Shafaq News

When Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), proposed in October 2024 that Abdullah Ocalan could address Turkish parliament if he called for the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the statement reverberated across Ankara's political landscape.

For decades, Bahceli had been associated with one of the country's most uncompromising nationalist traditions. Yet his proposal was followed by a series of developments few observers could have imagined only months earlier. In February 2025, Ocalan called on the PKK to convene a congress and consider ending its armed struggle. In May of the same year, the organization revealed that it would dissolve its organizational structure and pursue its objectives through political and democratic means.

The discussions that followed quickly moved beyond whether dialogue was possible and toward a more difficult challenge: what political framework could govern relations between the Turkish state and millions of Kurdish citizens if armed conflict ceased to be the dominant reality? Nearly a century after the founding of the republic, the Kurdish issue remains intertwined with questions of identity, citizenship, security, democracy, local governance, and political representation.

Read more: From dialogue to drone strikes: PKK-Turkiye conflict after Öcalan initiative

Power in Numbers

The Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Turkiye, but their true numbers remain open to debate. With the state collecting no ethnic data through its census, estimates are drawn instead from surveys, polling, and demographic research.

Most place the Kurdish population between 15 and 20 million, or roughly 15 to 20% of the country's population. A 2024 survey by the Turkish research company KONDA put the figure at around 18%, reflecting the scale of a community that has shaped Turkiye's social and political life for generations.

For decades, the center of Kurdish life lay in the country's east and southeast. Provinces such as Diyarbakır, Van, Hakkari, Batman, Mardin, and Siirt served as the main strongholds of Kurdish language, culture, and political activity.

Today, that geography tells only part of the story.

Over the past several decades, economic migration, rapid urbanization, and years of conflict have redrawn the Kurdish map of Turkiye. Millions left their hometowns, heading west toward the country's economic centers. Kurdish communities are now deeply woven into the fabric of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, and Mersin. The shift has been so profound that some scholars, including sociologist Mesut Yegen, argue that Istanbul has become home to the largest Kurdish population of any city in the world.

"The movement of Kurdish communities into Turkiye's largest cities blurred the old distinction between the Kurdish-majority southeast and the rest of the country, bringing Kurdish politics into the center of national life," Yegen wrote. Elections in major metropolitan areas, he argued, can no longer be understood without accounting for Kurdish voters, whose support has often proved decisive in tightly contested races.

Yet despite their growing electoral weight, Kurds do not enjoy a formal share of power within the state. Unlike countries such as Iraq, where parliamentary seats and senior positions are distributed along communal lines, Turkiye has no system of ethnic quotas. Representation in the 600-seat parliament, the cabinet, the judiciary, the civil service, and the armed forces is not allocated according to ethnicity.

Instead, Kurdish participation has emerged through the same institutions and political channels available to other citizens. Kurdish politicians have entered parliament through Kurdish-oriented parties, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Republican People's Party (CHP), and nationalist parties. Kurdish-origin figures have also occupied senior state positions, with former Turkish President Turgut Özal, widely regarded as having Kurdish roots.

Read more: Coexistence by design: Iran's Kurds straddle the line between inclusion and autonomy

The Threshold Breach

For much of the republic's history, Kurdish political activism was associated with protest movements, security concerns, or armed conflict. Over the past three decades, however, an increasingly important arena has emerged inside parliament, municipal councils, and ballot boxes.

That shift did not happen smoothly. Kurdish-oriented parties faced repeated closures, legal challenges, and political pressure, yet they continued to reappear under new names and organizational structures. The political lineage stretching from the People's Labor Party (HEP) and the Democracy Party (DEP) to the People's Democracy Party (HADEP), the Democratic Society Party (DTP), the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), and today's Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) reflects a long-running effort to pursue Kurdish demands through democratic institutions.

The movement's modern political roots date back to 1990, when HEP emerged as the first major pro-Kurdish party in contemporary Turkish politics. After its dissolution, a succession of parties —including DEP, HADEP, the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), DTP, and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)— carried the movement forward. While their priorities evolved over time, most advocated greater cultural rights, stronger local governance, and broader democratic reforms.

One major obstacle was Turkiye's 10% electoral threshold, among the highest in the world. The barrier made it difficult for smaller parties to enter parliament, prompting many Kurdish politicians to run as independents before later forming parliamentary blocs.

Despite that challenge, Kurdish-oriented parties built strong support networks, won municipalities across the southeast, and maintained a presence in national politics. The turning point came in June 2015.

HDP captured about 13.1% of the vote and won 80 seats in parliament, becoming the first Kurdish-led political movement to cross the electoral threshold as a party. The result denied the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) a parliamentary majority and demonstrated that Kurdish-oriented politics could influence national outcomes beyond Kurdish-majority regions.

For supporters, the election marked the culmination of decades of political participation and underscored the growing electoral weight of Kurdish voters.

Although the HDP later faced legal challenges, investigations, and the detention of its prominent figures, it remained a significant force in parliament. Ahead of the 2023 elections, many of its candidates ran under the Green Left Party banner before reorganizing under the DEM Party, now the principal vehicle for pro-Kurdish politics at the national level.

The importance of Kurdish political participation extends beyond Ankara. Municipal politics have become equally central to the debate. Cities such as Diyarbakir, Van, and Batman emerged as strongholds of Kurdish political representation, allowing local leaders to govern through elected institutions.

Yet it is at the municipal level that some of the sharpest disputes have unfolded.

Following terrorism-related investigations, Turkish authorities removed numerous elected mayors and appointed trustees to administer municipalities, maintaining that local governments must operate within the framework of national law and security requirements.

Kurdish politicians viewed the removals differently, arguing that replacing elected officials weakened democratic representation and disregarded the will of voters. DEM Party co-chairs Tuncer Bakırhan and Tülay Hatimoğulları have repeatedly contended that a lasting solution requires ‘’deeper democratic reforms and broader political participation.’’ Ankara, meanwhile, continues to stress national unity, security, and constitutional order.

Read more: Turkiye’s cautious gamble: PKK disarmament and the regional chessboard

Identity Reclaimed

Today, Kurdish politics is deeply woven into Turkiye's national political landscape. That was not always the case.

The relationship between the Turkish state and its Kurdish population has undergone profound changes since the founding of the republic. The roots of the modern Kurdish movement can be traced to the nation-building project that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

The new state sought to forge a unified national identity after years of war, territorial losses, and political upheaval. In that environment, public expressions of Kurdish identity were often viewed through the prism of national unity and state consolidation.

For much of the twentieth century, Kurdish identity received little official recognition. Restrictions on the public use of the Kurdish language appeared at different periods, and the state generally avoided acknowledging a distinct Kurdish political reality.

The issue remained politically sensitive for decades.

A major shift began in the early 2000s as Turkiye pursued reforms linked to its European Union accession process. Restrictions on Kurdish-language broadcasting were eased, Kurdish-language courses became possible under certain conditions, and public discussion of Kurdish identity expanded.

A symbolic turning point came in August 2005 when then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered a speech in Diyarbakir. "The Kurdish issue is everyone's issue," he remarked, acknowledging a reality that previous governments had often avoided discussing openly.

Supporters viewed the speech as a historic departure from earlier policies. Critics argued that recognition alone would not address deeper political grievances. Yet few questioned its significance.

The launch of TRT Kurdi in 2009 provided another visible sign of change. A state-run Kurdish-language broadcaster would have been difficult to imagine during earlier decades.

These reforms altered the nature of the debate. As historian Nicole F. Watts has previously observed, discussions shifted from whether Kurdish identity should be recognized to how Kurdish citizens should participate in political life and how the state should respond to demands related to representation, local governance, and political rights.

The PKK Changed Everything

While political and cultural reforms gradually expanded space for Kurdish identity in Turkiye, no development reshaped the Kurdish issue more profoundly than the emergence of the PKK. Founded in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan and a circle of Kurdish leftist activists, the group shifted into armed insurgency in 1984 against the Turkish state. What followed became one of the longest-running conflicts in the modern Middle East.

Turkish authorities, including the Ministry of Interior and the Turkish Armed Forces, have long placed the death toll at more than 50,000, covering security personnel, PKK militants, and civilians together. The conflict also carried a heavy demographic impact. Entire villages in southeastern Turkiye were emptied during counterinsurgency operations, a reality documented by Human Rights Watch, which suggested that more than 500,000 people were forced to leave their homes, relocating toward major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.

From Ankara’s perspective, the framing has remained consistent. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Turkiye, the United States, and the European Union. Successive governments have consistently treated military operations as necessary measures to protect territorial integrity and civilian safety. President Erdogan has repeatedly reinforced this stance, stating that Turkiye would “continue its fight against terrorism until the last terrorist is eliminated.”

The Kurdish political reading of the conflict moves in a different direction. Figures within the DEM Party and its predecessor, the HDP, argue that the roots of the violence lie not only in armed mobilization but also in decades of restrictions on language rights, political participation, and cultural expression.

Former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş captured this perspective, arguing that “peace in this country will not come through weapons, but through equal citizenship and democratic politics.” Current DEM Party representatives continue to maintain that the Kurdish issue cannot be reduced to security terminology alone, urging dialogue and democratic reform as the foundation for any durable settlement.

At the center of this landscape stands PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Captured in 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and transferred to Imrali Island, where he has remained ever since. His presence, however, has never fully faded, with his messages continuing to circulate through Kurdish political channels as influential interventions rather than historical remnants.

His role became especially visible during the 2013–2015 peace process. In March 2013, during Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakir, a message attributed to Ocalan called for an end to armed struggle. “Let guns be silent, and politics speak,” the message declared, while also framing the moment as a “historical responsibility.” For a brief period, the atmosphere shifted enough to suggest that a negotiated path might open.

That opening, however, remained fragile. Erdogan warned that the process would only continue if armed groups withdrew completely, stating that “we will not negotiate with those who hold weapons in their hands.”

Within Kurdish political circles, expectations remained cautious but oriented toward negotiation. Then-HDP co-chair Figen Yuksekdag argued that trust required more than political messaging, maintaining that “mutual confidence cannot be built while one side speaks of peace and the other maintains military pressure.”

By 2015, the process collapsed. Violence resumed, and both sides exchanged blame over stalled commitments. Erdogan maintained that the PKK had not fully laid down arms, while Kurdish political actors argued that the political framework necessary to sustain dialogue had been allowed to fall apart.

Peace by Piece

The developments of 2024 and 2025 brought these longstanding questions back into focus. Nearly a decade after the collapse of the peace process, discussions surrounding Ocalan re-emerged unexpectedly. Bahceli's proposal, Ocalan's subsequent call for the PKK to end its armed struggle, and the organization's move to dissolve its structure created a new political environment.

Whether these developments ultimately produce lasting change remains uncertain. History offers ample reasons for caution. Previous initiatives generated optimism before collapsing amid renewed tensions and violence.

Yet the current moment differs from earlier periods in important ways.

Kurdish politics is more institutionalized than it was in the 1990s. Municipal governance plays a larger role. Electoral participation is deeply entrenched. The DEM Party has emerged as a significant parliamentary actor rather than a marginal political force.

As a result, today's debate extends way beyond just an armed conflict.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.