Shafaq News (Updated on October 26 at 10:05)

Iraq is approaching its parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025, and the Shiite political scene—the country’s dominant arena since 2003—is entering one of its most competitive and fragmented phases.

More than 1,700 Shiite candidates will compete for 240 of parliament’s 329 seats, revealing not only the scale of ambition within Iraq’s majority community but also the depth of its internal rivalries.

For the first time in years, the contest within the so-called “Shiite House” is not defined by confrontation with rival sectarian blocs, but by a struggle for its own identity and leadership: who among Iraq’s Shiite elite can claim legitimacy, endurance, and control of the next government.

Read more:Read more: Iraq’s 2025 Parliamentary Elections — What You Need to Know

Al-Sudani’s Rise

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani enters the elections at the head of the Reconstruction and Development Alliance (Al-Ima’ar wal Tanmiya), a vast coalition fielding 446 candidates across 12 provinces. The alliance is competing for 240 seats and represents the broadest electoral vehicle any Shiite premier has built since 2003.

The coalition brings together an eclectic mix of political forces: the Euphrates Movement (Al-Furatain) led by al-Sudani himself; Iraqi National Accord (Wifaq) of former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi; Ata’a Movement headed by Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) chief Faleh al-Fayyadh; Irada Movement of Hanan al-Fatlawi; Bilad Sumer Gathering led by Labor Minister Ahmed al-Asadi; and the Karbala Innovation Alliance under Governor Nassif al-Khattabi. Notable figures such as MPs Mohammed al-Sayhoud and Mohammed Sahib al-Daraji also feature prominently.

The bloc’s electoral weight is strongest in Baghdad, where 138 candidates, including Al-Sudani, are competing for 71 seats, followed by Basra (50 for 25), Dhi Qar (38 for 17), and Babil (34 for 17). It maintains smaller footholds in Sunni-majority provinces like Nineveh and Saladin, reflecting al-Sudani’s attempt to present his coalition as national rather than sectarian.

Aide and political strategist Aaed al-Hilali described the alliance as a “reflection of a changing Shiite dynamic that combines technocrats, tribal leaders, and independent figures,” emphasizing that al-Sudani is building “a model blending state capacity with political inclusivity—appealing to both grassroots supporters and urban voters seeking stability.”

That diversity gives al-Sudani dual leverage: mobilizing traditional Shiite constituencies while courting younger, reform-minded voters disillusioned with sectarian politics. His Al-Furatain Movement, first launched ahead of the 2021 early elections, marked his break from Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, symbolizing a generational and stylistic shift from ideological rigidity to managerial pragmatism.

Read more:Fractured alliance: Iraq's CF faces internal strife

Al-Maliki’s Machine

Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, meanwhile, remains determined to prove that the old guard of Shiite politics still commands deep loyalties. His State of Law Coalition (Dawlat al-Qanoon) is fielding 425 candidates across Iraq and expects to secure between 40 and 45 seats, relying on one of the country’s most disciplined electoral machines.

The coalition’s backbone lies in Baghdad, where internal polling suggests 14 to 15 seats, including Al-Maliki himself, and it remains robust in the southern provinces. High-profile candidates include Agriculture Minister Abbas al-Aliyaoui (Najaf), Youth and Sports Minister Ahmed al-Mubarak (Baghdad), Oil Minister Hayyan Abdul-Ghani, and Electricity Minister Ziad Ali Fadel (Basra). Other names—Yasser Abu Rahab, Aqeel al-Fatlawi, Ibtisam al-Hilali, Muna al-Mousawi, Zainab al-Abbadi, and Fatima al-Issawi—highlight the coalition’s breadth across political and social strata.

The State of Law Coalition’s trajectory mirrors Iraq’s post-2003 political shifts. In 2014, it dominated parliament with 92 seats before al-Maliki was pressured to cede the premiership to Haider al-Abadi amid mounting domestic and international criticism. By 2018, internal fragmentation cut its tally to 25 seats, while in 2021 it rebounded to around 35, emerging as the second-largest Shiite bloc after Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement.

Spokesman Aqeel al-Fatlawi told Shafaq News that the coalition’s campaign centers on “restoring the authority of the state and ensuring governance continuity through experienced leadership.”

Senior member Alaa al-Hadadi added that a potential third term for al-Maliki “is on the table,” though it depends on broader consensus within the Coordination Framework (CF).

Despite al-Hadadi’s doubts that al-Sudani will secure a second term, the State of Law Coalition retains influence across the Shiite south—particularly in Najaf, Diwaniyah, and Karbala, where it is projected to trail only the governor’s pro-Sudani list.

Read more:Iraq's Shiite factions: a landscape of division

Brokers and Balancers

While al-Sudani and al-Maliki dominate headlines, other Shiite factions are maneuvering for leverage in post-election negotiations.

The National Wisdom Movement (Al-Hikma), led by Ammar al-Hakim, is contesting under the National State Forces Alliance, fielding 400 candidates across Baghdad and the southern provinces. Once a major pillar of Shiite politics—winning 29 seats in 2014 under the Al-Mowaten Coalition—Al-Hakim’s influence has waned, dropping to 19 seats in 2018 and only 2 in 2021.

Yet insiders say Al-Hikma still plays the role of mediator rather than contender. Senior member Fahd al-Jubouri told Shafaq News the strategy is to maintain a “third line” approach: “The goal is not to lead the government but to be a decisive voice in shaping it,” he said, adding that the bloc aims for no fewer than 20 seats this time.

Meanwhile, the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, is running independently with 460 candidates across all provinces—including Sunni areas—after failing to seal a pre-election alliance with al-Sudani. Senior Badr figure Hafez al-Saidi said the organization’s plan is to “secure an autonomous base before re-entering negotiations within the Coordination Framework.”

Prominent Badr candidates include former Interior Minister Mohammed al-Ghabban (Baghdad), alongside Razzaq Sweif, Hamed al-Mousawi, Abu Murtada al-Karbalai, and Ibtisam al-Ardhi.

Badr’s electoral history reflects Iraq’s broader post-ISIS transformations. The group won roughly 22 seats in 2014 within al-Maliki’s coalition, expanded to about 48 through the Fatah Alliance in 2018, then plunged to around 17 in 2021 amid public backlash against armed factions. Despite this decline, Badr remains a pillar of the Shiite establishment—militarily, politically, and symbolically.

The Deepening Rift

The fragmentation of Shiite politics today runs deeper than personal rivalries—it exposes competing visions of governance and identity.

Abu Meethaq al-Masari, a senior Badr figure, told Shafaq News the Shiite scene now divides into three camps: one advocating a second term for al-Sudani, another pushing for al-Maliki’s return, and a third representing emerging civil and technocratic movements with limited structures but growing appeal.

Political researcher Basil Hussein noted that these newer, protest-inspired movements led by figures like Adnan al-Zurfi and MP Sajad Salem “have not weakened the traditional parties, but they have infused them with new discourse and generational energy.” Their influence, though modest, reflects a shift in Shiite legitimacy—from resistance credentials toward governance performance.

The tensions have grown so pronounced that Iran’s Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani made an unannounced visit to Baghdad in early October to mediate between al-Sudani and al-Maliki’s camps within the Coordination Framework. A senior source told Shafaq News Qaani’s goal was to “prevent a complete breakdown among the Framework’s core components.” His intervention calmed tempers but yielded no binding electoral pact. “It was a holding action rather than a reconciliation,” the source said.

Despite division, key red lines remain intact. All major Shiite blocs reject normalization with Israel, insist on maintaining the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as a permanent state institution, and support continued coordination with Iran.

Even al-Sudani, despite emphasizing “the need to remove weapons from groups outside state control,” continues to defend the PMF’s strategic role. Al-Sudani, for his part, has never opposed the PMF Authority Law, despite US objections.

As Hussein observed, “There is a duality in the Shiite scene: fierce electoral competition coexisting with shared existential commitments.”

After the Vote

Most observers agree that, regardless of the rhetoric, Iraq’s Shiite parties will ultimately need to cooperate once the ballots are counted.

“The logic of power in Iraq compels cooperation,” researcher Hussein explained. “No single Shiite bloc can rule alone.” Al-Masari echoed this view, predicting that post-election negotiations will revive the Coordination Framework in a new form—reshaped by the relative strength of each camp’s parliamentary weight.

Despite their rivalries, Iraq’s Shiite factions remain bound by pragmatism and survival instincts. Therefore, the 2025 vote seems like a referendum on the future identity of Shiite politics—whether it will continue as a house divided or evolve into a modern political movement anchored in governance rather than grievance.

As Al-Masari put it, “The fight is not just for parliament; it is for the soul of the Shiite House itself.”

The Crossroads of Iraq’s Political Identity

Both the Shiite and Sunni political houses are approaching a decisive moment that will define Iraq’s post-2025 landscape. Their internal rivalries may differ in scale and background, yet they share the same challenge: reconciling power, legitimacy, and governance in a country still seeking stability.

Analysts view the parallel fragmentation across both blocs as a sign that Iraq’s traditional political divisions are fading. The Shiite arena is testing whether long-standing dominance can evolve into sustainable governance, while the Sunni camp is striving to turn representation into real influence. In both cases, Iraqis are demanding tangible results—jobs, services, and accountability—over slogans and sectarian rhetoric.

Read more: Race for the 2025 elections: Fragmentation dominates Iraq's Sunni house

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.