Shafaq News

Six days before Iraq’s parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 11, the decision of the head of the Patriotic Shiite Movement (PSM), Muqtada al-Sadr, to boycott the vote continues to cast a long shadow over the political scene.

Observers warn that the withdrawal of al-Sadr’s “well-organized and disciplined base” could significantly weaken voter turnout and disrupt the political balance within Iraq’s Shiite bloc—particularly in southern provinces where the movement has been a decisive electoral force in previous cycles.

Rahman al-Jazaeri, a senior figure in the Coordination Framework—the coalition that brings together Iraq’s dominant Shiite political forces—told Shafaq News that the PSM boycott will affect the voter participation, especially in the southern provinces, where field indicators show very low levels of mobilization.

He noted that the Shiite component faces “a real dilemma regarding participation, particularly after Sadr City—one of the movement’s main strongholds—announced a complete boycott of the elections.”

According to al-Jazaeri, the boycott will not only affect voter turnout but will also “reshape the dynamics of Shiite leadership and political authority. Al-Sadr may have withdrawn from parliament, but he remains a force within the governance equation.”

Al-Sadr announced in March his refusal to participate in the upcoming elections, citing “rampant corruption and the dominance of the corrupt,” warning that Iraq was “on the brink of collapse.” His withdrawal followed his June 2022 decision to exit political life, resign his 73 parliamentary members, and refuse any future electoral participation alongside what he called “corrupt politicians.”

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Political analyst Mujasheh al-Tamimi told Shafaq News that the boycott will directly affect turnout rates, especially in Baghdad and southern governorates where the Movement enjoys deep popular support.

“The movement’s wide and disciplined base has long been the decisive factor in boosting turnout,” al-Tamimi said, adding that its absence will shrink “the active electoral base and dampen public enthusiasm, which will, in turn, undermine the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process itself.”

He predicted that the boycott could create a political vacuum within the Shiite camp, “opening space for other forces to court Sadrist (PSM) voters, though none can replace the symbolic and popular weight the movement represents.”

Cities such as Baghdad’s Sadr City, Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar are expected to witness, he said, a sharp decline in participation, which “could shift the internal balance of power within Iraq’s political landscape.”

Political analyst Aed al-Hilali views al-Sadr’s decision as a critical juncture that will reshape voter behavior in key PSM strongholds.

“The absence of the PSM voters will lead to a noticeable drop in turnout, weakening the popular momentum behind the election process,” al-Hilali told Shafaq News. “This gives rival Shiite forces—chiefly the Coordination Framework—greater leverage within the Shiite political sphere.”

He explained that Al-Sadr’s movement was “the most capable of mobilizing the street and maintaining equilibrium among Framework factions,” noting that their absence “will allow those groups to reorganize internally without Sadrist pressure, but they will lose the mass-based balance that provided broader national legitimacy.”

Al-Hilali warned that a low turnout confined to traditional party bases could “weaken the image of unified Shiite representation before other communities” and “open opportunities for Sunni, civil, or independent forces to expand their presence in mixed provinces.”

“Even if absent electorally,” he added, “the Movement will remain an active protest force capable of influencing any future political phase.”

Under the 2023 amendments restoring the Sainte-Laguë proportional representation formula, Iraq’s electoral system now favors established parties and coalitions over mass-mobilization movements.

Analysts note that al-Sadr’s boycott therefore amplifies this structural tilt, reducing the chances for independents or street-based forces to convert popular energy into parliamentary seats—further consolidating power within traditional blocs like the Coordination Framework.

Read more: Concerns and boycott: Will the Iraqi November elections proceed on schedule?

Offering a more measured view, Researcher in political affairs Muhannad al-Rawi, argued that al-Sadr’s withdrawal will affect participation rates but “will not dramatically change the Shiite bloc’s numerical weight in parliament.

Speaking to Shafaq News, al-Rawi noted that the PSM has been rooted in Shiite provinces since the first elections in 2005, and its absence will reduce Shiite voter numbers, but will not grant other components substantial gains.”

He pointed out that Shiite parties currently hold about 184 seats in the Iraqi parliament, “a figure unlikely to change significantly despite the boycott.”

Under “the Sadrists” labeling, PSM won the largest number of seats in the October 2021 early elections but failed to form a government after the Coordination Framework blocked their efforts through a Federal Court ruling establishing the so-called ‘one-third veto’ on presidential selection sessions.

Al-Rawi said that the Shiite bloc, die to Al-Sadr’s boycott, might lose “four to five seats in Baghdad due to its mixed demographic,” yet he believes this will not alter the overall sectarian composition, “as southern and central provinces such as Najaf, Karbala, Al-Diwaniyah, Wasit, Basra, and Dhi Qar are closed Shiite constituencies, unlikely to elect Sunni candidates even in the PSM absence.”

He concluded that the next parliament is unlikely to see a dramatic shift in communal representation, estimating that “Sunni representation will not exceed 70 seats at best.”

Read more: Iraq's 2025 elections: Five major Sunni alliances ignite the race

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.