Shafaq News

By Ali Hussein Feyli

The prolonged political deadlock between the Kurdistan Region’s two main parties —the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)— has increasingly paralyzed decision-making on issues central to the Region’s future, placing its political credibility and external standing at risk after years in which it was viewed as a relative model of security and stability.

Marked most visibly by the failure to form a new Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the current impasse is an extension of long-standing and public disputes between the two dominant poles of Kurdish politics. As the stalemate has now exceeded a full year, the costs have moved beyond political inconvenience into tangible economic damage, with estimates suggesting losses ranging from several percentage points to more than 10% of the Region’s gross domestic product, driven by the absence of a fully empowered executive authority capable of managing fiscal, economic, and investment portfolios.

The impact of the deadlock is not confined to the economy, as the government formation crisis coincides with the paralysis of the Kurdistan Parliament and the inability of Kurdish parties to agree on a unified candidate for the presidency of the Republic of Iraq. This accumulation of institutional blockages has produced mounting political, security, and social pressures, while simultaneously opening space for greater regional and international influence.

In the absence of a unified decision-making center, external actors are increasingly able to advance their agendas, exploiting the vacuum created by internal division, which weakens the Kurdistan Region’s negotiating position with Baghdad and erodes its capacity to defend its political and financial interests at a time of heightened regional tension.

The extended institutional vacuum has also generated a visible crisis of legitimacy. With parliament effectively sidelined, both its legislative and oversight roles have been suspended, halting the passage of key laws that directly affect citizens’ livelihoods and the Region’s long-term governance. Public confidence in democratic institutions has declined, as these bodies are increasingly seen as unable to resolve crises or reflect popular will.

After more than a year of political and institutional stagnation, Kurdish representation has been weakened, leaving Kurdistan without a clear strategic compass in its relations with Baghdad or its engagement with an increasingly volatile regional environment. While the economic cost is substantial, the strategic cost may be greater: the deadlock acts as a sustained pressure point against the Region’s interests, constraining its room for maneuver and undermining hard-won gains.

More critically, the continuation of this impasse is gradually reshaping internal power balances at the expense of a unified Kurdish decision. Society bears the cost largely in silence, as political elites remain locked in a cycle of mutual vetoes. The central question has shifted away from assigning blame for the crisis toward assessing the scale of the political, economic, and security bill that will ultimately be paid if the situation persists.

Opportunities for agreement still exist, but they are increasingly shaped by a sensitive political, financial, and security context in which “points of no return” are beginning to emerge. There are no genuine winners in the current internal political landscape. The restoration of stability and effective governance in the Kurdistan Region can only be secured through a swift political agreement and greater transparency in the exercise of power.

The most dangerous outcome of the crisis has been the partial erosion of governance itself, with the emergence of parallel authorities and competing centers of power within the same Region. This fragmentation lowers the threshold for external interference and further weakens institutional coherence.

At its core, the deadlock has entrenched a culture of crisis management rather than crisis resolution, turning political disputes into a permanent mode of governance. Sensitive files are handled through delay and bargaining rather than through state institutions and clear legal frameworks, which does not necessarily imply relinquishing political rights or achievements, but it does require prioritizing the interests of the population and the Region as a whole.

Without a clear and credible timeline for resolution, the Kurdistan Region’s negotiating leverage with Baghdad and international partners continues to erode. The gap between governing authorities and society widens, and the Region risks being redefined, not as an exception of stability in a turbulent environment, but as a fragile entity increasingly vulnerable to internal fragmentation and external penetration.

This article was originally written in Arabic.