Shafaq News

With Iraq’s parliamentary elections set for November 11, 2025, rifts inside the Shiite-led Coordination Framework (CF) are widening, with accusations traded and no consensus emerging on core issues, most notably the post of prime minister.

Formed in October 2021 to block Muqtada al-Sadr’s bid for a majority government, the CF brings together State of Law, led by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Fatah Alliance of Hadi al-Amiri, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, headed by Qais al-Khazali, the al-Hikma Movement of Ammar al-Hakim, the Victory Alliance of Haider al-Abadi, along with smaller factions such as Faleh al-Fayyadh’s National Contract, Ahmad al-Asadi’s Bilad Sumer, and others.

The bloc maintains close ties with Tehran, though its members differ on how far Iraq should lean toward Iran versus balancing relations with the United States and Arab Gulf states. These differences underscore the internal tensions that extend beyond electoral calculations.

However, what began as a tactical front against Muqtada al-Sadr has long been undermined by personal rivalries, competition over state resources, and diverging visions on foreign policy and security.

Past attempts to bridge disputes allowed the bloc to form governments, but analysts note a recurring pattern: Shiite blocs come together under external pressure, but internal rivalries quickly resurface once the threat passes — as seen after the 2021 elections.

Post-election scenarios could further test the bloc, with corruption investigations or political disputes potentially moving into courts — including international ones — highlighting the fragility of CF cohesion.

Strategic Schisms

Politicians within the CF indicate that current disagreements now extend beyond leadership ambitions. They encompass strategic issues, including relations with Syria under its new government, ties with Washington, the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the status of armed factions.

Some view PMF weapons as leverage against foreign troops, while others argue the state must assume full control.

Speaking to Shafaq News, CF senior official Rahman al-Jazaeri highlighted that Iraq’s political and economic crises have “deepened the divisions within the Coordination Framework while also fragmenting the country’s political scene,” pointing to a clear external hand in fuelling tensions.

Read more: Ground zero in the battle for Iraq's Parliament

“Sensitive issues like disarming the resistance and the approval of the PMF Authority Law were among the reasons for the split inside the Framework,” he added, underlining that the US pressure remained a major factor.

Observers note these disputes are hardly new. Iran pushes for cohesion, but in practice, the Framework has long served as a bargaining platform, not a disciplined alliance.

The Re-election Rift

Another source of tension within the Coordination Framework (CF) is whether Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani should pursue a second term.

Political analyst Hussein al-Kinani noted that al-Sudani initially pledged not to run again but later “backtracked on that agreement,” forming the Reconstruction and Development Coalition—which includes his Euphrates Movement (al-Furatain) along with seven other political forces.

The move placed strain on the CF, which had been central to al-Sudani’s rise to power, prompting some factions to even harden their stance.

On April 21, the CF decided to contest the next elections under multiple lists that would later merge into a post-vote bloc—a strategy that highlights both the need for unity and the difficulty of sustaining it amid internal rivalries.

This approach is familiar in Shiite politics, where blocs often run separately to test their strength before negotiating post-election power-sharing. These widening disputes led key players, including State of Law, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, and al-Hikma, to field separate lists, while keeping the door open for post-election reconciliation.

Electoral arithmetic adds another layer of complexity. In 2021, State of Law captured roughly 33 seats, Fatah 17, al-Hikma just 2, and Asaib-linked candidates 4–6, with independents gradually chipping away at the Shiite vote.

Public fatigue with familiar parties was also evident in the December 2023 provincial elections, which recorded only 45% turnout—further intensifying rivalries as leaders maneuver for leverage in post-election negotiations.

Unsettled Scores

Rahim al-Darraji, head of the Kafa Movement, argued that the CF never fully resolved the old rifts dating back to its opposition days, when the bloc held roughly 40 parliamentary seats and operated outside the government coalition following the 2018 elections.

Electoral competition, he told Shafaq News, remains the main driver of the current splits. “Each party sees its interest separately and wishes to weaken its rivals,” he explained, noting that this dynamic has further widened the divide.

Al-Darraji further suggested that the divisions could carry a silver lining if they lead to the exposure of corruption files, potentially benefiting citizens. Yet he remained skeptical about the bloc’s prospects, stressing that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani “has no real chance.”

“The current rallying around his list is about office, votes, and money. His bloc will unravel after the election, as Haider al-Abadi did previously,” he added.

‘’Control over key offices lies at the heart of intra-CF bargaining,’’ making the CF split almost inevitable, al-Darraji noted.

Disputes Downplayed

In contrast, Fadi al-Jubouri of al-Hikma Movement minimized any notion of a CF rupture, labeling talk of splits as “exaggerated.”

He pointed out to Shafaq News that regular CF meetings continue and differences largely stem from divergent views or statements rather than fundamental divisions.

Al-Jubouri also highlighted that the bloc will run on 12 lists, yet with “agreements” designed to preserve the CF’s structure and pave the way for institutionalization through a general assembly and leadership council.

“There is consensus inside the Framework on strategic decisions related to the state, government, political system, and external relations with Iran and the US,” he emphasized, stressing that these constants remain insulated from political quarrels.

Whether the CF holds after November will hinge on whether its factions prioritize collective influence over individual ambition. History suggests the bloc rarely dissolves outright, but instead reshapes itself in cycles of rivalry and reconciliation, shaped by elections and external pressures.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.