Shafaq News- Washington

The administration of US President Donald Trump is betting on internal unrest —particularly among Iranian Kurdish groups— as part of a broader strategy to pressure the Iranian government amid the escalating military confrontation with Tehran and its allied factions, former US diplomat William Lawrence told Shafaq News on Sunday.

Lawrence, director of regional studies at the National Council on US-Arab Relations and a professor at the American University in Washington, said the conflict that erupted on February 28 between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other is part of a long-running confrontation unlikely to end soon.

Drawing on more than 15 years of diplomatic service in seven Middle Eastern countries, Lawrence described the current war as an extension of decades of tension between Iran and its adversaries rather than a short-lived crisis.

He also ruled out the possibility that the confrontation could evolve into a Vietnam-style war, noting that Vietnam involved a large-scale ground invasion, while there are no indications that the United States plans to invade Iran with ground troops. Instead, in his view, the conflict more closely resembles scenarios seen in Venezuela, Libya, or Afghanistan before direct intervention, where air power is used to shape developments on the ground without deploying large US ground forces.

Read more: Between war and neutrality: Kurdistan navigates US-Iran confrontation

Kurdish Uprising

According to Lawrence, Trump seeks to pressure Iran’s political system and views unrest in Iran’s Kurdish regions as a potentially positive development. Localized uprisings in Iranian Kurdistan, he explained, could serve as the starting point for broader internal instability across the country.

He compared this approach to earlier conflicts where local forces advanced with external backing. The model resembles the 2001 Afghanistan campaign, when Kabul fell through the advance of “local militias” supported by US special forces and American air power.

Reports indicating Kurdish forces have moved deeper into Iranian territory would likely suggest that those groups received firm assurances of aerial support from US and Israeli aircraft.

Even so, he expressed doubt that such a strategy could lead to the collapse of the Iranian government. Iran’s military establishment and affiliated forces number roughly one million personnel, making widespread defections unlikely. He also pointed to historical experience suggesting that many Iranians reject leaders perceived as chosen or supported by foreign powers, recalling lessons associated with the events of 1953.

Inside the United States

Trump, Lawrence said, remains deeply concerned about the upcoming midterm elections. He pointed to divisions within the American right as well as growing opposition among left-leaning voters and independents to attacks on Iran and what they view as unconditional support for Israel.

He explained that the administration is seeking a swift outcome that could be presented domestically as a victory before the elections. Losing control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate would significantly weaken Trump politically, potentially reopening the door to renewed impeachment efforts.

In Lawrence’s assessment, the administration’s handling of the crisis appears closely tied to electoral considerations, with the possibility that Washington may ultimately seek symbolic concessions from Iran similar to those he believes were achieved in cases such as Denmark’s position on Greenland or recent dealings with Venezuela.

Twenty-one Countries Involved

The professor also revealed that the conflict has expanded beyond the immediate parties involved, saying that 21 countries are currently participating militarily in various forms. Among those recently joining operations are Azerbaijan, Greece, France, and the Netherlands, while Egypt remains the only major Middle Eastern country that has not entered the conflict directly so far.

Russia and China, he added, are supporting Tehran through weapons supplies, intelligence sharing, and drone technology, though there are currently no indications that Moscow or Beijing intend to enter the fighting directly with their own forces.

The war, he concluded, is unlikely to produce a decisive military victory for either side. Instead, it will likely end only after the parties reach a stage of exhaustion, eventually forcing negotiations toward a ceasefire or a fragile settlement. For Iran, the survival of the regime itself would amount to victory, while for Washington, success would mean forcing a change in the regime’s behavior.

For Shafaq News, Mostafa Hashem, Washington, DC.