Shafaq News/ A French report said that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will never sacrifice its improved ties with Turkiye, Iran, Syria, and the central government of Iraq for what it called "short-term interests" with the Kurdistan Region, suggesting that the 2017 independence referendum and the intra-Kurdish differences might interfere the growing relations between the Monarchy and the semi-autonomous Region.

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has a dynamic foreign policy and has tried to turn the limitations of other countries in the region into an opportunity for itself. They have economic and political relations with their western neighbour, Iran, and at the same time, while straightening their relations with its enemy, the US. In the same way, they pursue their relations with Arab countries without neglecting these interactions with Israel. On the other hand, they have economic interactions with Turkiye, while hosting Kurdish groups opposed to Ankara and Tehran.

These interactions have shown the Kurdish authorities that in order to achieve their goals such as independence from the Iraqi central government, strengthening the economy, creating a modern region in terms of tourism, turning Erbil into a modern urban city, and enjoying the political support of other countries, it is necessary to expand their relations with all countries. Meanwhile, the rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf present a valuable opportunity for partnership with the KRI. Especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which values relations with the KRI more than other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.

Growing relationships

Since 2019, Kurdish authorities have visited various sheikhdoms of the UAE dozens of times. These meetings show the Kurdish region’s interest in communicating with a rich country like the UAE. In addition to rich oil revenues and the ability to invest in the KRI's industries, the UAE can use its strong desire for a wider communication with various groups, parties, and sects in the region and Iraq to implement the patterns of socio-political development of the seven sheikhdoms with a wider reach in the KRI.

These visits are in line with the collective will of the KRI and the GCC to strengthen and expand relations between the two sides. These interactions culminated in Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of KRI being invited by the Secretary General of the GCC, Jasem Mohamed Al-Budaiwi, to the sidelines of the World Government Summit 2023 held in Dubai to participate in the Council’s meetings. Among all the members, the UAE is more aware of Kurdistan's power to influence Iraq's Sunni society and its political developments. Also, they are the most hopeful about the promising future of its economic sector.

Relations between the UAE and the KRI dates back to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Until the time of Saddam Hussein, Erbil and Abu Dhabi had little communication with one another.

Since the beginning of UAE-Iraqi relations in 1971 and even throughout the developments of the 1990s and Abu Dhabi's support for the Arabs in condemning the occupation of Kuwait, the UAE has provided millions of dollars in food and medicine to Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq. Furthermore, they have been one of the largest providers of humanitarian aid to Baghdad. In fact, they went as far as violating the United Nations sanctions against this country and Saddam’s government and also demanded they be cancelled.

Until then, Iraqi Kurdistan had no place in Abu Dhabi's foreign policy, except for providing some humanitarian aid. However, following the Shiites' rise to power after 2003 and Iran's growing influence in Iraq, the UAEbecame more interested.. Accordingly, the UAE was the first country in the Persian Gulf to open its consulate in Erbil in 2012, followed by Kuwait in 2015, Saudi Arabia in 2016, and Qatar in 2023. Erbil lacks a diplomatic presence in the capitals of the Persian Gulf, but there have been recent discussions about establishing a Kurdish paradiplomatic office in the UAE.

Mutual need

The growing relations between the UAE and the KRI stem from mutual interests, and both Abu Dhabi and Erbil benefit from the deepening ties . Politics, security, economics and regional relations are the most important factors involved in the relations between the two countries. It seems that the KRI's most important priority in these relations is economic, but in consideration the political, economic, and soft power role of the UAE in the region, Abu Dhabi has broader goals in deepening these relations.

The UAE's strategic presence in the KRI is one of Abu Dhabi’s key long-term objectives in its relations with the Iraqi Kurds. The Kurdistan region is located in the north of Iraq and shares borders with three countries: Iran, Turkey, and Syria. All three countries have Kurdish minorities, whose history of armed struggle for autonomy and the formation of the great cause of independent Kurdistan among all the Kurdish ethnicities of these three countries is one of their long-standing dreams.

On the other hand, all three countries are seen as rivals of the UAE and the Emirati authorities have a history of tense relations with all three. The geopolitical and strategic location of the KRI allows the UAE to play an active role in “maintaining and creating tensions” or “managing tensions and mediating” between the three countries and the KRI.

In mid-June 2020, the Turkish military launched “Operation Eagle-Claw” against the PKK - a Kurdish group opposed to the Turkish government and designated as a terrorist group by the European Union and the US - in Iraqi Kurdistan. The New Arab revealed in an exclusive report that amid these attacks, the UAE government has been secretly funding the PKK in Kurdistan.

These financial relations have been developing over the past four years under the cover of social organisations or relief missions for refugees. After this report was published, the KRI’s authorities reacted and imposed restrictions on fast money transfers from the UAE. Earlier, there were reports of the UAE’s UAE’s involvement in the July 2016 Turkish coup.

Given the recent de-escalation of tensions between the UAE and Iran, Turkiye and the government of Bashar al-Assad, it is unlikely that the Abu Dhabi authorities will jeopardise their newly calmed relations, but considering the UAE’s active role in managing tensions and mediation, they are ready to mediate in the tense relations of the three countries with KRI and the issue of the Kurdish struggle. Al-Monitor, through anonymous sources, claimed that Mazlum Kobane commander in chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) met with the UAE's national security adviser, Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan in March last year to seek Abu Dhabi's help in mediating between the Syrian Kurds and Bashar al-Assad's regime. The UAE authorities rejected this report.

Reducing Iran's influence in Iraq and among Iraqi Sunni political forces is another goal of the UAE’s presence in the KRI. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran gained a lot of influence among Iraqi Shia politicians, to the extent that Tehran was able to choose the Iraqi prime minister through proxy groups and electoral pressure. Tehran has a lot of influence among the Shia militias known as Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi), which are described as Iran’s proxies.

Political Islam is one of the UAE’s political concerns in the region, and the presence of Shia political groups in Iraq that promote political Islam through military power and politics, is seen as a threat to the UAE. They are trying to reduce Tehran's control over the Iraqi Shia society and curb its influence by investing in Iraq, trying to integrate Baghdad into the Arab centre, and talking to influential Shia politicians such as Moqtada Sadr who has many followers among the urban society of Baghdad and southern Iraq.

In the aforementioned struggle with Iran, the KRI became very important for the UAE. The Sunni authorities of Kurdistan are a good counterbalance to the Shiite influence in Iraq. This incident became more important for the UAE, especially after the change of procedure of Mohammed al-Halbousi, the Sunni Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament.

Emirati leaders have become increasingly dissatisfied with al-Halbousi, who had been a key point of contact for Abu Dhabi. His political approach to other Sunni factions has led to internal divisions, resulting in a weakened Sunni position in Baghdad, which has undercut Emirate interests in Iraq. While the UAE aimed to cultivate positive relationships with various ethnic and sectarian groups in Iraq, Halbousi pursued a divisive strategy, according to experts, attempting to control all communication channels and thriving on factionalism. As al-Halbousi fell out of favour with the UAE, so did the UAE’s influence among Sunnis, and Abu Dhabi came to rely more heavily on the Kurds to navigate the increasingly complex politics of Baghdad.

Accelerating the expansion of soft power is another goal of Abu Dhabi in the KRI. The UAE does not face many problems with this. In fact, the Kurds are more willing than the Emirates to choose it as a model for policy development, distribution of political-financial power, and consolidation and efficiency of political and social institutions. The Kurds have chosen the UAE as a development model, and their goal is to turn Erbil into the next Dubai, but they are facing many problems.

The transformation of Erbil into Dubai with the help of oil wealth may be relatively possible, but the two have failed in the distribution of political power, the circulation of elites and the distribution of national wealth that the Emirates have successfully undertaken.

Between 2004 and 2014, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) turned the opportunities following the 2003 invasion into an economic boom. They built two international airports in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil to overcome the challenge of being landlocked. Mass hiring in the public sector reduced unemployment, and the 2006 Investment Law helped the KRG attract significant domestic and foreign capital. Today, more than 3,000 foreign companies are registered in this region. In the diplomatic sector, the KRI hosts 42 consulates and 14 representative offices around the world.

However, Kurdish politicians have many problems with the “distribution of political and financial power”. Political relations in the KRI are under the control of the two dominant parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by the Talabani and Barzani families, respectively.

In recent years, fissures have emerged among Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling families, which have become more prominent as the region’s political parties have weakened. After the PUK founder Jalal Talabani passed away in 2017, his eldest son and nephew together assumed leadership of the party as co-presidents. In 2021, a feud broke out between the cousins, Bafel and Lahur Talabani, and the former ousted the latter. Meanwhile, on the Barzani side, a power struggle is brewing between two Barzani cousins that has the potential to disrupt not only the cohesion of the KDP, but the entire regional government. These internal struggles reflect broader institutional weaknesses and democratic regression in the Kurdistan region.

Kurdistan's attempt to emulate the UAE led to a meeting between Rebar Ahmed, the Emirate Minister of Interior, and Masrour Barzani in April last year. The two sides held a series of meetings to transfer the experiences of the UAE to the KRI in government modernisation and performance improvement through the exchange of knowledge, expertise and development models. In 2022, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding in the field of governance, and development in government affairs and human resources.

Economics: common concept

The UAE is the second-largest investor in the KRI and accounts for 25% of foreign direct investment after China. Five UAE companies have invested a total of more than 2.5 billion dollars in the KRI. Additionally the value of bilateral trade is about 3 billion dollars per year. It is worth noting that the UAE-based Dana Gas Company produces up to 500 million cubic feet per day of gas in the KRI, mainly for Kurdistan's domestic consumption and power generation. In the field of agriculture, the KRG plans to export pomegranates, apples, grapes, and potatoes to the UAE. As per the agreement to export 5,000 tons of potatoes to the UAE in August 2023, the KRI is expected to export 90% of its potatoes to the UAE.

One of the priorities of the KRI's economic cooperation with the UAE is investing in areas where Kurdistan is lacking. The Kurdistan Region faces a critical shortage of 3,000 megawatt per hour of electricity. To produce the amount of electricity it consumes, it burns a large amount of fossil fuels, so that almost half of the electricity production relies on highly polluting local generators using diesel and fuel oil. According to a report by Green Hydrogen Capital Fund, based in Erbil, the KRI has the practical capacity and economic competitiveness to produce 1,000 megawatt per hour of electricity using green hydrogen, compared to conventional fuel and natural gas. In the KRI, only one solar energy project with a capacity of 25 megawatt per hour has been approved, and another 100 megawatt per hour solar project has been proposed. These planned projects are less than the country's solar energy potential and represent only a part of the total demand.

In this context and considering the very rich experience of the UAE in green hydrogen production and the country's 54 billion dollar investment in renewable energy, Erbil plans to use the investment and knowledge of Emirati companies in the field of solar electricity. The two sides have had many meetings for this purpose.

Common security challenges

Supporting anti-terrorist activities and fighting ISIS was one of the first cooperation and common security concerns between the UAE and the KRI. Kurdistan and its army, the Peshmerga, made admirable sacrifices to defeat ISIS. Erbil the capital of The Land of the Kurds was only 90 kilometres away from Mosul as the frontline of the conflict with ISIS. At the peak of the ISIS crisis in Iraq, the Kurds were able to completely defeat ISIS fighters in 2017, liberating 50,000 square kilometres from their control.

The UAE has also played a constructive role in fighting terrorism. This country hosted meetings of the Global Coalition to Defeat-ISIS's Stabilization and Communications Working Groups. The UAE also hosted the Sawab Center to counter messaging and online propaganda by ISIS and their affiliated organisations.

Furthermore, in the Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State established by Barack Obama on September 10, 2014, the UAE was responsible for addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises, and exposing ISIS’ true nature. UAE military forces participated in Syria against this terrorist group and carried out several airstrikes in this coalition.

The main contributions of the UAE to the KRI in the war against ISIS were humanitarian aid and support for Kurdish refugees affected by the conflict. In July 2015, the UAE launched a campaign to help one million displaced people in the Kurdistan region by providing humanitarian food and sanitary equipment through the Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation, and in cooperation with the Barzani Charity Foundation, covering 250,000 people. These aids are ongoing and are intended to empower Kurdish and Sunni refugees of Kurdistan.

The relations between the KRI and the UAE with Israel, as well as Iran's April 13 missile attack on Tel-Aviv, are among the common regional challenges faced by Abu Dhabi and Erbil. Both capitals have many economic, political, and security relations with Israel.

Relations between Kurdistan (especially the KDP) and Israel date back to the mid-1960s. During the 1960s and 1970s, Israel secretly supported the Kurdish insurgency against the Iraqi government. These relations became stronger after the fall of Saddam Hussein, with Israel being the first country in the world to recognise the independence of Kurdistan on September 9, 2017. At one point, Israel was importing three-quarters of its oil from Kurdistan. According to some reports, in 2004, the Israeli army and its intelligence units were active in the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Iran, and Syria, supporting and training these units and conducting covert operations.

Similarly, the UAE has continued to defend its links with Israel despite the war in Gaza. Since the beginning of relations between the UAE and Israel in 2020, associations between the two countries have been growing. About 45,000 Israeli tourists visited the UAE between January 2021 and January 2023 alone, and the two sides signed a partnership deal in 2022 that aimed to increase bilateral trade to $10 billion dollars over five years. Trade grew 17 percent last year to $2.95 billion dollars. According to data from Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics. Despite the cooling in the wake of the October 7 war, trade in the first quarter of 2024 was 7 percent higher than the previous year.

Abu Dhabi and Erbil were worried about the spread of tensions in the region after Iran's missile attack on Israel and wanted to de-escalate the tension between them. Reports indicate that some Iranian missiles have landed in the KRI and the UAE and Saudi Arabia have helped Jordan, France, Israel, and the UK in providing information to target Iranian missiles.

Iran's influence in Iraq is a common problem of Abu Dhabi and Erbil. Iran twice launched a missile attack on the KRI and signed a joint agreement with the central government in late August 2023 to destroy the Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in the northern regions of Iraq and transfer them from their official bases. The Popular Mobilization Forces attack with missiles and drones on the oil and gas fields of the KRI, which are managed by Emirates companies, has caused the stoppage of operations and security dissatisfaction among Emirates contractors.

Through inter-Kurdish differences, Iran accelerates the division in the KRI and relations with the central government. As in many parts of Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran provides financial, military, and logistical support to political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially the PUK. Tehran's financial support has caused influence among Iraqi Kurds.

In a televised interview in April 2023, Haji Mahmood, secretary of a party splintered off from the KDP, claimed that in the 2014 elections, Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of Iran's Quds Force, donated one million dollars to four Kurdish opposition parties. In 2017, he also met with the figures of the PUK and advised them and the Peshmerga forces not to take countermeasures against the forces of Haider al-Abadi, the former Prime Minister, in the city of Kirkuk in exchange for Iran's support for Kurdish interests.

The differences within the party will lead the UAE to perceive its influence in the KRI as weak and unstable due to multiple factions and inter-sectarian differences, and it will be less willing to invest in such an unstable situation. Abu Dhabi authorities need improved economic conditions to increase their soft power and long-term presence, otherwise, they will appear to have less economic influence and investment in the KRI.

Despite Masrour Barzani’s numerous visits to the UAE, the reason for the absence of high-ranking officials from Abu Dhabi, including the president of the UAE, is their realisation that the differences within Kurdistan and the tensions between Erbil and Baghdad prevent their direct presence, and it will gradually become the basis of disagreement between stakeholders such as Iran, Turkey, and the federal government. Therefore, in such circumstances, they prefer to regulate their presence through the central government.

Conclusion

Relations between the KRI and the UAE are being strengthened, and both sides benefit from their close ties. The KRI is pleased with the UAE's investment in Kurdistan and trade opportunities with Abu Dhabi. The UAE also considers its strategic presence in a sensitive region that is of interest to the four governments of Turkey, Iran, Syria and the central government of Iraq, to be advantageous, in addition to economic benefits.

However, the main problem of the KRI in benefiting from the opportunities of the UAE is the problems and differences that Erbil has with its internal groups or its neighbours. The UAE will never sacrifice its improved relations with Turkey, Iran, Syria, and the central government of Iraq for its short-term interests with the KRI. The issues that it found with these countries, especially after the independence referendum in 2017 or the internal differences of the Kurds, will hinder the growing relations in the future or at least slow down its momentum.

For example, following the KRI’s dispute with the central government over the transfer of natural gas from the Khor Mor field in the Chamchamal District of the KRG to the disputed province of Kirkuk in November 2023, The Ministry of Natural Resources of the KRG warned Emirate Dana Company against any agreement with the Iraqi government to move the region's natural gas without the regional government's permission.

These obstacles, stemming from intra-Kurdish disputes or with the Iraqi central government, have caused doubts among Emirates officials as the UAE needs calm and reduced tensions with its neighbours to continue its booming economy. For this reason, Kurdistan needs more internal unity for a deeper connection with the UAE.

The CFRI does not take collective positions. Its publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

(By Mohammad Salami for CFRI)