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Nearly 20 months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government on December 8, 2024, relations between Iraq and Syria are moving from a period of anxiety and caution toward a new phase marked by greater communication and pragmatism.

The relationship has never followed the pattern of normal ties between neighboring states. Throughout its history, Iraq-Syria relations have been shaped by complex political and security calculations, with their trajectory repeatedly changing according to the balance of power and circumstances in both countries.

The rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa to the Syrian presidency initially became one of Baghdad's main sources of concern. Yet contacts between the two countries soon began at the intelligence level, taking an increasingly containment-oriented approach. Gradually, Iraq's rhetoric shifted from expressing multiple security and political concerns toward cautious, incremental engagement.

The evolution can be seen in the changing language of Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law coalition. On February 19, 2025, al-Maliki held al-Sharaa responsible for killings and destruction that had affected Iraqis in previous years. Less than a year later, on February 4, 2026, he described al-Sharaa as a brother and said he was prepared to establish bilateral relations with Damascus if he won the elections. At the same time, he directly accused Bashar al-Assad of having "exported terrorism" to Iraq throughout his years in power.

The shift does not mean that all differences have disappeared. Rather, it reflects Baghdad's growing assessment that engagement with Damascus is becoming necessary to address shared security, political and economic interests.

Over the past year and a half, several major issues have begun to shape the relationship: security cooperation, the Kurdish issue, judicial coordination, and economic ties, particularly oil transportation. The latter has gained additional urgency amid the crisis created by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran, the route for most of Iraq's seaborne crude exports.

A Relationship Still Marked by an Imbalance

Despite the expanding contacts, the road between Baghdad and Damascus is not yet free of obstacles. The imbalance in official visits remains particularly visible.

Iraqi officials have made a succession of visits to Damascus, including National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and, most recently, Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidan.

Syrian official visits to Baghdad, by contrast, have remained limited. They have largely consisted of two visits by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani in 2025: one ahead of the Arab Summit hosted by Baghdad and another during the summit itself.

Al-Sharaa has not yet visited Baghdad, for reasons that remain present on both the Iraqi and Syrian sides. One of the most prominent has been the Iraqi political debate over whether to host the Syrian president.

Recent developments, however, suggest that this phase may increasingly belong to the past. The succession of high-level visits, most recently Zidan's trip to Damascus, points to a relationship moving toward a more regular institutional framework.

Faiq Zidan's Visit: Important, But not Enough

The visit by Zidan carries particular significance because it expanded bilateral engagement into the judicial sphere.

Baghdad-based political analyst Sabah al-Akaili said the visit was important, but it should be followed by reciprocal visits involving security, economic, and political officials. “Iraq and Syria need to consolidate balanced relations at a time when the region is going through a critical phase.”

He pointed to the historical relationship between the two countries and their mutual interests as reasons for greater coordination.

ISIS detainees transferred to Iraqi prisons were among the main issues discussed during the meetings, alongside judicial and legal cooperation, the exchange of expertise, transitional justice, transparency, combating corruption, and other shared judicial cases.

Read more: From Syrian prisons to Iraqi provinces

The ISIS file naturally occupies a central position in the judicial track. Iraq holds around 7,000 members of the organization, with at least 3,000 of them being Syrian nationals.

Al-Akili argued that coordination over trials, transfers, and legal procedures has become both a security and judicial necessity. The issue also extends to the possibility that individuals wanted by Iraqi courts may be present inside Syria.

Baghdad's Fears: A Historical Backdrop

Iraq's concerns have been deeply connected to its roughly 600-kilometer border with Syria.

For many Iraqi officials, the collapse of al-Assad's government presented the possibility of a new security vacuum that could be exploited by ISIS cells and other armed groups to carry out attacks in both countries.

Al-Sharaa's background added another layer to those concerns. His previous association with al-Qaeda in Iraq under the name of Abu Mohammad Al-Joulani became a major point of anxiety among Iraqi political and security circles. Baghdad was also concerned about the fate of Syrian prisons and camps holding ISIS members and their families in northeastern Syria.

Another factor was the presence of Iraqi armed factions and their networks inside Syria. The fall of al-Assad raised questions about what would happen to existing arrangements of influence and regional supply lines.

During the initial period, Baghdad therefore adopted a highly cautious position. It did not rush toward full political recognition of the new reality in Damascus, instead monitoring the behavior of the new Syrian administration while seeking answers about border security, terrorism, and the future of detainees.

On December 26, 2024, just 18 days after al-Assad's fall, National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri arrived in Damascus at the head of a senior delegation to meet the new Syrian administration. It was the first major and direct Iraqi contact with the new authorities while formal political relations between Baghdad and Damascus remained largely frozen.

The visit was more than a brief security contact. It carried messages concerning border control, preventing armed groups from entering Iraq, the fate of ISIS members, and the prisons holding them. The atmosphere was so tense at the time that al-Sharaa's reception of al-Shatri sparked widespread debate after the Syrian president was seen carrying his personal weapon.

On April 25, 2025, al-Shatri returned to Damascus at the head of a broader Iraqi government delegation that included officials from the Border Forces, the Border Crossings Authority and the ministries of oil and trade. The agenda was no longer limited to security. Both sides discussed counterterrorism, trade and the possibility of re-exporting Iraqi oil through Syrian ports on the Mediterranean.

The Iraqi tone gradually changed, while Syrian communication with Baghdad also expanded.

On August 28, 2025, al-Shatri made a third visit to Damascus and met al-Sharaa. Their discussions covered border security, counterterrorism, and the situation of the Iraqi community in Syria.

Meanwhile, the issue of ISIS families in al-Hol camp moved toward a solution. Iraq received most of the families transferred from the camp and continued to place them in social reintegration programs.

During his visit to Baghdad on March 14, 2025, al-Shaibani met Iraqi officials and said the new Syrian administration wanted to strengthen relations with Iraq, cooperate to prevent foreign interference, and confront the challenges of reconstruction.

Expanding Contacts: Energy Diplomacy?

The clearest expansion of the relationship came on June 29, 2026, when Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein visited Damascus in his first official trip to Syria. He met al-Sharaa at the People's Palace, with discussions focusing on strengthening bilateral relations and coordinating positions on shared challenges.

A week later, Iraq and Syria held their first publicly announced border meeting between their border forces in the al-Qaim area. The meeting addressed mechanisms for field coordination, information sharing, and control of the border strip.

Energy cooperation had already begun developing on a parallel track. On March 31, 2026, the first shipments of Iraqi oil were transported by tanker trucks through the al-Waleed border crossing toward Baniyas. On April 1, the first convoys carrying Iraqi fuel oil crossed through al-Tanf toward Baniyas.

The discussion subsequently expanded to the rehabilitation of the historic Kirkuk-Haditha-Baniyas pipeline, with US support for the project and Iraqi-Syrian talks on expanding its capacity.

The project has acquired additional importance as regional tensions threaten conventional export routes. Diversifying Iraq's access to Mediterranean markets could provide Baghdad with an alternative to routes exposed to disruption around the Gulf.

Al-Akaili described the energy file as activated but still "below the level of ambition." He argued that continuing instability around the Strait of Hormuz makes cooperation with Syria on oil exports more urgent, while stressing that such cooperation requires clear agreements between the two countries.

Nechirvan Barzani's Role

The visits by Iraqi officials to Syria have been accompanied by another important channel: the engagement of Kurdistan Region of Iraq President Nechirvan Barzani, whose role has built on previous meetings and contacts between Erbil and Damascus.

On April 17, 2026, he met al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Their discussions covered relations among the Kurdistan Region, Iraq, and Syria, particularly in the economic and trade fields. They also discussed regional developments, the situation of Kurds and other communities in Syria, and the agreement between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Days earlier, on April 6, al-Sharaa had spoken by telephone with Barzani, discussing regional developments, Iraqi-Syrian relations, and the situation of Kurds and other communities in Syria. Al-Sharaa also condemned attacks targeting the Kurdistan Region amid the US-Israeli war with Iran.

On August 3, Barzani traveled to Damascus and met al-Sharaa, further reinforcing the emerging channel between Erbil and the Syrian capital.

Kurdish politician Abdul-Salam Barwari, speaking to Shafaq News, said Barzani could play a role in easing tensions that accompanied the arrival of Syria's new authorities.

"Iraq and Syria are neighbors and must try to find harmony, because each needs the other," Barwari said, noting that the circumstances surrounding the arrival of the new authorities in Damascus had created tensions inside Baghdad.

"Barzani is capable of helping ease these tensions," he added, stressing that Barzani's movement between Erbil, Baghdad and Damascus could help open the way for more reciprocal visits.

Barwari also identified the Baniyas pipeline, counterterrorism, and Iraqi-Syrian coordination as among the issues connected to this broader diplomatic track.

Barzani's engagement has also extended beyond relations between Erbil and Damascus. As previous Shafaq News interviews with observers have highlighted, northeastern Syria places three principal actors in the same equation: Damascus, Syrian Kurdish forces and Baghdad, alongside the United States, Turkiye and other regional actors.

By hosting SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and maintaining contacts over the future of the SDF, Erbil has sought to help prevent the process of integrating Syria's civilian and military institutions from turning into another confrontation.

The position emerging from Barzani's diplomacy rests on a clear formula: a unified and stable Syria, while safeguarding the rights of Kurds and other communities, Barwari affirmed.

A New Phase

Syrian researcher Ahmad Kamel believes that the developments cannot be separated from the political changes that have taken place in both countries.

Syria, he observed, has entered a new era, while Iraq is also experiencing a significant political transition. Kamel noted that the current Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, as well as the previous government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, had sought to establish good relations with Syria. Iraq's new government was sworn in under al-Zaidi in May 2026.

"The success of the new Iraqi government in placing weapons under state control and ending the phenomenon of armed militias will put Iraq before a new phase.”

He indicated that Damascus is responding positively to Baghdad's outreach and seeking a relationship based on common interests and the management of shared risks.

"Damascus is returning the greeting with an equal or better one."

"Relations are becoming institutionalized, but remain asymmetric, cautious and incomplete," he added, linking the development to what he described as a new economic geography in the region.

Kamel contended that Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Turkiye could together form an alternative network to maritime corridors that are increasingly exposed to risk.

Kamel pointed to increased truck traffic between Iraq and Syria and efforts to rehabilitate oil pipelines as evidence that “what was merely a political concept has begun turning into economic realities.”

Read more: Syria’s calm: An end to threat or a start of a complex security phase for Iraq?

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.