Shafaq News- OPINION

By Ali Hussein Feyli*

With nearly 40 officially registered political parties active in the Kurdistan Region and regional pressures continuing to shape its choices, President Nechirvan Barzani’s quiet diplomacy and “strategic patience” have been more than political luxuries. They have helped preserve the Kurdistan Region’s delicate political balance and guard against collapse.

From the perspective of decision-making centers in Baghdad, regional capitals and international powers, this pragmatic approach has often been viewed as a reliable channel for building dialogue and untangling difficult political disputes. At times when polarization and entrenched positions have dominated the region, efforts to emphasize moderation, reason and constitutional frameworks have helped reinforce the Kurdistan Region’s image, from the perspective of this approach, as a stable region and an active partner in containing regional tensions.

The same method has appeared historically in the handling of several sensitive periods, from easing the consequences of difficult political crises to maintaining a balance among competing forces and dealing pragmatically with external factors that threatened the Kurdistan Region’s existence as a political entity. While other actors have at times resorted to confrontational rhetoric and emotional reactions, this approach has sought to preserve a margin of safety capable of sustaining the Kurdistan Region as a political entity.

Yet a closer examination of governance and administration reveals a clear contrast between external and internal performance, reflecting the different environments in which the Kurdistan Region President operates. While the external arena provides greater room for political maneuvering, the domestic arena remains constrained by structural problems and entrenched party influence within state institutions. The limits on President Nechirvan Barzani’s effective authority have prevented him from fully exercising the presidency’s legal powers, including those related to the general command of the armed forces and security institutions, prompting him instead to assume a mediating role and work to contain tensions to avoid further internal confrontation.

The existence of multiple centers of influence and competing interests among the main political forces has further complicated efforts to strengthen the presidency as an institution capable of bringing different sides together, while limiting the prospects for reconciliation and narrowing the space for bridging political differences.

Alongside these political challenges, the Kurdistan Region’s unproductive rentier economy remains a deep structural problem. Heavy dependence on oil revenues, recurring financial crises, growing pressure on public employees and salary earners, and delays in implementing fundamental reforms have imposed significant material and psychological burdens on society and contributed to declining public confidence in institutions.

This reality has largely confined the internal political process to temporary settlements and the containment of crises rather than structural reforms capable of addressing the causes of existing imbalances.

The paradox, however, is that the same strategic patience that has helped preserve the Kurdistan Region’s external balances could become a factor in prolonging domestic crises if it remains limited to de-escalation without reform. The constraints facing President Nechirvan Barzani cannot be separated from the shared political responsibility of the forces governing the Kurdistan Region, as the problem is not whether one individual can contain disputes, but whether the political parties are prepared to overcome these obstacles, unify institutions and decision-making centers, and move from managing crises to addressing their underlying causes.

As the region enters another period marked by uncertainty and risk, the diplomatic approach pursued today by the Kurdistan Region President faces three immediate challenges that raise questions over how far it can continue to operate effectively:

The first is a shrinking margin for political maneuvering amid sharper regional polarization and external interference, which increasingly limits the Kurdistan Region’s ability to make independent decisions while maintaining balanced relations with competing powers.

The second is continued pressure from Baghdad through financial entitlements and the salary and budget files, which are used as instruments of leverage and have left constitutional talks and negotiations moving in repeated cycles without producing sustainable understandings.

The third is a fundamental shift in domestic expectations, as moderate political discourse becomes less aligned with the accelerating demands of younger generations and growing frustration over the slow pace of reform leads parts of society to view prolonged strategic patience with increasing skepticism.

These conditions offer lessons from earlier experience. Diplomacy and strategic patience remain important tools for avoiding collapse in an environment marked by risk and surrounded by centers of tension, while maintaining the role of a rational mediator during crises can give the Kurdistan Region significant political and geographic weight. Yet developing the mechanisms through which the Kurdistan Region manages its affairs, with all their political and partisan complexities, cannot rest on one individual regardless of his political or diplomatic abilities.

When administrative and economic problems accumulate and institutions remain constrained by competing centers of influence and partisan calculations, the Kurdistan Region faces a decisive test between external pressures and the demands of internal reform. Here lies the importance of the equation President Nechirvan Barzani presents in this context: however effective external diplomacy may be, it cannot substitute for strengthening domestic legitimacy and rebuilding public confidence in the Kurdistan Region’s institutions.

* Ali Hussein Feyli, Chairman of the Shafaq Foundation for Culture and Media and former member of the Kurdistan Region Parliament.

This article was originally written in Arabic.