Shafaq News – Baghdad

When Mohammed Shia al-Sudani assumed the premiership in 2022, he declared a clear priority: building a “services government.” From electricity and water to healthcare and education, his cabinet pledged to reverse Iraq’s chronic infrastructure failures. But nearly three years into his term, many Iraqis see little improvement, raising a pressing question: how much of the country’s persistent service failure falls on al-Sudani himself?

From Promise to Disappointment

Al-Sudani’s government identified key priorities: fighting corruption, improving public services, stimulating the economy, enhancing national security, and resolving federal disputes with the Kurdistan Region. On paper, the focus was comprehensive and ambitious. In practice, however, delivery has lagged far behind public expectations.

The Prime Minister has repeatedly emphasized anti-corruption efforts, infrastructure development, and economic diversification. Still, Iraqis continue to suffer from recurring power outages, water scarcity, and poor health and education services. The symbolic slogan of a “government of services” now risks eroding public trust as the realities on the ground diverge sharply from official rhetoric.

Mounting Frustrations and Heatwaves

The current summer has seen electricity failures spike dramatically amid soaring temperatures above 50°C, forcing many provinces to suspend work and schools.

Political analyst Abbas al-Jubouri told Shafaq News that “there is clear negligence across all services, particularly electricity,” noting that drought-induced water shortages, stalled projects, and the delayed disbursement of the federal budget have all worsened the service crisis.

“The government made promises, but the situation in Baghdad and other provinces is visibly deteriorating,” al-Jubouri added, arguing that basic infrastructure projects like roads and bridges—now hailed as achievements—should have been the norm, not exceptions.

Political Structure or Executive Failure?

Critics are divided on where ultimate responsibility lies. Political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi argued that while al-Sudani’s administration carries part of the blame, Iraq’s systemic flaws run deeper.

“Service deterioration did not start with this government,” al-Tamimi said, noting that since 2003, successive cabinets have promised reforms that largely remained “ink on paper.” He pointed to Iraq’s entrenched ethno-sectarian power-sharing system, or Muhasasa, as a major obstacle: it prevents the appointment of qualified officials, empowers party loyalties over state performance, and shields corruption.

Al-Tamimi also emphasized the absence of effective oversight mechanisms and political stability, which he believes have rendered the legislative branch incapable of imposing executive accountability.

Despite what he described as “some visible achievements” by al-Sudani’s government in limited sectors, political interference and appointments based on loyalty have curtailed the Prime Minister’s ability to lead sweeping reforms.

Civil Society Response and a Warning from October

Civil society voices echo a growing sense of frustration. Activist Noor Salem told Shafaq News that the political class, especially ruling parties, bear primary responsibility for the deterioration of services. He argued that the lessons of the 2019 October protests—which triggered government resignations and political reckoning—were not absorbed by the ruling elite.

“The system has regressed,” he said. “What we’re seeing now—sectarian quotas, project mismanagement, and administrative chaos—is worse than what triggered the October Uprising,” Salem warned of rising public anger and hinted at renewed protest movements if the situation remains unchanged.

His warning is underpinned by a financial reality: despite massive spending over recent years, infrastructure and service outputs remain modest. Delays in passing the 2025 budget tables are adding fuel to popular dissatisfaction.

Budget Paralysis and Institutional Decay

Parliamentary voices, such as that of Mahdiya al-Lami from the Services and Reconstruction Committee, offer a mixed diagnosis. Al-Lami acknowledged that protests are constitutionally protected and a legitimate response to poor services. She attributed the crisis partly to chronic underfunding and, at times, the complete absence of financial allocations.

“Despite passing the tripartite budget law, budget schedules haven’t yet reached Parliament,” she explained, describing widespread institutional paralysis across ministries and departments. She also blamed delayed projects, rampant corruption, and the lack of administrative and technical capacity.

More significantly, al-Lami pointed to a broader decay in national responsibility and vision. “There is no genuine political will to reform or deliver,” she said bluntly.

Accountability in a Captive System

While al-Sudani’s term has not been devoid of progress, especially in launching select infrastructure and employment initiatives, the failure to deliver comprehensive service improvements is increasingly viewed as a leadership shortfall. However, as analysts and lawmakers agree, he operates within a dysfunctional structure that limits reform.

With time running out and popular discontent deepening, al-Sudani faces a critical test: either break the political mold or become yet another prime minister who promised services and delivered frustration.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.