Shafaq News
Syria entered a new political era following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's government in 2024; few communities faced a more consequential moment than the country's Kurds. Concentrated largely in the north and northeast, Syrian Kurds spent decades seeking citizenship, cultural recognition and political representation. The 2011 civil war transformed them into one of Syria's most influential military and political actors. Today, Kurdish leaders are working to preserve gains achieved during long-time conflict while defining their place in Syria's future.
Most estimates place Syria's Kurdish population at between two and three million people before the civil war, representing roughly 10 to 15% of the country's population. The largest Kurdish communities are concentrated in three historically important regions: al-Jazira in the northeast, Kobani (also known as Ain al-Arab) along the Turkish border and Afrin in the northwest. Significant Kurdish populations have also long lived in Aleppo and Damascus.
Unlike the Kurds of Iraq, who have enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy for decades, Syrian Kurds spent much of the modern era on the margins of political life. While Kurdish identity remained strong through language, tribal networks and cultural traditions, successive governments viewed expressions of Kurdish nationalism with suspicion.
Syrian Kurdish politics has long been shaped by tribal, ideological and regional divisions. Some movements developed close ties with Iraqi Kurdish parties, particularly the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by the Barzani family. Others were influenced by the ideas of Abdullah Öcalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), whose writings on decentralization and local governance later shaped institutions in northeastern Syria.
These influences became increasingly important after 2011, when the collapse of state authority across large parts of Syria created opportunities few Syrian Kurds had previously imagined. Within a few years, Kurdish-led forces controlled vast territories, administered millions of residents and became key partners in the international campaign against ISIS.
Decades of Marginalization
The modern Kurdish political experience in Syria was defined by exclusion, cultural restrictions, and unresolved questions of citizenship.
The most consequential episode occurred in 1962, when Damascus conducted a special census in al-Hasakah province. Approximately 120,000 Kurds were stripped of Syrian citizenship after being classified as foreigners. Because citizenship status was inherited, the number of stateless Kurds and their descendants grew steadily over the following decades, reaching roughly 300,000 by the eve of the 2011 uprising.
Stateless Kurds faced restrictions on employment, education, property ownership, marriage registration and freedom of movement. For generations of Kurdish families, citizenship became one of the defining political issues in their relationship with the Syrian state.
Historian Jordi Tejel, author of Syria's Kurds: "History, Politics and Society," described statelessness as "one of the most powerful symbols of Kurdish exclusion in Syria." The issue became a central rallying point for Kurdish political movements and remained unresolved for nearly half a century.
Citizenship was only one aspect of a broader framework that many Kurds viewed as an effort to weaken their identity. Kurdish-language education was largely absent from public schools, political activism was closely monitored, and Arabization policies in parts of the northeast deepened tensions between Kurdish communities and the state.
Despite these pressures, Kurdish political movements remained active. Several parties emerged during the second half of the twentieth century, though many operated under significant constraints. Their demands generally focused on cultural rights, citizenship, and political recognition rather than outright independence.
The most significant pre-war challenge to state authority came in March 2004. What began as clashes during a football match in Qamishli escalated into widespread unrest across Kurdish areas. Security forces responded forcefully, resulting in, according to Human Rights Watch, at least 30 to 40 deaths, dozens of arrests, and thousands of demonstrations that spread beyond the city.
The Qamishli unrest is widely regarded as the most significant Kurdish protest movement in Syria before the civil war. For many, it demonstrated both the depth of Kurdish grievances and the limits of reform under the existing system. Researcher Harriet Allsopp has argued that the unrest exposed frustrations that had accumulated over decades and foreshadowed many of the demands that later emerged during the Syrian uprising.
When protests erupted across Syria in 2011, Kurdish communities entered the crisis with a distinct historical experience. Their concerns overlapped with those of other Syrians seeking political change, while also reflecting long-standing, unresolved grievances that had accumulated over decades.
Chaos Breeds Power
The collapse of state authority across large parts of northern and northeastern Syria created opportunities that previous generations of Syrian Kurds had rarely imagined.
In 2012, government troops withdrew from many Kurdish-majority towns and cities, including Kobani, Amuda, Derik and large parts of al-Hasakah province. The main beneficiary was the Democratic Union Party (PYD), founded in 2003, which rapidly expanded its influence through local councils, civil institutions, and security structures.
The rise of ISIS accelerated this transformation. Beginning in 2013, the group seized vast territory across Syria and Iraq, placing Kurdish-controlled areas on the front lines of one of the region's most consequential conflicts.
No battle proved more significant than Kobani. In September 2014, ISIS launched a major offensive against the city, and many expected it to fall. Kurdish fighters, backed by US-led Coalition airstrikes, mounted a determined defense that ultimately forced ISIS to retreat.
Beyond its military importance, Kobani transformed the international profile of Syrian Kurdish forces. Images of Kurdish fighters resisting ISIS spread worldwide, turning the city into a symbol of resistance against extremism and elevating Kurdish forces into key partners in the campaign against ISIS.
As cooperation with Washington expanded, Kurdish-led forces helped establish the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in October 2015. The Kurdish-majority coalition brought together Arab, Syriac-Assyrian and other local forces, enabling operations across a broader area while reducing perceptions that the fight against ISIS was exclusively Kurdish.
Backed by the US, the SDF spearheaded major offensives against ISIS strongholds, including Manbij in 2016 and Raqqa in 2017, the group's de facto capital in Syria. Former US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk described the SDF as an "indispensable partner" in the campaign, which culminated in March 2019 with the fall of Baghouz, ISIS's last territorial enclave in Syria.
The victory came at a high cost. More than 11,000 SDF fighters were killed and approximately 24,000 wounded during the campaign. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 190,000 people were displaced in and around Raqqa between April and July 2017, while large sections of Kobani and other frontline communities were left heavily damaged.
Building the Autonomous Administration
Military victories against ISIS transformed the balance of power in northeastern Syria, but the more enduring development was political. As Kurdish-led forces expanded their control, they faced a challenge few Kurdish movements in the Middle East had previously encountered: governing a territory inhabited by millions of people from diverse ethnic, religious and tribal backgrounds.
The result was the gradual emergence of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Known to many supporters as Rojava, it evolved from local councils focused on public services, aid distribution and security into a broader administrative framework responsible for education, municipal affairs, economic management, and internal security.
At its greatest territorial extent, the Administration governed roughly one-third of Syria, an estimated four to five million residents. The territory also included many of the country's most important agricultural regions and oil-producing areas. Arabs, Syriac-Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmens, and other communities lived alongside Kurds, making diversity a defining feature of governance.
The Administration's political philosophy drew heavily on the ideas of Abdullah Öcalan, founder of the PKK. His concept of democratic confederalism emphasized decentralization, local participation, and community-based governance rather than a traditional nation-state.
Supporters viewed the model as an alternative to the highly centralized structures that had long dominated Syria. Critics, however, argued that power remained concentrated within a single political movement. Former Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad, for example, dismissed the Kurdish-led project as "a separatist project that has no future," questioning whether it truly reflected the region's political diversity.
One of the Administration's most distinctive features has been its emphasis on women's participation. Leadership positions generally operate through a co-chair system in which a man and a woman jointly hold authority, a model replicated across councils, political institutions and civil organizations. Among the Administration's most prominent female figures was Ilham Ahmed, who emerged as a leading diplomatic representative and became one of the best-known Kurdish political figures on the international stage.
Women also assumed prominent military roles through the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), which gained international attention during the fight against ISIS and became one of the most recognizable symbols of Kurdish resistance.
Education, meanwhile, became another major area of change. For decades, Kurdish-language instruction had been largely absent from Syria's public schools. Under AANES, Kurdish-language curricula were introduced in many schools alongside efforts to expand teaching of Kurdish history, literature, and culture.
Maintaining security across a vast and conflict-affected territory became another central responsibility of the Administration. To that end, it established the Asayish, an internal security force responsible for policing, public order, and counterterrorism operations. Together with the SDF, it became a central pillar of governance.
The Administration also faced persistent political disputes from within the Kurdish political arena. Although the PYD emerged as the dominant force, it never enjoyed unanimous support among Syria's Kurds. The Kurdish National Council (ENKS) repeatedly accused it of monopolizing political life and restricting opposition activity.
These disputes reflected a broader reality often overlooked by outside observers: Syrian Kurds are not politically unified. Differences over ideology, relations with regional powers and the future of self-government continue to shape politics across northeastern Syria.
Four-Way Crossfire
The future of Syria's Kurds cannot be understood through domestic politics alone. Geography has placed them within one of the Middle East's most complex geopolitical environments, where decisions made in Damascus, Ankara, Erbil, and Washington often carry as much weight as those made in Qamishli or Raqqa.
Since the emergence of AANES, Syrian Kurds have balanced relationships with regional and international actors whose interests frequently overlap, compete or directly conflict. Among these relationships, none has been more important than that with Damascus.
Despite years of conflict, Kurdish authorities and the Syrian state never existed in complete separation. Government institutions continued operating in parts of Qamishli and Hasakah, while state employees continued receiving salaries from Damascus, maintaining a limited presence in Rojava.
Late PYD co-chair Salih Muslim, whose party remains the dominant force within AANES, consistently maintained that the Kurds were not seeking independence. Instead, they advocated a decentralized political system that would preserve Syria's territorial integrity while granting substantial authority to local administrations.
Damascus, meanwhile, has traditionally taken a different view. Successive governments favored centralized authority, arguing that military and administrative institutions should ultimately operate under state control.
If relations with Damascus are defined by constitutional and political questions, relations with Turkiye are shaped primarily by security concerns. Ankara maintains that the PYD and YPG have close ties to the PKK, an organization designated as a terrorist group by Turkiye, US and the European Union, and therefore represent a ‘’national security threat.’’ This perception has guided Ankara's policy throughout the conflict.
Beginning in 2016, Turkiye launched a series of military operations aimed at preventing Kurdish-controlled territories from forming a continuous zone along its southern border. Operation Euphrates Shield disrupted Kurdish territorial continuity west of the Euphrates River. Operation Olive Branch in 2018 resulted in the capture of Afrin, while Operation Peace Spring in 2019 led to further territorial changes around Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan described these operations as "necessary border security measures," while Syrian Kurds viewed them as efforts to prevent the consolidation of Kurdish self-rule and weaken institutions that emerged during the war.
The relationship between Syrian Kurds and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has also shaped political dynamics. The strongest ties have historically existed between the Kurdish National Council (ENKS) and the KDP, one of the dominant political forces in the Region.
KDP President Masoud Barzani repeatedly encouraged dialogue among Syrian Kurdish factions, with Erbil serving as a venue for repeated reconciliation efforts between the PYD and ENKS. That role has continued under current President Nechirvan Barzani, who has consistently advocated dialogue and political compromise.
This relationship extends beyond politics. Thousands of Syrian Kurds maintain family, educational and commercial ties with the Kurdistan Region, which has served at various times as a refuge for displaced Syrians, and an economic outlet for northeastern Syria.
Yet no external partnership has shaped Syrian Kurdish fortunes more than the relationship with the United States. The alliance took shape during the campaign against ISIS, enabling the SDF to expand operations, defeat the group, and emerge as one of the country’s most powerful military actors.
The partnership, however, has always been accompanied by uncertainty. Kurdish leaders remain aware that foreign military deployments are rarely permanent, and that lasting security ultimately depends on a political settlement within Syria itself.
Fragile New Dawn
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's government in 2024 opened a new chapter in the history of Syria’s Kurds. Soon after assuming power, transitional Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa called for all armed formations operating outside state institutions to be integrated into a unified national army.
Damascus also sought to restore state authority across territories administered by AANES.
Kurdish leaders did not reject integration outright but pushed for guarantees on political representation, local administration, and the future of institutions built during more than a decade of conflict. A breakthrough appeared to come in March 2025, when al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi signed an agreement establishing a framework for integrating northeastern Syria into the Syrian state.
The agreement recognized the Kurdish community as an integral component of Syria and addressed issues ranging from citizenship rights and border crossings to airports and energy infrastructure. “Our vision of Syria is a decentralized, secular and civil country based on democracy that preserves the rights of all of its components,” Abdi stated during the signing ceremony, describing the deal as “a real opportunity to build a new Syria.”
Backed by strong US engagement, the framework was widely viewed as the most significant understanding reached between Damascus and Kurdish authorities. Yet implementation soon stalled as disputes emerged over timelines, mechanisms, and competing interpretations of the text, producing what both sides described as a “crisis of confidence.”
The tensions were reflected on the ground. Clashes involving government-backed forces and the SDF erupted in Aleppo, al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani. According to local authorities, at least 24 people were killed and around 129 wounded. SDF-affiliated media reported dozens of civilian deaths in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, along with the displacement of more than 165,000 people.
Efforts to revive the diplomatic route led to a ceasefire agreement on January 20, 2026. Under the framework, Damascus and the SDF committed to further talks on unresolved issues, including the future of Kurdish-run civilian and security institutions, following SDF withdrawals from areas it had previously controlled.
US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack described the moment as “the greatest opportunity” for Syria’s Kurds to secure citizenship rights, cultural protections, and political participation within a unified Syrian state.
Implementation accelerated in the months that followed. Syrian security forces were deployed to the centers of al-Hasakah and Qamishli, replacing SDF personnel, while institutions affiliated with the Autonomous Administration were integrated into state bodies. The framework retained civilian employees, addressed Kurdish civil and educational rights, and included provisions facilitating the return of displaced residents.
Under al-Sharaa, the Kurdish component has obtained 11 seats in the new Syrian People’s Assembly (the 2026 transitional parliament), out of a total of 210 seats, representing 4.07% of the legislature, according to electoral data and official results.
The limited representation has sparked widespread debate and sharp criticism from Kurdish political actors, who argue that the figure does not reflect their demographic weight in Syria.
Of the 11 seats won by Kurdish representatives, nine were secured through electoral processes involving local “electoral bodies” in northern and eastern Syria, including districts in al-Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani. The remaining two seats were part of the 70-member group appointed directly by al-Sharaa. The appointees include Abdul Hakim Bashar, a leading figure in the Kurdish National Council (ENKS), and Mustafa Abdi, bringing limited Kurdish representation within the presidential quota.
Whether the new process ultimately produces a lasting settlement remains uncertain. What is already clear, however, is that Syria’s Kurds have moved from the political margins to the center of negotiations shaping the country’s future.
Written and edited by Shafaq News Agency staff.