, also known as “unity of the arenas,” gained widerpublic prominence in the Palestinian arena in 2022 before expanding into abroader regional framework linking Iran-aligned actors across Lebanon, Iraq,Yemen and Syria, particularly after the events of October 7, 2023.

Following the completion of the withdrawal of US forces and theUS-led Coalition from Iraq on September 30, 2026, “unity of fronts” appears tobe entering a new phase. The concept has not disappeared for all Iraqifactions, but its methods are being reshaped in response to changing powerdynamics and the challenges ahead.

The US withdrawal has not ended the debate over weapons or resolveddivisions between factions that have declared their readiness to operate withinstate institutions and others that continue to reject giving up theirindependent military capabilities.

Unity Through Different Means

The region is entering a complex phase as the war between the USand Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, continues. Given its geographicalposition and ties with both Tehran and Washington, Iraq faces the challenge ofavoiding direct involvement in the war while preserving its regionalrelationships and political and security interests.

Lebanese writer and political analyst Ali Alaaeddine saidcoordination among the fronts “remains in place,” pointing to continuedcommunication among Iran, Iraqi factions, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and Yemen’sAnsarallah, also known as the Houthis.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Alaaeddine added that recent militarydevelopments had necessitated “a different tactic,” with each front managingits confrontation according to its own circumstances and assessments whilemaintaining a shared strategic objective.

For Alaaeddine, differences in the level of involvement across thefronts do not signal the end of the concept, but rather its adaptation tochanging conditions.

Reshaping the Fronts

In Iraq, the departure of US forces has not resolved the issue ofarmed factions. Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Ansarallah al-Awfiya have declaredtheir commitment to the government’s vision, while Kataib Hezbollah and Harakatal-Nujaba continue to reject the same course.

Security expert Saif Raad told Shafaq News that developments onother fronts, particularly in Lebanon, had prompted Iran’s IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to reconsider its operational and militarymethods. He described a shift away from reliance on large formations towardsmaller groups linked directly to IRGC leadership figures and operating withgreater independence from established factions, attributing the change todevelopments on the Lebanese front during the 40-day war and the events that followed.

Raad said the varying levels of Iranian support across the regioncould be understood in light of this shift. Iran sought to avoid being drawninto a prolonged war of attrition, he explained, and might therefore turn tosupporting smaller groups operating within a structure that preserves theconcept of “unity of fronts,” but through methods different from those usedpreviously.

According to Raad, this shift gives Iraq particular importance inIran’s emerging strategic vision because of the country’s geographicalposition, political significance, and ties with Tehran.

Since October 7, 2023, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), anumbrella group of Iran-aligned Iraqi armed factions, has claimed responsibilityfor repeated drone and rocket attacks on US military bases in Iraq and Syria,initially citing Washington’s support for Israel’s war in Gaza and the presenceof American forces in the region.

The group later expanded its operations to Israeli targets,announcing drone and missile strikes on sites in the Golan Heights, northernand southern Israel, and areas including Haifa and Tel Aviv. The attacksintensified during the Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon in 2024, as the factionsframed their operations as support for Palestinians and Lebanese fighters.

This campaign prompted US retaliatory strikes against Iran-alignedfaction positions in Iraq and Syria, while Baghdad sought to contain theescalation and prevent Iraq from being drawn further into regional conflicts.

Keeping Iraq Out of the Conflict

Political researcher Suhad al-Shammari offers a differentperspective, focusing on the Iraqi state’s position.

In an interview with Shafaq News, al-Shammari said Iraq “is not aparty to the ongoing war between Iran and the United States,” adding that thegovernment, with the support of political forces, was working to prevent theregional conflict from affecting Iraq’s security and economy.

“Iraq has paid a heavy economic and security price in recentyears,” al-Shammari said, warning that disruptions to oil exports or threats tovital infrastructure could create additional crises that Baghdad does not needat this stage.

Al-Shammari indicated that Iraqi factions will not become directparties to the confrontation for now, citing “domestic political understandingsand a government commitment to preventing Iraqi territory from being used as alaunchpad for attacks.”

She argued that the departure of US forces had changed Iraq’spolitical and security environment and could open the way for a new phase inwhich the prime minister, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, becomesthe main decision-maker on security matters. This shift could be supported bypolitical forces that believe Iraq’s interests lie in avoiding becoming anarena for regional conflict.

Yemen’s Perspective

In Yemen, Adel Rajeh, a member of the Alliance of Parties AgainstAggression, described “unity of fronts” as remaining in place at both thepolitical and military levels, with coordination continuing among Iran, Iraqifactions, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.

Rajeh distinguished this regional framework from the nature of thecurrent conflict in Yemen. He said the ongoing confrontation there was domesticin character, with Houthi military capabilities addressing local adversariesand mobilizations linked to Saudi Arabia independently.

This does not mean “unity of fronts” has ended, but rather thateach front operates according to its own circumstances, he said, concludingthat direct US or Israeli involvement in a future confrontation with Yemencould lead to a wider application of the concept, potentially involving Iraqifactions and Iran.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraqi dinar devaluation sparks backlash from blocs inside the cabinet

Thu, 08 Oct 2026 10:28:24 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Iraq's new official exchange rate of 1,520 dinars per US dollar tookeffect on Wednesday, the country's first devaluation since 2020 and a fiscalresponse to oil revenues squeezed by the resumption of the US war with Iran.Within hours, the dollar's street price jumped. Two of Baghdad's main wholesalemarkets shut, and lawmakers began organizing to overturn a decision taken by acabinet in which nearly every major political bloc holds a seat.

The Council of Ministers approved the move on Tuesday night on anemergency recommendation from the finance minister and the governor of theCentral Bank of Iraq (CBI), Nizar Hussein. It gives the treasury more dinarsfor every dollar of oil sold. It also raises the local cost of almosteverything Iraq imports, in an economy where salaries, pensions and savings areheld in dinars. The government calls the step a precaution. Critics see it asshifting the war's cost from the state's books to household budgets. Thepolitical backlash suggests the dispute is as much about Iraq's unfinishedgovernment as about its currency.

A New Rate, An Old Gap

Under the new structure, the CBI buys dollars from the Finance Ministryat 1,500 dinars, sells them to banks at 1,510 and to end users at 1,520, upfrom 1,320. Every $100 now costs 20,000 dinars more at the official window. TheFinance Ministry paired the decision with a suspension of the advancecollection of customs duties and tax deposits on imports.

Iraq runs two exchange rates: the official one, at which the CBIsupplies dollars through banks for trade, travel and other approved uses, and aparallel street rate set by supply and demand. The parallel market respondedfirst. In Baghdad, the dollar climbed to around 168,500 dinars per $100 onWednesday morning, from 159,800 the day before, then eased to about 167,000 byevening. In Erbil, capital of the Kurdistan Region, it traded near 166,700.

The disruption reached beyond the exchange counters. Shops andwarehouses in Baghdad's Shorja market and the Alwat Jameela wholesale marketclosed temporarily, as did several exchange and money-transfer firms, becausetraders could not reprice goods and outstanding commitments.

Gold followed the dollar. A mithqal of 21-carat gold, the roughlyfive-gram unit Iraqi jewelers trade in, rose in Baghdad from 930,000 dinars onTuesday to 978,000 on Wednesday morning.

Before the decision, the parallel market sat about 21% above theofficial rate. On Wednesday, the distance narrowed in percentage terms, butonly because the official rate jumped. The street price rose as well.

A Revolt From Inside The Tent

The backlash in parliament came quickly. Lawmaker Uday al-Zamili of theKhadamat bloc told Shafaq News that parliament had decided to host the financeminister and the CBI governor on Thursday to examine the feasibility of thedecision. He said it would hit citizens already facing a wave of price rises,and that MPs want to expose files linked to the exchange rate and corruption.

Lawmaker Suzan al-Saad of al-Nahj Al-Watani bloc said she had gatheredmore than 50 signatures for a dedicated session on the decision's consequences.

At a press conference in parliament, lawmaker Saba al-Saadi of theReconstruction and Development bloc warned that raising the exchange rate tocover the deficit is a "red line."

The Kurdistan Democratic Party stopped short of demanding a reversal.Shakhawan Abdullah, head of the KDP bloc in the federal parliament, told localoutlets that the government's aim in adjusting the rate was to recover the20,000-dinar increase and turn it into revenue for the treasury. It should havetaken concrete steps to control markets and contain rising prices first, hesaid, rather than leaving citizens to face "this economic spiral"alone.

The Iraqi Contractors Union asked Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to delayimplementation. It warned that the costs of materials, transport and serviceswould rise and erode companies' margins, and said dues linked to the 2020–21adjustment rate had still not been fully paid.

Afterturning Wednesday's sitting into a general debate on the decision, parliamentscheduled a special session for Thursday to question the finance minister andthe CBI governor. The presidency then cancelled it, moving the hearing to theFinance Committee instead. KDP lawmaker Siban Shirwani said the committee wouldmeet both officials at noon to discuss the reasons for the change, and mightalso take up the draft federal budget.

Former lawmaker Amir al-Maamouri challenged the outrage itself. Healleged that "most of the objectors knew the dollar would be raised andbought dollars from the market before the vote and the announcement of the 152rate and made large gains." He asked why they were pretending not to know.

The cabinet, he noted, includes representatives of all political blocs,and they voted for the adjustment: "Did the representatives of thepolitical blocs work in complete secrecy and hide the information?"

Al-Maamouri offered no evidence for the allegation of profiteering. Thebroader point, that the decision was no surprise inside the political class,finds support in the record.

The composition of the cabinet sharpens the contradiction. Al-Zaidi, abusinessman with no party of his own, was sworn in in May as the nominee of theCoordination Framework, the alliance of Shia parties that won the most seats inthe November 2025 election; since then, only 14 of 23 ministers have beenapproved. Finance Minister Falih al-Sari, who carried the recommendation tocabinet, belongs to al-Hikma, the movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, and is alongtime senior figure on parliament's Finance Committee. Other approvedministers come from the Islamic Dawa, Badr, Reconstruction and Development, andSadiqoon, Taqadum, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK), and the New Generation movement, among others.

The opposition to the devaluation appeared to have two strands: blocsinside the cabinet distancing themselves from a decision they share, and blocsoutside it using the exchange rate as leverage in a government formation thatremains incomplete, with nine portfolios still vacant.

The War Behind The Figures

Iraq's budget runs on oil, and the war has squeezed it. Exports throughthe Strait of Hormuz, the route for most of Iraq's crude before the conflict,have continued, but under disruption. Baghdad has added alternative routes,including overland shipments through Syria, which cost more and carry less.Those alternatives have not offset the shortfall.

The strain showed in the central bank's balance sheet well beforeTuesday. CBI data show foreign reserves fell from $97.4 billion at the end of2025 to $80.6 billion at the end of July 2026, a decline of about 17% in sevenmonths. Finance Ministry figures showed a gap of more than 29 trillion dinars($19.08 billion) between revenue and total spending during the first sevenmonths of 2026.

Spending commitments made in Baghdad's political bargaining compoundedthe revenue shock. The Finance Ministry warned parliament that it could notfund the 2026 budget without an adjustment. That budget includes 100,000 newpublic-sector jobs demanded by political blocs during government formation. Thedraft 2027 budget is built around the new 1,500-dinar rate.

The draft sets spending at 217 trillion dinars ($142.76 billion) with aprojected deficit of 50 trillion, assumes oil at $58 a barrel and exports offour million barrels a day, and fixes the exchange rate at 1,500 dinars perdollar, Finance Committee member Abbas Hayal told Shafaq News. The draft is duein parliament by October 15.

The Official Case

Mudhir Mohammed Saleh, the prime minister's financial adviser, framedthe decision as insurance rather than rescue. He told the state-run Iraqi NewsAgency (INA) that the measures do not reflect an imbalance in the economy. “Theyare pre-emptive hedging against a war that threatens oil exports throughHormuz, and with them public revenue, the budget and foreign-currency inflows.”

Saleh presented the exchange rate, customs, taxes, spending andsubsidies as one integrated protective system. He said monetary policy wouldkeep foreign currency flowing so that trade finance continues on a regular,stable basis.

Fiscal policy would absorb part of the external shock. Customs and taxmeasures, in his account, are meant to regulate imports, strengthen revenue,and ration foreign currency, not to burden citizens or produce unjustifiedprice rises, and to avoid passing their full cost to consumers.

Continued state spending on food, medicine, fuel and basic services, hesaid, would serve as the line of defense for living standards. "Thesemeasures do not aim at a sudden change in the exchange rate or at makingsociety bear the cost of the crisis," he told INA, "but at hedgingand building a financial and monetary safety margin."

The CBI called the move a strategic step to strengthen financialstability. It said its foreign reserves are sufficient to meet all requests tofinance trade, settle bank-card payments and sell cash dollars to travelers. Italso described the change as a positive adjustment that would make Iraqiproducts more competitive against imports, encourage factories to expand, drawinvestment into non-oil sectors and create jobs for young Iraqis. Thestate-owned Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) began supplying foreign currency throughofficial channels on Wednesday to support the market.

Who Pays

Economists who spoke to Shafaq News accept the fiscal logic but disputewho carries the bill.

Economist Ahmed Abd Rabbo said the decision should be read as part of abroader economic package, estimating that the higher rate could bring thetreasury between 17 and 20 trillion dinars a year, depending on oil revenuesand how they are counted in the budget. That gain, he warned, would not beenough if import costs pass quickly into the prices of goods and services.

“A weaker dinar could give Iraqi industry and agriculture more room tocompete with imports, but that does not happen automatically," he said,adding that it would require energy, financing, infrastructure, protectionagainst dumping and simpler production procedures.

He proposed judging the decision against three indicators in the monthsahead: the spread between the official and parallel rates, inflation andcommodity prices, and whether productive sectors actually benefit from improvedcompetitiveness.

Nawar al-Saadi, a professor of international economics, put the questionmore bluntly: who will bear the cost? By his estimate, the move cuts thedinar's value by about 14.5%. The government will collect more dinars for itsoil, he said, but import costs will rise, pressing on purchasing power, especiallyfor people on fixed incomes. He identified inflation and a widening gap withthe parallel market as the greatest risks, while cautioning that prices willnot necessarily rise in step with the dollar.

The effect will vary with each product's dependence on imports, traders'margins, competition and monetary policy. Local industry may gain from a weakerdinar, he said, but Iraqi factories also depend on imported raw materials andequipment, which will push their own costs up.

Al-Saadi’s sharpest warning was against turning the exchange rate into apermanent tool for financing the budget deficit. Instead, he called forcontrolling current spending, limiting expansion of public hiring, raisingnon-oil revenue, and stimulating investment and production.

Manar al-Obaidi, head of the Iraq Future Foundation for economic studiesand consultancy, said the state has already secured significant fiscal space.

Applying Iraq's high customs tariffs at the same time, he argued, hitsimported goods twice, through a dearer dollar and steeper duties. The combinedeffect passes, to varying degrees, into the cost of food, medicine, factoryinputs, machinery, spare parts and transport, and finally to the consumer.

Al-Obaidi called on the cabinet and parliament to freeze the 2010Customs Tariff Law No. 22 for one year. In its place, he would revive themechanism of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 38 of 2003, theoccupation-era mechanism that imposed a 5% Reconstruction Levy on most coveredimports.

The finance ministry and customs authority would issue unifiedinstructions for all border crossings, and a review would follow after sixmonths to measure the effect on inflation, prices, imports, revenue andindustry. Protecting domestic producers, he said, does not require high tariffson thousands of goods; the Iraqi Products Protection Law can target dumping andharmful import surges directly.

“The state should not use the exchange rate and customs tariffs at thesame time as twin tools to raise revenue, loading the cost of both ontocitizens and the market.”

Al-Obaidi describes the combination of exchange rate and customs as theproblem, while Saleh describes the same combination as the protective design.

Third Reset In Six Years

Iraq has been here before, and each reset has followed fiscal need andpolitical bargaining. In December 2020, as the COVID-19 oil crash opened acrippling deficit, the central bank moved the rate from 1,182 to 1,450 dinarsper dollar. The Fatah Alliance and State of Law, both aligned with Tehran,rejected that devaluation and delayed the national budget. In February 2023,al-Sudani's government reversed course and revalued the dinar to 1,300. TighterUS controls on dollar transfers through Iraq's banking system had pushed the streetprice toward 1,690.

The latest move also follows repeated official denials. In February, thethen-governor Ali al-Alaq said there were no plans to change the rate. In June,the bank again denied reports of a planned increase. The parallel market didnot believe them.

The Eco Iraq economic observatory counted six waves of increases in2026, taking the street rate from about 150,400 dinars per $100 in January to apeak of 168,000 in October.

The Tests Ahead

The decision will be judged on terms its defenders and critics broadlyshare. The first is whether the parallel rate settles near 1,520 or keepsdrifting away from it. The second is whether prices rise in step with thedollar or, as al-Saadi and Saleh both suggest, by less. The third is whetherdomestic producers capture any of the promised competitiveness.

The draft 2027 budget, due within a week, will show if the governmenttreats 1,500 as a one-time adjustment or as the basis for a larger spendingplan.

Hours before the decision, Jabar Goran, spokesman for al-Sulaymaniyah'scurrency market, warned that setting the rate at 1,500 would provoke a verynegative reaction from citizens and the market. He did not expect thegovernment to do it.

The government did it the next day.

This time, unlike in 2020 or 2023, the oil shock comes from a warBaghdad does not control and cannot end. The exchange rate has become thequickest tool the state has, and the blocs that share the cabinet now mustdecide whether to defend that tool or protest against it.

1 USD = 1520 dinar

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

ISIS hits Iraqi night surveillance twice in 24 hours in Kirkuk's Hawija

Wed, 07 Oct 2026 18:00:04 +0000

Shafaq News- Kirkuk/ Saladin/ Nineveh

ISIS militants struck the same village in Kirkuk's Hawijadistrict twice in less than 24 hours, and both times they went after thecameras. The attacks disabled thermal imaging equipment that Iraqi forces useto watch open farmland and valleys at night. They have also renewed attentionon stretches of northern Iraq that local commanders concede are not fullycovered.

Hawija, southwest of Kirkuk city, was one of the last urbanareas ISIS held in Iraq before government forces retook it in October 2017. Thelatest attacks came less than a week after the US-led Global Coalition toDefeat ISIS ended its military mission in Iraq on September 30. None of theIraqi officials who spoke to Shafaq News linked the two.

Two Attacks, One Village

On the evening of October 5, militants attacked a positionheld by the 3rd Battalion of the Federal Police's 9th Brigade in al-Bargliya,in Hawija's al-Danadish sector. One officer was killed, four were wounded,and several thermal cameras at the site were destroyed.

Federal Police units, under Iraq's Interior Ministry, latersurrounded a group of ISIS militants inside a school in nearby al-Uraysha, inthe same sector. Authorities had not disclosed the outcome of the standoff bythe time of publication.

The following day, militants hit the 2nd Battalion of the61st Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in al-Bargliya. A snipershot out a thermal camera, and no casualties were reported.

The choice of target is telling. Thermal cameras let smallgarrisons monitor wide, empty terrain after dark, when ISIS cells usually move.Without them, those positions need far more manpower to see the same ground.

Kirkuk Operations Commander Maj. Gen. Maad Badai told ShafaqNews that his forces had arrested a senior ISIS figure in Hawija after trackinghis movements. Badai described the man as one of the group's most wantedtargets in the province.

The October attacks follow a run of incidents in Kirkuk thisyear. On September 27, ISIS mortar fire on al-Malha village killed a woman andwounded several civilians. In August, Iraqi F-16s destroyed an ISIS hideout inWadi Zghaitoun, killing those inside, and in July the Counter-Terrorism Servicekilled an ISIS member north of Kirkuk.

Seven-Kilometer Gaps

Badai acknowledged gaps of up to about 7 kilometers in hisarea of responsibility. In his view, closing them does not require troops fromother provinces. Redeploying existing units and adding posts where coverage isthin would remove the empty stretches between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga,the armed forces of the Kurdistan Region.

He said the forces under his command were sufficient for thesector. Those forces include more than four army divisions, along with FederalPolice and special forces brigades.

The areas east of Altun Kupri and around Qara Salem are themost exposed, according to Badai, because their mountains and valleys offercover. In a joint Iraqi-Peshmerga operation there more than a month ago, oneISIS member and one member of the security forces were killed.

Villages Without Forces

Abdul Muttalib Najm al-Din, head of the Altun Kuprisubdistrict, said about four villages along the strip between Altun Kupri andthe Shwan subdistrict have no security presence at all. He called for an armyforce to be stationed there.

"About 12 farmers have been kidnapped from their landover the past two years," he said.

A Belt Across Three Provinces

Security expert Ali al-Bayati said the problem extends wellbeyond one sector. The gaps run along the areas linking Kirkuk and Nineveh,from Altun Kupri toward the outskirts of al-Dibis and on to the edges ofMakhmur. They also follow the boundary between Kirkuk and Saladin, from Wadial-Shay and Wadi Zghaitoun to al-Zarga in Tuz Khurmatu district.

"Mountains, valleys and wide farmland in these areaslet ISIS cells move away from population centers," al-Bayati said. Heurged authorities to redeploy existing forces, step up surveillance andreconnaissance, and secure the corridors cells use to move between the threeprovinces.

The belt has a long history of armed activity. Groups linkedto al-Qaeda operated there before ISIS emerged. In 2014, ISIS absorbed many ofthem and turned the terrain between Kirkuk, Nineveh and Saladin into a base ofoperations. The group lost its hold on territory after the 2017 offensive, butthe landscape still favors small cells.

Much of the belt lies within the territories disputedbetween Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Article 140 ofIraq's 2005 constitution set out a process, ending in a referendum, to settletheir status, but it has never been completed. Federal forces and the Peshmergahold neighboring sectors there, and Badai's own account places the weak pointsin the gaps between them.

The Kirkuk Operations Command maintains that redeploymentcan close those gaps. Najm al-Din, whose subdistrict has lost a dozen farmersto kidnappers, wants a force that stays.

Can Iraq’s economy weather a wider regional shock? Experts differ

Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:00:37 +0000

Shafaq News

When Iraq temporarily closed threecrossings with Iran in mid-September, the restrictions lasted only days, withtrade continuing through other routes before traffic gradually returned. Evenso, they offered a useful stress test for an economy whose room for maneuverdepends heavily on regional stability.

The restrictions followed SaudiArabia’s announcement that drones launched from Iraqi territory had struck itsEast-West oil pipeline, prompting Baghdad to tighten controls at Shalamcheh,Al-Sheeb and Mandali while investigating possible security breaches. SaudiArabia has since resumed operations on the pipeline after a nine-day shutdown,but the episode showed how quickly a regional security incident could forceBaghdad to safeguard economic channels at home.

MP Uday Al-Zamili, who representsthe Wasit Al-Ajmal bil-Khadamat bloc, framed the closures in precisely thoseterms, telling Shafaq News that they were “military more than commercial oreconomic” and reflected an effort by the government to keep Iraq outside theregional confrontation and “keep the specter of war and economic sanctionsaway.”

Keeping Iraq outside the conflict istherefore an economic as well as a security calculation, because repeated linksbetween Iraqi territory and regional attacks could bring pressure extendingwell beyond temporary border restrictions.

Financial and economic expert SafwanQusay told Shafaq News that the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) still has sufficientroom to support salaries, pensions and social welfare while defending theofficial exchange rate “for long periods,” adding that he sees no need torevalue the dinar.

The dollar market broadly supportsthat reading without removing the warning embedded in it. The parallel rateeased to around 163,000 dinars per $100 in Baghdad and Erbil on Tuesday butremained well above the official rate of roughly 1,300 dinars to the dollar,showing that the state can preserve its formal monetary anchor even asuncertainty commands a premium outside official channels.

Iraq also has alternatives if oneroute becomes harder to use, including the northern outlet through Turkiye aswell as overland corridors capable of absorbing part of the import flow. Theybuy Baghdad time but cannot replace the southern system: the overwhelming shareof Iraqi crude normally leaves through the Gulf, while disruption around Babal-Mandeb would raise costs for goods moving through the Red Sea, making otherroutes slower, more expensive and less capable of offsetting losses elsewhere.

Qusay expects inflation to remain“under control” through the end of the year. “There is no option but to dealwith land routes at this stage,” he said, acknowledging the higher costsinvolved. Iraq can absorb those costs and rely on central-bank buffers whilethe disturbance remains temporary; resilience becomes harder to sustain ifemergency measures “must become the economy’s normal operating condition.”

Economic expert Kareem Al-Hilou toldShafaq News that Iraq enters any regional shock with structural weaknesses thatshort-term buffers cannot erase, with public finances still overwhelmingly tiedto oil even as weak domestic revenue and limited refining capacity leave thecountry exposed, while an underdeveloped banking system restricts its abilityto mobilize savings and credit when pressure rises.

The contradiction is particularlyclear in fuel, where one of the world’s major crude producers was still dealingwith gasoline shortages in Basra on Sept. 19 after similar problems elsewhere,forcing parliament to press for measures aimed at preventing further supplybottlenecks.

That does not mean the recent fuelshortage was caused solely by the regional confrontation, but it does show whya longer disruption would be harder to absorb than the border closures were. Aneconomy that already has weaknesses in domestic fuel supply has less room totreat higher transport costs or delayed imports as temporary inconveniences,particularly if the same regional crisis is also affecting the oil revenues onwhich government spending depends.

Al-Hilou also points to lowconfidence in banks and years of delayed government final accounts. Some ofthat backlog has begun to clear, with the 2012–2015 accounts moving through therequired process and work continuing in later years, but a government preparingfor a volatile oil and security environment still needs a clear view of what ithas spent, collected and carried forward; fiscal planning becomes moredifficult when it is still catching up with previous budgets.

The 2027 budget is therefore a keytest of whether Baghdad is preparing for a more difficult economic environment.The Ministerial Council for the Economy approved the draft in September andreferred it to the Council of Ministers, but as of October 6 the cabinet hadnot yet given final approval.

That unfinished process mattersbecause the border closures showed that, if regional pressure persists longenough to strain monetary defenses, raise the cost of alternative trade routes,and compound weaknesses in fuel supply, banking, and public finance, Iraq’sshort-term buffers could become increasingly difficult to sustain.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Iraq's second US troop withdrawal shifts the test to armed factions

Sun, 04 Oct 2026 22:30:04 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraq's second US military withdrawal in 15 years ended onSeptember 30, when the last US-led Coalition troops and equipment left ErbilAir Base in the Kurdistan Region (KRI), Iraq's autonomous, Kurdish-governednorth. Their departure closed the Coalition's military mission against ISIS,launched in 2014, nearly 15 years after the last American convoy crossed fromsouthern Iraq into Kuwait in December 2011.

Both exits raised the same doubt: whether the Iraqi statecould secure its territory, airspace, and borders without foreign forces. Thisone adds a harder test. For more than a decade, Iran-aligned armed factionsjustified keeping their weapons by pointing to the presence of foreign troops.That argument has now lost much of its premise, narrowing the factions' caseagainst a state monopoly over the use of force.

When President Barack Obama announced the first withdrawalin October 2011, about 39,000 US troops remained in Iraq, what was left of afar larger force. By September 2024, when Baghdad and Washington agreed to winddown the Coalition, the declared US contingent stood at about 2,500. Thedivergence between those figures reflects two different missions. The firstclosed a war of regime change. The second ended an advisory campaign launchedafter ISIS seized Mosul. In both cases, the combat role ended before the troopsleft: in 2010 the first time, and at the end of 2021 the second.

That first exit still shapes how Iraqi and Kurdish leadersread this one. Obama promised a normal relationship between two sovereignstates. Less than three years later, Mosul fell, and Baghdad asked foreignforces to return. The 2011 withdrawal alone does not explain the rise of ISIS,which also fed on Iraq's political crises and the war in Syria. But the speedof that collapse has made two questions part of every later debate about anAmerican departure: what Iraq's army can do, and whether it keeps access to USintelligence.

Like the first exit, this one was set by one USadministration and completed by another. Under the September 2024 agreementbetween the Biden administration and the government of then-Prime MinisterMohammed Shia al-Sudani, Coalition forces first left the areas under Baghdad'sdirect authority. That included Ain al-Asad air base in western al-Anbar, whoseevacuation Iraq's Higher Military Committee confirmed in January. A contingentstayed in the KRI to support operations against ISIS in Syria. That contingenthas now gone.

Where the troops went matters more than the departureitself. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the Combined Joint TaskForce–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), the command that has led thecampaign against ISIS since 2014, remains operational from a new headquartersin Jordan. US forces, it said, will continue the counter-ISIS mission in Syriaalongside Coalition partners and the Syrian government.

Patriot missile batteries had already been moved to Jordan,according to Mohammed Saleh, a nonresident senior fellow at the Foreign PolicyResearch Institute's national security program. He told Shafaq News he did notrule out a limited presence, such as special forces, or a return of US troopsif a major crisis erupts.

Washington presents the exit as a change in form rather thanan end. The Pentagon described it as the end of the Coalition's militarymission, not of the relationship, and said targeted training and intelligencesupport would continue with Iraqi forces leading operations against ISIS cells.A senior White House official told Shafaq News in late August that Washingtonwas moving toward a permanent bilateral security partnership. Its terms remainopen, including what training, intelligence, maintenance, and weapons theUnited States will supply.

The likely shape is technical rather than territorial.Training, advice, and maintenance for Iraq's F-16 fighter jets and C-130Jtransport aircraft could continue without permanent US deployments at Iraqibases, said Myles Caggins, a former military spokesperson for the Coalition.Nor is Washington asking Baghdad to seal its border with Iran, he told ShafaqNews. Its aim, in his description, is to curb Tehran's influence inside Iraqiinstitutions and the activities of the armed groups it backs.

The anxiety is sharpest in the KRI, which Iran andTehran-aligned Iraqi factions have attacked repeatedly since the war betweenIran and the US broke out on February 28. Days before the deadline, MasoudBarzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the KRI’s dominantparty, recalled in a television interview the 2011 debates over whether Iraqiforces could protect the country. He warned against a repeat of the ISISscenario while acknowledging that conditions today are different.

KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said the departure cameat a sensitive moment and that leaving the region without air-defense systemswas cause for concern. He thanked Coalition members and said Iraqi forces andthe Peshmerga, the KRI's armed forces, were ready for what follows.

Saleh called the Kurdish concern justified. Washington hasbeen the KRI's main security guarantor for about 35 years, he said, a role thatdates to the no-fly zone imposed over northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.Kurdish leaders have also watched what happened to the Syrian Democratic Forceswhen US support in Syria was abruptly scaled back. Even so, Saleh expects thepartnership between Erbil and Washington to continue.

Baghdad's answer is procurement. Maj. Gen. Sabah al-Numan,spokesperson for the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, said Iraq wasclose to acquiring air-defense systems from South Korea, Turkiye, and theUnited States, under plans that include covering the KRI's airspace. He gave nodelivery dates.

The Coalition's exit does not end every foreign militarypresence in Iraq. Turkish forces deployed in the north against the KurdistanWorkers' Party (PKK) operate outside the Coalition framework. Baghdad andAnkara have agreed to hand the Bashiqa-Zilkan camp near Mosul to the Iraqigovernment gradually, under an agreed timetable. Whether Baghdad can crediblydescribe Iraq as free of foreign bases depends on that separate process.

Across the region, the yardstick is the same: what Baghdaddoes next, not the empty bases. Ahmed Fahim, a Jordanian researcher, toldShafaq News that Jordan's interest lies in an Iraqi state able to protect itsborders, but he warned against reducing sovereignty to replacing one outsidepower's influence with another's.

Lezgin Ibrahim, a researcher at the Euphrates Center forStudies in Syria, said Damascus stands to gain from an Iraq with a unifiedsecurity command that helps police the shared border and fight ISIS."Factions acting independently of the state would leave more room forIranian influence and cross-border threats," he said.

Iran-aligned factions hailed the end of the mission, andtheir reaction points to the risk that Abdul Qader al-Nayel, an Iraqi politicalresearcher, identified. The end of the mission does not amount to fullsovereignty while US advisory, intelligence, and logistical roles continue, hetold Shafaq News, and the withdrawal could even help the factions hold on totheir influence. A departure they can present as their own victory makesdisarmament a harder sell.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, who took office in May 2026,has set a deadline of June 30, 2027, for bringing those weapons under statecontrol, and the factions are divided over it.

Tehran's position is harder to read. On July 28, IraqiNational Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi said Iran had agreed to help bringweapons held outside state institutions under government control. Two weekslater, Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, visited Baghdad andreportedly urged Iraqi armed factions “not to surrender their weapons for now”while warning them against any armed confrontation with government forces.

Al-Zaidi marked the day of the withdrawal in Baghdad withthe Coalition commander at his side. "No weapons outside the umbrella ofthe law, and no force outside state institutions," he said.

In 2011, the test was whether Iraq could fight its own wars.This time the challenge is narrower and harder: whether the state can claim theauthority that the foreign presence allowed others to contest for over adecade.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

*Operation Inherent Resolve is the US-led military campaignagainst ISIS, and its command, the CJTF-OIR, has advised, assisted, and enabledforces fighting the group in Iraq since CENTCOM established it in 2014.

Sacrificing the Kurds: How the West traded heroic anti-ISIS allies for political convenience

Sun, 04 Oct 2026 09:15:07 +0000

Shafaq News- OPINION

By Nick Kossovan

In March 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)raised their flag over the rubble of Baghouz, marking a symbolic victory thatWestern capitals hailed as the collapse of the Islamic State's terror regime.Yet behind the glossy press releases, the truth about those who endured andthose who lost their lives in the 2014–2019 conflict remained hidden.

It wasn't American or European boots on the groundsweeping through the desert dust. It was young Kurdish women and men, fightingalongside local Syriac Christians, Assyrians, and Sunni Arab tribesmen, doingthe brutal, door-to-door groundwork Western armies simply lacked the stomach toexecute themselves.

The price of that victory, which gave the West asemblance of security, was that more than 11,000 Kurdish and allied fighterslost their lives fighting ISIS, sacrificing themselves to protect the so-called"free world" only to be abandoned in the desert. Western countries,including Washington and European nations, shifted responsibility for detainingtens of thousands of hardened jihadist prisoners to the Kurds because theylacked the political resolve to repatriate their own radicalized citizens. Thisarrangement exemplifies Western hypocrisy: let the Kurds bleed for Westernsecurity today, then turn a blind eye when regional enemies come for themtomorrow.

Fast-forward to August 2026, and that blood-boughtself-governance in Rojava —the autonomous, democratic sanctuary carved out ofwar-torn northern Syria— has been systematically dismantled. Formally governedby the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), adecentralized, secular administrative framework that explicitly prioritizedwomen's leadership, multi-ethnic pluralism, and local self-determination, theregion no longer exists. Trapped in a vice grip between relentless foreign airstrikes, aggressive demands from Damascus, and backroom arm-twisting by Westerndiplomats, DAANES was officially dissolved. Self-defence forces were disarmed,and its institutions were absorbed into the Syrian central government.

This forced surrender exposes a callous, recurringpattern in Western foreign policy. As Washington recruited and then abandonedHmong fighters in Laos, using them as shields during the Cold War, Westernnations continue to repeat the same 'throw them back to the wolves' approach inthe Middle East. When Western nations need a dirty job done, they deem secular,heroic partners indispensable. But when the threat recedes, those same alliesbecome an inconvenience, prompting Western diplomats to quickly negotiate withwhichever rebranded regime promises central control.

Blood Equity and the Disposable Alliance

The Western-SDF alliance was always an asymmetricmarriage of convenience. When ISIS swept across Iraq and Syria, capturingMosul, threatening Western interests, and destabilizing NATO's doorstep,Washington urgently needed a reliable local force with real grit on the ground.The Kurds answered the call. They fought block by bloody block through Kobani,Raqqa, and Der Ez-Zor, all while building a pioneering governance modelgrounded in direct democracy, gender equality, and secular pluralism.

Yet as the immediate threat from ISIS receded, Westernpriorities shifted back to calculated self-interest.

The abandonment was gradual, not sudden. In 2018,Turkiye, a NATO ally, invaded Afrin, a Kurdish-controlled region, forcinghundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to make way for extremist proxies.By October 2019, President Donald Trump abruptly ordered US troops to withdrawafter a single phone call with Turkish President Erdogan. Trump claimed thewithdrawal was to end an 'endless war' and save money, but he knowinglygreen-lighted Turkiye to attack local ground partners of the US and the Westerncoalition.

By late 2026, Western envoys had stopped standing byas Rojava's autonomous institutions were dismantled to appease central stateauthorities and regional powers. The core message: Kurdish blood was essentialto crushing terrorists, but Kurdish self-governance was a diplomaticinconvenience.

The Rebranding of Extreme Ideology

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this geopoliticalrealignment is how quickly Western capitals embraced rebranded warlords, to thedetriment of their secular allies.

At the centre of this whitewashing campaign arefigures such as Ahmad al-Sharaa. Under his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammadal-Julani, al-Sharaa led Jabhat al-Nusra —al-Qaeda's official Syrian franchise—and later commanded Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an armed group forged in thesame ideological furnace as ISIS.

That Western power brokers now court former extremistcommanders simply because they traded battle fatigues for tailored suitsreveals a glaring double standard: radicalism isn't the deal-breaker in Westernforeign policy; disobedience is.

Washington's quick willingness to lift terrordesignations and warmly welcome former warlords highlights a recurringhypocrisy. Changing appearance —trimming beards, wearing Western suits, andusing diplomatic language— doesn't erase a person's core ideology. Yet Westerndiplomats eagerly accept these surface-level makeovers in the name ofcentralized order, while demanding total capitulation from the Kurdish forceswho spent a decade taking bullets to stop those same extremists.

Paper Concessions Versus Structural Autonomy

Western rationalizers highlight symbolic gestures fromDamascus, such as formal acknowledgment of Kurdish language rights, restoredcitizenship, and official decrees marking Nowruz. But these paper concessionsare an insultingly cheap trade. Ink on parchment in Damascus doesn’t compensatefor the deliberate destruction of living, self-governing institutions, nor doesit shield a population when political winds shift, as they inevitably will.

In a centralized security state, language rights andcultural crumbs granted by decree don't ensure physical security. Withoutindependent military capabilities or enforceable federal structures underDAANES, regional minorities, including Kurds, Christians, Druze, and Alawites,are left entirely defenceless against state reprisal and violence from localmilitias. Liquidating the SDF didn't bring stability; it destroyed the onlycredible check on centralized dictatorship in northern Syria.

The Broader Precedent

What happened to Rojava and DAANES in August 2026transcends regional borders; it's a repeated warning to any future ally naiveenough to trust Western promises. By abandoning the very people who crushedISIS to satisfy the immediate whims of Middle Eastern authoritarian warlords,Western leaders are sending a message to freedom fighters everywhere thatshouldn't be ignored: dying for Western security earns warm gratitude while thebullets are flying, but those fighters are disposable once the smoke clears.

Rojava's destruction underscores the need to challengethe superficial morality of Western diplomacy. Sustainable regional stabilitycannot come at the cost of sacrificing vibrant, pluralistic democracies toappease autocrats. By trading away the DAANES secular experiment for short-termpolitical gains, Western leaders didn't secure peace; they merely demonstratedthe lethal price local allies pay when Western commitments are treated asdisposable currency.

*Nick Kossovan, a self-described connoisseur of humanpsychology, writes about what's on his mind from Toronto.

Disclaimer: This article is a guest opinion. Theviews and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views or editorial position of Shafaq News.

Iraq's Dawn Crackdown moves from raids to rulings

Sat, 03 Oct 2026 06:22:09 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

In the early hours of June 28, Iraqi security forces fanned out across Baghdad and several provinces, detaining politicians, officials, public employees, and business figures in an anti-corruption operation the government called Dawn Crackdown. Three months later, the campaign's defining image is no longer the pre-dawn raid but the courtroom.

The opening phase was measured in arrests. Based on sources at the Federal Integrity Commission, Iraq's main anti-corruption body, Shafaq News documented 67 detentions in the first sweep. By August 9, it had recorded at least 210 people detained during the campaign's first six weeks. The government has not kept a continuously updated, consolidated count.

By September, the pattern had shifted. Arrests continued, corruption networks were still being exposed, and state institutions remained under investigation. But the large, concentrated arrest announcements of the early weeks faded from the cases reviewed by Shafaq News. In their place came court judgments, illicit-enrichment rulings, asset recovery and financial tracing, and investigations reaching deeper into individual institutions. That shift may prove more consequential than the raids themselves.

The change coincided with a crowded national agenda. On September 30, the US-led Global Coalition formally ended its military mission in Iraq, while the government continued the politically sensitive process of bringing armed factions' weapons under state control. Baghdad and Washington have shifted toward bilateral security cooperation.

Nothing in the record shows that the Coalition transition diverted attention from corruption. Dawn Crackdown now enters its fourth month, however, as security and sovereignty issues command much of the political agenda. That raises a broader issue: can a campaign launched under extraordinary public scrutiny keep producing results once the spotlight moves on?

From Mass Sweeps to Institution-Level Cases

September's record does not suggest that enforcement has stalled.

On September 2, the Integrity Commission said it had dismantled an 11-member network accused of forging loan files at the Real Estate Bank in Babil. Investigators identified manipulation in 56 files and put the damage to public funds at more than 543 million dinars (about $414,000). Investigators arrested five bank employees and two intermediaries, and warrants remained outstanding for other suspects.

Days later, Commission investigators announced arrests over alleged manipulation of land allocation in Nasiriyah, in Dhi Qar province. One case involved 104 valuable properties whose allocation and ownership procedures were suspected of forgery and other violations.

On September 21, authorities in Maysan reported finding 120 allegedly falsified land-allocation files in municipal and real-estate registration offices, detaining eight employees, and issuing further arrest warrants. The following day, a separate investigation targeted a nine-member network suspected of buying more than 170 properties in Babil and Baghdad and registering them in the names of relatives and associates to hide ownership and the origin of the money.

On September 29, the Commission announced the arrest of ten employees at a hospital in Samawah, in Al-Muthanna province, over suspected manipulation of payment receipts and misappropriation of collected fees. Investigators examined more than 1,000 patient records from 2024 through 2026.

Taken together, the cases point to enforcement that has dispersed rather than disappeared. Instead of a single national sweep producing dozens of arrests at once, September's cases unfolded institution by institution and province by province.

The Courtroom Takes Center Stage

The more significant change came once investigations reached the courts.

The courts have also ruled the other way. On September 12, a man detained in the investigation into Adnan al-Jumaili, the former deputy oil minister for refining affairs and former director-general of the North Refineries Company, who remains in custody, was released after investigators found no evidence that he knowingly participated in the transfer of two commercial properties into his name. Rulings in both directions change how the campaign should be judged: its credibility now rests on verdicts, not detentions.

On September 14, a court sentenced Alaa Samir Rashid, director general of the Electricity Ministry's Central Electricity Distribution Company, to seven years in prison for illicit enrichment. The Integrity Commission said he was also ordered to repay the illicit gains and pay an equivalent fine, bringing his total financial obligation to about 25.7 billion dinars.

Two days later, lawmaker Bahaa al-Din Noor Mohammed Hussein al-Nouri received a seven-year sentence for illicit enrichment. According to the Commission, the case involved illicit gains of more than 5.8 billion dinars and nearly $11 million, and repayment plus an equivalent fine pushed the total above 40 billion dinars.

September 23 brought seven-year sentences against two more lawmakers. Alia Nassif was sentenced to seven years for illicit enrichment. Hours later, Ashwaq Salem Hassan received a separate seven-year sentence for illicit enrichment and was ordered to repay illicit gains and pay an equal fine totaling nearly 11.95 billion dinars.

On September 29, the Central Anti-Corruption Criminal Court sentenced MP Mohammed Farman Shaher Salman al-Jubouri to seven years for illicit enrichment. It ordered him to repay the illicit gains and imposed an equivalent fine, together totaling more than 28.1 billion dinars. He was the fourth sitting MP convicted of illicit enrichment in September.

The same case shows how far that process still has to run. On September 29, a security force accompanied by an Integrity Commission team arrested a businessman at his home in Tikrit, in Saladin province, in connection with the al-Jumaili case, a security source told Shafaq News. The businessman was detained hours after returning to Iraq from abroad. Investigators have begun legal proceedings and questioning but have not disclosed the allegations.

Following The Money

On September 21, the Supreme Judicial Council, which oversees Iraq's courts, announced that a Baghdad court had recovered 51 billion dinars for the state-owned Rafidain Bank in a financial and administrative corruption case. Proceedings against those involved are continuing.

The government, for its part, has begun measuring its anti-corruption performance through broader indicators. On September 8, government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi said more than 26,000 corruption reports had been submitted to the Integrity Commission and that recovered funds, properties and other assets had exceeded 1.359 trillion dinars. The government credited much of that activity to Dawn Crackdown, alongside contract audits, preventive oversight and rewards for reporting corruption.

Quieter, Not Necessarily Weaker

The September record points more strongly in one direction than the other. The operation's first weeks were defined by raids and rapidly climbing detention figures. September was defined by institution-level investigations and judicial outcomes. Four lawmakers received seven-year sentences for illicit enrichment, and a senior state official was jailed. Investigators continued to pursue land allocation, municipalities, banks and hospitals, and courts went after money and assets as well as defendants.

This new phase extends a trend visible by late August. Shafaq News reported on September 2 that Dawn Crackdown had moved beyond its dramatic opening raids and was spreading through land registries, municipalities, electricity institutions, banks, and provincial administrations. September's cases reinforce that reading. The campaign appears to be moving from a stage in which success was shown by the number of people detained to one in which success must be shown by what happens to their cases.

Beyond September 30

September 30 had become a focal point of Iraq's security debate because the Coalition's departure was closely tied to weapons outside state control. That process has now moved beyond the withdrawal date: Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi has set June 30, 2027, as the deadline for completing the weapons-control roadmap, a timetable the Coordination Framework formally backed on October 2.

Security, sovereignty and the armed factions are therefore competing for political attention just as Dawn Crackdown enters its fourth month.

If Dawn Crackdown's early momentum depended primarily on high-profile arrests, its visibility may fade as other issues take over. If it is developing into a sustained institutional effort, the evidence will surface elsewhere: in final judgments, recovered funds and confiscated assets, successful prosecutions and acquittals where evidence falls short, changes to procurement and administrative procedures, and fewer repeat cases inside the same institutions.

* Methodology note: The figures and cases reviewed in this story are limited to official announcements by Iraq's Federal Integrity Commission and corruption-related cases documented by Shafaq News during the review period. They should be treated as documented minimums, not a comprehensive count of corruption activity across Iraq. The review excludes cases pursued or announced solely by other government bodies, security agencies, courts or oversight institutions unless they were also reported through the Integrity Commission or documented by Shafaq News. Cumulative figures, updates to previously reported cases and later judicial developments were not counted as new arrests when assessing the pattern of enforcement.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq’s media and the price of false credentials

Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:32:37 +0000

Shafaq News

By Ali Hussein Feyli*

Amid blurred boundaries around professional journalismand the organized rise of “shadow media,” journalism in Iraq is facing a deepstructural crisis that affects both its independence and its role in shapingpublic awareness.

The problem has intensified with the retreat fromdemocratic promises and the continued weakness of professional protections.Even the Iraqi Journalists’ Rights Law No. 21 of 2011 has failed to providesufficient safeguards, while provisions of the Penal Code, enacted during theBaath era, continue to be used against journalists.

Iraqi journalists have neither gained the professionalfreedom to report independently nor faced the total suppression of earlierauthoritarian eras, instead finding themselves caught between partisan mediaand political money on one side and disinformation and the loss of facts on theother.

Under these conditions, many qualified journalistscontinue to work outside formal employment structures, without contracts oradequate professional guarantees. This places an additional burden onjournalists, who must confront the influence of various powerful actors whilealso trying to make a living under the threat of legal action and withoutadequate professional safeguards.

Alongside weak protections for professionaljournalists, another problem concerns the criteria for granting journalisticstatus. Loose standards have allowed hundreds of people without adequatequalifications to obtain press identification, while pages and platforms haveemerged that use microphones and media logos without adhering to professionaljournalistic standards.

Official figures indicate that Iraq, including theKurdistan Region, has more than 20,000 journalists, though the figure alonedoes not show how many are actively practicing or the level of theirprofessional experience. Iraq also has more than 100 television channels andhundreds of news websites and digital platforms. Some pursue programs andobjectives that do not align with the public interest, while the sources offinancing for others remain unclear.

This proliferation has not produced greaterjournalistic independence, leaving Iraq’s media environment deeply divided andheavily polarized.

Granting press credentials to people with no groundingin journalism, writing, professional values or media ethics is not merely anadministrative error, but can contribute to a broader decline in the standingof the profession. When journalistic work is placed in the hands of unqualifiedindividuals, the consequences extend beyond the media sector by underminingpublic confidence in the information people receive.

Such disorder opens the door to misinformation andmedia extortion, undermining society’s psychological well-being andintellectual integrity while exposing weaknesses in professional standards andthe mechanisms meant to protect the profession.

Inviting people who lack professional and ethicalstandards to government press conferences as journalists, and paying them, alsoexposes shortcomings in the media policies of some state institutions.

Rather than applying professional and ethicalstandards, some government media departments focus on numbers and appearances,granting access and journalistic status to individuals and outlets with noprofessional record or that rely on fabricated news for promotion and extortion.

The problem is not limited to politics or security. Politicalfinancing in the media sector, combined with easier access for unqualifiedindividuals, has distorted independent journalism. The emphasis on images,online presence, and social media visibility is also no longer confined toparts of the younger generation. A considerable number of officials appear tohave adopted the same approach, allowing digital visibility to outweighprofessional competence.

Any serious attempt at reform requires updated legislationprotecting professional rights and ensuring those protections are enforced. Clearcriteria are also needed for issuing press identification to prevent abuse and preventjournalistic status from becoming a cover for people whose media presence restslargely on cheap microphones and logos, while the damage caused by theirpractices can be severe.

In practical terms, the Iraqi Journalists Syndicateand government media departments should act as safeguards against extortion,misinformation, and misuse of journalistic status, while upholding professionalethics and protecting independent journalists’ right to work and criticize.

In Iraq today, the appearance of being a journalistcan sometimes be created within hours: a microphone can be purchased, anidentification card printed, and a digital page launched, allowing a personwith little experience or commitment to journalistic standards to establish apublic presence. Years of education, professional work, and credibility canconsequently be overshadowed by tools and branding that provide immediatevisibility without producing journalism worthy of public trust.

This disorder is no longer confined to televisionscreens or the online sphere, but has moved into the streets throughmicrophones and media logos unsupported by genuine professional practice. Whensuch disorder receives funding and institutional access, it can becomeorganized chaos that damages society’s collective conscience.

Professional journalists carry the heaviest burden inthis environment, as the fading distinction between those committed to theprofession and those who practice extortion forces them to defend both theircredibility and the meaning of journalism itself. A microphone and a logo maycost little, but the loss of public trust in the media carries a far greaterprice for society.

* AliHussein Feyli, Chairman of Shafaq Foundation for Culture and Media andformer member of the Kurdistan Region Parliament.

This article was originally written in Arabic.

Iraq's Sovereignty Days: Coalition mission ends, factions keep their weapons

Thu, 01 Oct 2026 10:06:37 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Iraq is marking the end of the US-led Coalition's military mission witha four-day public holiday, from September 30 to October 3, that the governmenthas named "Sovereignty Days." Five politicians and analysts who spoketo Shafaq News described the occasion as significant but incomplete, arguingthat while foreign combat forces have left, the Iraqi state has yet toestablish a monopoly on arms.

The Coalition, formed in 2014 to fight ISIS, wound down its mission inIraq on September 30. Baghdad once treated that date as the deadline fordisarming the country's armed factions as well. On September 21, Prime MinisterAli al-Zaidi separated the two. His phased plan opens with a 90-day pause inwhich the factions halt attacks in exchange for assurances that US forces willnot strike them, followed by a weapons handover due to end by June 30, 2027.Some factions are pushing for an even later deadline, at the end of 2027.

"Ending the foreign presence by agreement completes sovereignty onpaper," said Sami Oshana, a member of parliament's Foreign RelationsCommittee. "Bringing weapons under state control completes it on theground."

If the state succeeds on both fronts, Oshana told Shafaq News, nofaction operating outside the law could invoke "resistance" or"security necessity" to justify its arms. He warned, however, thatthe military action alone cannot settle the issue. It requires a political dealthat guarantees the factions a secure role in politics in exchange for thestate's monopoly on force.

Completing, Not Beginning

Adel al-Ghariri, an independent politician, argues that September 30marks the completion of Iraqi sovereignty rather than its birth. “Iraq'ssovereignty was never absent. Its most visible gap was the presence of foreignforces that Baghdad itself invited in 2014 to fight ISIS,” he told Shafaq News.The next step, in his view, is ending every foreign military presence on Iraqisoil, Turkish forces included, so that the state alone decides matters of war,peace and security.

Al-Ghariri does not tie disarmament solely to the foreign presence. Hecalls it a national demand resting on five pillars: public opinion, theconstitution, parliament, the judiciary, and religious leadership. “Shiite,Sunni and Christian religious authorities have all called for weapons to beheld by state institutions,” he noted, as has the Supreme Judicial Council,Iraq's top judicial body. The legal framework, he argued, must give thefactions and their members a route into official institutions, whether thesecurity services or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Safaa al-Asam, a security expert, points to a contradiction in thefactions' long-standing case. “They justified their weapons by the presence offoreign troops, yet the Iraqi state never described that presence as anoccupation.” It rested on the Strategic Framework Agreement that Iraq and theUnited States signed in 2008 under then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. WithISIS reduced to sleeper cells that Iraqi forces can handle, the Coalition'smission no longer had a rationale, he said.

“Together with efforts to end the Turkish presence at Bashiqa, a basenortheast of Mosul, the exit removes the factions' justification for keepingarms outside the state.” In his view, Iraq has begun tying up the loose ends ofthe weapons question.

Sovereignty Beyond The Ground

Political analyst Ali al-Nasser warns that sovereignty cannot bemeasured by the departure of ground troops alone. Al-Zaidi's government hastaken important steps, he told Shafaq News, but they need to go further,starting with control of Iraq's airspace: operational air-defense systems andradar, and the ability to stop any country from violating Iraqi skies. Heexpects the process to extend to Turkish positions, “including Bashiqa andMount Sinjar,” if withdrawal arrangements are completed.

Nasser also argues for economic sovereignty. Iraq depends almostentirely on oil revenue, and he says diversifying the economy should show up inthe 2027 budget. “That effort faces outside pressure, particularly over USdollar flows and American financial policy.”

On weapons, Nasser expects the end of the foreign presence to weakensome factions' case for keeping their arms, especially as armed groups moveinto politics and elections. “The hardest part concerns heavy weapons, missilesand drones. Other weapons are already registered with the Interior Ministry.”He believes the heavy arsenal could be handled gradually if the governmentbuilds more trust with the factions and with neighboring states.

One State, One Authority

Issam al-Faili, a professor of political science at Baghdad'sMustansiriya University, rejects any partial reading of the concept.Sovereignty cannot be divided, he told Shafaq News. It depends not only on theabsence of foreign troops but on respect for the law and the constitution, andon the absence of any authority outside the state. “No parallel entity has theright to carve up that sovereignty, and all armed groups must answer to theprime minister as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.”

Religious and sectarian particularities deserve respect, he added, butno creed or foreign loyalty can take precedence over the state.

Al-Faili argues that the US departure removes the last justification forweapons outside state institutions, citing a proposal under which the factions'weapons and fighters would be absorbed into the PMF, with thecommander-in-chief, not the armed groups themselves, deciding which weapons arehanded over. The state funds these groups, he noted, so the state should decidehow their weapons are used.

Resistance From Within

Political forces are negotiating with the factions over how the planwill be carried out. On September 23, al-Maliki, who heads the State of Lawcoalition, said the program and timetable would be announced on Sept. 30, butno such announcement had been made by publication time.

Some factions have hardened their position. On September 28, Abu Mujahidal-Assafi, security chief of Kataib Hezbollah, one of the most powerfulIran-aligned factions, whose political wing, the Hoqooq Movement, holds sixseats in parliament, threatened to work to topple al-Zaidi's government if “itfailed to serve the people.” He also threatened to close the crossings ofcountries he accused of taking part in a blockade of Iran.

He warned that if US aircraft continued to violate Iraqi airspace afterOctober 1, the group would monitor the skies, issue warnings, and then shootdown aircraft it deems hostile.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Kurdistan Region faces air-defense gap as US troops leave Iraq

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 06:55:36 +0000

Shafaq News

In the earlyhours of Monday, three drones struck Azadi Camp in Koya, east of Erbil, asettlement that has housed families of the Iranian Kurdish opposition for morethan two decades. Nobody was hurt. The attack came two days before the US-ledcoalition ends its military mission in Iraq, and it brought into focus thequestion now dominating Erbil: who will defend the skies over the KurdistanRegion of Iraq (KRI) once the Coalition's military mission ends?

TheKurdistan Region Security Agency said the drones struck between 1:40 and 2:10a.m. No party claimed responsibility, and there has been no independentconfirmation of who carried out the attack. The camp shelters families offighters from the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), an exiledopposition group that has been a target all month. On September 2, Iranlaunched a series of drone strikes on KDPI bases, positions and camps, seniorparty official Karim Barwazi told Shafaq News. On September 15, an unidentifieddrone fell inside a KDPI camp north of Erbil, he said. The following night,coalition aircraft shot down a drone over the Soran Independent Administrationin Erbil province, a local source said. Komala, another exiled Iranian Kurdish party,has faced similar drone attacks on its camps in recent months.

The KRI'sMinistry of Peshmerga Affairs said that the Kurdistan Region has faced morethan 1,000 drone and ballistic missile attacks since the US-Iran war began inFebruary, some of them deadly. It called the timing of the withdrawal"sensitive" and said the departure of US forces without leaving anair-defense system behind was "a cause for concern." It also drew aconstitutional line: the KRI's airspace is part of Iraq's, and protecting it isthe federal government's job.

A USoversight body has documented the same gap. The 44th Lead Inspector Generalreport to the US Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the US-ledcampaign against ISIS, found that the Peshmerga lack significant air-defensecoverage of their own. American systems protected US facilities in Erbil, thereport noted, but the KRI's security forces, civilians, and energyinfrastructure remained exposed to aerial attack. The report, which coveredJanuary through March 2026, also recorded escalating strikes by Iran-alignedarmed factions and a temporary drawdown of US advisory support to thePeshmerga.

The DeadlineThat Moved

Kurdishofficials have not publicly tied their concerns to the disarmament of Iraq'sarmed factions, but the two are hard to separate. Erbil has been explicit aboutwho is firing. On April 5, KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani condemned attackson the US Consulate and civilian areas in Erbil by "terroristmilitias" and urged Baghdad to act against the groups responsible.Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT), an independent monitoring group, documented751 attacks on the Kurdistan Region between Feb. 28 and May 28, includingstrikes attributed to Iran and Iran-aligned Iraqi groups.

Baghdadoriginally linked disarmament to the same September 30 date as the coalition'sexit. On September 22, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi replaced that deadline witha phased plan. It opens with a 90-day pause in which the factions halt attacksin exchange for not being struck by US forces, followed by a weapons handoverdue to end by June 30, 2027. As a result, the Coalition mission ends this weekwhile the phased weapons-control process is scheduled to continue for anothernine months.

The USwithdrawal from the KRI is now complete, according to an Iraqi security sourcewho spoke to Shafaq News. Equipment moved overland through Duhok province andacross the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing into Turkiye, the source said. USequipment withdrawn from Erbil was transported to Incirlik Air Base near Adana,a US logistics hub in southern Turkiye that has supported American operationsacross the Middle East since the 1950s. Coalition forces had already left theirother Iraqi bases in January. Washington said on September 23 that the drawdownwas running on schedule under the plan agreed with Baghdad in 2024 to move to abilateral security relationship.

A Gap, Not AVacuum

Ahmedal-Sharifi, an Iraqi strategic expert, told Shafaq News that the withdrawalwill leave real gaps in Iraq's combat and technical capabilities. “Manpoweralone does not win modern wars. They turn increasingly on technology,surveillance, electronic warfare and advanced systems,” he argued.

He separatesthe end of the coalition's mission from the end of American power in the MiddleEast. The coalition was formed in 2014 to fight ISIS and has been shrinkingsince 2017, he noted. “What matters is whether US support continues.”

US troopsand aircraft stationed elsewhere in the Middle East can still back Iraq withsurveillance, electronic warfare and air support if needed. For that reason,al-Sharifi rules out a complete vacuum.

Even so, hecalls Erbil's fears justified. The KRI was attacked by both Turkiye and Iranwhile American troops were present. It will now depend more heavily on Iraqiinstitutions that, in his words, remain unable to deter every form of attack.“The Peshmerga cannot carry that burden alone,” he said, adding that theconstitution defines them as a force for protecting the Kurdistan Region, whiledefending Iraq's airspace and sovereignty falls to the federal Ministry ofDefense.

MohammedZangana, a political analyst based in Erbil, is less reassured. The withdrawalshould have come with a defense system able to protect Iraq's airspace,borders, and territory, insulated from political rivalries, he told ShafaqNews, tracing Erbil's anxiety to three things: Baghdad has offered no clearguarantees for the KRI, the political process remains fragile, and power andweapons are spread across too many hands.

He points to2011, when US forces left. Three years later, ISIS swept across a third ofIraq. The Inspector General report separately warned of the risk of an ISISresurgence following mass prison escapes in neighboring Syria.

TheBarzanis' Warning

MasoudBarzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which leads the KRIgovernment, made the same comparison on Al Sharqiya television on Sunday. Herecalled the debate in 2011 over whether Iraqi forces could take fullresponsibility for security. The Americans left, ISIS emerged three yearslater, and Baghdad had to seek international help again, he said, whileacknowledging that conditions today differ.

PM MasrourBarzani told the Financial Times that the withdrawal comes at a highlysensitive time and warned against leaving the KRI without adequate airdefenses. His office later accused the newspaper of misrepresenting hisremarks. It said his core concern was the lack of defensive means and repeatedthat the attacks had come from Iran and from "militias" inside Iraq.

Alial-Bidar, an Iraqi political analyst, told Shafaq News that Kurdish fears arewell founded, and that parts of the Sunni public and political class sharethem, given the turbulence across the Middle East and Iraq's own securityrecord. “The Barzanis' warnings deserve serious study,” he said, callingMonday's attack in Erbil province proof that the threat has not passed, andIraq may need American support again if its forces fall short of fullreadiness.

Beyond TheWithdrawal

HaithamNumaan, a public relations assistant professor at the University of Exeter,sees Erbil's calculations shaped by Syria. He singles out the dissolution ofthe Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led force that controlled muchof northeast Syria, and its integration into the new Syrian state. “Relationswith Baghdad also hinge on divisions inside Kurdish politics,” he told ShafaqNews, where the KDP and its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), takedifferent approaches to the federal government.

Thewithdrawal has exposed that divide. While KDP leaders have issued publicwarnings, the PUK has not officially voiced similar concern. Party members,speaking to the press, have instead described a different strategy. The PUK,they say, prefers balanced and less confrontational relations with Iran and itsallies in Baghdad, to keep the KRI from becoming a battleground for regionalscore-settling. In their view, the KRI's real guarantee after the withdrawallies not in a lasting American military presence but in resolving outstandingdisputes with Baghdad over public-sector salaries, the budget and theadministration of disputed territories such as Kirkuk, alongside reliablesecurity coordination between the Iraqi army and the Peshmerga.

Geographyhelps explain the gap. The American military presence was concentrated in Erbilprovince, the KDP's heartland, at Harir Air Base and Erbil airport, near the USConsulate. The PUK's base in al-Sulaymaniyah hosted no comparable US presence,so the withdrawal is felt most directly in Erbil. Al-Sulaymaniyah has notescaped the drones, however. Komala's camps in the province have been among thetargets.

Numan alsolinks the American debate over Iraq's "Balkanization" to disarmament.Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned last week that Iraq must disarm itsfactions to avoid that outcome. Numan reads the warning not as a call forpartition but as a warning against fragmented state institutions and competingcenters of security and political power, and as pressure to bring weapons heldoutside official institutions under state control.

Baghdad'sAnswer

Politicalforces in Baghdad reject the idea of a security vacuum. Fahad al-Jubouri, aleader in the al-Hikma Movement, a member of the Coordination Framework, theprincipal Shiite political alliance and a central force in governmentformation, told Shafaq News that the timetable for ending the coalition missionwas debated and agreed within the State Administration Coalition, thecross-sectarian alliance that formed the government. “The government is workingto strengthen control of Iraq's airspace and is buying air-defense systems.Iraq's security, intelligence and logistics institutions can handle internalthreats, and concerns will fade once the deadline passes.”

Bothcapitals point to signs of consolidation. Last week, Baghdad reached anagreement with Turkiye to take gradual control of the Zilkan base in Bashiqa, aTurkish military installation northeast of Mosul. In Erbil, a Sept. 21 ceremonyformally placed Peshmerga units under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs,marking a major step in a years-long effort to unify forces historicallydivided between KDP- and PUK-aligned commands.

Neither stepfully answers Erbil's central question. Al-Zaidi's initial 90-day phase runsuntil late December, followed by a weapons-control process scheduled toconclude by June 30, 2027. In the meantime, the Kurdistan Region will dependincreasingly on federal institutions for air defense while negotiationscontinue over weapons held by factions that Kurdish officials have blamed forrepeated attacks on the Region.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq's armed factions sit at the center of a Middle East war, experts say

Mon, 28 Sep 2026 22:38:35 +0000

Shafaq News

On Sept. 30, the US-led Global Coalition's military missionin Iraq is scheduled to end, marking a transition toward a bilateral securityrelationship between Baghdad and Washington. Six analysts interviewed by ShafaqNews say the country it leaves behind is the most exposed battleground in aregional war that no longer runs along a single front.

The experts broadly agree that the Middle East has entered aphase of multi-front escalation. They see the main danger not in one decisiveconfrontation but in the way violence now moves between Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,Yemen, the Gulf and the Red Sea. A strike in one place can trigger a responsein another, often through armed groups that no government fully controls.

Since war broke out between the United States and Iran onFebruary 28, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has fallen sharply. Trafficthrough Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow passage between Yemen and the Horn of Africa,has also suffered under attacks by Yemen's Houthi movement.

In Iraq, many of the factions operate through formationswithin the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-funded securityinstitution established during the 2014 fight against ISIS and dominated byShiite formations. Several of those factions keep close ties to Tehran. Theirpolitical wings sit inside the Coordination Framework, the principal Shiitepolitical alliance and a central force in government formation. Prime MinisterAli Falih al-Zaidi took office after the November 2025 elections. He is nowtrying to keep Iraq out of the war while negotiating the disarmament of groupsthat answer only partly to his government.

No Longer One Bloc

Firas Elias, a professor of international relations at theUniversity of Mosul, argues that treating the region's armed groups as aunified front is now analytically wrong. Their goals, capabilities anddependence on state sponsors differ too widely.

Elias describes three overlapping circles. The first is Iranand the groups aligned with it in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. The second isIsrael, which relies increasingly on direct military force. The third is theUnited States, still the most influential outside military power in the region.Turkiye, the Gulf states and Syria each play their own, uneven roles alongsidethem. These circles now link the Gulf and Hormuz to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, andthe Red Sea. With so many militias, regular armies, foreign bases, oilinstallations and shipping lanes packed into one theater, he warns that asingle "miscalculation" could push the conflict onto a differentlevel. A strike on a strategic facility or one that causes mass casualtieswould be enough.

He places Iraq at the top of the risk list. The country sitsbetween the warring parties, and some of its factions hold missiles and drones.“Any attack launched from Iraqi territory therefore reaches directly intoBaghdad's relations with Washington, Tehran and the Gulf.”

For Elias, the real challenge is not only keeping Iraqi soilout of the war. It is whether the Iraqi state can hold a monopoly over thedecision to use force and stop the country from becoming a military extensionof wider regional conflicts. He adds that if the fighting reaches energyinfrastructure or shipping routes, the security crisis would become an economicone. Freight and insurance costs would rise, oil exports would be disrupted,and supply chains would break.

Adnan al-Kinani, an Iraqi security expert, argues that thewar has outgrown its three main protagonists: the United States, Israel andIran. It has spread to fronts where their allies and partners operate. He namesthe Houthis, Iraq's factions and Lebanon's Hezbollah as potential backup frontsif the war with Iran widens. In his reading, fighting in Syria and Lebanon haseased compared with elsewhere. Yemen, by contrast, has become more closely tiedto the regional confrontation, particularly as Saudi Arabia takes a more activerole against the Houthis. He also places the conflict within a wider climate ofglobal tension, noting that the war in Ukraine carries its own risks for energymarkets and the world economy.

Iran's relationships with the groups are not identical.Hezbollah has maintained a particularly close ideological, financial, andmilitary relationship with Tehran for decades, while the Houthis retain a moredistinct political and religious identity despite extensive cooperation withIran. In both cases, Iranian support has extended their reach well beyondnational borders.

Players Outside The Axis

Sami Salam, a political researcher, argues that Turkiye,Saudi Arabia and a transformed Syria make any two-camp reading of the regionmisleading. He points to the agreement between al-Zaidi and Turkish PresidentRecep Tayyip Erdogan, reached on Sept. 23 on the sidelines of the UN GeneralAssembly in New York. Under the deal, control of the Bashiqa/Zilkan base, aTurkish military installation northeast of Mosul, will pass gradually to theIraqi government. The two leaders also agreed on steps to restore stateauthority in Sinjar, the Yazidi-majority district where Ankara has longdemanded the removal of armed groups it regards as foreign and banned.

Salam says Saudi Arabia has become a more direct securityactor. Syria now weighs heavily in Iraq's calculations, he adds, especially asregional trade and energy routes shift. Since Bashar al-Assad fell in December2024, the transitional leadership under Ahmed al-Sharaa has widened Damascus'sArab and Western ties. On Aug. 24, Washington formally removed Syria from itslist of state sponsors of terrorism, building on broader sanctions reliefintroduced earlier. The experts argue that Syria no longer serves as the landbridge in Iran's regional network that it did under al-Assad. That changereshapes the calculations of factions operating across the Iraqi-Syrian border.

Asef Melhem, director of the JSM Center for Research andStudies in Moscow, expects Washington to scale back its Middle East presenceafter years of direct involvement. The mounting cost of unresolved conflicts,from Gaza and Lebanon to Yemen, Iran, and Iraq's factions, is blurring USstrategy for the region's future, he argues. Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,Egypt, Iran and Israel would each try to fill the resulting vacuum.

Melhem does not expect any regional alliance to replace theUS role. Instead, he warns that the competition could turn into indirectrivalry fought through local allies. Without a regional settlement, thatrivalry would keep the region unstable and carry it onto new fronts.

The Weapons Question

Salam says not all factions share al-Zaidi's goal ofneutrality. Some have already handed over their weapons or begun integratinginto state institutions. Others keep their arms, remain tied to Iranpolitically and ideologically, and argue that continuing regional threatsjustify what they call "resistance weapons."

The holdouts include Kataib Hezbollah, whose political wing,the Hoqooq Movement, holds six seats in parliament. They also include KataibSayyid al-Shuhada, whose Muntasiroun bloc won about five seats within the Stateof Law coalition led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Harakatal-Nujaba, which has no parliamentary wing, completes the group. On Sept. 4,al-Nujaba reaffirmed that it would not give up its arms. The holdouts tie anyhandover to a full withdrawal of foreign forces, and some also demand defenseguarantees, including stronger Iraqi air defenses.

Other factions have shown more willingness to work with thestate. They include Asaib Ahl al-Haq, whose Sadiqoon bloc won 27 seats in the2025 vote. Another is Saraya al-Salam, the armed wing of cleric Muqtadaal-Sadr's movement, which boycotted the elections. The third is Kataib al-ImamAli, which leads the five-seat Khadamat Alliance.

The timetable has evolved. Sept. 30 was initially treated byIraqi political forces as a key deadline for bringing factional weapons understate control, but al-Zaidi has since outlined a phased process extending toJune 30, 2027. Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said on Sept. 25 that thegovernment is drafting a new plan to bring unlicensed weapons under statecontrol while talks with the factions continue.

Even within the Coordination Framework, the approach hascritics. A source in the alliance told Shafaq News on Sept. 23 that fixing ahard deadline could complicate negotiations with faction leaders.

The US-led Coalition's forces have been withdrawing fromtheir remaining mission sites as Baghdad and Washington transition toward abilateral security relationship. Iraq says its forces can manage internalsecurity and the remaining ISIS threat, while intelligence sharing, trainingand arms cooperation are expected to continue.

Beyond Security

Ahmed Fouad Anwar, a professor of Israeli studies at Egypt'sAlexandria University, sees risks on two levels. At home, any securitybreakdown or delay in payments owed to some armed groups could spill intoIraq's internal security. Abroad, the factions' behavior will track thepressure on Iran. He argues that ordinary Iraqis would be the first to feel anywider shock through fuel prices, flight disruptions and insurance costs.“Because so many outside powers are involved, disarming the factions will alsorequire broader regional arrangements. It may even require a review of Iraq'spolitical and constitutional framework.”

From Beirut, political analyst Hussein Chaito argues thatIraq's geography and the overlapping presence of regional powers on its soilmake it impossible to separate from events around it. He considers Iraq a keyfront for Iran's allies and sees the dispute over weapons as inseparable fromthe US presence and the regional balance of power. He describes the standoffbetween the government and the factions as a fire smoldering beneath thesurface, though he believes dialogue can still prevent armed confrontation. Hestresses the role of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's senior Shiitecleric in Najaf, in calming public anger and preventing a slide into internalconflict. Iraq's stability, he concludes, is essential to the stability of theregion as a whole.

Al-Zaidi's 90-day phase runs until late December. Thatperiod covers the first weeks after the Coalition mission ends and a US-Iranwar that shows no sign of ending. The plan is built around factions refrainingfrom attacks. Whether that restraint survives a sharper escalation against Irancould shape not only Iraq's internal stability, but the wider regionalconflict.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Houthi official cites ‘private channels’ with Iraqi factions

Sun, 27 Sep 2026 21:24:23 +0000

Shafaq News

Abdulaziz Bin Habtour, a member of Sanaa’s Houthi-run Supreme Political Council and former prime minister, said Saudi vessels are excluded from guarantees for passage through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and confirmed continuing coordination with Iraqi political and armed groups through “private channels.”

In an interview with Shafaq News, Bin Habtour also said Houthi authorities would continue military mobilization and work to develop a “war economy” in areas under their control.

Bin Habtour, who also serves as deputy head of the General People’s Congress in Sanaa, discussed Red Sea shipping, coordination among members of the “Axis of Resistance”, a regional network that includes the Houthis, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and several Iraqi armed factions, and prospects for de-escalation in Yemen amid widening fighting on the western coast and rising tensions with Saudi Arabia.

“Private Channels”

Bin Habtour said members of the “Axis of Resistance” coordinate politically, through the media, and on security and military matters, while maintaining that each party decides its level of involvement based on its own circumstances, capabilities and leadership.

Asked specifically about contacts between Sanaa and Iraqi political forces and armed factions, he said the groups’ leaders were in “continuous and ongoing coordination” through “private channels.”

He did not identify the Iraqi groups involved or clarify the extent of any military coordination.

On Iraq’s debate over bringing weapons under state control and reserving decisions on war and peace for the government, Bin Habtour praised Iraqi armed factions for their role in fighting ISIS and described their weapons as a “firm guarantee for protecting Iraq.”

He also criticized figures within Iraqi state institutions, claiming some could “leave the country” if ISIS mounted another major attack.

His remarks come as the Iraqi government moves ahead with plans to bring faction weapons under state control. Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi has outlined an initial 90-day period during which factions would refrain from attacks, followed by phased weapons handovers, with the process targeted for completion by June 2027.

The sovereignty debate has also become entangled with tensions between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

After drones struck Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline, Riyadh said they had been launched from Iraq. Baghdad opened an investigation, and the spokesman for Iraq’s commander-in-chief later said the attacks had originated from a site in Maysan province. The government removed the commander of Maysan Operations Command and formed an investigative panel.

Asked about governments’ responsibility to prevent their territory from being used to attack other countries, Bin Habtour did not directly address the question. Instead, he criticized the presence of US military bases in Arab states and accused Arab governments of siding with Israel.

He also accused Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states of funding ISIS and other armed groups, without providing evidence for the allegations during the interview.

Bab Al-Mandeb

Bin Habtour described security in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb as “stable and safe,” saying forces under the Sanaa authorities guarantee the passage of global trade through the strait, except for Saudi vessels.

His description also contrasts with the UN'sassessment of an increasingly volatile security environment around Babal-Mandeb. On Sept. 15, UN Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari told theSecurity Council that fighting had intensified along Yemen's west coast andthat Houthi advances had heightened concerns over the strategic waterway,although commercial shipping flows at the time appeared largely unaffected. The IMO said four seafarers were killed in a Houthi attack on a merchant vessel on August 11 and urged shipping operators to assess risks before transiting the region.

War Economy

Asked about prospects for de-escalation and a renewed political process in Yemen, Bin Habtour offered no specific conditions for ending the escalation or a plan for restarting negotiations.

Instead, he called on forces allied with Sanaa to continue confronting their opponents amid the regional conflict and praised Iran and other members of the “Axis of Resistance.”

Another official in the Sanaa authorities, Zaid Al-Gharsi, previously told Shafaq News that an end to attacks on Saudi Arabia depended on ending the war and lifting what the Houthis describe as a blockade. He accused Riyadh of retreating from understandings over a peace roadmap.

Saudi Arabia rejects accusations that it has obstructed a settlement and holds the Houthis responsible for the latest escalation.

Efforts to establish a peace roadmap date to commitments announced by the United Nations in December 2023, including a nationwide ceasefire, payment of public-sector salaries, resumption of oil exports, reopening roads and easing restrictions on Sanaa airport and Hodeidah port. Those commitments have yet to produce a settlement ending the conflict.

Looking ahead, Bin Habtour said the Sanaa authorities would focus on maintaining their military and security capabilities, strengthening the domestic front, continuing “popular military mobilization” and developing a “war economy” to support the fighting.

The escalation has taken a growing toll on civilians. The UN refugee agency said on September 22 that intensified fighting, particularly along Yemen’s western coast, had displaced more than 130,000 people inside the country.

Arms and ballots: Iraq's armed factions test constitutional boundaries

Sat, 26 Sep 2026 16:57:26 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraq has around 340 licensed political parties, but real power rests with 10 to 15 parties and coalitions, and more than half of those are tied, directly or indirectly, to armed factions or security formations with political loyalties. The overlap blurs the constitutional boundary between armed institutions and political activity just as Baghdad moves ahead with efforts to bring faction weapons under state control.

Parties linked to armed groups hold ministries and parliamentary seats and help decide who governs. Iraq's legal framework, meanwhile, prohibits militias outside the armed forces and restricts political parties from maintaining links to armed formations. The challenge for Iraqi lawmakers, and for Washington, which has pressed Baghdad to bring weapons under state control, is whether the state can enforce those rules on political actors that are themselves part of the governing system.

From One Party To Hundreds

Before 2003, Iraq was a one-party state. The Baath Party of Saddam Hussein controlled political life and allowed no real competition. The US-led invasion that toppled Saddam in April 2003 opened the field, and the 2005 constitution established a multiparty system built on the peaceful transfer of power.

The sectarian shape of Iraq's armed politics has roots in the Baath era. Shia Muslims, who make up most of Iraq's population, were largely excluded from power, and their opposition movements were driven underground or into exile. When Shia-led uprisings swept southern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, government forces crushed them with large-scale atrocities against civilians, according to Human Rights Watch. Several of today's factions grew out of that opposition.

The Badr Organization began in the early 1980s as the Iran-based armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, then the main exiled Shia opposition party. That history helps explain why Shia factions form the largest and most visible part of Iraq's armed politics. It does not, however, resolve their status under the constitution and the parties’ law, neither of which distinguishes between communities.

Legal expert Faisal Rikan told Shafaq News that the abrupt shift from single-party rule to open pluralism produced a flood of new movements and parties. In the years that followed, it also produced armed wings.

“Some parties kept fighters to protect themselves and spread their ideas,” Rikan said, even though the constitution clearly prohibits militias outside the armed forces.

What the Law Says

Article 9 of the constitution requires the armed forces and security services to reflect Iraq's communities without discrimination, places them under civilian authority, and states that they shall not be used to suppress the Iraqi people, interfere in political affairs, or play any role in the transfer of power. Its second clause states: “The formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is prohibited.” Another provision restricts members of the armed forces from running for political office or campaigning for candidates while preserving their right to vote.

The Political Parties Law No. 36 of 2015 goes further. Article 8(3) stipulates that a party's founding and activity “shall not take the form of military or paramilitary organizations,” and that a party may not be linked “to any armed force.” The law also provides mechanisms for legal action against parties that engage in military or paramilitary activity or use violence in politics.

Rikan said those provisions have not been effectively enforced against the major political forces associated with armed factions.

When the Factions Entered Parliament

Political researcher Muhannad al-Janabi traces the problem to the earliest years after 2003, when armed groups that had opposed Saddam were absorbed into the new order, followed by a period of proliferating factions and militias. Al-Janabi rejects the idea that this is a passing irregularity, calling it “a dilemma in the Iraqi political system.”

He identifies the 2018 elections as the turning point. Factions tied to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-funded umbrella of mostly Shia armed groups formed in 2014 to fight ISIS and later incorporated by law into Iraq's security structure, entered parliament through political fronts while retaining armed formations.

That, al-Janabi told Shafaq News, created a major constitutional and legal problem. The PMF's legal status makes the issue particularly complex: its formations operate within a state-recognized security institution, while political organizations associated with some of those formations compete in elections and hold parliamentary seats.

The November 2025 elections cemented the pattern. Five Shia factions with armed wings now hold roughly 61 seats in the 329-member parliament, nearly a fifth of the chamber. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, sits through its Sadiqoon bloc with 27 seats, and one of its lawmakers, Adnan Fayhan, serves as first deputy speaker. The Badr Organization of Hadi al-Amiri holds 18 seats. Kataib Hezbollah's political wing, Hoqooq, holds six. Kataib Imam Ali, led by Shibl al-Zaydi, sits through its Khadamat bloc with five, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, led by Abu Alaa al-Walai, holds about five through its Montasiroun list, which runs inside former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition.

All five belong to the Coordination Framework, the alliance of Shia parties that has dominated government formation since 2022, and all five field brigades inside the PMF. Their fighters draw state salaries through the PMF, while their political representatives sit in the legislature that sets the institution's budget and legal framework.

The Framework itself is not uniformly armed: the State of Law of Nouri al-Maliki, the al-Hikma Movement of Ammar al-Hakim, and the Reconstruction and Development Coalition of former prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani have no armed wings, yet they govern alongside faction-linked political forces.

A further group sits outside the formal political system. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, led by Akram al-Kaabi, along with Saraya Awliya al-Dam and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, operate as armed factions with no registered political wing. That places them outside the direct reach of provisions in the parties law governing registered political organizations, leaving their armed status to be addressed through the wider constitutional and security framework.

The result, in al-Janabi's analysis, is a class of political actors that combines parliamentary influence with armed power. He argues that sovereignty can be eroded from within as well as from outside once armed groups can shape official decisions on security and politics.

“How freely can the commander-in-chief of the armed forces decide the fate of formations associated with parties in his own governing coalition?” he questioned.

Beyond One Community

The pattern is not confined to Shia factions. The PMF also absorbed Sunni tribal forces, known as the Tribal Mobilization, along with Christian, Turkmen, Shabak, and Yazidi units. The Babylon Movement, led by Rayan al-Kildani, controls the PMF's 50th Brigade and won four of the five parliamentary seats reserved for Christians in 2021; in the 2025 elections, the group dominated Christian quota seats. Much of its fighting force and voter base comes from Shia communities rather than Christian ones, and the Chaldean Catholic Church has publicly distanced itself from the group.

In the Kurdistan Region (KRI), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) historically maintained Peshmerga forces organized largely along party lines. The Kurdistan Regional Government has since moved to bring those forces under the unified command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, formally announcing completion of that process in September 2026. The Peshmerga also differ legally from militias outside the state structure because the Iraqi constitution recognizes the KRI's security forces.

Shia factions nevertheless account for the most significant intersection between faction-linked political representation and the PMF itself, where several Iran-aligned groups have maintained substantial influence.

The Vocabulary of Retreat

Al-Janabi points to a quieter shift in how the issue is discussed. The official Arabic formula, usually translated as “confining weapons to the state,” once implied full disarmament. In his reading, the political conversation has since drifted toward “regulating weapons,” a lower ceiling that leaves the arms in place and changes only who supervises them.

“Iraq needs disarmament, not merely the confinement of weapons,” he said.

The distinction matters because recent pledges fit both readings. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, sworn in on May 14, 2026, made state control of arms a central commitment. After Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr dissolved his Saraya al-Salam armed group and placed it under state control, other factions followed. Asaib Ahl al-Haq said it would leave the PMF and place its weapons under state control, as Kataib Imam Ali had done. If implemented, those moves would end the dual status of both factions' fighters.

Others were less clear. Kataib Hezbollah said it supported handing over weapons to the state but attached conditions, including the complete withdrawal of US forces from Iraqi territory and airspace, guarantees against their return, an end to “American influence” over the country's political and economic decisions, the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Iraq, and the dissolution of the Peshmerga.

Those conditions make any immediate disarmament contingent on demands extending well beyond the government's weapons initiative. Al-Nujaba rejected the initiative outright.

Both positions illustrate al-Janabi's point: “handing over” and “disarming” are not the same act.

Economic Reach

Political researcher Abdul Qader al-Nayel argues the problem has moved beyond legal violations into the character of the political system itself. The system, he told Shafaq News, breaches the parties’ law in practice, and two decades of tolerance have produced what he calls “statelets” with military, economic, political, and media power of their own.

He attributes this to weak state institutions and the leverage armed groups hold over political and economic decisions. His prescriptions reach beyond the weapons: closing the “economic offices” run by armed parties, some of which are accused of pressuring merchants, contractors, and business owners; addressing foreign armed groups operating on Iraqi soil; and requiring the Independent High Electoral Commission to bar any party proven to have an armed wing from running for office.

Al-Nayel also proposes a path for the fighters themselves, either reintegration into state institutions or civilian alternatives.

A political source previously told Shafaq News that a government proposal envisaged absorbing around 35,000 faction members into the army, police, and Counter Terrorism Service in exchange for surrendering their weapons. Baghdad also plans to continue its weapons buyback program. The proposed state monopoly bill, as currently drafted, would not affect the Kurdish Peshmerga.

Washington's Timetable

The domestic legal argument now runs alongside external pressure. Al-Zaidi instructed officials in August to draft legislation regulating the possession and use of weapons by state institutions as part of a broader effort to establish a state monopoly over arms.

The timetable has since stretched substantially. What was initially presented as a Sept. 30 deadline has evolved into a staged process that al-Zaidi says should be completed by June 30, 2027.

Meeting US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly this week, al-Zaidi renewed his government's commitment to restricting weapons to state institutions. US officials have also continued to press Baghdad over the role of armed factions and weapons outside direct state control.

What the Law Cannot Yet Reach

Every expert who spoke to Shafaq News located the solution in enforcing laws Iraq already has, not simply writing new ones. Rikan warned that any party whose armed wing remains outside the legal framework could face constitutional and legal accountability.

The difficulty lies in applying those provisions to a political system in which faction-linked parties hold parliamentary seats, senior positions and roles in government formation, while armed factions without political wings sit outside the parties’ law altogether.

Weapons handed to the state can be counted, catalogued, and verified. Determining whether a political party has truly severed its relationship with an armed force is harder, and Iraq's institutions will have to make that determination while some of the parties concerned hold seats within those same institutions.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Rubio's "Balkanization" warning links Iraq's armed factions to the country's unity

Fri, 25 Sep 2026 16:32:00 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has linked Iraq'sarmed factions to what he called the “Balkanization” of the country, arguingthat bringing all weapons under government control would end the presence ofindependent forces operating outside a unified state command. The warning tiesthe fate of Iraq's armed factions to the integrity of the Iraqi state moreexplicitly than Washington has before, and it comes days before September 30,the scheduled end of the Global Coalition's military mission in Iraq.

Until now, Washington had framed disarmament largelyas a question of sovereignty and Iranian influence. Rubio'slanguage moves it into the territory of state survival. In Baghdad, politiciansand analysts who spoke to Shafaq News broadly accept that the country's manysources of arms threaten a unified security decision. They disagree sharply onhow close Iraq is to breaking apart, and several argue that the more realisticdanger is not partition but a confrontation over who controls the state.

Readmore: Iraq caught between US-Iran war and September 30 deadline

A Deadline That Moved

Rubio spoke to reporters in New York on Wednesday onthe sidelines of the UN General Assembly, after he and President Donald Trumpeach met Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi. He said Washington had no doubtabout al-Zaidi's commitment to disarming the factions but described the task asmassive and difficult.

By his count, at least three armed groups had disarmedand joined state institutions, while at least one had been far lesscooperative. Completing the process, he said, would mean Iraq no longer had"independent forces operating and balkanizing the country."

Readmore: Iraq factions resist disarmament as coalition exit nears

That timetable has since changed. Sept. 30 remains thescheduled end of the coalition's military mission and is now expected to markthe announcement of a weapons-control program, while al-Zaidi has set June 30, 2027,as the target for completing the disarmament process.

The factions at the center of the debate are mostlyShia groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). At least five of themalso hold seats in parliament through political wings. Their responses todisarmament have varied. Some have pledged to hand over their weapons, Kataib Hezbollahhas offered to take custody of drones and missiles rather than surrender them,and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba has rejected the process outright.

The term Rubio chose carries a specific memory. TheBalkans became shorthand for violent fragmentation after Yugoslavia broke apartin wars between 1991 and 1999, leaving seven states where there had been one.In Iraq, the word evokes a long-standing fear that the country could splitalong Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish lines.

Too Many Centers Of Force

Khalid Sido, a member of the Iraqi parliament'sSecurity and Defense Committee, said that the problem extends beyond thefactions. The presence of multiple armed actors, including the US-led coalitionand Turkish forces, “weakens the state's monopoly on force and creates spacefor competition over influence and political pressure.” Turkiye maintainsmilitary bases in northern Iraq for its campaign against the Kurdistan Workers'Party (PKK), a Kurdish militant group it has fought for decades.

Multiple centers of force, Sido said, "reduce thevalue of a unified security decision" and weaken Iraq's position with itsneighbors and the international community. He backed al-Zaidi's efforts toregulate weapons so that security decisions rest with the government alone. Healso warned against underestimating the risk of fragmentation, while notingthat Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which administers thesemi-autonomous Kurdish north, share intelligence and coordinate on security.

Division Before Fragmentation

Political and strategic researcher Ziad al-Arar ranksthe threats differently. Political division comes first, he said, particularlywhen factional interests override the public good. Rising sectarian rhetoricfollows, then weapons outside state control and foreign interference.

Uncontrolled weapons, in al-Arar's analysis, havebecome a regional and international concern that can deter investment and turnIraq into a target for military and political strikes. He sees the competinginfluence of Washington and Tehran as a separate pressure, pulling the countrybetween opposing external interests.

He stops short of Rubio's conclusion. Iraq, he argued,is not at the point of Balkanization, because tribal networks, securitycapabilities, and a judiciary that protects the state and the constitutionstill act as brakes. “Rubio's warning is a message to Iraq's political classabout its responsibility to fix the situation, not as a forecast that partitionis imminent.”

A Contest Over The State

Security expert Ahmed al-Sharifi rejects theBalkanization framing more firmly. Iraq faced a graver test in 2014, he said,when army units collapsed, and ISIS seized large areas, and the countryrecovered. He sees no direct risk of partition.

The more likely scenario, in his view, is a politicaland security clash over the shape of the state and control of its decisions,especially if some factions keep refusing to hand over their weapons or iftalks break down. “Should dialogue fail, the dispute could lead toconfrontation between state institutions and armed groups, with social andpolitical constituencies mobilizing behind either side.”

Al-Sharifi links the outcome to factors beyond Iraq'sborders, particularly negotiations between the United States and Iran, arguingthat any understanding between them could lower the temperature across theregion.

He also shifts the focus from the weapons to thepeople who will command the reorganized security institutions. Thoseinstitutions, he argued, must be freed from muhasasa, the post-2003 system thatdistributes state posts among parties along sectarian and ethnic lines.Reproducing those divisions inside the security services would weaken commandand control, a failure he identifies as a cause of their collapse in 2014.

Security expert Sarmad al-Bayati also considerspartition unlikely, pointing out that Iraq has survived harder periods withoutbreaking apart. The balances and pressures among Shia, Sunni, and Kurdishforces, he said, work against any scenario of division. His concern lies withwhat follows the coalition's exit, which could invite “greater interferencefrom various parties seeking to shape Iraq's politics.” The government'sability to keep control, al-Bayati said, will determine whether disputes staypolitical or become a security conflict.

Readmore: Establishing a Sunni Region in Iraq based on Kurdistan's model

Unity On Map, Division In Chain Of Command

The Iraqi voices in this debate reject Rubio's word,but none expects Iraq to split into separate states. Each describes a riskinside the state itself: rival centers of force, security institutions dividedby party quotas, and decisions on war and peace made in more than one place.

That distinction sharpens the issue facing Baghdad.Bringing the factions into state institutions could end their independence, orit could carry their loyalties into the institutions that absorb them.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq’s “copy-and-paste republic” takes toll on journalism, creativity

Thu, 24 Sep 2026 16:30:01 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraq’s digital media landscape is exposing a wideninggap between intellectual property rights guaranteed by law and the ability toenforce them online.

Journalists, intellectuals, content creators andemerging media institutions increasingly complain of articles, investigations,photographs and videos being copied and republished without permission orattribution.

The problem extends beyond disputes over credit. Itaffects the economics of content production, journalistic ethics and investmentin digital media, as copying and distribution tools evolve faster thaninstitutions can document violations and enforce their rights.

Media researcher Haider Shallal says the practice hasmoved beyond unprofessional conduct, warning that copy-and-paste threatens thecore of journalism. “Journalists’ efforts are stolen without attribution oradded value, while the copier gets the reach and engagement,” he told ShafaqNews.

The deeper concern, he explained, lies in weakprofessional and legal accountability, which “encourages the continuation ofthe phenomenon and creates unfair competition between those who invest inproducing content and those who simply appropriate it.” He called for strongerlegal protection, professional oversight and a culture that respectsintellectual property and journalistic sources.

The Law in the Digital Age

Iraq's copyright legislation dates to 1971 but hassince been amended, notably through Coalition Provisional Authority Order No.83 of 2004.

Copyright Law No. 3 of 1971 protects originalliterary, artistic, and scientific works, including written works, computerprograms, photographic and cinematic works, radio and television productions,sound recordings, compilations, and other forms of creative output.

The 2004 amendment extended copyright protections todigital reproduction and storage, as well as making works available to thepublic through wired or wireless means.

Online platforms have also become an important part ofcopyright enforcement. Social media platforms and YouTube employ mechanismsthat include automated content-matching systems, copyright takedown noticesunder the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), and other tools that allowrights holders to manage copyrights and submit disputes.

Zainab Rabie, head of Al-Nakheel Center for PressRights and Freedoms, regards the theft of journalistic and cultural material asone of the most prominent problems of the modern era.

The issue is not confined to Iraq, she stressed, butappears “more uncontrolled” there because of weak laws and legislation, limitedlegal deterrence, and the exploitation of the space for freedom availableonline.

Rabie urged journalists, intellectuals, artists, andspecialists to join efforts to develop legislation capable of keeping pace withthe times and protecting journalistic, intellectual and cultural achievements.The path toward such reforms, she cautioned, remains “long and complicated.”

A “Copy and Paste Republic”

In the digital environment, copyright infringement isno longer limited to reprinting a book or reproducing an article in anothernewspaper. A journalistic piece can be copied in full, broken into paragraphs,repackaged as a video or post, and distributed across dozens of pages within ashort period.

Previous media reports have documented the case of anIraqi journalist who accidentally discovered entire sections of her articlesincorporated into another person’s work without attribution. After tracking theindividual’s accounts, she found other material apparently assembled from thework of different journalists.

Journalists and intellectuals describe a problem thatextends beyond articles to poetry, prose, books, academic research, and visualworks, as well as investigative material requiring weeks or months of work.

The issue therefore reaches beyond copyright intoprofessional ethics. The traditional journalistic principle rests on verifyinginformation, attributing it to its sources, and recognizing the individualeffort behind it. Digital platforms, however, reward speed and engagement,creating incentives to reproduce trending material quickly rather than investin original reporting.

Shallal argues that the copy-and-paste culture harms“the core of journalism” by placing original producers in competition withthose who merely appropriate their work. In his view, the absence of effectiveaccountability also undermines fair competition, “as the cost of producingcontent becomes a burden on the original institution, while the copier gets aready-made product.”

The Battle over Proof

Legal action also depends on whether an allegedviolation falls within existing law. Courts cannot create offenses or penaltieswithout a legal basis.

That does not leave Iraqi courts without tools toaddress copyright violations. Existing law gives authors rights over thereproduction, adaptation, distribution and public communication of their workand provides penalties for certain infringements.

The broader difficulty in the digital environment liesin legal classification, evidence, and enforcement. Material published on asocial media platform does not necessarily disappear when an account holderdeletes it. It may remain in screenshots, archives, electronic copies, servers,or other accounts, making proof of the original publication date and theidentity of the original creator a central element in disputes.

Raad al-Mashhadani, spokesman for the IraqiJournalists Syndicate, considers the copying and republication of journalisticcontent without permission or reference to the source “a violation of therights of journalists and media institutions” and incompatible withprofessional and ethical standards.

The syndicate, he explained, treats the matterseriously but insists that individual cases be handled through professional andlegal channels, with “judgments or accusations not being made until the factsare verified.”

Al-Mashhadani added that the syndicate’s disciplinaryand monitoring committees track violations involving content theft orrepublication in ways that infringe on the rights of its owner. The committeesdocument such cases and submit them to the syndicate’s council for appropriateaction under its internal regulations and the applicable legal framework.

“Protecting rights in the digital environment alsobegins with the journalists themselves, by documenting published material andpreserving evidence related to the original content and its publication date,which helps prove rights when violations occur.”

Legislation without Enforcement

Iraq has been a member of the World IntellectualProperty Organization (WIPO) since 1976. The organization’s data shows thatIraq has national offices responsible for intellectual property, including theNational Center for Copyright and Related Rights, alongside bodies dealing withpatents and trademarks.

The legal framework extends beyond copyright toinclude Patent and Industrial Design Law No. 65 of 1970 and the law governingtrademarks and commercial indications, whose amended version WIPO lists through2010.

Yet the existence of multiple laws, with varying datesand scopes, does not by itself resolve the enforcement challenges created bythe platform-driven digital environment.

Hadi al-Marai, head of the Iraqi Observatory for PressFreedoms, argues that political dominance over public institutions has alsoweakened protections for the press and intellectual property. At the same time,he rejects placing sole responsibility on the judiciary, arguing that “it isnot fair to say that the judiciary turns a blind eye to all those intellectualviolations and infringements of rights.”

In an interview with Shafaq News, Al-Marai places muchof the responsibility on the political system, particularly the legislature,which he believes must establish enforceable rights through binding legislationand strict application of the law.

He further links the broader disorder to what hedescribes as political groups seeking to extend their influence and control thelandscape, arguing that this contributed to a situation in which intellectualproperty concepts became obscured amid the expansion of social media and moderntechnologies.

The Cost of Content

The issue extends to a journalist’s right to havetheir name attached to their work. Journalistic content has become an economicasset that requires financing.

An investigative report may involve a research andproduction team, filming, editing, travel, documents, and substantial time,while another platform can obtain the finished product simply by copying it.

Under this model, the original producer carries thecost and risk of production, while the copier can generate reach, engagementand revenue from material for which they paid nothing.

That dynamic weakens the incentive to produceexpensive work, particularly for smaller institutions that lack the resourcesavailable to larger organizations. The Iraqi Journalists Syndicate maintainsthat protecting content should not become a pretext for restricting thecirculation of information.

Al-Mashhadi stresses that “press freedom does not meanwasting the rights of the journalist or media institution,” while protection ofthose rights “should not come at the expense of freedom of information.” Headvocates a balance between the right to access information and respect for therights of content owners, alongside stronger standards of journalisticintegrity and proper attribution of information and sources.

Contracts and Creators’ Rights

Another dimension of the intellectual property debateconcerns the contractual relationship between content creators and mediainstitutions.

In a market where independent creators often havelimited bargaining power, contracts can determine who owns a work, who mayreuse, modify, or distribute it, and whether financial compensation covers onlycurrent use or also future rights.

Specialists therefore call for contracts to clearlyidentify the rights holder, licensing period, scope of use, financialcompensation, and rights of reuse, rather than leaving these matters ambiguous.

This does not mean that every agreement between aninstitution and a creator constitutes a “contract of adhesion.” However, animbalance in bargaining power can leave individual creators with limitedchoices, particularly when they depend on larger institutions for financing,distribution, or protection.

The debate remains divided over whether Iraq needs anew law or better enforcement of existing legislation.

One side argues that the current framework, despiteits age, can address some forms of infringement and that the primaryshortcomings involve documentation, enforcement, and technical expertise.Others call for a broader modernization of the system to address digital works,electronic evidence, and cross-border violations.

Digital rights advocates, meanwhile, stress thatintellectual property or cybercrime legislation must not become a tool forcriminalizing opinion or investigative journalism. They call for a cleardistinction between protecting a work against unauthorized copying and offensesinvolving political content, while advocating effective compensation andexplicit exceptions for criticism, education, and journalistic coverage.

They also call for clearer regulation of digitalevidence, including publication data, original files and platform records, andfor the use of digital fingerprints and blockchain technology in documentationwithout treating as conclusive evidence on its own.

Arab Experiences

Experiences in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt suggestthat copyright protection requires more than penalties, combining digital-userules, complaint mechanisms, technical expertise and safeguards for freedom ofexpression.

While those systems cannot simply be replicated inIraq, they offer possible models for handling digital evidence, complaints anddispute resolution.

Amid legislative delays, civil and union activismcontinues to push for digital laws that distinguish intellectual propertyprotection from political offenses and avoid vague language that could restrictopinion.

The approach seeks to protect creators from theftwithout turning copyright law into a mechanism for preventing legitimatequotation, criticism, satire or journalistic coverage.

Al-Mashhadani concludes that the syndicate “supportsany legislative or regulatory direction that contributes to strengthening theprotection of journalistic content and holding violators accountable under thelaw,” emphasizing that the rapid development of digital publishing requires areview of relevant procedures and legislation.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Kurdistan Region unifies Peshmerga, folding rival KDP and PUK forces into one army

Tue, 22 Sep 2026 09:17:30 +0000

Shafaq News

On September 21, 2026, the Kurdistan Region (KRI) publicly marked thecompletion of a long-running effort to bring the KDP- and PUK-aligned Peshmergaforces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.

The ministry had announced the formal completion of the unification onSeptember 10. The restructured force is organized under two regional commandscontaining 11 divisions, 33 brigades, and 99 battalions, but the persistence oftwo geographically distinct commands means that formal institutionalunification does not by itself prove that political influence has disappeared.

For most of the Kurdistan Region's autonomous history, the Peshmerga —Kurdishfor "those who face death," and the KRI’s legally recognized armedforce— operated as two armies with separate command structures, even after someformations had earlier been transferred into ministry structures. Unit 80answered to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by the Barzani familyfrom its stronghold across Erbil and Duhok. Unit 70 belonged to the PatrioticUnion of Kurdistan (PUK), the rival party rooted in the Talabani family's basearound al-Sulaymaniyah.

Each retained its own commanders, payrolls, and deployments. Cooperationbetween them rose and fell with the political weather between the parties. Whatthe September ceremony formally ended was the separate party headquarters, notnecessarily the party influence that grew up around them.

The public marking came nine days before September 30, the scheduled endof the remaining Global Coalition military mission in Iraq. Separately, thefour-year memorandum of understanding between the US Department of Defense andthe Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, renewed in September 2022, also reaches theend of its current term this month.

The Kurdish leadership was careful to keep the two matters apart, yetthe convergence of dates places both Baghdad and Erbil before a sharper set ofobligations than the language of unity conveys.

Inside a hall at the Kurdistan Region Presidency, decrees appointed Lt.Gen. Nijat Ali Saleh to command the First Military Zone, covering Erbil, Duhok,and their surrounding districts, and Lt. Gen. Omar Saleh Hassan to command theSecond, spanning al-Sulaymaniyah, Halabja, and their environs. PresidentNechirvan Barzani, who serves as general commander of the Peshmerga, oversawthe proceedings. He was joined by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, Deputy PrimeMinister Qubad Talabani, Peshmerga Affairs Minister Shoresh Ismail, andrepresentatives of the International Coalition and foreign missions.

The presence of Lt. Gen. Abdul Amir al-Shammari, who directs the officeof the commander-in-chief of Iraq's armed forces, signaled the federaldimension of a force whose status is layered: the constitution recognizes theKurdistan Region and its authorities, the Peshmerga holds legal standing, andit is broadly regarded as part of Iraq's wider defense architecture, withoutfalling under Baghdad's operational command.

Two zone commands survive the merger, and that has drawn a naturalobjection: one army with two headquarters could preserve the old split undernew names. Retired Lt. Gen. Sarwar Sheikh Qader, a security and militaryanalyst, rejected that reading in an interview with Shafaq News, describing thechange as an organizational and tactical shift from party-based administrationto institutional military management, and framed the neutral designations,First Zone and Second Zone, as a deliberate move to strip out partisanidentity.

“Two commands pose no problem, as long as both report to the ministrythrough a single line of command rather than to rival party headquarters,” hesaid.

President Barzani addressed the Unit 70 and Unit 80 legacy directly,casting the change as a national undertaking with more at stake than abureaucratic reshuffle. He set a demanding measure of success: each fightercoming to see the ministry as his institution and his comrade-in-arms as apartner regardless of party or region, rather than any count of units absorbedinto the new structure.

The military, he said, is no arena for party competition. Partiescontest elections; the Peshmerga is Kurdistan's force, and belongs to no singleparty. He also cautioned that the announcement opens reform rather thancompleting it, with command, training, promotions, and doctrine still to bereworked.

The path here ran along two overlapping timelines. The first began in2016, when the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs launched a reform program with theGlobal Coalition backing, led principally by the United States, the UK, andGermany, alongside the Netherlands, Italy, France, and other partners. Theeffort sought to consolidate command and control, audit personnel rolls andpayrolls, and build a more centralized military and financial administration.

The second milestone came on September 21, 2022, when the ministry andthe US Department of Defense renewed their memorandum of understanding, firstsigned in 2016, setting a four-year framework for continued US support andfurther institutional reforms. The September 21, 2026 ceremony fell on thefourth anniversary of that renewal.

The obstacles were rarely just technical. The decisive variablethroughout was the readiness of the KDP and PUK to hand real control of theirforces to the state. Presidency spokesman Dilshad Shahab conceded on the eve ofthe ceremony that political disputes had complicated the process for years.

PM Masrour Barzani called it a historic day and said the unifiedstructure now covers operations, training, command and control, communications,and financial management, with the next phase focused on advanced weaponry andair defense. He then turned the conversation to Baghdad, urging the federalgovernment to guarantee the Peshmerga's constitutional entitlements and bringits salaries and benefits in line with those of the Iraqi army. That plea forinstitutional unity in Erbil, while clear, does not settle the fiscalrelationship with the center.

In Baghdad, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi welcomed the completion of themerger, describing the consolidation of forces within constitutional and legalframeworks as a step toward national security and unified defensedecision-making.

Iraqi media outlets reported that the transition formally integratedmore than 100,000 party-affiliated fighters into the unified structure. Evenso, officials published no final tally from the payroll audit that has anchoredthe reform since 2016, and no detailed timetable for transferring authorityover appointments, promotions, armament, and deployment to the ministry.

The breakdown of how the divisions are distributed between the twocommands went unpublished, as did the degree to which former Unit 70 and Unit80 personnel are actually intermixed. As Sheikh Qader noted, that blending willdetermine whether the KRI has produced a genuinely unified army or rearrangedold formations beneath a single roof.

Kurdish officials said unification had been a condition for continuedcoalition support, presenting the merger's completion as timed to thatrequirement. By their account, Erbil met the condition at the very moment theinternational presence that underwrote it began to recede, shifting the burdenof funding, equipping, and sustaining the new structure onto Baghdad and Erbilthemselves. That burden, and the slow work of making two zones feel like oneforce, is where the harder phase of reform now begins.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iran war spreads to Iraq and Red Sea as regional risks mount

Sun, 20 Sep 2026 21:37:33 +0000

Shafaq News

The war between the United States and Iran, now in itsseventh month, has drawn Yemen, the Red Sea and Iraq into the fighting, butregional and international analysts told Shafaq News that a full regional warremains unlikely for now. They pointed to the approaching US midterm elections,Gulf pressure to calm the conflict, and the rising cost of a prolonged energycrisis as the main restraints on further expansion.

The war began on February 28, 2026, and its effects havespread over the past week to Yemen and the Red Sea, where Iran-aligned Houthiforces have made major territorial gains along Yemen's western coast and aroundBab al-Mandeb, the strategic strait linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden andIndian Ocean. The Houthis captured the Red Sea port of Mocha and Perim Island,which sits in the strait.

Iraq Tests Its Sovereignty

In Iraq, the spillover has become a direct test ofBaghdad's ability to keep its territory out of the region's wars. On September10 and 11, drones launched from Iraqi soil struck two pump stations on SaudiArabia's East-West pipeline, the line that carries crude from the kingdom'sEastern Province to the Red Sea port of Yanbu and lets it bypass the Strait ofHormuz. Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry said the drones came from Iraq and shutthe pipeline as a precaution.

Iraq's government confirmed the attacks originated on itsterritory and opened an investigation. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi removed thecommander of Maysan Operations Command and ordered an investigative council intothe command after authorities traced the launch site to the southern provincebordering Iran. He later dismissed Maysan's police chief and referredprovincial security officials for investigation.

Iraqi authorities said they reject any use of the country'sland or airspace to attack neighboring states. No group has claimedresponsibility for the attacks, and several Iraqi armed factions deniedresponsibility and offered to take part in the investigation.

The US State Department told Shafaq News that it supportsal-Zaidi's efforts to assert state authority and to prevent attacks inside Iraqor launched from its soil.

“The episode tests the government's ability to enforcesovereignty and protect Iraq's ties with its Arab neighbors at a moment whenBaghdad is trying to avoid being pulled into the regional confrontation,” Ahmedal-Sharifi, an Iraqi security analyst, said.

Energy Corridors Under Pressure

US officials have reported a sharp recovery in oil flowsthrough Hormuz, although commercial shipping trackers have producedsubstantially lower estimates. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said about 18million barrels of crude and refined products passed through the strait onSeptember 15. Independent trackers, however, have recorded far fewer vesseltransits, highlighting uncertainty over the actual volume moving through thewaterway.

The attack on the East-West line, one of the kingdom's mainalternatives to Hormuz, damaged its eighth and ninth pump stations and halted aflow of about four million barrels a day, with reports estimating that fullrepairs could take several weeks.

Samir Faraj, a retired Egyptian major general and strategicaffairs analyst, said widening the war serves no party's interest, and warnedthat disrupting shipping through Bab al-Mandeb while Hormuz is alreadyunsettled would carry broad economic costs worldwide.

Egyptian and Saudi efforts are focused for now on securingthe Red Sea, he added, pointing out that Cairo sees negotiations as “the moresuitable path and backs the Saudi approach, particularly while the UnitedStates stays out of direct combat against the Houthis.”

A Cautious Washington

Washington has kept a hand in managing the crisis whileavoiding direct combat. Reuters reported that US officials met Houthirepresentatives in Muscat to preserve an existing understanding and keep Babal-Mandeb open to shipping, and that a US military team is helping Saudi forceswith intelligence-sharing and planning without joining operations.

Military officials from the United States and Israel metthe army chiefs of several Arab states in Germany, according to Axios. Thetalks covered the war with Iran and regional security cooperation.

Mahdi Azizi, an analyst of Iranian affairs, said the Saudiand Egyptian moves and the Germany meeting do not necessarily mean the regionis heading toward all-out war. He expected the escalation to stay within"limited, lightning strikes," arguing that Washington wants quickresults and that the November congressional midterm elections make a long warof attrition more costly politically.

Bets on toppling the Iranian government have not paid off,Azizi added, and the United States has turned to other tools, among themsanctions, economic pressure and closer coordination with Arab states.

Henry Cuellar, a Democratic member of the US House ofRepresentatives, said that dealing with Iran requires both pressure and softpower, calling for tighter sanctions alongside continued humanitarian aid tothe Iranian people.

Two Tracks

Ghaleb Sarhan, a Lebanese political analyst, said theregion is moving along two tracks at once. The first is a geographic spread ofthe confrontation beyond the direct US-Iran axis, seen in the Saudi-Houthifighting in Yemen and in the Iraqi pipeline attack; the second is the limitedUS ability to widen the war under Gulf pressure, the energy crisis, and thecoming midterms.

Sarhan said regional and international powers “are tryingto avert the worst outcome but cannot fully control the course of theescalation.” He described the standoff as “a test of nerves” between Washingtonand Tehran, and argued that the most likely path is heightened mutual pressureaimed at improving the terms of an eventual political settlement.

Hazem Ayad, a Jordanian political analyst, said that theconfrontation has already widened as the fighting moved into Yemen and Babal-Mandeb, and Yemen's west coast became part of the battlefield, with effectsreaching beyond the states directly involved to regional and internationalsecurity and the economy.

“The ground situation points to further spread rather thancontainment,” he said, warning that allowing it to continue could turn aregional conflict into a chronic international one. He also noted politicalbrakes, among them the US midterms and domestic political calculations in boththe United States and Israel.

In the coming weeks, three tracks will help set the war'sdirection: the results of Iraq's investigation into the drone attack, whetherthe Muscat channel between Washington and the Houthis keeps Bab al-Mandeb open,and how long repairs to the East-West pipeline's pump stations take. Thesedevelopments will unfold as the United States approaches November's midtermelections, which several analysts interviewed by Shafaq News identified as animportant constraint on Washington's appetite for a prolonged regional war.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq signs 63 foreign deals under Al-Zaidi, but analysts doubt delivery

Fri, 18 Sep 2026 14:40:10 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Iraq's new government hassigned 63 agreements, memoranda of understanding and partnership declarationsacross six countries in barely four months, an intensive diplomatic push aimedat attracting investment and expanding Baghdad's economic partnerships. Iraqianalysts, however, warn that signing agreements is easier than turning theminto projects that deliver tangible results.

Al-Zaidi, a banker with noprior political career, took office in May 2026 as the compromise candidate ofthe Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shia political forces that includesparties with longstanding ties to Iran, after months of post-election deadlock.He inherited a fiscal emergency. The US-Iran war that erupted in late Februaryhad choked the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 90 percent of Iraqicrude flows. With oil revenues accounting for the overwhelming majority ofstate income, the disruption left the new government facing severe fiscalpressure. That pressure has added urgency to Al-Zaidi's push for foreigninvestment and alternative export routes.

The investment drive also fitsWashington's vision for the next phase of US-Iraq relations. During Al-Zaidi'sJuly visit, President Donald Trump framed the transition around a larger rolefor American companies as US forces withdraw by September 30. Al-Zaidi'sitinerary reads as an answer to that expectation.

Readmore: Iraq-US investment deals depend on implementation, experts say

The tour opened in the UnitedStates between July 13 and 17, where Iraqi and American institutions signed 48agreements across oil, electricity, technology, finance, health andagriculture, with announced deals valued at more than $60 billion. Iraq's OilMinistry later valued its agreements with US energy companies, includingChevron, Halliburton, HKN Energy and ConocoPhillips, at about $200 billion.

From Washington, Al-Zaidi flewto Qatar, met Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and signed nothing, then to Iran onJuly 23 for fourtransport and railwayaccords, but without the tanker exemptions or additional gas supply Baghdad hadgone looking for.

Turkiyefollowed with fivememoranda; Francewith six covering air defense, civil aviation and a gas protocol between theelectricity ministry and TotalEnergies; Germany,where he arrived Tuesday, is expected to produce understandings with Siemens onpower transmission.

For the parliamentary bodythat oversees such diplomacy, the ledger is already familiar. Mukhtaral-Musawi, a member of parliament's foreign relations committee, told ShafaqNews that Iraq "has not felt anything" from al-Zaidi's earlier trips,because deals in energy, arms and oil keep foundering on the absence offollow-through.

Haidar Shalal Muta'ab, aresearcher on domestic affairs, credited the government with widening Iraq'sreach and opening political and economic channels, but insisted value is notcounted in documents. The real test, he argued, is the passage from signing to"implementation, follow-up and evaluation," a passage requiringexecutive programs, timelines and accountability that most of these textssimply do not contain. He turned the point on the press as well: “coverageshould not end at the signing ceremony but track what is actually delivered.”

Firas Ilyas, a professor ofinternational relations at the University of Mosul, pointed to structuralobstacles to implementation. Iraq has converted some agreements into realgains, he acknowledged, pointing to counterterrorism cooperation and energy andtransport links that have begun to reintegrate the country into the regionaleconomy. But he drew a hard line between "signing diplomacy" and"implementation diplomacy," blaming the gap on bureaucracy, changinggovernments and priorities, a weak investment climate and Iraq's multiplecompeting centers of power.

Foreign partners, he noted, nolonger treat a signature with Baghdad as a guarantee; they want political,security and legislative stability before capital moves.

Khalid al-Ardawi, an academicand political researcher, focused on the legal nature of the agreementsthemselves. “Most of what Al-Zaidi has signed are memoranda of understanding:declarations of intent carrying no binding legal obligation.”

The French documents are hisclearest example: letters of intent in defense and corporate cooperation withnothing to guarantee they become enforceable contracts. And the obstacle, inhis telling, is not the foreign partner but “a political and security environmentfractured by corruption, the *muhasasa* system of ethno-sectarianpower-sharing, and the lack of a single, unified decision.”

Wary of committing to a statethat may not deliver, he said, some governments let their understandings lapseinto "diplomatic courtesy," and the frameworks stay "ink onpaper."

The Atlantic Council notedthis week that Al-Zaidi has only a narrow window to attract American investmentinto Iraqi oil while convincing investors that the country is a secure,commercially viable place to operate, a challenge it linked to his limited politicalauthority within a system still shaped by Iranian influence. His cabinet,meanwhile, is unfinished: parliament approved only 14 of a planned 23 ministersamid factional bargaining. The contrast is notable: while Baghdad isnegotiating new defense arrangements abroad, the Defense Ministry remains amongthe vacant cabinet portfolios at home.

Iraq has faced this problembefore: agreements announced abroad have often encountered bureaucratic,political and financial obstacles at home. This time, however, the stakes areunusually high. Oil revenues are recovering from the disruption caused by thewar, the US-led coalition's military mission is approaching its September 30end date, and Al-Zaidi is trying to attract foreign capital while completinghis cabinet.

The 63 agreements thereforeoffer a measurable test of his government's economic diplomacy. Theirsignificance will ultimately depend on how many projects Iraqi institutions canimplement at home.

Readmore: Al-Zaidi sworn in as Iraq's prime minister with program already failed

Written and edited by ShafaqNews staff.

$45B deficit looms over Iraq’s draft 2027 budget

Thu, 17 Sep 2026 11:37:12 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraq is preparing its 2027 budget against an uncertain oil market, a potential deficit of more than 60 trillion Iraqi dinars ($45.8B) and a growing list of spending commitments, with the draft still awaiting cabinet approval.

Much of the budget's final shape remains unsettled. Revenue estimates, the overall spending ceiling, the balance between operating and investment expenditure, the size of the deficit, and assumptions for oil prices and export volumes are still being worked out, Financial and Economic Adviser to Prime Minister Mudher Mohammed Saleh told Shafaq News.

"The full picture of Iraq's 2027 budget has not yet emerged until the Council of Ministers finishes discussing and approving the draft federal budget law and refers it to parliament," Saleh said.

That uncertainty carries particular weight in Iraq, where oil remains the government's main source of revenue. A shortfall in either prices or export volumes could quickly widen the gap between revenues and spending, putting additional pressure on deficit financing and investment plans.

Yet oil is only one part of the challenge facing the budget.

"The preliminary indicators suggest that the 2027 budget was designed, to a large extent, on assumptions closer to those of peacetime economies," Saleh said, pointing to benchmarks based on a financial year that predates the war and the Strait of Hormuz crisis that began on Feb. 28.

That leaves Iraq facing a broader question: whether a budget built around relatively stable conditions can absorb the economic disruption that followed, from trade and transport to energy, imports and supply chains.

For Saleh, the answer does not lie simply in increasing expenditure. Peacetime assumptions may help preserve fiscal stability, but the budget also needs enough financial room to absorb unexpected shocks. Public money, he argued, should be directed toward areas with the strongest economic and development impact rather than used broadly to offset the effects of the crisis.

Oil, however, remains the first major test of that approach. An overly optimistic forecast for crude prices or export volumes could leave the government with a larger-than-expected deficit. A forecast that is too cautious, by contrast, could squeeze funding for essential services and investment. Saleh therefore favors realistic, conservative oil assumptions, supported by alternative scenarios covering lower prices, reduced exports and unexpected spending.

Economist Nabil al-Marsoumi sees the same uncertainty over oil as one of five major obstacles facing the 2027 budget. In a social media post, he pointed to the difficulty of forecasting both prices and export volumes while the regional situation remains unsettled, particularly with the Strait of Hormuz closed and no clear indication of how long the disruption will last.

"The other immediate problem is how to finance the gap," he said, warning that the deficit could exceed 60 trillion dinars ($45.8B) at a time when domestic debt has risen sharply and the scope for securing substantial external borrowing remains limited.

"That would leave the government having to weigh new borrowing against a range of competing demands already built into the budget," he added.

Where Spending Goes

The pressure on the budget is not confined to how much money comes in. What happens to that money once it reaches the spending side will be just as important.

For Saleh, the key question is therefore not simply how large the investment budget will be, but what Iraq gets in return.

Energy, transport, water, infrastructure and public services are among the areas he sees as needing priority, alongside projects that can help the private sector expand and broaden the country's productive base.

At the same time, the government cannot set aside the cost of running the state. A continued rise in operating expenditure would leave less room for investment, while poorly targeted cuts could affect basic services.

"The real challenge facing the 2027 budget is not the size of the figures alone, but its ability to withstand changing conditions," Saleh said.

Some of those pressures are already built into the budget. Al-Marsoumi put the Kurdistan Region's share of the federal budget at 14.1%, or 29 trillion dinars ($22.1B), based on the latest population census.

The public payroll adds another layer. The budget must account for new appointments, the permanent employment of contract and daily-paid workers, as well as financial obligations owed to employees for more than a year, he said.

Al-Marsoumi also expects allocations to the Oil Ministry to rise significantly following the introduction of a new economic model for pricing oil allocated for domestic consumption.

Taken together, those commitments leave limited room for error. The government must finance salaries and services, meet existing obligations, support investment and cover any deficit while remaining heavily dependent on volatile oil revenues.

Governing On Interims

The 2027 budget is being prepared against another complication: Iraq has spent the past two years without a fully approved annual federal budget with valid spending schedules.

Parliament approved a three-year budget law covering 2023, 2024 and 2025, but the spending schedules for 2025 were not approved before the financial year ended. The Finance Ministry then relied on a temporary mechanism under the Financial Management Law, allowing spending at one-twelfth of the previous year's allocations to cover salaries and essential expenditures.

That arrangement has carried into 2026 after parliament did not approve a new budget law, amid political complications, regional tensions and fluctuations in energy markets.

The government is now working toward a new annual budget. The Finance Ministry plans to send the 2027 draft to parliament on Oct. 15, according to lawmaker Jamal Kochar, a member of parliament's Finance Committee, who spoke to Shafaq News.

The timetable is set, but the numbers are not. Saleh has stressed that the preliminary features of the budget can still change before the cabinet approves the final draft. Only then will the balance between revenues and spending, the size of the deficit, the oil assumptions and the split between operating and investment expenditure become clearer.

For now, the budget is being built within a narrow margin: enough discipline to contain the deficit, enough spending to keep the state functioning and investing, and enough financial space to absorb another economic shock.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Saudi pipeline attack deepens pressure on Al-Zaidi over armed factions

Tue, 15 Sep 2026 22:33:07 +0000

Shafaq News

Drones launched from southern Iraq struck Saudi Arabia's main oil pipeline late last week, forcing Riyadh to shut the line and handing Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi the hardest test so far of his promise to bring the country's Iran-aligned armed factions under state control. The strike turned a long-running debate over bringing faction weapons under state control, increasingly tied to the US-led coalition's September 30 departure, into an urgent problem for Iraq's relations with the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline runs about 1,200 kilometers from the oil fields of the east to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, and it has become the kingdom's main route for moving crude while Iran's pressure on the Strait of Hormuz keeps Gulf exports at risk. The drones caused casualties and damage in the Riyadh and Medina areas, and Riyadh closed the line as a precaution.

The timing sharpened the alarm: the attack came as Yemen's Houthis seized Mokha and advanced toward islands near the Bab al-Mandab strait, the Red Sea's southern gate, placing Iran-aligned forces near the two chokepoints that carry much of the region's oil. Brent crude has traded above $100 since the Yemeni offensive began.

Al-Zaidi moved within hours. An Iraqi investigation found that the attacks had been launched from Maysan, prompting him to remove the commander of the province's Operations Command and later its police chief. Iraqi authorities also temporarily closed several border crossings with Iran, including Shalamcheh, al-Sheeb, and Mandali, as they investigated security breaches. A security source later said forces had found a launch platform suspected of involvement in the attacks, while Al-Zaidi approved an Iranian request for a joint investigation into launch sites near the border. Conceding that an attack on a neighbor began on Iraqi soil is the admission Baghdad has spent years avoiding.

No group claimed the strike, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella of Iran-aligned factions, denied involvement and offered to cooperate with the government investigation. The attack nevertheless immediately intersected with the wider dispute over armed groups because it originated from Iraqi territory at a time when Baghdad is under pressure to bring all weapons under state control.

Baghdad's political leadership lined up behind the government's account. President Nizar Amedi, parliament speaker Haibet al-Halbousi, and the Kurdistan Region's presidency each rejected the use of Iraqi land or airspace against neighbors and repeated the demand to place all weapons under state authority.

Sakr al-Muhammadawi, a member of parliament's security and defense committee, told Shafaq News that a fact-finding team had reached Maysan and that its findings would set the course. He linked the country's stability to its economy and warned that the committee would stand against any foreign strike on Iraqi soil in response.

In July, the United States and Saudi Arabia struck Iran-backed fighters in Iraq after Riyadh accused the groups of launching drones at its oil facilities, killing at least 20 members of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and wounding 32, according to PMF figures —the same state-funded umbrella that houses the armed factions now at the center of the disarmament talks. A second cross-border attack raises the prospect of a repeat, this time against a government that has staked its standing on preventing exactly this.

Sami al-Murshid, a Saudi writer on international affairs, said Tehran “has spent years using allied armed groups in Iraq and Yemen to pressure Gulf states,” and that cooperation between the Houthis and the Iraqi factions has run through media, logistics, and intelligence channels.

Speaking to Shafaq News, he placed the responsibility on Baghdad to secure its borders and disarm groups outside state control, and called a state monopoly on weapons “the first step toward restoring Iraqi sovereignty.”

The Yemeni front is escalating on its own terms. Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthis' supreme political council, said Yemen was fighting Saudi Arabia to restore its independence and had imposed a naval blockade on Saudi shipping, describing the moment as escalation answered with escalation.

Abed al-Thawr, a Houthi military spokesman, said coordination among what the movement calls the axis of resistance —linking Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, the Palestinians, and Yemen— was continuing. The Houthi advance toward Bab al-Mandab, which took the port of Mokha and extended fighting toward several Red Sea islands in a week-long offensive the UN says displaced tens of thousands, has put a second major oil corridor at risk.

Ahmed al-Sharifi, an Iraqi analyst, said the operation carried meaning beyond the damage it did. “Its timing alongside the Houthi push at Bab al-Mandab signals an ability to act across a span of territory from Yemen to Iraq within a wider contest with the United States.”

Al-Sharifi told Shafaq News that a strike of this range —the targets lie hundreds of kilometers inside Saudi Arabia— needs continuous guidance and a ground-control station, “which points to sustained command on Iraqi soil rather than a single launch.” He noted that the drones flew from Maysan, a province central to Iraq's oil output, which raises questions about who controls its production zones.

Al-Zaidi has built his months in office around economic opening such as foreign investment, energy deals, and warmer relations with Washington, and al-Sharifi said an attack staged from an Iraqi oil province cut against that case directly. The attack showed how armed activity beyond effective state control could threaten Al-Zaidi's economic agenda, strain ties with Gulf states and expose Iraq to retaliation even before responsibility for the strike was established.

For now, Baghdad's response is containment. It has opened an investigation, tightened controls at several border crossings and approved an Iranian request to join a probe into launch sites near the frontier. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has agreed to refrain from responding for now while Baghdad investigates.

Those measures are meant to demonstrate the state control Al-Zaidi has promised to strengthen. But the attack has exposed the gap between that objective and conditions on the ground: Iraqi investigators say the drones were launched from Maysan, yet those responsible have not been publicly identified. A suspected launch platform has been found. The people behind the attack have not.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq caught between US-Iran war and September 30 deadline

Sun, 13 Sep 2026 22:12:57 +0000

Shafaq News- Baghdad

The maritime war between the United States and Iran flared back into open fire this week, with American forces sinking Iranian oil tankers, Tehran firing missiles at a base in Jordan that hosts US troops, and Brent crude climbing past $100 a barrel for the first time since July. Iraq is not a combatant in that war. It may be its most exposed bystander, and the escalation has arrived almost three weeks before a deadline that could decide whether it stays out.

By September 30, Iraq's new government is expected to reach a critical stage in its effort to bring weapons held by Iran-aligned factions under state control, as the US-led coalition's military mission draws to an end. The two clocks are now running against each other. A regional war that gives those factions both a cause and cover to keep their weapons is accelerating at precisely the moment Baghdad has promised Washington it will take those weapons away.

Ashraf Akka, a specialist in international relations based in Ramallah, told Shafaq News that Iraq is the most fragile state in the region under the current trajectory. “Iraq cannot easily hold the middle ground between Washington and Tehran, and its territory could become an additional theater if either its factions strike American interests or the United States and Israel retaliate inside Iraq,” he told Shafaq News.

The mechanics of that risk are already established. Since the war opened on February 28, Iran-aligned Iraqi factions grouped under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella of hardline Shia paramilitaries, several of them also folded into the state-funded Popular Mobilization Forces, have struck US facilities in Iraq and the Gulf hundreds of times, by the reckoning of Iraqi and US officials. American and Israeli airstrikes have answered by killing dozens of fighters and, in at least one case reported by Baghdad, an Iraqi army commander. The Kurdistan Region has absorbed a share of the damage, with Erbil hit repeatedly and strikes reaching hotels, telecommunications sites, and residential districts.

This week sharpened every one of those pressures. US Central Command (CENTCOM) said it destroyed three Iranian tankers on September 5 and five more on September 8, each time describing the strikes as retaliation for Iranian attempts to hit US warships.

Iran answered on September 9 with missiles aimed at the Al-Azraq base in Jordan; the Jordanian military said it intercepted 18 of 20 incoming missiles, with the rest falling in open ground and no casualties. Iran's claim to have damaged two US destroyers was denied by CENTCOM. On the same day, the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency voted 23 to 3 to refer Iran to the Security Council over its nuclear obligations, the first such move in two decades.

For Iraq, the most direct signal came at sea. A cargo ship was struck by a projectile roughly 52 kilometers southeast of al-Faw, at the mouth of the corridor through which almost all of Iraq's crude reaches the world. Iraq exports the bulk of its oil through the northern Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Traffic through the strait has thinned to around ten commodity vessels a day over the past ten days, its lowest in months, and Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, has announced a restricted maritime zone in which ships entering without permission may face Iranian penalties. A prolonged squeeze on those lanes reaches Iraqi state finances directly, since federal revenue and the stability of export routes both hinge on the security of the Gulf.

Baghdad's room to maneuver is narrow in both directions. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, whose government rests on the Shia political forces closest to Tehran, has warned that factions refusing to disarm will face terrorism charges and reaffirmed that foreign forces will leave by October 1. Washington has pressed him hard: after a drone struck a US diplomatic facility in Baghdad, the State Department summoned Iraq's ambassador and publicly faulted Baghdad for failing to prevent the attacks. Tehran has pushed the other way.

Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran's Quds Force, the arm of the Revolutionary Guard that manages relations with allied groups abroad, visited Baghdad seeking an arrangement that would let the factions retain, or merely freeze, their weapons rather than surrender them. The Badr Organization, among the oldest of those groups, has warned that forced disarmament could open the door to internal strife.

The deeper problem for Iraq is that the war it is exposed to shows no sign of ending quickly. Saleh al-Qazwini, a political analyst who follows Iranian and regional affairs, told Shafaq News that Western forecasts of Iranian collapse misread the picture: inflation and a falling currency are real, but the state's security and political institutions remain intact, and decisions taken at the top by the Supreme National Security Council or the Supreme Leader still hold.

Mahdi Azizi, an expert on Iranian affairs, made a complementary point, arguing that “economic pain has not pushed Tehran toward surrender” and that time may work against Washington as the cost of a long war mounts. “If both readings are correct, the exchange grinds on.”

Akka expects intermittent fighting of low to medium intensity, limited air strikes, attacks on ships and energy infrastructure, cyber and intelligence operations, and the activation of allied groups across the region, a scenario he judges more dangerous than a short, sharp conflict precisely because it leaves no clear line between war and peace. For Iraq, months of that ambiguity mean months in which a single faction's strike on a US target could invite a response on Iraqi soil, and in which the disarmament deadline functions less as a resolution than as a test Baghdad can neither afford to fail nor fully pass.

Al-Zaidi's task is to take the factions' weapons without triggering the internal conflict they have threatened, and to do it while a live regional war hands those same factions their strongest argument in years for keeping them.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Iraq factions resist disarmament as coalition exit nears

Sat, 12 Sep 2026 06:21:50 +0000

Shafaq News

Iraq's most powerful armed factions say they will give uptheir weapons only after the country secures full sovereignty, a condition theydo not expect to be met by the end of September. Prime Minister Ali Falihal-Zaidi has linked efforts to bring faction weapons under state control to theSeptember 30 end of the US-led Coalition's mission, arguing that the departureof foreign forces would remove one of the factions' principal justificationsfor remaining armed. Some Iran-aligned groups reject that sequence.

The clearest statement of their terms came from KataibSayyid al-Shuhada, an Iran-aligned faction inside the state-funded PopularMobilization Forces (PMF) and a group the United States designated a terroristorganization in 2023. Its spokesman, Kadhim al-Fartousi, told Shafaq News thefaction would not disarm while foreign forces and outside threats to Iraqisovereignty remained, and that its arsenal exists to defend the country ratherthan to serve any single government. The factions, he said, treat weapons andsovereignty as one bargain.

Washington’s pressure on the question is concrete. TheHouse-passed version of the US National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 2027 (H.R. 8800), which as of September 11, 2026 has not yet been enactedinto law, would limit the obligation of certain US security-assistance fundsfor the Iraqi security forces to no more than 25 percent until the Secretary ofDefense certifies that Baghdad has taken credible steps to “reduce theoperational capacity of Iran‑aligned militia groups not integrated into theIraqi security forces” through a publicly verifiable disarmament,demobilization and reintegration process; strengthen the authority andoperational control of the Prime Minister of Iraq as Commander‑in‑Chief overthe Iraqi security forces; and investigate and hold accountable members of“Iran‑aligned militias or the Iraqi security forces” who operate outside theformal chain of command and engage in attacks on US or Iraqi personnel orotherwise act in an illegal or destabilizing manner.

Alina Romanowski, the former US ambassador to Iraq, told anAtlantic Council panel in Washington that sanctions would remain Washington'smain instrument and would tighten until the United States reaches a broadersettlement with Iran.

For Baghdad, she said, the working relationship betweenal-Zaidi and President Donald Trump is the most effective way to soften thatpressure and turn it toward economic cooperation. The two met in Washingtonover the summer.

Al-Zaidi has little margin to absorb any of it. Anindependent banker with no prior senior office, he took power in May as acompromise candidate of the Coordination Framework —the alliance of Shiapolitical forces that includes the parties tied to the factions he is now askedto confront— after months of deadlock following the 2025 election. At 41, he isthe youngest prime minister in Iraq's history.

Fahd al-Jabouri, a leader of the National Wisdom Movement, aShia party within the Coordination Framework, said disarmament is settled inprinciple and needs only time. He described a document, expected to be signedin the coming weeks, that would set out a mechanism for the handover, andcalled it a near-agreement among the government, the factions, and theFramework.

September 30, in his account, opens the process rather thanends it, with the handover running toward the close of the year.

There are talks to point to. A three-member committee formedby the Framework —the former prime ministers Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and Nourial-Maliki, with Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri— has met the factions inrecent weeks over the guarantees they want, among them the coalition'sdeparture and national control of Iraq's air defenses.

Issam al-Faili, a professor of political science atal-Mustansiriyah University in Baghdad, reads the legislative track lesshopefully. "The long-delayed PMF Service And Retirement Law, which wouldfix the force's ranks, pay, and command structure in law, is being used to foldthe factions into the PMF rather than to dissolve them," a path that wouldkeep their weight inside the state. Some groups are making any reorganizationconditional on the law's passage, he added, and the bill remains stuck.

That reading fits a proposal reported in August, under whichweapons handed over by the factions would be stored at PMF sites rather thanpassed to the defense or interior ministries or the counter-terrorism service.The PMF still contains the Iran-aligned factions themselves, so the arrangementwould put the weapons under a state command in name while leaving them insidethe same network. Shiite political figures have described the shift as a movefrom disarmament toward what they term weapons management.

Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi analyst and fellow at CenturyInternational, part of The Century Foundation, made a similar case at theAtlantic Council. The emerging timeline, he said, ends the coalition's missionbut not the factions' armament; the groups see no reason to disarm while USsanctions still target their commanders, and no political guarantees are on thetable.

He described the government's approach as pressure pairedwith incentive: sanctions and the threat of force on one side, the promise offoreign investment, particularly in energy, on the other. That investment, hesaid, is meant to revive an economy he estimates has lost billions of dollarsto disrupted oil exports, leaving the state struggling to cover salaries andpensions.

Jiyad put al-Zaidi's real problem at home. Relations withWashington are the warmest in years, he said, carried by the rapport with Trumpand by back-channel diplomacy. But the prime minister holds no bloc or party ofhis own to shield him from the established leaders who have run Iraqi politicsfor two decades. Should the effort fail, Jiyad suggested, al-Zaidi could weighresignation rather than let wider sanctions fall on the state —a possibility heraised, not a stated intention.

A thinner US presence brings its own risk, Romanowski added:it narrows Washington's options for a quick military response if the factionsescalate, including against the Kurdistan Region, which has taken repeateddrone and missile fire.

Haitham Numaan, a professor of political science at theUniversity of Exeter, is more doubtful still. Al-Zaidi's outsider standinggives him some room, he said, but a prime minister produced by the existingorder cannot break with it, and the factions are bound too tightly to powerfulblocs for him to take them on directly.

What has happened so far, in his view, is a set of politicalmaneuvers meant to convince Washington that change is coming. He warned thatIraq could be pulled into a wider US-Iran confrontation, whatever Baghdadintends.

That danger stopped being hypothetical while the talks werestill underway. Saudi Arabia said several drones launched from Iraq struck itsEast–West pipeline in the Riyadh and Medina regions, causing casualties andproperty damage and forcing a precautionary shutdown of a line that carriescrude toward the Red Sea coast. Riyadh said it reserved the right to protectits sovereignty, security, and installations.

No faction claimed the attack, a silence that stands outfrom the openness with which the same groups had set out their terms weeksearlier.

Al-Zaidi's response tracked the demand Washington has beenpressing. After authorities concluded the drones had flown from a site insideMaysan, he ordered an investigation into the province's operations command andremoved its commander, while security forces opened a large-scale search forthose responsible, a campaign the Counter-Terrorism Service could join.

The move asserted his authority as Commander-in-Chief, thesame authority the US defense bill would have him strengthen, and it exposedthe limit of the arrangement his government has been negotiating: weapons keptinside the state yet still inside the factions' network had, by Riyadh'saccount, just been fired across a border at a neighbor whose investment Baghdadis counting on to rescue its economy.

September 30 will close the coalition's military mission,the final phase of a drawdown that began when US forces left federal Iraq in2025. The factions' weapons will still be in the country the next day. Underthe arrangements now discussed, they would pass into state-run PMF storagerather than be surrendered, a distinction the government and the factions haveyet to settle.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.