Shafaq News

Roughly 10,000 years ago, in the river valleys that now run through modern Iraq, people first learned how to cultivate wheat. The Fertile Crescent —the arc of fertile land stretching between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers— was where settled farming began, where grain was first stored, and where the agricultural foundations of civilization were laid. Wheat did not spread across the world from somewhere else. It spread from here.

Today, Iraq is one of the world's largest importers of wheat flour. It buys more milled flour from abroad than almost any other country. For years, roughly 100 mills in Turkiye operated almost exclusively to supply the Iraqi market. At the same time, Baghdad spends billions of dollars every year paying local farmers more than double the global wheat price just to keep domestic production alive. And still, it is not enough.

This is the central paradox of Iraqi agriculture —and understanding it requires looking at water, war, climate, and oil all at once.

Rain Vs. River

Iraq grows wheat in two fundamentally different ways, in two very different parts of the country, each exposed to its own set of risks.

In the north, in provinces such as Nineveh, Kirkuk, and Saladin, as well as across the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRI), wheat farming depends almost entirely on rainfall. Farmers plant in November and wait for winter rain. If the rain does not come, neither does the harvest. This is also where Iraq's agricultural history runs deepest. Nineveh, surrounding the ancient city of Mosul, has historically been the country's leading wheat-producing province. The soil is rich, the plains are wide, and in good seasons, the north contributes a major share of Iraq's total harvest.

Further south, the system changes completely. In provinces stretching along the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, from Baghdad through Wasit, Basra, and Dhi Qar, wheat farming relies on irrigation. Farmers depend on rivers and canals rather than rainfall. That gives them greater control over planting, but it also ties their harvests to something far beyond their reach: how much water flows into Iraq from upstream countries.

That dependence is enormous. Roughly 90% of the Euphrates' water originates in Turkiye. Ankara and Tehran together also account for most of the Tigris flow reaching Iraq. Sitting at the downstream end of both river systems, Iraq receives whatever water its neighbors choose to release. Over the past several decades, those flows have steadily declined.

Read more: Rooted in soil: An Iraqi farmer holds on as the land changes

Turkiye's Southeast Anatolia Project —a massive network of dams and irrigation schemes developed over the past 40 years— has progressively reduced the volume of water flowing into Iraq. Iran has done the same with tributaries feeding the Tigris from the east. Despite signed agreements and memoranda of understanding with both countries, none are legally binding, and none are consistently enforced.

The consequences have become clear as Iraq's total available water volume dropped from approximately 93 billion cubic meters in 2019 to around 50 billion in 2020. By 2025, water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates had fallen by as much as 27%, while Iraq's water reserves reached their lowest point since 1933. The Ministry of Water Resources suspended September farming plans —including wheat cultivation— because of severe shortages. In Najaf, one of Iraq's key agricultural provinces, authorities prohibited rice cultivation entirely in May 2025 to preserve water for drinking supplies and lower-demand crops.

The Volatility Trap

When conditions are favorable, Iraq can still produce enormous quantities of wheat. The 2024 harvest, 6.3 million tons nationally, including the KRI, became the largest in the country's history, driven by unusually heavy rainfall and an aggressive government subsidy campaign. Iraq briefly declared wheat self-sufficiency for the first time in years, and officials even discussed exporting surplus supplies.

The achievement proved short-lived.

By 2025, the harvest had fallen to an officially estimated 4.4 million tons, around 4% below the long-term average, according to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The decline came as a drought linked to the La Niña weather pattern, a climate phenomenon associated with cooler Pacific Ocean temperatures and disrupted rainfall, had been intensifying since late 2024, limiting planting early in the season and cutting yields across the north. Although spring rains later brought some improvement, they could not reverse the earlier damage. As a result, import requirements for the 2025–26 marketing year were estimated at roughly 2.4 million tons, around 8% above the five-year average.

Read more: Iraq's farmers fed the state. Now they're waiting to be paid.

The volatility is not unusual; it is structural. Iraq's wheat production swings sharply from one year to another, depending on rainfall and river flows. During the severe drought of 2022–23, the rainfed north produced almost nothing —only 26,000 tons from areas that normally yield hundreds of thousands. The irrigated south partially compensated for the losses, but not enough. Imports surged, and the cycle repeated itself once again.

Pricey Loaf

Iraq's wheat sector is related directly to the Public Distribution System (PDS), which has shaped how Iraqis access food since 1990.

The system was created during the sanctions era that followed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Built around a national ration card program, it provides subsidized flour, rice, sugar, and cooking oil to nearly every Iraqi household. At its height, it functioned as a lifeline. Decades later, it remains politically untouchable. Any government attempting to dismantle it would likely face enormous public backlash. In practice, the entire structure of Iraq's wheat procurement system revolves around sustaining it.

Supplying the PDS requires approximately 5.2 million tons of wheat every year for a population of 42 million people. As a result, the government intervenes heavily at every stage of production. Farmers receive a guaranteed procurement price —set at 850,000 Iraqi dinars ($650) per ton in 2024— more than double prevailing global wheat prices. Seeds are subsidized at 70% of their cost through two state-linked companies. Irrigation, agricultural inputs, and mechanization services also receive subsidies, while the state owns 97% of Iraq's 280 licensed flour mills.

The federal government allocated roughly 5.8 trillion Iraqi dinars (about $4.4B) for wheat procurement during the 2024 season. World Grain estimated total government spending on wheat at nearly $6 billion that year. In its 2025 assessment of Iraq's economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) described the PDS as a "large and untargeted universal food subsidy," while urging gradual reform focused on more vulnerable households.

The IMF's concern is rooted in Iraq's economic structure. Oil revenues account for roughly 90% of government income, meaning every decline in crude prices immediately squeezes the state's ability to pay farmers, subsidize agriculture, and sustain the PDS.

The break-even oil price Iraq needed to balance its budget reached approximately $84 per barrel in 2024, up sharply from $54 in 2020. With oil prices facing renewed pressure in 2025, the long-term sustainability of Iraq's wheat subsidy system remains uncertain.

The Kurdistan Region Dimension

Any attempt to examine Iraqi wheat production as a single national system leaves out an essential part of the story. The Kurdistan Region operates its own agricultural institutions, silos, and Ministry of Agriculture. Its wheat production is entirely rainfed and is systematically excluded from Iraq's national production figures, which is why FAO data consistently carries the note "excluding Kurdistan Region."

In 2024, the Kurdistan Region planned to collect 700,000 tons of wheat from local farmers, 228,000 tons from Erbil, 282,000 from al-Sulaymaniyah and Halabja, as well as 189,000 from Duhok. The Region also operates 39 mills.

Relations with Baghdad, however, remain complicated. In 2024, the Kurdish Ministry of Agriculture pushed for federal authorities to purchase the entire KRI harvest through the national procurement system. Baghdad offered to buy between 576,000 and 605,000 tons —both proposals were rejected by the Kurdish government (KRG), which later submitted a formal letter to former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani demanding full acceptance of the harvest.

By the latest procurement season, the proposed quota for KRI wheat had fallen to only 292,000 tons, while Kurdish officials estimated the harvest could exceed 2 million tons and requested that at least half be federally purchased.

Turkish Flour Tide

Even during its record harvest year, Iraq never fully stopped importing wheat and flour. Imports declined sharply —flour imports were projected to fall to a decade low in 2024–25— but Iraq remained the world's second-largest importer of wheat flour.

The reason is structural rather than temporary.

Most Iraqi mills, which are overwhelmingly state-owned, produce an 80% extraction flour —a coarser product that is cheaper to manufacture but unsuitable for many private bakeries and food-processing companies. Higher-quality fine flour, especially the type used in commercial baking, still needs to be imported.

Turkiye built a major industry around meeting that demand. Turkish mills produce flour tailored specifically to Iraqi market standards, labeled in Arabic, and sold at prices Iraqi mills struggle to match. Roughly 100 Turkish mills have operated primarily to supply Iraq. In 2024, Iraq became Turkiye's largest destination for flour exports, generating $1.16 billion in revenue for Turkish exporters.

In an effort to reduce that dependence, Iraq introduced customs tariffs on imported flour beginning in September 2024. Duties started at 10%, rose to 25% by mid-2025, while pre-packaged flour faced a 30% tariff from October 2024 onward.

The measures produced early results. Turkish flour exports to Iraq dropped by roughly 40% between September 2024 and January 2025 compared with the same period a year earlier. Whether Iraq's domestic milling sector can eventually replace those imports in terms of quality —not just quantity— remains unresolved.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.