Shafaq News/ Iran is intensifying its efforts to target exiled opposition groups in neighboring countries, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan. This aggressive campaign comes amid Tehran's ongoing struggle with the war in Gaza and its preparations for a potential broader conflict, including a direct confrontation with Israel, a recent report by Fazel Hawramy, published by Amwaj, revealed.

Hawramy's report sheds light on Iran's increasing focus on Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, whom it accuses of having ties with Israel, allegations that these groups and their hosts vehemently deny.

"Amid this broader regional context, Tehran is particularly worried about Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based across the border in Iraqi Kurdistan. Iranian authorities accuse such actors—and their hosts—of having ties with Tel Aviv, which they vehemently deny. Facing the prospect of a potential escalation of the intelligence war with Israel, and possible open warfare with ramifications inside its borders, the Islamic Republic is now using an apparent window of opportunity to go after its Kurdish foes."

Hawramy notes that Iran's offensive against these Kurdish groups is being carried out under the broader context of escalating regional tension, particularly as Iran gears up for a possible expansion of the conflict in Gaza. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has already made significant moves, including a ballistic missile and drone attack on Erbil in January, which Tehran claimed was a strike on a Mossad base. This attack resulted in four deaths, including that of a prominent local businessman, which drew sharp condemnation from Iraqi Kurdish authorities. Despite the outcry, the IRGC labeled the operation as successful retaliation for the killing of commanders within the' Axis of Resistance'—a network of Iran-backed militant groups—by suspected Israeli agents (Mossad).

"Members of the leftist Kurdish opposition group Komala, accusing the Peshmerga fighters of having been tasked by Mossad with carrying out sabotage operations in Isfahan. Of note, both military and nuclear sites in the central city have been targeted with apparent quadcopters in recent years—equipment that some in Iran charge has been smuggled into the country from Iraqi Kurdistan."

In his report, Hawramy emphasizes the growing pressure on Iraqi Kurdish authorities to dismantle Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in the region. This pressure has intensified since the signing of a major bilateral security accord between Iran and Iraq in 2023. The accord has led to a significant escalation in demands from Tehran, with Iraqi Kurdish authorities now under increased scrutiny from both the federal government in Baghdad and Tehran. Hawramy quotes Fariba Mohammadi, the deputy head of the Kurdistan Toilers Party-Komala, who reveals that the group has been pressured to relocate as part of this agreement. Mohammadi states, "We have been told since last year that we need to relocate as part of the agreement between Iran and Iraq, but the pressure has increased in recent weeks."

Hawramy further explores the impact of these developments on various Kurdish groups. The report details how Komala, along with other Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, has faced repeated attacks from the IRGC, including missile strikes and drone attacks. The pressure to relocate has now reached a critical point, with Komala reluctantly agreeing to move, although the exact timing of the relocation remains uncertain. Hawramy quotes Mohammadi again, who explains that Tehran is fearful of the escalating confrontation between the Iran-led' Axis of Resistance' and Israel and is now tightening its borders as part of a strategy to preempt potential threats.

The report also highlights the experiences of other Kurdish groups, such as the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), which has faced similar pressures from Iran. PAK spokesperson Khalil Naderi tells Amwaj.media that his group has complied with many of the demands made by Iranian and Iraqi authorities, including closing training bases and handing over heavy weaponry.

"We have done what we have been asked to do such as closing our training bases, moving away from the border area, handing over our heavy guns and avoiding appearing [in public] with guns," he said, accusing Tehran of coming up with unreasonable demands with the ultimate goal of dismantling all Kurdish opposition parties—including those which pursue non-violent resistance. "They want these parties to be placed in camps outside the KRG's control or once in a while, they provide a list of individuals from these parties to be handed over to them as criminals."

Hawramy's investigation also touches on the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), a group aligned with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) of Turkey. According to the report, PJAK has not experienced significant changes over the past year, although its members remain in the mountainous region near the Iranian border, outside the reach of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls Al-Sulaimaniyah Governorate.

A significant aspect of Hawramy's report is the focus on the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Iraqi Kurdistan's main Iranian opposition group. Despite facing pressure from Iraqi Kurdish authorities, the KDPI has continued to display defiance, with its fighters holding a parade in the mountains outside Erbil as recently as August. Hawramy describes how the KDPI's show of force is likely to anger Tehran, especially given the group's stated priorities, which include the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and the establishment of democratic rule in Iran. KDPI spokesman Khalid Azizi, speaking at the August 21 event, emphasized the group's readiness for any eventuality, stating, "We are preparing ourselves for all the possibilities that cannot be predicted."

Throughout his report, Hawramy provides a detailed account of the ongoing confrontation between Iran and its Kurdish opposition, illustrating how these tensions are intertwined with the broader regional conflict involving the 'Axis of Resistance' and Israel. Hawramy's investigation underscores the precarious position of Kurdish groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, who find themselves caught between the pressures from Tehran and the complex political dynamics of the region. As Hawramy points out, the fate of these Kurdish groups is closely linked to the wider regional tension, with the potential for further escalation in the conflict between Iran and Israel.

Hawramy concludes by quoting a well-informed Kurdish opposition figure who warns of the possible consequences of Iran's actions. The figure, speaking on condition of anonymity, suggests that Iran's crackdown on Kurdish opposition groups is a prelude to a broader strategy to secure internal unity in the face of external threats. As the Kurdish official explains, "[Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei will not dare to hit Israel hard, but if he does, he knows a war could break out—and to fight an external enemy, he needs to have internal unity."